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This research focuses on the provision of intrastate security and on the question 
how states in the global South do or do not provide security for their citizens 
and do or do not protect them from physical violence. This thesis argues that 
while institutional conditions are an important aspect of security provision in the 
global South, more attention needs to be paid to policy processes. Institution 
building as set out in the literature about Security Sector Reform and 
statebuilding assumes that it is possible to provide security to all citizens of a 
state by building democratic state security institutions. However, this is only 
possible if the state is the predominant force of controlling violence. Research 
showed that this is rarely the case in countries of the global South. This thesis 
contends that statehood in the global South is contested due to power struggles 
between multiple state and non-state elites. It argues that the analysis of 
security policy processes allows for an analysis of security provision in societies 
where no centralised control over violence exists. It contributes to a better 
understanding of the shortcomings of security provision in the global South 
because it shows the impact of societal and state actors on security policy 
making. Using the case of security policy making under the first FMLN (Frente 
Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional, Farabundo Martí Front for 
National Liberation) government in El Salvador (2009-2014), the thesis shows 
that, in a contested state policy making does not result from a pact between the 
state and society or from a social consensus as envisaged by parts of the 
FMLN and other forces of the New Left in Latin America. Instead, policy making 
results from elite pacts and elite struggles. This is illustrated in the domination of 
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an ad hoc decision-making mode which describes short-term decisions which 
are insufficiently implemented and easily reversed or replaced. Thus, security 
provision as a policy field remains focused on elite interests and does not 
include the interests of the broader population.   
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1. Introduction 
 
In one of her classes a teacher of German as a foreign language asked her 
student, an 11 year old Salvadoran boy, to build a sentence using the words: 
Anna – policewoman – 30 – from Berlin – two children. The idea was to learn 
how to describe people and their lives. The boy wrote: ‘Anna needs 30 
policewomen for two children from Berlin.’  
Having read the boy’s worksheet during my fieldwork visit in El Salvador in 
2013, I was amused by his creative way of composing sentences but the phrase 
did not seem to make sense. Why would two children need 30 police officers? 
Yet, I wondered if the idea was not so irrational from the boy’s perspective. 
Providing security as a huge mobilisation of security forces – was that what he 
had learned in El Salvador? 
This research focuses on the provision of intrastate security and on the question 
how states in the global South do or do not provide security for their citizens 
and protect them from physical violence. It explores what policies inform 
security provision in states of the global South and whether security policies 
embody the use of force as outlined in the anecdote above or what alternatives 
do exist. The thesis argues that while there is comprehensive knowledge about 
the role of institutions in state security provision less is known about security 
policy making. Scholars have examined security provision through the lens of 
statebuilding and Security Sector Reform (SSR) (e.g. Call and Wyeth, 2008, 
Chanaa, 2002); other scholars have criticised these approaches for their 
presupposition of an ideal-type liberal, democratic state to be achieved, either 
implicitly or explicitly, and for neglecting regional and local understandings of 
security and statehood (e.g. Chandler, 2006, Richmond, 2014). The literature 
showed that both statebuilding and SSR are concepts strongly oriented towards 
the building of formal state institutions. Less attention was paid to the role of 
policy processes and the question how security actors on the executive level 
make decisions. State security provision is not only the result of state security 
institutions, i.e. of norms and rule structures; it is also the result of decision-
making processes of political actors. Shifting emphasis to policy processes 
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uncovers security provision as it is, not as it ideally ought to be. Analyses of 
policy making in the statebuilding and SSR literature do exist but are 
concentrated on policy processes within the international community and/or the 
relationship between international and ‘local’ actors (e.g. von Einsiedel, 2005, 
Peake et al., 2008, Willems, 2015). Analyses with an in-depth focus on security 
policy making in a specific society and within a specific political environment are 
rare. 
While the thesis acknowledges the importance of institutional conditions for 
security provision, it spots a gap in understanding the policy-making process of 
security provision, that is, in understanding modes of coordination or 
contestation between state and social actors. It draws on conceptualisations of 
statehood in the global South by Risse (Risse and Lehmkuhl, 2006, Risse, 
2011) and Boege et al. (2008, 2009) as well as on Migdal’s state-in-society 
approach (Migdal, 1988, Migdal et al., 1994, Migdal, 2001, Migdal and 
Schlichte, 2005). On this basis it argues that in contexts of ‘contested 
statehood’, security provision is driven by power struggles between state actors 
and social actors. Risse (2011: 4) coined the term ‘limited statehood’ to 
describe areas in which central authorities lack the ability to ‘enforce rules and 
decisions’ or lack a legitimate monopoly on violence. He argued that besides 
the institutionalised rule structure of states the process dimension is important 
to consider to understand how areas of ‘limited statehood’ are governed. He 
described this process dimension as ‘modes of social coordination’ between 
multiple actors. Similarly, Boege et al. (2008, 2009) developed an approach to 
analyse statehood in the global South which they called ‘hybrid political orders’. 
The authors claimed to reject an ideal-type state model and instead focused on 
‘existing realities’ to overcome the notion of deficient statehood which underlies 
the concept of Risse and other scholars of state formation and statebuilding. 
Migdal (2001) on the other hand contended that states are shaped by power 
struggles between state and social actors. According to Migdal, states compete 
with social actors for imposing certain standards of behaviour. Combining the 
contributions of these strands this thesis suggests the term ‘contested 
statehood’. The process dimension of statehood which exists besides the 
institutional structure of the state does not only comprise modes of coordination 
but also modes of contestation between multiple actors. The ability of central 
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state authorities to enforce rules and decisions is influenced and contested by 
other state and social actors. Importantly, this thesis adopts a perspective which 
does not assume centralised control over violence where it does not exist. 
Instead, it looks at practices of violence control by social and state actors.  
This thesis offers a critical, non-descriptive, in-depth analysis of security policy 
making. The focus of the thesis is not on single policy decisions in their various 
stages of enactment but on how political decision makers act in contexts of 
‘contested statehood’ and on how their decisions impact on reforms of security 
institutions. Thus, the thesis contributes to understanding modes of security 
decision making and to identifying obstacles to security institution building. The 
thesis argues that in a contested state the forces of society which shape the 
state-society relationship are the interests of powerful elites. In this context, 
policy making does not result from a pact or social consensus between the state 
and the majority of society. Instead, policy making results from modes of 
contestation and accommodation between economic, military, and political 
elites. Thus, security provision as a policy field remains focused on elite 
interests and does not include the interests of the broader population.  
Epistemologically this research is grounded in critical security studies and more 
specifically is inspired by the works of the Paris School (Bigo, 2008, Balzacq et 
al., 2010). Theorists of the Paris School, influenced by the practice theory of 
French sociologists, proposed that in order to understand how security 
operates, everyday security practices needed to be examined. According to 
Bigo (2008), social concepts including the concept of security only become 
significant if they are placed in a spatial and temporal context and if they relate 
to specific practices. This implied a strong focus on empirical investigations, 
namely exploring what actors do and explaining their reasoning. However, 
empirical research of scholars from the Paris School concentrated on security in 
European societies. In this regard this research follows the call of critiques from 
scholars of critical security studies regarding the statebuilding and SSR 
literature to include regional and local perspectives on security and statehood in 
practical and academic work. Therefore it is, first, embedded in academic 
security thinking in the global South, particularly in Latin America, and second, 
investigates the development of security policies by national policy makers. This 
includes a discussion of the Latin American concept of citizen security which 
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placed emphasis on the responsibility of states to protect citizens as well as the 
entitlement of citizens for protection (Luckham and Kirk, 2012). Similar to the 
statebuilding literature, the responsibility of states to protect citizens was mainly 
associated with institution building. The entitlement of citizens for protection was 
predominantly addressed by community-based approaches. Although the 
concept of citizen security is strongly policy-oriented and lacks substantial 
theorisation, decision-making processes by political actors were not explored in 
the citizen security literature.  
As a northern researcher in a southern society and with a focus on national 
(rather than departmental or community-based) policies, there are limits to the 
‘local-ness’ of the approach. Similarly the conceptual framework of the thesis 
(Chapter Three) as well as the methodology (which is briefly outlined below and 
explained in detail in Chapter Four) draws primarily on the works of northern 
scholars. For instance, the policy cycle model (Howlett et al., 2009) is a 
heuristic tool which guides the analysis (see below). However, it was developed 
with regard to policy making in northern societies. Thus, using this specific tool 
already implies certain presuppositions about the process of policy making as it 
ought to be. These are the boundaries which mark the research. In the 
methodology part I described how I tried being reflexive upon these limitations 
throughout the research process in three ways: first, I considered the possible 
impact of cultural differences between the researcher (from the North) and 
research participants (mostly from the South) on the collection and analysis of 
the data. Second, in the empirical analysis I complemented the focus on the 
national level with materials which add information about the local level; for 
instance special attention was paid to the local effects of national policy 
decision making. Third, I tried to minimise the projection of presuppositions of 
the conceptual framework on the materials by working inductively and starting 
off with a rather loose and general set of questions for data collection (see 
below) which was refined during the research process.     
Embracing national, non-northern perspectives on security requires an 
understanding of the role of violence in the past and present of the society 
under examination. This thesis focuses on El Salvador where security provision 
faces extreme difficulties: In 2015, 103 intentional homicides per 100,000 
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inhabitants were counted in El Salvador.1 This means it replaced Honduras as 
the world’s most violent country. At the present time criminal violence receives 
by far the most attention from national and international policy makers. The 
omnipresence of violent actors like gangs and criminal networks, and of private 
security companies assuming a major role in protecting businesses, 
communities, and even state agencies underscores the lack of a legitimate 
state monopoly of violence. El Salvador is politically highly polarised and 
economically divided between a very small wealthy economic elite and a large 
impoverished population, with a relatively small middle class. Even though 
criminal violence is extraordinarily high in El Salvador, other Latin American 
countries are affected similarly. Venezuela, Honduras, Guatemala, and Mexico 
are, for instance, societies struggling with massive criminal violence. Besides 
Southern Africa, Central America is the world’s region with most violent deaths 
unrelated to war (UNODC, 2013). In the last two decades responses by 
governments and security forces in these countries were marked by mostly 
authoritarian, coercive policies. Coercive security policies rely on punishment 
through incarceration, deterrence, and the use of military force in the realm of 
public security. They contrast with non-coercive policies which aim at the 
protection of all citizens through preventive, participatory, community-oriented 
measures and are based on the principles of the rule of law. Research showed 
that rather than containing violence coercive policies contributed to further 
escalation (Bailey and Dammert, 2006a, Jütersonke et al., 2009, Bruneau et al., 
2011, Kenny and Serrano, 2011, Zilberg, 2011). Although political and historical 
conditions are unique in each society, other Latin American countries are not 
just similarly affected by criminal violence but are also marked by a multitude of 
non-state violent and security actors. Against this background this thesis asks 
whether in contexts of massive social violence and a lack of a legitimate state 
monopoly of violence non-coercive state responses to violence do exist. If this 
is to be confirmed, than it is further questioned what characterises these non-
coercive state responses. To this end, the thesis explores the attempt of the first 
FMLN government in El Salvador (2009-2014) to establish a non-coercive 
security policy.  
                                            
1 Numbers for El Salvador are according to the Salvadoran Institute for Forensic Medicine (Reuters, 
2015). In Honduras, 90.4 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants were listed in 2012, according to the United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Global Study on Homicides (2013).  
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The thesis shows that in the process of state formation in El Salvador violence 
served as an instrument for elites to exercise control but was not centralised. 
After the end of the civil war in 1992 efforts were made to centralise and 
democratically control violence through institutional reforms of the security 
sector. These reforms were part of the Peace Agreement between the 
Salvadoran government and the guerrilla group FMLN (Frente Farabundo Martí 
para la Liberación Nacional, Farabundo Martí Front for National Liberation), 
mediated by the United Nations (UN). ONUSAL, the United Nations Observer 
Mission in El Salvador (1990-1995), and other actors of the international 
community strongly supported the implementation of the security reforms. The 
reforms implied a paradigm shift of the state from using violence as an 
instrument of suppression toward assuming the responsibility to protect citizens 
from violence. The thesis explores the gap between this claim of the security 
reforms for a paradigm shift articulated in the Peace Accords and the actual 
performance of security actors using the examples of policing and the prison 
system. Based on the literature about post-war violence and about security 
responses of the post-war governments, it finds that the continuance of violence 
is linked to coercive policies under the ruling of the ARENA party (Alianza 
Republicana Nacionalista, Republican National Alliance, 1989-2009) and to a 
neoliberal economic order which has resulted in precarious work and social 
exclusion (Aguilar, 2004, Amaya, 2006, Jütersonke et al., 2009, Bruneau et al., 
2011, Zilberg, 2011, Bull, 2013, Zinecker, 2014). The literature showed that 
violence was criminalised and made an apolitical issue in the discourses of the 
Salvadoran political elites and international policy makers (Peetz, 2008, Moodie, 
2010, Moodie, 2012, Cruz, 2016). In this regard, violence was made a problem 
of the poor and marginalised. The discourse was conducive to the construction 
of a state that contrary to the intentions of the Peace Accords withdrew from the 
responsibility to provide protection to all citizens. In other words, in post-war El 
Salvador a state emerged which was not made to legitimately control violence. 
In a state in which the government did not seek to build a legitimate state 
monopoly on violence, violence remained dispersed. 
In 2009 the leftist government of Mauricio Funes took power in El Salvador. For 
the first time in Salvadoran history the FMLN which had transformed from a 
guerrilla group to a political party won the elections. El Salvador became a 
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country governed by a party of the ‘New Left’, a term which is associated with 
the politics of left parties rising to power in several Latin American countries 
since 1998. Although quite diverse in their ideologies and policies, analysts 
articulated some commonalities of the New Left: it strived to replace the 
neoliberal policy of conservative governments and international financial 
institutions in the 1980s and 1990s with a new vision of the state. It envisaged a 
state which was responsive to societal needs and addressed social issues 
which concerned large parts of the population such as poverty and violence. In 
contrast to other left governments in the region which only reluctantly addressed 
security issues the FMLN developed a vision of citizen security that reflected 
the ‘post-neoliberal’ (Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2012) ideas of rapprochement 
between the state and non-elite parts of the society. This vision was stipulated 
in the FMLN’s security policy programme, the so-called Política Nacional de 
Justicia, Seguridad Pública y Convivencia (National Policy of Justice, Public 
Security, and Living Together, PJSC) (Ministerio de Justicia y Seguridad 
Pública, 2010). The PJSC was a comprehensive, prevention-focused security 
policy developed by members of the FMLN, of NGOs, academia, community 
councils, the justice sector, and the police prior to the presidential elections in 
2009 and was refined early during the term. The FMLN’s security policy differed 
significantly from the repressive mano dura (‘iron fist’) approaches of previous 
right-wing Salvadoran governments as it aimed at increasing the ability of the 
state to protect citizens from violence. Approaching the issue of insecurity with a 
new vision of non-coercive state responses (as characterised above) was 
exceptional for a left government in the region, given that Latin America’s New 
Left was slow in developing comprehensive alternatives to coercive policy 
responses to issues of insecurity. However, during the FMLN’s first term in 
power, security policy makers made decisions which seriously hampered the 
implementation of the policy. The thesis seeks to explain ruptures in the 
realisation of the security policy with the power struggle between various state 
and social actors that shapes the process of security policy making; this is 
reflected in the ad hoc characteristics of the decision-making process.  
To this end, the thesis analyses decision making in the security policy process 
by adopting a qualitatively oriented, singular case study design and conducting 
a policy study. The methodology draws on public policy research, researching 
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the field of security. Using the policy cycle model (Lasswell, 1956, Brewer, 
1974, Jones, 1984, Anderson, 1984, Howlett et al., 2009) as a heuristic tool of 
policy research the thesis analyses the security policy under the FMLN 
government in El Salvador between 2009 and 2014. The research question is: 
Why did institutional security reforms in El Salvador between 2009 and 2014 not 
result in a reduction of violence? More concretely, the questions are: How did 
the FMLN government 2009-2014 respond to violence in El Salvador? Why was 
the FMLN government not able to implement its far-reaching and well-designed 
security plans? In order to answer the research questions, the policy study 
focuses on the process of political decision-making which, analytically, 
precedes the implementation of the security policy. Theorists of policy research 
have identified different decision-making modes that will be explored within the 
conceptual framework. This study proposes the term ‘ad hoc security decision 
making’ to label short-term security decisions which are insufficiently 
implemented and easily reversed or replaced by other decisions. It argues that 
ad hoc decision-making occurs particularly when state and non-state actors 
strongly impact on decision-makers. In other words, ad hoc decision-making 
reflects the power struggles between state and other actors. The empirical 
chapters explore the role of state and social actors in the security context. The 
idea of ad hoc decision making serves as the framework to interpret data about 
decision making in the Salvadoran security policy and to understand the power 
struggle between state and other actors at a specific stage of the policy 
process. This approach does not ignore the institutional structure of the state 
but it gives priority to the process dimension of statehood (as outlined above 
and conceptualised in detail in Chapter Three). Two arenas of decision making 
are analysed in detail: police and prison reforms. Based on the questions 
outlined above the thesis argues that: 
1. Ad hoc decision making is a significant characteristic of policy processes 
in El Salvador. Ad hoc decision making illustrates that political, economic, 
and military elites are powerful enough to significantly alter policies of the 
official decision makers. This contestation of security policies is 
exemplified in the security policy process in El Salvador between 2009 
and 2014. 
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2. The power struggle between security decision makers and other state 
and non-state actors, which is illustrated in the ad hoc decision-making 
process, undermined the development of stable democratic security 
institutions. Ultimately, the power struggles impeded the building of a 
state capable of legitimately centralising and controlling violence. This 
implies that the Salvadoran government failed to provide security for the 
majority of citizens.  
The case study aims at gaining strong insights into security decision making 
under the Funes administration and chose semi-structured interviews as the 
main data collection method, supported by document analysis and field 
observation. Data was collected during three fieldwork trips between August 
2011 and March 2013 which altogether lasted six months.  
At the core of the analysis were official decision makers and the way decisions 
were made and impacted by other actors. These decision makers were 
identified through an incremental process of approaching potential interviewees 
working at the executive levels of state institutions and to a lesser extent of non-
state organisations. Data was gathered from FMLN security experts, 
government officials, especially from the Security Ministry, members of the 
Legislative Assembly, police leadership, prison authorities, and business elites. 
However, in order to investigate the effects of decisions the research also 
reached out to interviewees affected by policy decisions such as prison staff, 
prisoners, gang members, community workers, and human rights lawyers. 
Additional knowledge was gathered through interviews with NGO workers, 
journalists, and academics. Altogether 61 interviews were conducted. Data was 
analysed by using NVivo software to organise interview responses, documents, 
and scripts from field observation. Materials were interpreted by articulating 
their fact-based and narrative content and by distinguishing between policy 
decisions and their effects (see Chapter Four). 
The Salvadoran case study shows that the lack of security provision in a 
violence prone society cannot solely be comprehended on the basis of 
institutional reforms. It can also be explained through policy processes, 
especially through decision-making processes. The analysis of police and 
prison reforms in the timeframe from 2009-2014 demonstrates that policy 
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decisions of the government were impacted by the interests and power 
strategies of other state and non-state actors. This is reflected in the fact that 
decisions were often made ad hoc meaning that they were oriented towards 
short-term solutions, ignored long-term problems, and were frequently revised. 
As a consequence of the power struggles the establishment of democratically 
controlled security institutions failed. The case study shows that more attention 
needs to be paid to the official decision makers and those contesting the 
decisions within the societies affected by social violence. These decision 
makers are the ones who are responsible for drafting and implementing security 
policies against the resistance of powerful elites.   
The analysis of police reforms between 2009 and 2014 firstly highlights conflicts 
within the political system. It shows that political elites from the Left and the 
Right instrumentalised political polarisation to maintain their power. This political 
polarisation fostered ad hoc decisions and impeded the realisation of police 
reforms. Secondly, the impact of actors which do not form part of the 
Salvadoran state played a role in the failure to realise reforms. Salvadoran 
business elites which are traditionally close to the conservative right-wing 
ARENA party developed different strategies for dealing with the FMLN rising to 
power and for securing their traditionally strong influence on economic politics. 
Where economic and security interests overlapped a majority of the business 
elite resisted government initiatives, and only a small part of the elite aligned 
their position with the government. However, in both instances activities of 
business elites undermined state efforts of security provision. Furthermore, 
representing the biggest bilateral donor and most important trade partner, the 
United States’ (US) interests impacted on the security decision-making process 
of the FMLN government. The US influenced decision making concerning 
personnel changes at the Salvadoran security ministry which successively 
changed the course of police reforms. Finally, conflicts within the FMLN 
impacted on security decision making. Parts of the party especially from the 
orthodox wing disagreed with important security decisions made by 
representatives of the moderate wing. In addition, a second cleavage between 
the party base and President Funes further complicated decision making. The 
impact of these state and non-state actors on security policy decisions of the 
FMLN government and the ad hoc mode which shaped the decisions in this 
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context eventually impeded the realisation of plans for a professional and 
democratically controlled police. 
The second specific arena examined in this thesis concerns the review of prison 
reforms. Herein it was found that youth gangs shaped the situation in 
Salvadoran prisons decisively and reforms of the prison system were closely 
connected to policy decisions of the government concerning the gangs. The 
analysis shows that government decisions concerning the prison system mainly 
followed a power struggle between the government and the gangs which 
developed around the truce between the two major Salvadoran gangs in 2012-
2013. The truce was an attempt to establish a pact between the state and a 
group of potentially violent non-state actors which were not part of the elites. In 
the context of ‘contested statehood’ where powerful elites exert pressure on the 
official decision makers and where ad hoc decisions are characteristic for 
policy-making processes, the truce was a creative approach to reduce violence 
with non-coercive means. However, it failed because the ad hoc decisions 
made regarding the truce were not transformed into a sustainable long-term 
strategy which would have connected to other security issues like the prison 
system. Remaining in an ad hoc decision-making mode implied that decisions 
regarding the gangs were easily reversed and ultimately replaced by coercive 
responses. Whilst the government used the military as an instrument of power, 
the gangs used their influence on the homicide rate as leverage. With the end of 
the truce in 2013 the attempt of the gangs to use murders as leverage became 
futile and the homicide rate escalated. Likewise, the increased militarisation of 
public security was a futile effort of the government to contain gang violence. 
Reforms of the prison system had aimed at the humanisation of inmates and 
the professionalisation of prison management. However, they were impeded by 
the failure to bring about rapprochement between gangs and the government, 
as well as by the increased militarisation of the prison system. The study 
reveals that although non-elite organisations like the gangs were able to 
influence the policy process, they did not outweigh the power of state and non-
state elites. The attempt to achieve an accommodation between state elites and 
non-state non-elites over violence control failed because no agreement was 
reached over the gangs giving up coercive power or transforming it into another 
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form of power. As a consequence, efforts to centralise violence and build a 
legitimate state monopoly on violence failed. 
The study is organised in eleven chapters. Chapter Two offers a survey of the 
literature about the role of the state in security provision in the global South. The 
chapter shows that literature which defines security provision as statebuilding 
emphasised the institutional side of statehood and paid less attention to state 
practices or, in other words, to the process dimension of statehood. Thus, it 
ignored significant factors contributing to the failure of security provision in 
states that lack a legitimate monopoly on violence.   
Chapter Three shows how this gap in knowledge about the relevance of the 
process dimension of statehood for the failure of security provision is filled. The 
chapter provides the conceptual framework of the study. It introduces the 
concept of ‘contested statehood’ and combines it with the idea that power 
struggles between state and social actors shape policy processes. Based on 
insights from public policy research the notion of ad hoc-ism is developed to 
characterise a decision-making mode which serves to illustrate the contestation 
of policy processes. The chapter establishes the claim that security policy 
processes which are shaped by power struggles undermine the development of 
democratic security institutions. 
In Chapter Four the methodology and the concrete design of the case study are 
explained. Methods of data collection and analysis are presented and cultural, 
ethical, and practical aspects of the relationship between researcher and 
research participants and research environment respectively are explored. 
Chapter Five explores the historical roots of the lack of a legitimate state 
monopoly on violence in El Salvador and traces its development until the end of 
the civil war (1980-1992). It links these roots to modes of struggle and 
accommodation between economic, military, and political elites as well as other 
social forces in the process of state formation in El Salvador in the nineteenth 
and twentieth century.  
In Chapter Six the study traces the genesis of the FMLN as an insurgent group 
in the 1970s fighting against the rent based economy, and changing into a 
political party with the Peace Agreement and the transition to a democratic 
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political system in 1992. It highlights that in contrast to ARENA the FMLN did 
not build power to secure the rent economy but to change the political and 
economic order. It also shows its roots in large popular organisations consisting 
of peasants, students, unions, and churches. These aspects are the historic 
background which explains the FMLN forming an identity as a left party seeking 
to build a state which is responsive to the needs of those large parts of the 
population which are affected by poverty and violence.  
Thereafter, security reforms after the Peace Agreement with a focus on police 
and criminal justice reforms are explored, revealing the gap between the effort 
to centralise and democratically control violence through institutional reforms 
and the failure of the state to provide security. Chapter Seven also discusses 
the literature about contemporary violence in El Salvador, showing that under 
post-war ARENA governments the combination of continued economic 
exclusion and coercive security approaches led to a reproduction rather than 
reduction of violence.  
Chapter Eight traces the evolution of the security thinking of the FMLN as a 
political party. Having explored the roots and identity of the FMLN in Chapter 
Six, this chapter shows how a non-coercive security policy developed out of this 
identity as a left party prior to the Presidential elections in 2009. It highlights the 
lack of progress of security reforms by the end of the first term of the FMLN 
government which leads to the research question as to why security reforms 
under the FMLN government did not lead to a reduction of violence.  
The following chapters answer this question with regard to the police, showing 
that the Salvadoran security policy process is marked by ad hoc decision 
making. Ad hoc decision making demonstrates that business elites, the US, and 
the political opposition were powerful enough to contest and alter the police 
reform process. As a consequence of this contestation, institutional 
development of the police was undermined (Chapter Nine). Thereafter, prison 
reforms and the relationship between the government and the gangs are 
analysed, showing that the pact between the government and the gangs was 
not sufficiently supported by state and non-state elites to last. The chapter 
demonstrates how the failed pact undermined institution building of the prison 
system (Chapter Ten). 
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The concluding chapter considers the implications of the study. If we aim to 
understand why security reforms in contexts of massive social violence fail, a 
look at the nature of security institutions gives an incomplete answer. Scholars 
and policy makers need to broaden their perspective and pay attention those 
decision makers who are responsible for drafting and implementing security 
policies in the affected societies and to those powerful actors impacting on the 
official decision makers. The fact that in societies which lack a legitimate 
monopoly on violence, security policy decisions are contested and made ad hoc 
requires a revision of the possibilities of approaching security reforms in such a 
specific context. Thinking about security reforms needs to incorporate more 
critical thinking about security practices, in particular about the process of 
making and implementing security decisions.  
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2. The state and security provision in the global South 
2.1 Introduction 
This research explores the provision of intrastate security and the question how 
states in the global South do or do not provide security for their citizens and 
protect them from physical violence. Security studies are a broad academic field 
comprising of multiple approaches and perspectives. Among them, the literature 
considered most relevant for this research can be grouped in three sets: 
literature which understands security provision as statebuilding; literature which 
introduces critical perspectives on security provision; and literature which deals 
with security provision in contexts of ‘limited statehood’ in which central 
authorities lack the ability to enforce decisions. All three sets of literature are 
interwoven and build on each other. Each strand is discussed below and it is 
shown that while all three fields are relevant for this research the particular 
contribution of the thesis lies within the third area, namely security provision in 
contexts of ‘limited statehood’. Special attention is also paid to Latin American 
security concepts since they provide the necessary insight in regional and local 
conceptualisations and research agendas.  
This thesis explores the interplay between state and social actors in the security 
realm but focuses particularly on the role of the state. Therefore, the previous 
three sections are complemented by a fourth part which surveys the literature 
on state formation in Latin America. The research focuses on the protection of 
citizens against the threat of physical violence. In this regard, the discussion of 
the state formation literature explores how state formation processes are 
connected to contemporary and historical forms of violence in Latin America.  
The chapter reveals that approaches of security provision as they are conceived 
in the statebuilding literature failed to resolve forms of violence reproduction due 
to the tendency to focus merely on institutional aspects of security provision 
(Section 2.2). The narrow perspective of state responses to security threats 
through institutional reforms was criticised by scholars of critical security 
studies. The Paris School, a strand within critical security studies, proposed a 
stronger consideration of security practices. It argued that security can only be 
comprehended if it is placed in a spatial and temporal context and if it relates to 
specific behaviour (Section 2.3). The conceptual framework developed in 
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Chapter Three builds on these epistemological assumptions, arguing that the 
best way to explore security practices is to explore security decision making of 
political actors and the implementation of these decisions. However, the Paris 
School centred on European societies and does not add to our understanding of 
security provision in countries of the global South. The concepts of ‘limited 
statehood’ and ‘hybrid political orders’ (Section 2.4) as well as the literature on 
state formation in Latin America (Section 2.5) highlighted the importance of 
comprehending states in the global South not as deviation from Western ideal-
type models but as existing realities with specific characteristics which shape 
the way states interact with society. However, the approach of ‘limited 
statehood’ does not overcome the notion of deficiency in its definition of 
statehood and thereby adheres to an ideal-type model of statehood. This 
deficiency is addressed by the concept of ‘hybrid political orders’ but this 
concept was developed referring to the South Pacific region and is not 
transferable to Latin American states. This becomes clear with a look at the 
literature on Latin American state formation processes which underscores the 
persistence of violent non-state actors undermining a legitimate state monopoly 
on violence in many states of Latin America. Building on insights from and gaps 
in these sets of literature, the chapter poses the question what conceptual 
framework is needed for the thesis to explain failed security provision in violent-
prone societies of the global South. It concludes that the conceptual framework 
firstly, needs to allow for a focus on the analysis of security practices in contexts 
of dispersed violence and secondly, needs to conceptualise the interaction 
between state and social actors who have the power to use violence.  
 
2.2 Security provision as statebuilding 
The scholarly discussion of statebuilding has been widely associated with the 
discussion of state failure and the assumption that a number of states in the 
global South have deficiencies which can be fixed. Since Robert Jackson’s 
(1993) publication on quasi-states and Helman and Ratner’s (1992-1993) article 
on failed states numerous works have yielded terms like weak states, fragile 
states, failed states and collapsed states (e.g. Zartman, 1995, Crocker, 2003, 
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Rotberg, 2003, Fukuyama, 2004). Weak or fragile states is a concept that 
describes states in which:  
central government has a poor capacity to control public 
order within its territory, is unable to consistently control its 
borders, cannot reliably maintain viable public institutions 
or services, and is vulnerable to extra-constitutional 
domestic challenges. Indications of this condition can be 
found in poor levels of economic performance, human 
welfare, economic distribution, and levels of con ict. State 
failure suggests that the government – if one exists – is 
completely unable to maintain public services, institutions, 
or authority, and that central control over territory does not 
exist (Newman, 2009: 422).  
The concept of weak and failed states became especially popular after the 9/11 
attacks and the US ‘war on terror’ as a response to the attacks. The perception 
of weak and failed states as a security threat was also integrated into the work 
of the United Nations (UN) (2004). Statebuilding emerged as a response by the 
United Nations and other international organisations as well as national donors 
to weak and failed states. Weak and failed states were no longer just regarded 
as humanitarian issues but as providing the backing for terrorists posing a 
danger to the national security of other states, first and foremost the United 
States (US). Failed states were believed to nurture the so-called ‘new threats’ 
like terrorism and organised crime. Scholars of statebuilding argued that weakly 
institutionalised states need to be strengthened in order to stabilise the 
international system and to protect people in these countries which are usually 
in the global South (Paris, 2004, Chesterman et al., 2005, Ghani and Lockhart, 
2008, Call and Wyeth, 2008). According to these scholars, states need to be 
modernised meaning that they need to become governance entities which 
function under liberal, democratic norms. In this sense, modern statehood 
usually refers to Weber’s theory of the state that builds on state formation 
processes in Europe.2 While its characteristics are debated continually in state 
                                            
2 Weber identified territorial sovereignty, the monopoly of violence, impartial bureaucratic structures, and 
public institutions as key characteristics of the modern state; these variables form what scholars call the 
Weberian ideal-type state (Weber, 1922, Leftwich, 2011). 
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formation theory, the notion of the ideal-type state is still the dominant 
normative assumption that underpins statebuilding activities and is widely 
shared among liberal-democratic policy circles in the global North (Bliesemann 
de Guevara, 2012).  
Criticism regarding the concepts of statebuilding and weak or failed states 
commonly evolved around the Western centrism of these ideas. It called into 
question the universal validity of the Weberian ideal-type state as the foundation 
of statebuilding. As scholars argued, by exporting statebuilding models that are 
based on culturally and historically bound norms non-Western states resemble 
phantom states because they bypass domestic political processes (Chandler, 
2006, Bickerton, 2009). Chandler (2006) contended that interventionist 
approaches like statebuilding undermined the legitimacy of domestic democratic 
institutions because political processes of electing representatives responsible 
for policy making were increasingly shaped by the interests of Western states 
transmitted through development organisations. Richmond (2014) argued that 
statebuilding failed to incorporate local agency. It ignored that overcoming the 
reproduction of structural violence required considering local dynamics which 
could contribute to peace and stability. Following these critiques of statebuilding 
the analysis of intrastate security provision in a given state of the global South 
needs to comprise more than an examination of progress and setbacks of 
externally driven statebuilding efforts. It needs to take into consideration local 
policy-making modes. This requires an understanding of local 
conceptualisations of security and statehood as well as a look at processes of 
state formation that explain specific characteristics of the state in question. 
Others argued that statebuilding initiatives place emphasis on building formal 
state institutions and ignore that even in collapsed states governance can 
function on a local and regional level, implying that there are institutionalised 
modes of coordination which are not bound to a central government (Menkhaus, 
2006). Indeed, as the definition of weak and failed states above shows, state 
weakness and state failure is conceived as institutional deficiency and 
institutional collapse respectively. Thus, statebuilding is invariably an 
institutionalist approach to statehood as Lemay-Hébert (2013: 4) underscored. 
Lemay-Hébert related this institutionalism back to Weberian understandings of 
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statehood. In this sense, Lemay-Hébert (ibid.) wrote ‘statebuilding is the 
creation of new government institutions and the strengthening of existing ones.’ 
On this basis statebuilding equals institution building.3  
In the context of statebuilding Lemay-Hébert (2009) argued that the strong 
emphasis on the institutional part of statehood impedes a closer look at another 
dimension. In his view socio-political cohesion in the tradition of Durkheimian 
sociology is the perspective that needs to be added to the discussion about 
statebuilding. He referred to the works of Buzan (1992) and Holsti (1996) and 
their notion of an ‘idea of the state’ that is the necessary third element of 
statehood besides institutions and territorial sovereignty. Here, the idea of the 
state means the ‘implicit social contract and ideological consensus pertaining in 
a given society’ (Lemay-Hébert, 2009: 24). In other words, there needs to be 
some degree of established social consensus on what a state is if state 
institutions are to work. Based on this, Lemay-Hébert elaborated on the 
importance of legitimacy in statebuilding. This thesis contends that besides the 
territory, institutions and a shared idea of the state, a fourth dimension of 
statehood exists which is state practices. This argument is further developed 
below drawing on the approach of the Paris School of critical security studies.  
The link between statebuilding and the perception of new threats underscores 
the close connection between statebuilding activities and security. Some 
scholars argued that it is the security interests of the global North which created 
the motivation to address the problem of weak states in the global South (Boas 
                                            
3 Institution building is a term frequently used by multilateral organisations like the World Bank and by 
development scholarship since the 1990s. It describes the attempt to use insights from researchers of new 
institutionalism for building and modifying institutions in the global South. New institutionalism emerged 
in the 1980s and shifted focus from institutions as organisational structures (old institutionalism) to 
comprehending institutions as rules and norms (Rakner and Randall, 2014: 45). Douglass North was one 
of the pioneers of institutional economics, a strand of new institutionalist theories. He defined institutions 
as ‘the rules of the game in society, or, more formally, the humanly devised constraints that shape human 
interaction.’ (North, 1990: 3). Although some critics warned against unintended consequences of 
institution building and for the need to consider specific interests in a given political context (Bastian and 
Luckham, 2003), this form of institution building was supported by development organisations after 
regime changes to democracy and in post-conflict contexts (Rakner and Randall, 2014: 45). With new 
institutionalism, research grew about the persistence of informal institutions in formally democratised 
political systems. With a particular focus on Latin American political systems, Helmke and Levitsky 
(2006) defined informal institutions as the unwritten, socially shared rules which are communicated 
outside official channels. The concept of informal institutions shares some features with the approach of 
state practices promoted in this thesis. In fact, North’s institutionalist model of explaining persistence and 
change of social orders is useful for explaining historical economic developments in El Salvador and is 
discussed in the theory chapter (3.2). However, it is argued that other than institutional dimensions of 
statehood complement and enhance our understanding of state activities. 
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and Jennings, 2005, Chandler, 2006, Duffield, 2007). However, statebuilding 
activities often take place in the security sector of countries in the global South. 
They are inextricably linked to security issues in these countries. Security sector 
reforms (SSR) developed as a concept parallel to statebuilding, and it shares 
the same normative assumptions as statebuilding (Jackson, 2011, Chappuis 
and Hänggi, 2013). Both concepts aim at fixing conflict-prone, war-torn societies 
and failed or weak states by building liberal, democratic states.   
The concept of SSR emerged in the 1990s and gained particular attention in the 
development policy sphere (OECD/DAC, 2001, DFID, 2002). SSR aims at 
creating a functioning security system with democratic and accountable actors 
(Brzoska, 2000, Chanaa, 2002, Wulf, 2004, Hänggi and Bryden, 2005, Sedra, 
2010a, Sedra, 2010b). Thereby it should minimise the risk of conflict and open a 
space for development. It focuses on a wide range of actors on the executive 
and legislative level and includes statutory as well as non-statutory security 
forces. SSR places the transformation of institutional structures at the centre of 
the reform process: Authoritarian and non-transparent structures, for example, 
should be changed by removing personnel and by separating the role of the 
military and police; human rights violations by security forces ought to be 
prevented or minimised by introducing new codes of conduct, establishing 
oversight bodies and changing the training programme. Reforms and capacity-
building within the security institutions are described as:  
a process of professionalization aimed at increasing 
operational effectiveness, rationalizing bureaucratic 
structures, eliminating corruption, and institutionalising 
international standards (Sedra, 2010b: 4). 
SSR shares much of the criticism expressed about statebuilding. It is often 
donor-driven and has been criticised for a lack of contextual understanding of 
the socio-political and economic environment of the countries in which it ought 
to be implemented (Egnell/Halden 2009). SSR is also criticised for focusing 
primarily on state institutions and, while the concept acknowledges the principle 
of local ownership, it is argued that safety at the level of local communities is 
disregarded (Gordon, 2014). SSR claims to be based on good governance 
principles; and some authors tried to strengthen its governance orientation by 
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introducing the term security governance (Krahmann, 2003, Hänggi and 
Bryden, 2005, Wood and Dupont, 2006, Chappuis and Hänggi, 2013). There is 
no clear definition of security governance; the focus of most works is on 
governance with security being considered a particular objective or a public 
good that is being promoted by institutions (Wood and Dupont, 2006: 2). In the 
context of security governance, governance is defined as:  
the structures and processes which enable a set of public 
and private actors to coordinate their independent needs 
and interests through the making and implementation of 
binding policy decisions in the absence of a central political 
authority (Krahmann, 2003: 11, emphasis added).  
Despite this claim to include security policy-making processes, SSR remained 
strongly oriented towards the building of formal state institutions (Peake et al., 
2008). On the one hand, analysts noticed a wide gap between the model and 
reform practices. In particular, reforms of the police and military forces received 
considerable attention while less institution-centred aspects which the concept 
tried to contain (like empowering civil society actors in the security sector) 
remained largely unattended (Ball and Hendrickson, 2006: 2, Sedra, 2010b: 
20). Among other problems, the strong focus on state security institutions is 
considered one of the main reasons why SSR efforts had limited impact (Ball 
and Hendrickson, 2006, Peake et al., 2008). On the other hand, the analysis of 
policy making in the statebuilding and SSR literature concentrated on policy 
processes within the international community and/or the relationship between 
international and domestic actors (e.g. von Einsiedel, 2005, Peake et al., 2008, 
Willems, 2015). This thesis pays special attention to the political situation in 
which a state engages with security provision. It focuses particularly on El 
Salvador and the Salvadoran society which does not imply that international 
and regional influences are ignored. In fact, El Salvador was one of the first 
countries in which post-war security reforms took place that gained extensive 
international support (Chapter Seven). However, the situation in El Salvador 
provides the focal point for the empirical analysis of security provision. It looks 
at security practices in the form of security policy decisions made and 
implemented in a specific historical, social and economic context. The link 
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between the notion of security practices and security policy processes is 
explored in the conceptual chapter (Chapter Three).  
The concepts of Security Sector Reform and security governance deal with the 
protection of society (as opposed to realist approaches of security as national 
security), but they do so with a focus on state institution building. Importantly, in 
Latin America the change from the state as the key subject of security towards 
the provision of security for citizens began with the introduction of the concept 
of democratic security and was further developed with the idea of citizen 
security. The rise of democratic security is outlined in the following paragraph 
and the concept of citizen security is addressed in the following section. 
Democratic security is a concept developed by political and intellectual elites 
during the late 1980s to replace the National Security Doctrine (NSD) which 
was the dominant security model of Latin American dictatorial regimes from the 
1960s through the 1980s. Against the background of the Cold War, the National 
Security Doctrine was an ideology that understood Latin American guerrilla 
movements as communist threats to state orders (Pion-Berlin, 1989, Leal 
Buitrago, 2003, Tickner and Herz, 2012, Tickner, 2016). This ideology was 
influenced by French and US counterinsurgency strategies. Therefore, it did not 
only justify the large-scale involvement of the military in politics but placed the 
military beyond civilian rule as a ‘caretaker of the ‘state’ and ‘nation’’ (Tickner, 
2016: 69). In the name of NSD it was proclaimed that individual security had to 
be sacrificed for the larger good of national security. Especially in the Southern 
Cone but also in other countries of the region NSD ideology was linked with 
economic and social development and yielded the state model of bureaucratic 
authoritarianism (Tickner, 2016). According to this model public order was a 
necessary precondition for economic growth, modernisation, and 
industrialisation.4 Hence, statehood was closely connected with security and 
development but in a repressive, authoritarian form. This nationalised, 
militarised comprehension of security led to large-scale state terrorism in many 
Latin American societies, although Koonings and Kruijt (1999: 10) argued that 
the arbitrariness and day-to-day practices of state-sponsored violence was 
beyond any doctrinal justification.  
                                            
4 For the concept of bureaucratic authoritarianism see, for example, O’Donnell (1988) and Colliers 
(1979). 
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Democratic security, in turn, was claimed to be aimed primarily at the well-being 
of the society and its members which would have required a democratic, 
institutional state (Arévalo de León, 1999). The concept gained significance in 
the light of the peace processes in Central America in the early 1990s and the 
transition to democracy in South American countries. It represented the effort of 
Latin American scholars and policy makers to develop security and defence 
policies that removed the military from the political sphere and placed it under 
civilian control (Tickner, 2016: 70). Several Latin American scholars addressed 
this process from various perspectives and in various countries; important 
topics were, for example, the development of a new role for the military within 
regional cooperation frameworks (e.g. Diamint, 2001, Herz, 2010), civil-military 
relations (e.g. Rojas Aravena, 1998), and democratic consolidation (e.g. 
Dominguez, 1998). Democratic security found its way into policy documents like 
the Framework Treaty of Democratic Security in Central America of 1995 (CSC, 
1995). In this policy document regional cooperation to maintain and consolidate 
democracy is emphasised which points to the conceptual change away from 
national security to regional security (Arceneaux and Pion-Berlin, 2005).5 The 
agreement called for closer collaboration between the countries with regard to 
security matters, the elaboration of a legal framework of police and military 
functions in the region, better arms control and containment of arms trafficking 
(CSC, 1995, Sereseres, 1998: 218-219). It also initiated the creation of the 
Central American Security Commission (consisting of the vice ministers of 
external relations, defence, public security, and governance of each country) 
whose responsibility it became to keep the collaboration going. The treaty is the 
foundation of today’s Central American Integration System (SICA), the key 
organisation for regional security cooperation on an intergovernmental level. 
However, Sereseres (1998: 220-221) attested to governments of the region a 
reluctance in developing security doctrines, institutions, and policies. Despite 
the important turn from national to regional security, Arévalo de León (1999) 
saw the limits of the concept in its vagueness which did hinder the development 
of specific mechanisms of security provision. Ultimately democratic security did 
                                            
5 In Colombia, the concept was adopted by President Uribe in 2003 as a comprehensive state security 
strategy to combat the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC, for its acronyms in Spanish). 
While the Uribe Administration claimed that the strategy had helped reducing homicides and kidnappings 
committed by the FARC, the strategy was criticised for fostering anti-insurgent paramilitary forces and 
for excessively expanding military power (International Crisis Group, 2003). 
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not permeate security policy making of the countries in the region, not least 
because national policies were not differentiated enough to meet the ambitious 
agenda of democratic security, Arévalo de León argued. 
 
2.3 Critical security studies and citizen security 
A number of scholars, among them some of which criticised the previously 
outlined approaches that were summarised under security provision as 
statebuilding, elaborated on security thinking with a shift away from the state to 
the individual. Epistemologically, these approaches can be located in critical 
security studies. In their edited book Critical security studies: Concepts and 
cases, Krause and Williams intended to open up the thinking of traditional 
security studies by questioning the referent object of security and asking who or 
what is to be secured (Krause and Williams, 1997: ix). They invited scholars 
and policy makers to rethink security from the perspective of human beings. 
They argued that it is people’s ideas, needs, and values that constitute the 
lifeworld or environment where people live and that, therefore, understandings 
of security in people’s environment needs to consider these ideas and needs 
(Mutimer, 2010: 89). In this regard, what constitutes security depends on what 
is perceived as threat and by whom. This led to a broadening of security studies 
and the inclusion of threats like food insecurity, environmental disasters, and 
poverty. Since Krause and Williams’ publication, the field of critical security 
studies has expanded into various strands and schools. Three schools 
developed within critical security studies, Copenhagen School, Aberystwyth or 
Welsh School, and Paris School. However, there are many scholars of security 
taking a critical stance that do not fit one of these schools (Peoples and 
Vaughan-Williams, 2015: 10). Therefore, critical security studies are sometimes 
mapped according to intellectual strands such as securitisation theory, 
emancipatory security studies, feminist security studies, human security, post-
structuralist security studies, or, most recently, resilience and security (e.g. 
Shepherd, 2013, Dunn Cavelty et al., 2015).  
One of these approaches is the Paris School that evolved around Huysmans 
(2006), Bigo (2008), Balzacq (2010) and others. This line of thinking argued for 
an interdisciplinary approach to security and underscored the contribution the 
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field of international political sociology has to make to security studies (Bigo, 
2008, Balzacq et al., 2010). In particular, it considered security as a process of 
(in)securitisation, drawing on Wæver’s (1995) securitisation theory and the 
claim that security is a matter of discursive practices (Copenhagen School). The 
Paris School, influenced by the practice theory developed by French 
sociologists ranging from Bourdieu to Foucault, contended that the focus on 
discursive practices is too narrow and needs to include everyday practices. In 
order to understand how security operates, scholars need to examine the 
effects of discourses as well as ‘the conditions of possibility of security 
practices’, Balzacq et al. argued (2010). Practices are:  
a routinized type of behaviour which consists of several 
elements, interconnected to one another: forms of bodily 
activities, forms of mental activities, ‘things’ and their use, a 
background knowledge in the form of understanding and know-
how, states of emotion and motivational knowledge (Reckwitz, 
2002). 
In this context, Balzacq et al argued, security is the result of a process of 
(in)securitisation, which means it emanates as a dispositif ‘mainly, but not only, 
from a specific field of professionals’.6 
In this sense, the concept strengthened the need for empirical research as the 
study of specific security practices (Bigo, 2008: 122-123). This thesis draws on 
these ideas for the conceptual framework to empirically investigate practices of 
security, using the notion of practices of political sociologist Joel Migdal whose 
concept was influenced by Foucault’s thinking (see Chapter 3.2.1 for details). 
However, empirical research of the Paris School clearly focused on Western 
societies (e.g. Huysmans, 2006) which is why no attention was paid to the 
peculiarities of security provision in the global South or more concretely in Latin 
America. 
                                            
6 Dispositif is a term coined by Foucault, it describes ‘a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of 
discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific 
statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions – in short, the said as much as the unsaid. 
The dispositif itself is the system of relations that can be established between these elements.’ (Foucault, 
1980: 194). 
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While the literature about specific security issues in Latin America is abundant, 
concepts that do address security in Latin America from a critical perspective 
are rare. The most widely used notion is that of citizen security. Like democratic 
security the term citizen security emerged in the 1990s. This was also partially 
rooted in a scholarly search for an alternative to the repressive security 
understanding of the military dictatorships and repressive regimes as Pontón 
(2007) pointed out. However, debates about citizen security are more seen as a 
reaction to the apparent failure of many Latin American states to provide 
security for its citizens in the newly established democracies (Neild, 1999). With 
the growing awareness of the magnitude of the problem of violent crime citizen 
security became the dominant discourse that described the vulnerability of 
citizens to the threat of violent crime and possible efforts to contain it (Frühling 
et al., 2003, Ungar, 2007, Ungar, 2011, Goldstein, 2016: 140). In this regard, 
the Organization of American States (OAS) defined citizen security as the 
absence of the threat of violence and crime (Interamerican Commission on 
Human Rights, 2009: 7). The exclusive focus on threats posed by criminality 
was criticised by Goldstein (2016) who argued that the concept was used by 
governments to justify authoritarian and violent responses, as well as to 
undermine civil and human rights. Sometimes the term is used as a synonym to 
‘public security’ (Chinchilla, 2001, González, 2003) which emphasises the 
responsibility of the state to create security for citizens. However, as Luckham 
and Kirk (2012) noted the responsibility of states to provide protection is just 
one side of security provision. Beyond that security is also an entitlement of 
citizens. This complex relationship between state and society in the case of 
security deserves more attention. As described above, efforts to reform state 
security institutions had limited success. This led some authors to advocate for 
more attention being paid to security as an entitlement of citizens. 
Abello Colak and Pearce (2009, 2015) suggested ‘security from below’ which 
envisages people-centred but publicly delivered security. According to these 
authors security from below means enhancing the capacity of people in their 
communities to ‘define collectively the values and norms that should inform 
state provision’ (Abello Colak and Pearce, 2009: 17). Their research is based 
on experiences in Medellín, Colombia. Another example is the notion of 
‘participatory security’ suggested by Marquardt (2012), which is based on field 
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research in Peru. Whilst the work of these and other authors drew attention to 
the citizens’ perspective on security issues, this thesis focuses on decision-
making processes of political actors. This is an important yet scholarly 
neglected dimension because it addresses the deficiencies of Latin American 
states in security provision through the lens of policy making. It will add a new 
perspective on understanding security provision, besides state institution 
building and community-based approaches. This new perspective goes beyond 
exploring the shortcoming of security provision. Instead, it seeks to explain the 
latter with the behaviour of political decision makers.  
Advocates of citizen security interpreted the concept as a right of citizens to a 
safe and secure life, as Goldstein (2016: 141) observed. Citizen security as the 
right of citizens to protection was adopted by think tanks (e.g. Latin American 
Faculty of Social Sciences, FLACSO; Washington Office on Latin America, 
WOLA) as well as international organisations and donors (Inter-American 
Development Bank, IDB; United Nations Development Programme UNDP; 
OAS; World Bank). In other words, citizen security became a policy goal. As 
several authors noted there is no consensus as to what exactly citizen security 
comprises of (González, 2003, Alda and Beliz, 2007, Muggah and Aguirre, 
2013). However, the way the concept is used in the policy (and the academic) 
sphere suggests a number of principles which serve as a basic consensus. Key 
aspects are the focus on prevention, local communities, and decentralisation; 
citizen participation in security governance; the inclusion of inequality and 
development issues in security plans; and strengthening democratic institutions 
(especially the police and judiciary system).7 These principles are not only 
opposed to the militarised approaches of dictatorial regimes, they also contrast 
with the punitive approaches applied by governments in Central America, 
Mexico, and Colombia since the 1990s.  
The policy orientation of the term is not unproblematic. As Tickner and Herz 
(2012) argued, security analysis in the region is often produced in order to be 
translated into public policy decisions. It does not illustrate larger theoretical 
issues and misses comparisons with other parts of the world. In addition, 
                                            
7 It should be noted that US-sponsored citizen security activities comprise a much broader definition of 
the term than that of international organisations. This includes, for example, counter-narcotic efforts, and 
as such, includes measures like the provision of military equipment (Muggah and Aguirre, 2013). 
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Tickner and Herz criticised that the literature is often suggestive to policy 
makers and uses prescriptive language. This observation also applies to citizen 
security. When the term emerged in the 1990s, it had some potential to become 
a concept that would help clarify the nature of security provision in Latin 
America. However, with the adoption of the concept by donors, it turned into a 
policy agenda. This limits the concept’s use as analytical framework for 
understanding the political problems of security provision. Therefore, the 
theoretical and methodological framework of this thesis is based on different 
approaches which stand out to be more suitable. Namely Migdal’s state-in-
society approach which serves to set out the complex relationship between 
state and society in the realm of security provision, as well as insights from 
public policy research which provide the methodology for the analysis. 
However, citizen security is still relevant for this thesis. It was used as the basic 
normative orientation for the first Salvadoran FMLN government to develop a 
security policy. Therefore, the key policy goals of the concept serve as the 
template against which the FMLN’s security policy is analysed. 
In sum, the approaches examined in this section question the state as referent 
object of security and brought to attention a change of perspective towards 
individuals and communities. However, these approaches pay less attention to 
what constitutes a state. Especially where states fail to provide security, a 
clearer concept of statehood in the global South and particularly in Latin 
America adds to the understanding of the quality of security provision. 
  
2.4 Security provision in contexts of ‘limited statehood’ 
A number of scholars who acknowledged the limits of the statebuilding model 
began to develop concepts that would describe statehood in countries of the 
global South. In the last decade, two concepts emerged that provide an 
interesting theoretical starting point for this research, namely ‘governance in 
areas of limited statehood’ and ‘hybrid political orders’. 
‘Governance in areas of limited statehood’ is a concept developed by Risse and 
colleagues (Risse and Lehmkuhl, 2006, Risse and Boerzel, 2010, Risse, 2011). 
Their lead research question was how areas of limited statehood are governed. 
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They defined statehood as ‘institutionalised rule structure with the ability to rule 
authoritatively […] and to legitimately control the means of violence’ (Risse, 
2011: 4). Based on this definition, areas of limited statehood are parts of 
countries in which central authorities lack the ability to ‘enforce rules and 
decisions or in which the legitimate monopoly over the means of violence is 
lacking’ (ibid.). These parts of a country are not necessarily defined territorially; 
they can also refer to specific policy areas or parts of the population. To 
approach the main research question, Risse adopted a governance perspective 
by defining political governance as ‘institutionalised modes of social 
coordination to produce and implement […] rules, or to provide collective 
goods.’ (Risse, 2011: 9). This definition follows that of theorists of governance 
who emphasised that modes of governing, steering, and social organisation in 
society are not bound to a government but involve multiple public and private 
actors (Mayntz and Scharpf, 1995).8 According to this definition governance has 
a structural (‘institutionalised’) and a process dimension (‘modes of social 
coordination’). Central features of the institutionalised structural dimension of 
governance in Western states are democracy, rule of law, security, and the 
provision of public services. In areas of limited statehood, these governance 
services are often absent, and research needs to focus on ‘functioning 
equivalents to modern statehood’, Risse (2011: 10) argued.  The process 
dimension implies a focus on the role of (multiple) actors as well as on 
hierarchical and non-hierarchical ‘modes of steering’. This includes a look at the 
interplay of state and non-state actors and how they ‘govern’ in areas of limited 
statehood. By hierarchical modes of steering, Risse referred to top-down modes 
of social coordination, while non-hierarchical modes of steering describe 
horizontal modes of coordination with non-state actors such as bargaining, 
negotiations or ‘benchmarking’. According to Risse and his colleagues non-
hierarchical modes of steering are common in areas of limited statehood. This 
conceptualisation has been further elaborated by a range of scholars (e.g. 
Müller, 2012a). However, this thesis argues that the description of governance 
processes as modes of social coordination is one-sided and misses the fact that 
the interplay between state and non-state actors can also be characterised as 
competition or contestation. This thesis speaks of power struggles between 
                                            
8 Governance as a term is used and interpreted differently by various strands of research, see for instance 
the overview by Benz and Dose (2010). Risse’s interpretation adheres to governance in policy research.  
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multiple state and non-state actors which shape state responses to violence 
(this idea is further developed in the theoretical discussion in Chapter Three). 
Based on Risse’s concept, this thesis argues that security provision has both an 
institutionalised structural dimension and a process dimension. As the above 
review of the literature of security-as-statebuilding showed, the institutional 
dimension of security provision received much attention from scholars and 
practitioners alike. While this thesis acknowledges the importance of 
institutional conditions for security provision, it spots a gap in understanding the 
process dimension of security provision, that is, in understanding modes of 
coordination or contestation between state and non-state actors. This research 
begins to fill this gap by conducting a security policy study (the approach is 
explained in the following theoretical discussion). This research also seeks to 
understand how state and social actors in the security realm are related to each 
other and how their interplay in the process of security policy-making impacts 
on the institutional side of security provision. In other words, it is interested in 
the effects of security policy-making on security sector reforms.9  
Limits in Risse’s concept can be seen in the reproduction of the notion of 
deficiency with regard to statehood in non-Western countries. Risse 
acknowledged this limitation in so far as he used ‘limited statehood’ as the 
definitional starting point and placed the emphasis of research on governance. 
By doing so, he attempted to overcome the heavy focus on institutional 
development of other statebuilding approaches. However, the notion of 
deficiency remained a central aspect of the concept. For the conceptual 
framework of this research it poses the question of how to conceptualise 
statehood avoiding the notion of deficiency and emphasising that interaction 
between multiple state and social actors is often contested.  
The concept of ‘hybrid political orders’ addressed the problem of defining 
statehood in the global South from a non-deficiency perspective in a different 
manner. This approach is located in political sociology with theoretical roots in 
state formation theory. It originated from research on the political orders of 
South Pacific countries by the Australian Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies 
                                            
9 Although written as a policy paper, I owe some of my initial ideas about security policy making to 
Bastian and Hendrickson (2008).  
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(Clements et al., 2007, Boege et al., 2008, Boege et al., 2009). The concept of 
hybrid political orders suggested that concentrating on existing realities of 
statehood is more constructive than looking at the deficiencies of states and 
elaborating their shortcomings against the background of the Weberian norms 
of statehood (Kraushaar and Lambach, 2009). Hybrid political orders are a 
combination of societal and state structures and can be found in:  
[…] places, in which diverse and competing claims to 
power and logics of order co-exist, overlap and intertwine, 
namely the logic of the ‘formal’ state, of traditional 
‘informal’ societal order, and of globalisation and 
associated social fragmentation […]. In such an 
environment, the ‘state’ does not have a privileged position 
as the political framework that provides security, welfare 
and representation; it has to share authority, legitimacy 
and capacity with other structures (Boege et al., 2008: 24).  
The approach is interdisciplinary and as such informed by insights from the 
fields of anthropology, history, and state formation theory. The explicit rejection 
of an ideal-type state model was inspired by previously developed approaches 
from different disciplines such as neopatrimonialism, clientelism, informal 
institutions, legal pluralism, and para-statehood. The particular value of the 
concept was seen according to Kraushaar and Lambach (2009) in its openness 
to various forms of governance that do not automatically assume the state as 
the superior form. Critics argued that there is little added value in the notion of 
hybridity since states and political orders are always a mixture of specific 
historical developments and various internal and external influences (von 
Trotha, 2009, Roberts, 2013). Hoffmann (2009) objected to the use of the term 
‘orders’ in the context of hybrid state models when it is not clear what kind of 
order is being described or whether ‘disorder’ would be the more adequate 
term.    
The strength of the concept lies in the serious effort to conceptualise statehood 
in countries of the global South through an epistemological shift from deficient 
statehood to the strengths and potentials of hybrid statehood. However, this 
brings along some conceptual difficulties, especially in the security realm. 
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Boege and colleagues (2009) contended that besides civil society actors who 
complement state institutions, non-state actors are usually considered as 
spoilers that contest state authority. They argued that non-state security actors 
like chiefs and religious figures can effectively contribute to statebuilding and 
development. This argument appears controversial. Ultimately Boege et al. 
claimed that there are desirable and despicable non-state security actors, for 
instance ‘peaceful’ clan leaders vs warlords, and that the desirable actors 
should be strengthened. However, this requires a normative consensus on the 
distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ security actors. The concept did not 
articulate on what norms such a distinction is to be based but remained vague 
in this regard. In addition, in most Latin American countries such an approach 
remains problematic since the range of non-state security actors often 
comprises of gang leaders, organised criminal networks, and private security 
providers that create insecurity, reproduce violence, and exclude large parts of 
the population from security provision. Indeed, empirical research on hybrid 
political orders concentrated on the South Pacific region, and findings are not 
transferable to Latin American issues of security and statehood. 
 
2.5 The state in Latin America: reproducing violence or providing 
security? 
As demonstrated above, there are limits regarding the concept of hybrid political 
order, specifically considering scholars claims for a more effective contribution 
of non-state security actors to statebuilding and development. This is the case 
in particularly when looking at most Latin American cases.10 However, the 
concept is beneficial to this research in two aspects: firstly, the idea of hybrid 
political orders was not built around the question of the state monopoly of 
violence and secondly, it called for exploring the realities of existing statehood 
through the incorporation of state formation processes in the analysis. A look at 
the literature about state formation in Latin America reveals that in many cases 
violence and the state were inextricably linked since the emergence of states 
and these links endured until the present time. Inspired by Tilly’s grand theory 
                                            
10 Similarly, the term ‘plural security’ was suggested to describe a system of security provision by non-
state and state actors alike at various places in Africa and the Middle East (e.g. Belhadj et al., 2015).  
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about state formation processes in Western Europe, Latin American scholars 
sought to understand the connection between wars and state formation (Tilly, 
1975, 1985, 1992). In contrast to Tilly’s findings for Western Europe they 
concluded that warfare and violent conflict did not accelerate statebuilding 
processes. López-Alves analysed statebuilding processes in Uruguay, 
Argentina, and Colombia by determining the impact of war on the development 
of armies and political parties. Similarly, Centeno (2002a, 2002b) looked at the 
impact of war on the formation of states. He maintained that Latin American 
wars were not as comprehensive as European wars in the sense that they did 
not require equally large mobilisation of people into armies nor did they require 
an equally large collection of revenues. Thus, due to the limited coercive and 
extractive capacity of states, power was not centralised enough to stave off 
recurrent internal violent conflicts and rivalries.11 Thies (2005, 2006) and Soifer 
and Saylor (2008) discussed how inter- and intrastate wars and threats shaped 
Latin American states. While they had different views about the role of 
international threats for the formation of states, they found that internal conflict, 
in some (but not all) cases, had weakened state capacity. Analysing ‘public 
violence and state formation’ in Central America, Holden (1996, 2004) argued 
that Central American states are: 
improvisational states, whose defining characteristic was the 
continuous need to improvise its coercive authority by 
bargaining with […] armed bands of various kinds […] (Holden, 
2004: 5).   
These and other studies underscored the persistence of violent intrastate 
conflict beyond early state formation processes in the nineteenth century as well 
as the persistence of a variety of potentially or actually violent actors who 
continuously contested efforts of the state to centralise coercive means. Much 
has been written about state-sponsored and revolutionary violence under Latin 
America’s authoritarian regimes in the second half of the twentieth century as 
well as about the more diffuse appearances of violence since the democratic 
                                            
11 State capacity is a term coined by Tilly referring to the ‘degree of control state agents exercise over 
persons, activities, and resources within their government’s territorial jurisdiction’ (McAdam et al., 
2001). While the term was initially related to the capacities of the state to raise revenues, its use was 
extended by Tilly and other historical sociologists to other competences like military capacity or the 
capacity to manage economic processes.  
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transitions. Reviewing this enormous amount of literature would be beyond the 
scope of this project.12 Particularly interesting, however, is the shift of scholarly 
attention from political violence to social violence and the debate about how to 
characterise contemporary violence. A vast literature focused on violence as 
part of revolutionary wars and counter-insurgency campaigns of dictatorial 
regimes, often from the perspective of political science (e.g. McClintock, 1998, 
Johnson et al., 2013). After the transition periods violence continued but 
seemed no longer linked to the state as perpetrator and suppressor. With the 
emergence of more diffused types of violence, research shifted towards more 
anthropological approaches and looked at the experience of violence in day-to-
day life of individuals and social groups, criticising the deficiencies of the newly 
democratised states from a citizenship perspective (e.g. Caldeira and Holston, 
1999, Méndez et al., 1999, Savenije and Van der Borgh, 2004). The framing of 
violence that underpinned this type of research has been characterised as de-
politicised or social violence (e.g. Koonings and Kruijt, 1999). 
Scholars argued that the distinction between political and social violence was 
not useful since it ignored the role of the state and policy makers in perpetuating 
violence. For instance, Rotker (2002) contended that contemporary violence 
was similar to civil war violence and could be interpreted as rebellion albeit in a 
less organised and purposeful way. Moser and McIlwaine (2004) showed how 
political, social, and economic expressions of violence were interlinked and 
continued to penetrate urban life in Colombia and Guatemala. Indeed, the 
literature about state formation in Latin America showed that these processes 
were inextricably linked to violence and that violence still represents a feature of 
the state while at the same time many Latin American states did not monopolise 
violence. Building on these findings, researchers began to develop models of 
how to understand the role of violence in the social order of Latin American 
societies. Pearce (2010) argued that containing new forms of violence was no 
priority for modern Latin American states, instead, they facilitated the 
reproduction of violence by building their authority on the violent confrontation of 
perceived threats and risks. Arias and Goldstein (2010) presented their model 
of ‘violent pluralism’ as an approach to understand the coexistence of political 
regimes and organised, violent non-state actors who created various forms of 
                                            
12 For a discussion of violence research in El Salvador see Section 7.5. 
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violent sub-state order. Similarly, this thesis seeks to understand the role of the 
state in reproducing or diminishing contemporary forms of violence, but the 
focus is narrowed to state responses to new forms of violence. Instead of 
adding to scholarly knowledge about contemporary expressions of violence, this 
thesis explores state practices of dealing with social violence. While it is 
acknowledged that social and political forms of violence are connected, they 
can be separated for the analytical purpose of this study of understanding state 
responses to social violence. Violence committed by state actors is not 
excluded entirely but it is defined as violent or coercive responses to social 
violence (which means not all acts of state violence may be regarded as state 
responses to social violence but the emphasis is on the latter). Also, structural 
conditions which contribute to the reproduction of violence are not ignored, they 
provide the context for the analysis of security practices. 
Based on these considerations, the following research questions arise: In 
contexts of massive social violence and a lack of a legitimate state monopoly of 
violence, are there state responses to social violence which aim at the 
protection of citizens, and what characterises them? Answers to these 
questions add to our understanding of why states fail to provide security for their 
citizens.  The literature discussed above demonstrated that the gaps inherent in 
the existing research prevent finding answers to these questions due to a 
narrow understanding of security provision as institutional reforms and due to 
the difficulties in conceptualising statehood in the global South. The discussion 
showed that a conceptual framework is required which, firstly, allows for a focus 
on security practices in contexts of massive social violence and, secondly, 
conceptualises the interaction between state and social actors with the potential 
to use violence. This conceptual framework is developed in the following 
chapter. 
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3. Power struggles and ad hoc-ism in security policy making 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter criticised the strong focus on institutions in security 
concepts and identified the lacunae in research about security provision in the 
global South. It argued that an analysis of security practices would offer a more 
nuanced understanding of the shortcomings of security provision in countries of 
the global South. The discussion of the literature showed that the conceptual 
framework of this research needs to allow for a focus on security practices in 
contexts of massive social violence, and needs to conceptualise the interaction 
between state and social actors who have the power to use violence. Such a 
framework is developed in this chapter, drawing on Migdal’s concept of state-in-
society (Migdal, 1988, Migdal et al., 1994, Migdal, 2001, Migdal and Schlichte, 
2005). Migdal comprehended the state as two folded. On the one hand, the 
state is the image of a corporate, unified entity. On the other hand, states are 
constituted by diverse and often conflicting practices. This links to the 
discussion about the different dimensions of statehood (Section 2.2) and to 
state practices as defined by the Paris School (Section 2.3) (Bigo, 2008, 
Balzacq et al., 2010). Migdal’s approach serves as the theoretical foundation of 
this work because his definition of state practices paid special attention to the 
interactive effects of state and social structure. According to Migdal, state 
practices are shaped by constant power struggles between state and social 
actors. The chapter elaborates on the thought of power struggles and 
introduces the term of ‘contested statehood’ which builds on Risse’s (2011) 
notion of limited statehood but avoids the notion of deficiency in the definition of 
statehood. Thus, it adopts a perspective which does not assume a legitimate 
state monopoly on violence where it does not exist. Instead, it looks at practices 
of violence control by social and state actors.  
The second part of the chapter shows that the most suitable way to explore 
security practices is by an analysis of the security policy, or, to be more precise, 
an analysis of security decision making by political actors and of the effects of 
policy decisions. The heuristic tools for such an analysis are provided by policy 
research, especially by the policy cycle model (Lasswell, 1956, Brewer, 1974, 
Jones, 1984, Anderson, 1984, Howlett et al., 2009). Theorists of policy research 
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have identified different decision-making modes that will be explored, one of 
them being ad hoc decision making. Based on these insights, the chapter 
proposes the term ‘ad hoc security decision making’ to label short-term security 
decisions which are insufficiently implemented and easily reversed or replaced 
by other decisions. It is argued that ad hoc decision making occurs particularly 
when state and non-state actors strongly impact on decision makers. In other 
words, ad hoc decision making reflects the power struggles between state and 
other actors. 
 
3.2 Contested statehood: power struggles between state and social 
actors 
3.2.1 Migdal’s state-in-society approach 
The state-in-society approach emerged within the discipline of political 
sociology in the late 1980s. It is concerned with state-society relations and 
draws on classic theories of social change in the works of Durkheim, Weber, 
and Elias exploring patterns of domination and social and political change. The 
state-in-society approach claims that domination and change are not formed by 
either state structure only or, conversely, social formations alone. Instead, they 
derive from the interactive effects of state and social structure. In his book State 
in society the US Sociologist Joel Migdal (2001) sets out the basic tenets of his 
approach which he developed over time and in various publications:13 First, 
states are not necessarily the central actors in societies; second, states and 
societies are organisations in a melange or a web, that is, both state and social 
organisations operate in a specific social context influencing one another; third, 
major struggles in societies take place over who has the ability to guide 
people’s social behaviour; and fourth, patterns of change or inertia are often 
due to accommodations between states and social forces. These tenets can be 
explained by looking at historical and academic predecessors of Migdal’s 
approach.  
                                            
13 Earlier and later versions of the state-in-society approach are published in Migdal (1988, 1994, 2001) 
and Migdal and Schlichte (2005). State in society is a compendium of various essays and the most 
comprehensive yet precise presentation of the concept (Migdal, 2001). 
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Migdal started off by thinking about issues of state capacities and policy-making 
in countries of the global South. Similar to Risse (2011), Boege et al (2008) and 
others, he argued that European concepts were not useful for theorising 
processes of state formation in Africa, Latin America, and Asia (Migdal, 2001: 
42). He added that the European concepts still served as models of practical 
state organisation in the South since the 1950s. They were based on the 
assumptions that stability in society requires a strong centre that brings together 
elites. The state, then, is the political arm through which elites rule over society 
(p. 45). Based on theorists like Weber, the modern state was understood as a 
coherent, autonomous, and uniform institution. Applying these assumptions 
about the state to the organisation of states in the global South was a key 
element of the concept of modernisation that guided theories of political 
development in the 1960s (e.g. Lerner, 1958, Lipset, 1959). However, scholars 
have noted that in reality many states in the South did not and still do not 
develop a strong, coherent, and uniform political centre as was suggested by 
the model. Similarly, they noted that states lack the capability to regulate and 
transform their societies (p. 43). While criticism of the modernisation model led 
to the emergence of other concepts such as the dependency school (e.g. Frank, 
1969, Dos Santos, 1970), the idea of the state as an institution that regulates 
people’s behaviour persisted among both political leaders and scholars of 
political science, Migdal  argued. Reflecting on the debates about the nature of 
the state in the 1970s and 1980s, he positioned his approach as a third 
alternative to state-centred and society-centred theories. In society-centred 
theories, the state’s role is considered to be relatively small in explaining 
political and social change. Although they assume ideologically quite different 
positions, these theories share the assumption that the state is not an 
autonomous entity. For example, scholars of the systems theory regard the 
state as one system of society among others (Luhmann, 1984). For pluralists 
the state is more of an arena representing the conflicts between different 
societal groups (e.g. Truman, 1951, Dahl, 1961). For neo-Marxists state 
autonomy may exist to a certain extent but serves the interests of the capitalist 
class (e.g. Offe, 1973, Poulantzas, 1975). State-centred theories on the other 
hand, consider the state to be a force on its own right which constitutes society 
(Krasner, 1984, Jessop, 2001, Stefes, 2006). Both state-centred and society-
centred theories developed over long periods of time, but in the 1970s a new 
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debate emerged in the US about the role of the state in political and social 
science. At the height of this debate was a collection of essays in Bringing the 
state back in by Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol (1985). According to the 
neo-statist concepts published in Bringing the state back in and in other works 
of this period, state activities can be explained by the state’s own distinctive 
properties as an administrative organ (Jessop, 2001). State-centred theories 
assume that the state develops its own preferences independent from social 
actors, and that the state and its institutions influence and determine societal 
developments and individual agency (Stefes, 2006: 175). With regard to these 
different perceptions about the nature of the state and the continuous debates 
between Pluralist/neo-Marxist and neo-statist theorists Timothy Mitchell (1991) 
articulated a critique that Migdal adapted into his own thinking: Mitchell 
questioned the assumption of both pluralist/neo-Marxist and neo-statist writers 
that there are clear boundaries between state and society and the assumption 
that each can be studied on its own. He argued that ‘the elusiveness of the 
state-society boundary needs to be taken seriously […] as a clue to the nature 
of the phenomenon’ (Mitchell, 1991: 78). Research about the state, Mitchell 
wrote, needed to study the overlap of state and society. This was precisely the 
intention of Migdal’s state-in-society approach. Studying the intersection of both 
fields avoids the assumption of Weberian state theorists and their critiques of a 
state with a strong central authority, Migdal (2001: 46) argued. At the core of the 
state-in-society approach is a process-oriented perspective of ‘doing the state’ 
(Migdal and Schlichte 2005: 14). This perspective allows us to explore how 
states do or do not exercise authority outside the European state formation 
model, as the following sections show.  
As mentioned above, the particular strength of Migdal’s concept lies in its ability 
for not only showing the relevance of both state and society for social and 
political change, but for conceptualising the intersection of both fields. Migdal 
began depicting the state by distinguishing between the idea of the state and 
state practices. On the one hand, the state is seen by both state and non-state 
actors as a single whole. He called this corporate, unified entity the image of a 
state as it represents the state as a whole, with a defined territory, a 
government, state organisations etc. (Migdal, 2001: 22, Migdal and Schlichte, 
2005: 14). He argued that this idea or image of the state is at the core of most 
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state-centred theories and that, by the middle of the 20th century, the image of 
the state was considered as right and proper by political leaders in almost any 
society in the north and south (Migdal, 2001: 49). Following this idea or image 
of the state, political leaders have seen the goal of the state in achieving 
uniform rules for the people living in a defined territory:  
[T]he ‘idea of the state’ is, through law and regulations, to 
impose a single standard of behaviour in a given territory, one 
that is legislated, executed, and adjudicated by the various 
parts of the state organization (ibid. p. 48).14  
To support this part of the argument, Migdal gave some examples of the state 
aiming to govern people’s lives such as taxing, the public infrastructure (roads, 
schools, water, health care etc.), welfare, and capital investment.  
On the other hand, if this wholeness is deconstructed, diverse and often 
conflicting practices of ‘doing the state’ appear because states compete with 
other social organisations for power. These other organisations stretch from 
families to ethnic groups to multinational corporations. Thinking of Latin 
American security issues, youth gangs or criminal networks also come to mind. 
Migdal (p. 49) wrote that for a state achieving the goal of governing people’s 
lives is very difficult and elusive, because ‘leaders of other social organizations 
have been unwilling to relinquish their prerogatives […] without a fierce struggle. 
Their prerogative is to devise at least some rules that govern some or many 
people’s lives. With families the state’s struggle may be about the rules of 
education; struggles with business corporations or criminal networks may be 
about the use of resources. 
Migdal’s concept of ‘doing the state’ links to the concept of security practices 
brought forward by the Paris School which regarded security as a set of 
practices emanating from state actors (see Chapter 2.3). While this approach 
reminded us of the need to study political practices as concrete forms of social 
                                            
14 Migdal used both image of the state and idea of the state interchangeably. While the term image points 
to the influence of Foucaultian thinking in Migdal’s texts, the notion of the idea of the state reminds us of 
Buzan’s (1992) work who distinguished between idea, institutions, and territorial sovereignty (2.3). While 
there are similarities between Migdal’s and Buzan’s conceptualisation of the idea of the state, they are not 
identical. While Buzan emphasised the thought of social consensus of the role of the state, Migdal 
referred to the formal representation of the state.    
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interaction guided by specific norms and rules (Balzacq et al., 2010), Migdal 
defined this interaction as power struggles between state and social forces.    
Being critical of structuralist theories, Migdal explicitly aimed at bridging macro 
and micro perspectives of social and political change. Keeping the broader 
picture of the historical development of states in mind, he dismantled state and 
society into webs of agents. This allows for a look at concrete arenas of state 
power. Arenas are comprehended not as spatially limited but rather conceptual 
loci (Migdal, 2001: 108).15 According to Migdal (2001: 100), power struggles are 
not only about top leadership positions or among large-scale social forces (e.g. 
between state and civil society), but they take place among the individual parts 
of the state and in multiple arenas. Migdal proposed four different levels within 
society’s multiple arenas on which state officials encounter pressure: At the 
bottom, the daily struggles of state officials and social forces take place, 
involving for instance tax collectors and teachers. On the next level, local and 
regional bodies are responsible for the implementation of policies, e.g. the 
federal police, courts, legislative bodies, and local councils. Normally, these 
bodies are territorially bound. Conflicts can arise among local and regional state 
organisations as well as between state organisations and regional/local 
representatives of social organisations such as parties, religious groups, and 
business corporations. At the third level are the central offices where policies 
are decided and designed, i.e. ministries, parliaments, and national agencies. In 
many countries, the military high command would also be considered a 
significant central body involved in the policy-making process. These bodies are 
accountable to the top leadership of the state and bargain with each other. They 
also have to deal with and can be opposed by the most powerful social forces in 
society outside state organisations like business corporations, media organs, 
and labour unions. At the highest level is the head of state, usually the 
president, prime minister, junta or even religious leader. The head of state does 
not act independently but receives pressure from all sides, including from 
international actors. Some powerful social forces may have direct access to the 
leadership and thus exert their influence directly. This may impact, for example, 
on how states deal with oppositional forces or what role the military plays. The 
                                            
15 Migdal’s concept of arenas has similarities with Bourdieu’s concept of fields which is acknowledged in 
Migdal and Schlichte (2005).    
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head of state may also influence state organisations on a lower level and their 
interaction with each other, e.g. the level of co-ordination between ministries.  
Migdal’s notion of arenas shows that the state is not a homogenous actor but 
comprise different groups and individuals that can have different and sometimes 
opposed interests. Among these different state actors conflicts can arise. Thus, 
the state is not a self-contained entity that can be juxtaposed with non-state 
actors. According to the diverging interests of state actors, security provision 
can serve different purposes in society which are demonstrated in the empirical 
analysis. The government as the major decision maker in the most general 
sense represents only one force among others, although potentially a powerful 
one. But even within the government there may be diverging interests.  
While Migdal conceptualised state organisations in some detail, his work 
reveals a certain weakness in explaining the structural features of social 
organisations. Migdal’s point of departure was his interest in the state, or 
statehood, and societal influence became his dependent variable that remained 
somewhat undertheorised. Migdal’s work did not explain whether social 
organisations can be categorised and how they exert power. While Migdal’s 
theory revolved around power and struggles, the work of Michael Mann – a 
macro-sociologist – is useful to shed some light on the relationship between 
power and organisation (Mann, 1986). In the first volume of Mann’s history of 
power, he set out society as ‘multiple overlapping and intersecting sociospacial 
networks of power’ (Mann, 1986: 1). Mann, too, drew on Marxists and 
Weberians and the stratification of society into class, status, and party but split 
the latter into a political and a military category. According to Mann, power is 
organised along these four lines: Ideological power (concerning status, norms, 
and concepts of meaning) is organised in ‘sacred’ forms of authority or authority 
with immanent morality; political power (concerning state elites) is organised 
territorially and geopolitically; military power (concerning physical defence) is 
organised through coercion; and economic power (concerning classes) is 
organised by production and exchange. This is a simplistic representation of 
Mann’s so called IEMP model (Ideological, economic, military, and political 
power), but it highlights that the competition for power between social 
organisations and state organisations falls within one or more of these 
categories. They are hence ‘doing the state’ and controlling people’s lives 
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through ideological, political, coercive and/or economic power. For example, 
ethnic groups have ideological power; however, multinational corporations have 
economic power but may also have political power. These categories are useful 
in setting the context for an analysis of the struggle between social and state 
organisations. Organisations do not correspond with one of Mann’s four sources 
of power in every case, and at the same time they may draw on more than one 
source to achieve their goals (Mann, 1994: 39-40). Separating between 
ideological, economic, political, and military power is therefore a simplifying tool 
for analytical purposes. Actors and their sources of power that are relevant for 
this study are presented in the methodology chapter (Four) and the empirical 
discussion (Chapters Nine and Ten).16  
Importantly, the power struggles not only happen between the state and non-
state actors but rather between actors inside and outside the realm of the state. 
In many cases, social actors have joined forces with parts of the state and 
developed practices that contradict the official laws and regulations of the state 
(Migdal, 2001: 49). These practices reveal the intersection of state and society 
and may contradict the idea of the state. Ultimately, the struggle for power is a 
battle between the idea of the state and the agenda of other social actors for 
how society should be organised. The dispute is about who makes the rules 
that guide people’s social behaviour (p. 64). From the state’s perspective, the 
struggle is not just about compliance with the law, but about whether the state is 
able to displace other social forces as the rule-making organisation. In this 
scenario:  
                                            
16 Migdal used the terms social organisation/social force/social groups interchangeably without defining 
the terms. For Mann, organisations are ‘means to achieve human goals’ (Mann, 1994: 16). People 
organise themselves because they have a common goal which is easier to achieve in an organised manner. 
Organisations cannot be separated from power since power is an organisational means (p. 21). That is, by 
organising themselves, people gain power to achieve their goals. Actors and organisations are not 
identical but in the context of policy research, the term ‘actors’ usually refers to organised actors because 
policy processes are considered to be determined by interaction between organisations (Schneider, 2009b: 
192-194). These organisations exist in both state and society, and can refer to collective, collaborative, 
and individual actors (Blum and Schubert, 2011: 54). Individual actors, here, are usually officials or 
leaders of organisations. For pragmatic reasons, I prefer to speak of actors rather than organisations: 
uncovering practices rather than ideas means that state and social organisations are sometimes relevant as 
unified actors. But sometimes actors within these organisations are relevant (still in there organised sense 
as officials or leaders). For instance, the Salvadoran Ministry of Justice and Public Security is an 
important actor in the security policy-making process which is the theme of this work. However, the 
Ministry is also part of the government which is an actor, too; and sometimes I refer to the Minister as an 
individual actor.  
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[p]ublic policy is the attempt by state leaders to use their 
organisation to make new rules and consequently change the 
behaviour of the public (p. 65).  
Such attempts, of course, trigger resistance among social actors. According to 
many state theorists, predominance of the state is achieved through tax 
collecting mechanisms, a standing army, and legal institutions, all of which allow 
states to enforce rules. However, state practices in the global South often do 
not correspond to this idea of the state. Instead of attaining predominance, the 
state accommodates itself with other actors (ibid.). This ‘accommodation’ 
between state and social actors as Migdal calls it is similar to Boege’s concept 
of hybrid political orders. According to Migdal, accommodation happens where 
predominance for the state is unattainable. In such cases: 
the state does not simply disappear nor does it always 
continually incur the high costs of battling those who are 
effectively making the rules in this realm or that, in one locality 
or another. […] The struggle over the state’s desire for 
predominance, the accommodations between state and others, 
and the maneuvering to gain the best deal possible in any 
arrived-at accommodation are the real politics of many third-
world societies […] (Migdal, 2001: 65).  
In sum, interaction between state and social actors is not only marked by 
modes of coordination, as Risse (2011) displayed it (2.4). Migdal underscored 
that interaction is also shaped by competition and accommodation.  
  
3.2.2 Defining power and violence in contexts of contested statehood 
Migdal’s concept of power struggles between state and social actors provides 
the foundation for the term ‘contested statehood’. Risse’s (2011: 4) term limited 
statehood described areas in which central authorities lack the ability to ‘enforce 
rules and decisions’ or lack a legitimate monopoly on violence. He argued that, 
besides the institutionalised rule structure of states, the analysis of modes of 
social coordination between multiple actors gives insight into the process of 
governing in areas of limited statehood. It was criticised that firstly, the notion of 
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deficiency still underpinned Risse’s definition of statehood and that secondly, 
interaction between actors comprises more than coordination. With Migdal’s 
(2001) approach of states being shaped by power struggles between state and 
social actors, we can comprehend statehood as contested. This means that the 
process dimension of statehood which exists besides the institutional structure 
of the state does not only comprise modes of coordination but also modes of 
contestation between multiple actors. The ability of central state authorities to 
enforce rules and decisions is influenced and contested by other state and 
social actors. Contested statehood avoids the notion of deficiency because it 
does not assume centralised control over violence where it does not exist. This 
allows for a look at practices of violence control by social and state actors. 
Contested statehood appears in societies in which a multitude of actors 
continuously contest efforts of the state to legitimately monopolise coercive 
force. The precise modes of contestation are a question of empirical 
investigation; they can range from massive criminal violence to arrangements of 
non-state security provision.  
Having defined contested statehood it is essential for this thesis to establish 
applicable definitions of both power and violence which represent central 
concepts in the provided argument. Migdal used different terms to describe the 
struggle between state and social forces. In State power and social forces 
(Migdal et al., 1994) he spoke of struggles for ‘domination’. In some parts of 
State in society he referred to the struggle for ‘social control’ which he used 
interchangeably with the term ‘power’ (Migdal, 2001: 48). In Migdal and 
Schlichte’s introductory chapter to The dynamics of states (Schlichte, 2005), 
‘power’ is at the heart of struggles. One reason for this lack of differentiation and 
coherence may be the constant evolution of the concept over time and 
successive changes in the way of thinking about it. The terms used also reflect 
their embedding in academic debates at different times.17  
                                            
17 For example, social control was a controversially discussed concept among sociologists from the 1970s 
to the early 1990s. For an overview of the debates see, for example, (Cohen, 1985, Van Krieken, 1991) 
These debates brought a more critical perspective to the previously uncritical stance of social control as a 
mechanism that fosters or impedes deviance from social norms (Ross, 1901, Merton, 1968). Similar to 
these critical often Marxist and feminist authors of the 1970s, Migdal used the term in a more reflective 
manner that would consider social norms not as immanent in society but as socially constructed. Yet 
today, social control is a term much less used in political sociology and more associated with social 
welfare and criminology. I consider it to be geared towards specific fields of research and less suitable to 
describe general power relations in state and society. 
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The somewhat interchangeable use of the terms power and domination may be 
related to Migdal’s understanding of power as dominating rather than enabling 
power.18 The widespread notion of dominating power relates to Weber’s popular 
definition of power as ‘the probability that one actor within a social relationship 
will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance […]’ (Weber, 
1978). According to Weber, domination is different from power insofar as 
domination requires legitimacy. Both terms are widely used in classical statist 
theory.19  
However, this thesis studies issues of (in)security from the perspective of critical 
security studies which means comprehending power merely as domination 
would fall short of encompassing the complex social constellations marked by 
power relationships. That is, it would fall short of describing forms of power that 
are not intrinsically linked to the state. Mann’s concept of power provides a 
useful alternative. Mann (1986) did not think of power itself as a resource or as 
an original goal of human beings, instead he comprehended power as 
organisational means for attaining goals. Only if a form of power ‘is a powerful 
means to other goals, it will be sought for itself.’ (Mann, 1986: 5-6, original 
emphasis). This view provided his point of entry to identifying the four sources 
of power outlined above. For the purpose of this thesis, this definition of power 
as organisational means is broad enough to incorporate dominating and 
enabling forms of power.  
For Migdal power remained a concept closely associated with coercion and 
violence: 
Both the image and practices of the state involve power, 
inducing people to think and behave in ways that they would 
otherwise not do, and particularly using the most direct 
inducement of all, violence. […] The state is a field of power 
marked by the use and threat of violence (Migdal and Schlichte, 
2005: 15).  
                                            
18 For this difference see for instance Pearce’s (2007) thoughts about power in the context of chronic 
violence in Colombia. 
19 Both terms led many scholars to research the conditions of state legitimacy. Yet, legitimacy is a very 
complex subject; an analysis of its meaning would go beyond the scope of this thesis. For the conceptual 
framework presented here, I regard the existence of state legitimacy with Müller’s words as an empirical 
question: ‘[…] the existence or absence of state legitimacy cannot, ex ante, be assumed.’ (Müller, 2012a: 
14). 
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Apart from this paragraph, Migdal did not write much about the role of violence 
in his model, only that the exercise of violence, like the exercise of power, is 
shaped by images and practices and should be analysed as such (Migdal and 
Schlichte, 2005: 16). This means that the role of violence is subject to certain 
ideas about its role in the state, namely to the idea that states develop a 
legitimate monopoly on violence. However, violence is also subject to state 
practices which may differ from the image of a monopoly on violence. As 
mentioned before, scholars have criticised the state monopoly on violence as 
an abstract norm which evolved against the background of state formation in 
Europe but does not do justice to the reality in most states of the world. This is 
similar to Migdal’s (p. 46) criticism of models of macro sociological change 
based on modernization theories. He argues that models of social order and 
social change cannot assume a central authority where there is none. Hence, 
the focus of the analysis is on practices of violence control by social and state 
actors. Based on Mann’s IEMP model power can be achieved through various 
means, and violence is a major tool to achieve power but it is not the only one. 
Thus, violence is regarded as a source of power. Since this research is 
interested in policy making, a rather narrow view of violence as direct or 
personal violence is suitable. As is explained in the following section, the 
interest lies in the possibility of policy decisions and their effects to contain 
forms of direct violence which includes physical violence like assaults, rape, 
torture, and homicide as well as psychological violence like verbal aggression, 
dominant behaviour, and bullying (Galtung, 1969). Direct violence includes 
criminal as well as political violence (although not all political violence is direct 
violence). Focusing on direct violence does not imply that structural conditions 
which foster violence are ignored. According to Galtung’s famous violence 
triangle (1969), direct violence describes visible forms of violence but these 
visible forms of violence have structural roots. Exploring the persistence of 
violence necessarily needs to include a survey of structural conditions. These 
structural conditions revolve not only around state and society, but they require 
the inclusion of economic processes.   
The economic dimension is notably absent from Migdal’s concept but scholars 
researching the political economy of development offer some useful insight. 
Douglass North and his colleagues (2007, 2009, 2013b) suggested the term 
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‘limited access order’ to describe social and economic orders in which privileged 
individuals generate rents by limiting access to resources and to forms of social 
organisation for others. In this regard, they agree with other rent-seeking 
theorists (Buchanan et al., 1980) but they add an explanation of the role of 
violence in these orders. According to North et al. (2009), the use of violence in 
limited access orders is discouraged because violence threatens the creation of 
rents. However, limited access orders are based on personal relationships 
among the elites, and vertical organisations of elite networks are often 
portrayed as patronage networks. Since individuals and their relationships are 
impermanent, the order is vulnerable to shocks caused by various sources like 
climate, economic cycles, or external threats, North argued. These shocks lead 
to regime collapse and an outburst of violence, for instance war, civil war, ethnic 
violence, peasant revolts, and coups. North further argued that elites and even 
the rest of the population would be inclined to re-establish another stable limited 
access order which would guarantee the maintenance of order, rather than bear 
disordered violence that could lead to a transition toward an open access 
society. According to North (2009), open access orders rest on economic and 
political competition, therein they foster the organisation and participation of a 
large part of the population based on the rule of law. Throughout, the use of 
violence is politically controlled which means there is a legitimate state 
monopoly on violence. The transition toward an open access society requires 
certain conditions, first and foremost the shift of the organisation of society from 
elite pacts to impersonal relationships based on the rule of law. 
In societies with rent-based economies, violence is a latent constant. This 
reflects a Hobbesian understanding of violence as a natural condition which 
needs to be contained. The above given definition of violence as a source of 
power does not indicate the causes of violence, thus, it does not determine 
whether violence is a natural state or something that is triggered by external 
conditions. It claims that violence is used in specific situations, namely during 
power struggles, albeit it does not assume that the use of violence is limited to 
power struggles. However, North’s theory (which comprises more than the 
statements delineated above) is useful because it allows for an approach to 
comprehend the lack of a state monopoly of violence in rent-seeking 
economies. 
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3.3 Ad hoc decision making as security practices 
Security practices that result from the mutual influence of state and social forces 
are at the core of this analysis. According to Bigo (2008), analysing practices 
means to explore what actors do and to explain their reasoning. The heuristic 
tools to approach such an analysis are provided by policy research. One of the 
pioneers of public policy research, Thomas Dye, coined the key interest of the 
field into three questions: Policy analysis is ‘what governments do, why they do 
it, and what difference it makes’ (Dye, 1976). Since then, public policy research 
developed further and does not only examine governments but considers a 
broad range of political actors. It comprises of various theoretical perspectives 
and empirical methods.20 However, Dye’s three questions show that it is 
essentially oriented towards an explanatory analysis of practices. As a sub-
discipline of political science it looks at political decisions and their realisation 
into concrete action taking into account contingent and structural conditions 
(Schneider and Janning, 2006: 11).21 In the subsequent paragraphs follows a 
discussion of policy decision-making modes which provide the conceptual 
framework for an explanation of why security policies fail. By introducing the 
term ad hoc decision making, the research shows how power struggles 
between social and state actors shape security practices. It argues that ad hoc 
decision making occurs particularly when state and non-state actors strongly 
impact on decision makers. In other words, ad hoc decision making reflects the 
power struggles between state and other actors. Ad hoc-ism as a decision-
making model serves as the framework to interpret data about decision making 
in the Salvadoran security policy and to understand the power struggle between 
state and other actors at a specific stage of the policy process. 
For this thesis public policy is defined with Jenkins as:  
                                            
20 For an overview of theoretical and methodological strands of policy research see Howlett et al.(2009) 
and Schubert and Bandelow (2009). 
21 Today, the term ‘policy analysis’ is more often used for approaches that concentrate on concrete policy 
outputs using quantitative methods. ‘Policy studies’ look more at policy processes in a holistic way 
(Howlett et al., 2009: 8). This work is an analysis in the sense of policy studies and therefore uses that 
term (interchangeably with policy research). I also use the terms ‘policy’ and ‘public policy’ 
interchangeably. ‘Policies’ also exist in the non-public realm but the interest of this work clearly is on 
public policy. Public policy describes policies that relate to state practices (even though, strictly speaking, 
these may also include goods and tasks that could be considered as private (Schneider and Janning, 2006: 
16).     
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a set of interrelated decisions taken by a political actor or group 
of actors concerning the selection of goals and the means of 
achieving them within a specified situation where those 
decisions should, in principle, be within the power of those 
actors to achieve. (Jenkins, 1978, cited after Howlett et al., 
2009: 6).  
As Howlett et al. have stated, this definition underscores that policy making is a 
dynamic process consisting of various decisions that are made in relation to 
context and content of an issue or theme. This holistic focus on the process 
goes along with Migdal’s concept of ‘doing the state’. According to Migdal 
(2001: 23) an important aspect of state/society interaction is the process-like 
character of group interactions. State and non-state forces not only mix with one 
another, they are also in constant flux throughout the struggles. There is no 
static picture of actors with fixed rules and goals. In this regard, this analysis 
looks at security policy making as a dynamic process. This notion of policy 
making as a process becomes visible in the so called policy cycle model which 
is explained further below. 
Jenkins’ definition shows a general problem of policy studies in so far as it 
assumes that political actors have the power to decide and to implement 
decisions. Constraints are usually only considered to appear within the political 
system, for example through limited time and financial resources or political 
opposition. It assumes that, even if there is no consent on a political issue, a 
community exists that has an interest in a certain topic, the so called sub-
system (Howlett et al., 2009: 82). This policy subsystem is described by 
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith as:  
an advocacy coalition [which] consists of actors from a variety 
of public and private institutions at all levels of government who 
share a set of basic beliefs (Jenkins, 1978, cited after Howlett et 
al., 2009: 6, emphasis added).  
This narrow analytical focus ignores that state actors can be influenced by 
social actors to the extent that ‘the selection of goals and the means of 
achieving them’ (ibid.) is essentially determined by the interest of social actors 
who may or may not share basic beliefs with political decision makers. In other 
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words, most policy studies ignore the power struggle between state and social 
forces. Here lies the contribution of Migdal’s concept because it points to the 
contestation of policy making. It questions the presumably inherent 
predominance of the state and asks what role society plays for state practices. 
Political decisions are contested by social and state actors. 
Based on Migdal’s conceptualisation of power struggles between state and 
social actors, I understand political decisions about security provision as 
reactions to or as part of these constant struggles. Through this lens, 
discontinuities in security policies become more comprehensible. This thesis 
uses the term ad hoc-ism to label a specific mode of state responses to 
problems of violence which appears especially when decisions are contested. 
The following paragraphs explain what ad hoc-ism and ad hoc decision making 
is.  
To set out these terms, a review of decision-making models as part of the public 
policy process is useful. An often used model to describe the public policy 
process is the policy cycle. This model is a heuristic tool which breaks the policy 
process down into several stages in order to reduce its complexity for analytical 
purposes (Blum and Schubert, 2011: 104, Howlett et al., 2009: 10). Being first 
introduced by Harold Lasswell in 1956, the model was slightly adapted and 
modified by other researchers and sometimes varies with regard to the names, 
order, and definition of stages. The thesis adheres to the model used by 
Michael Howlett and his colleagues who refer to earlier models developed by 
Brewer (1974), Jones (1984), and Anderson (1984). It comprises of five stages: 
Agenda setting (problems come to the attention of governments) – policy 
formulation (generating options on what to do about a public problem) – 
decision making (adopting a particular course of action) – policy implementation 
(put policies into effect) – policy evaluation (monitor the outcome of policies) 
(Howlett et al., 2009: 12). The model is called the policy cycle because the 
evaluation may lead to a reconceptualisation of the issue and may go through 
the different stages again. In practice, the policy process is not as linear as the 
model suggests. Instead, the stages overlap or their sequence is different or 
some stages do not appear at all (Sabatier, 2007). As mentioned above, the 
policy cycle is not a theory itself, but it is a heuristic tool to gain insight into 
policy processes. While the model as such is not suited to explore causalities it 
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has two essential advantages: first, by pointing to the importance of processes it 
does not give preference to either structure or agency (Blum and Schubert, 
2011: 133-134). Both structure and agency are considered to impact on social 
and political change. Structural features such as recurrent patterns of economic 
processes are important for gaining deep insight into the case study. They build 
the background against which agency (in the form of state practices) must be 
interpreted. Second, the model helps to articulate the specific analytical interest 
of the thesis. It is considered to be particularly useful for the purpose of this 
thesis because it distinguishes decision making from other stages of policy 
making. This allows for a closer empirical look at the decision-making stage 
which is of particular importance for this thesis.  
However, since policy making is not a strictly linear process, other stages will be 
considered too. The stages that precede and follow it (policy formulation and 
policy implementation respectively) are directly linked with decision making and, 
as such, will be dealt with within the analysis of the case of Salvadoran security 
policy: Any decisions of the FMLN government regarding its security policy were 
preceded by a process of generating policy options on security provision prior to 
the Presidential elections and early during the term. This does not imply that all 
policy decisions are part of a policy programme. To the contrary, it is important 
to acknowledge that decision makers may not adhere to programmatic outlines 
(Weiss, 1982). However, the decisions they make can still be considered as 
policy decisions. This means, a policy is more than a government programme. It 
describes the entire process of decisions made and implemented with regard to 
a specific policy area. This also implies that factors contributing to the success 
or failure of implementing a policy are not just found in the implementation stage 
but also in the decision-making stage. Therefore, implementation is not 
analysed as an isolated stage of the policy process but as being closely 
connected to decision making. From the theoretical perspective, this makes 
sense: Research showed that the success or failure of implementing a policy 
can only be explained with regard to previous policy stages (Schneider and 
Janning, 2006: 63). In this regard, there is heightened awareness of 
researchers for the interconnectedness of all policy stages (Jann and Wegrich, 
2009: 96-97). Also research which focuses solely on policy implementation is 
not as comprehensive as research on the previous stages. It would therefore be 
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difficult to draw on any studies that could guide the conceptualisation of such a 
focus.  
Agenda setting and policy evaluation as stages of policy making are touched 
upon in the contextual chapters. Agenda setting plays a role in the discussion   
about the rise of security as a political theme (Chapter Seven) and as a topic 
within the FMLN (Chapter Eight). The thesis touches upon policy evaluation in 
the empirical discussion (Chapters Nine and Ten), and reflecting on the results 
of the data analysis is similar to an evaluation of the FMLN’s security policy. 
However, there is no explicit focus on the existence or inexistence of an 
evaluation process in Salvadoran political circles.     
Decision making as part of the public policy process has been subject of many 
studies and brought forward several models. Howlett et al. (2009: 158) took the 
different strands of models and organised them into four categories: Ad hoc, 
rational, incremental, and negative decision making. However, Howlett’s ad hoc 
category is not well developed, instead it remained a rather vague idea of a 
decision-making mode that is not rational, incremental or negative. The thesis 
therefore briefly describes these other modes and, thereby, first explores what 
ad hoc-ism is not, before it constitutes what ad hoc-ism is. Negative decision 
making is the deliberate choice of decision makers to do nothing about a public 
problem and to retain the status quo, even though the problem is on the political 
agenda and a policy might have been formulated. The status quo is also 
retained with so called non-decisions. In contrast to negative decisions, non-
decisions mean that problems do not appear on the political agenda at all either 
because decision makers have the power to ignore problems or they are blind 
to the need to act on a problem (Howlett et al., 2009: 139-142, Blum and 
Schubert, 2011: 120-122). Rational and incremental decision making are two 
modes opposed to each other deriving from a controversial debate among 
policy researchers from the 1960s (Blum and Schubert, 2011: 147-148). 
Rationalism in this context means solving public problems by choosing the best 
of all alternative strategies after attributing costs and benefits to each 
alternative. This rather technical approach of maximising the expected outcome 
through a scientific mode has been criticised by incrementalists. This strand 
argues that the actual behaviour of decision makers is not as rational as rational 
models suggest, instead decisions depend on their political feasibility. The 
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incremental model was first developed by Charles Lindblom (1959: 88) who 
described it as ‘the science of muddling through’ in which decision making is the 
process of ‘continually building out from the current situation, step-by-step and 
by small degrees’. Without going into detail, this model also has its limitations in 
so far as it was criticised for the absence of the option of large-scale change 
and for assuming that decisions lack any goal orientation. However, Howlett et 
al. (2009: 149) acknowledged that, while neither incremental nor rational 
models accurately describe the decision-making process, both types as well as 
negative and non-decisions may appear in practice.  
Ad hoc decision making, according to Howlett et al., are neither rational (in the 
above described sense) nor incremental nor negative modes of decision-
making. Ad hoc decisions often ‘shuttl[e] between different alternatives over 
fairly short periods of time’ (Howlett et al., 2009: 158). This characteristic is 
based on the assumptions of the so called garbage-can model which sought to 
move beyond the rationalism/incrementalism divide. In this model, developed by 
Cohen, March, and Olsen (1972), decision making is considered to be a highly 
ambiguous process with no clear goals and unpredictable outcomes. The 
contingency of decisions is just one aspect of the garbage-can model. The 
approach assumes that solutions often exist before there is high awareness of a 
public problem, and solutions ‘wait’ to be implemented during a window of 
opportunity. This thought was developed further in the multiple streams 
approach by Kingdon (1984) and Zahariadis (1999).22 The central idea of ad 
hoc-ism refers to the frequent alteration of policy decisions. Decisions on how to 
deal with a public problem are made but are not implemented or insufficiently 
implemented because, within a short period of time, these decisions are either 
replaced or reversed or ignored. 
Furthermore, Howlett et al. distinguish decision-making modes by what they call 
the cohesion of the policy subsystem and the severity of policy constraints. High 
cohesion means that there is a high level of agreement among those actors 
involved in a particular decision-making process, that certain ideas and interests 
dominate within the policy subsystem, and that decision makers enjoy 
legitimacy within this subsystem. Low cohesion is the opposite of all this. Policy 
constraints refer to the complexity or intractability of the nature of the policy 
                                            
22 See Rüb (2009). 
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problem, time constraints, and the availability of information about a problem. 
Ad hoc decisions, according to Howlett’s taxonomy, most often appear where 
the cohesion of the policy subsystem is low. That is, the interests of the actors 
involved in the decision-making process are diverse. More specifically, they 
disagree on political options, and do not enjoy much legitimacy within the 
subsystem. The model also suggests that ad hoc-ism can be found when policy 
constraints are low, i.e. the complexity of the nature of the problem is 
manageable and sufficient time and information is provided. 
There are some limitations to the model developed by Howlett et al.  First, 
‘subsystem’ is not a useful analytical category because it is built on the 
assumption that policy is made by actors who share basic beliefs and enjoy 
legitimacy (as was criticised above). It ignores actors who contest such 
legitimacy. Issues of cohesion and contestation are more complex and need to 
be considered within the wider social and political context. In Michael Mann’s 
words, there are no subsystems because societies are not social systems, as 
such they are not an entity (Mann, 1994: 14; 30-34). This raises a question 
concerning the actors involved in the decision-making process. Or, put 
differently, it asks how actors take impact on decision making. In this regard, 
this thesis shares the assumption proposed in the policy cycle model, namely 
that principally only key government decision makers such as elected official, 
judges, and bureaucrats are able to make legally binding policy decisions 
(Howlett et al., 2009: 140). This is not to say that other actors like, for instance, 
lobby groups, do not impact on the decision-making process. However, the 
problem with the model is that it says nothing about how other actors do impact 
on the decisions that are made (or not made). Policy decisions are not 
necessarily contingent, as suggested by the garbage-can model. Often they are 
the product of the impact of social and state actors on decision makers. As 
argued with Migdal and Mann above, this study proposes that actors use their 
(ideological, economic, political, and coercive) sources of power to guide 
people’s social behaviour. This is often a competitive process at all stages of 
the policy process and leads actors to either accommodate with each other or 
keep struggling to be the rule-making organisation. Which actors are involved in 
the policy process, essentially depends on the policy area and on the case to be 
examined, and will be dealt with in the methodology (Chapter Four) and 
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empirical discussions (Chapters Nine and Ten). Likewise, the ways in which 
actors impact on the policy process are manifold and depend on the policy area 
and on other factors some of which are discussed below. Since this work 
focuses on the decision-making process in the security area, it builds on the 
assumption that social and state actors use their sources of power to impact on 
political decisions and their implementation in the field of security.    
Rejecting Howlett’s term ‘subsystem’ means that the two variables cohesion 
and constraints cannot be used in the way Howlett et al. suggested. Especially 
the thought that ad hoc decisions prevail where policy constraints are low does 
not follow a clear line of argument. It would be more logical to assume an ad 
hoc decision mode when the nature of the problem is very complex and in a 
policy context where time and information are limited. Due to this contradiction, 
constraints are not a feasible category to characterise ad hoc-ism.23 
Considering the degree of cohesion of the political context, on the other hand, 
seems useful, if we replace ‘subsystem’ with ‘actors involved in the policy 
process’. The more political and social actors disagree on a policy and the more 
diverse the interests of the involved actors are, the more difficult it will be to 
decide for one policy option. This scenario of low cohesion can be taken even 
further: if there are a considerable number of actors involved, and interests of 
the involved actors are not only diverse but adverse, there may be no cohesion 
at all and policy decision making is essentially contested. Even if decisions were 
taken, it will be difficult or impossible to implement the policy in the next step if 
resistance against the policy is high. This may lead to political paralysis where 
the public problem is not resolved, no matter what policy options were 
elaborated. The decision-making modes that are most often (but not 
exclusively) to be found in such a scenario of low or no cohesion are ad hoc 
and negative decision making because no government decision satisfies the 
interests of the ‘stakeholders’. Dissatisfied ‘stakeholders’ will mobilise their 
sources of power to contest decisions and their implications, and to fight for 
alternative decisions or to impede decision making altogether. The more actors 
with adverse interests there are involved, the more contested the policy 
                                            
23 Howlett’s variable ‘constraints’ builds on the previous work of other scholars, e.g. Lindblom (1959) 
and Forester (1984). They all agree that constraints such as limited time and limited information about an 
issue shape the decision-making process. However, so far, no convincing conceptualisation of the impact 
of constraints on the decision-making process exists. 
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decisions are: if an alternative decision was taken, it may be contested by yet 
another actor. The power of actors to obstruct any decisions (negative decision 
making) would be an interesting subject of study in this regard. However, since 
this work concentrates on decisions which were actually taken, the focus 
remains on ad hoc decisions.     
Another limitation of Howlett’s model is the assumption that decisions lead to 
change –either to linear or non-linear change. According to Howlett et al., ad 
hoc decision making is considered to have a tendency towards non-linear 
change, it is thus to be distinguished from incremental decisions which lead to 
linear, step-by-step change. Rational decisions, in this taxonomy, can lead to 
either linear or non-linear change. The only decision-making mode which 
considers inertia is negative decision making, following the simple logic of ‘no 
decision – no change’. However, this raises questions about the simplicity of the 
causal relation portrayed. We need to consider situations in which decisions are 
made with the intention for social change but do not result in substantial 
change. This option should be kept in mind when categorising decisions into 
these different modes. Especially ad hoc decisions may result in no substantial 
change, firstly, precisely because their implementation is often replaced by 
other decisions and the successive implementation. Secondly, because of their 
temporary character, they are not embedded in a profound long-term policy 
strategy which would include the other stages of the policy cycle.  
Based on the elaborations above, ad hoc decision making can be summarised 
as follows:  
- It appears where state and non-state actors use their power to impact on 
and contest decisions of decision makers in formal offices, involved 
actors have adverse interests, and resistance against (or attempts to 
influence) the policy is high. 
- It means that strategic long-term decisions are either easily replaced or 
ignored or reversed by short-term decisions. Short-term decisions are 
often unrelated to any strategy. 
- Ad hoc-ism has a temporary character (which means decisions are either 
provisional measures or soon replaced). 
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- It assumes that political awareness of the problem is high, and decisions 
are made with the intention to solve a problem.24  
With regard to the effects of ad hoc decision making, it is assumed that: 
- Comprehensive and/or long-term strategic decisions are not or 
insufficiently implemented because decisions are either ignored or easily 
replaced or reversed by short-term decisions which are often unrelated to 
the long-term strategy. 
- Public problems remain unsolved because ad hoc decisions do not result 
in substantial change. 
There is a relation between ad hoc decision making and the above given 
characteristics, but not necessarily a causal one. That is, not every ad hoc 
decision-making process is marked by these characteristics, and in turn not 
every policy situation in which the characteristics are found, can be labelled as 
ad hoc decision making. As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, 
substantial attention is paid to the contestation of policy decisions and the 
power struggle between state and non-state actors. This is at the core of the 
empirical analysis. The power struggle described above may take place at 
various policy fields and at various stages of the policy process but the focus of 
the analysis is on its appearance in security decision making as one example of 
security practices. Based on the conceptualisation of contested policy 
processes the following chapter sets out the methodology of the study. 
  
                                            
24 The degree of awareness and the intention for change are not the same as the perceived gravity of the 
problem or how thoroughly the problem is analysed. In the model outlined here, the perception of a public 
problem would be considered to be a policy constraint which also shape the decision-making process but 
are not subject of analysis here. Hence, there is no particular focus on the perception of (in)security in this 
work. 
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4. Research design: decision making in security policy in El 
Salvador 
4.1 Introduction 
With the conceptual framework at hand, this chapter sets out the methodology 
of the study. The Salvadoran case study aims to show that the lack of security 
provision in a violence prone society cannot just be comprehended from the 
perspective of institutional reforms. It can also be explained through policy 
processes, especially through decision-making processes. This is demonstrated 
by the analysis of the security policy under the FMLN government in El 
Salvador between 2009 and 2014 with special focus on police and prison 
reforms. This thesis asks why institutional security reforms in El Salvador 
between 2009 and 2014 did not result in a reduction of violence. It examines 
how the FMLN government (2009-2014) responded to violence in El Salvador. 
On that basis it goes on to explain why the FMLN government was not able to 
implement its far-reaching and well-designed security plans. 
This chapter identifies a case study approach as the appropriate way to conduct 
the policy study and explains why the case of security policy making in El 
Salvador was chosen. The chapter underscores that the case of El Salvador is 
suited for the research goal of explaining the failure of intrastate security 
provision in societies with widespread criminal violence and in a state that does 
not have a legitimate monopoly of violence. It elaborates on how the research 
questions above will be answered by analysing two arenas of decision making, 
one dealing with the Salvadoran police and the other with prison reforms as a 
response to gang violence (Section 4.2). The chapter presents the three data 
collection methods used (semi-structured interviews, field observation, and 
document analysis) and shows how access to the field was sought, including 
what difficulties emerged during empirical investigations (Section 4.3). 
Moreover, it briefly elaborates on how data was analysed and interpreted, using 
NVivo software (Section 4.4). Finally, Section 4.5 explains how ethical concerns 
during fieldwork were addressed by paying special attention to cultural 
differences between research participants and the researcher/the researcher’s 
university.   
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4.2 Case selection 
4.2.1 Why choose a case study as the methodological approach?   
Singular and comparative case studies are common methodological 
approaches in qualitative policy research because they allow for deep insight 
into a public policy process as well as detailed description and analysis of a 
specific field (Schneider and Janning, 2006: 41, Burnham, 2008: 63). As this 
work’s purpose is to gain detailed insight into the field of security policy it follows 
this fundamental thought and adopts a singular case study design as the 
feasible methodological approach. A number of additional reasons justify this 
decision. First of all, the focus is on a single policy area, and the idea is to 
collect as much data as possible on this specific policy area in order to 
substantiate the arguments put forward: political, economic, and military elites 
were powerful enough to significantly alter the security policy of the FMLN 
government. The power struggle between the FMLN government and these 
elites undermined the development of stable democratic security institutions. 
The study comprises of a small exploratory part (How did the FMLN 
government respond to violence in El Salvador between 2009 and 2014?). 
However, it mainly is an explanatory study as the main research question 
suggests: Why did institutional security reforms in El Salvador between 2009 
and 2014 not result in a reduction of violence? The aim is to create a 
comprehensive account of specific security responses of the FMLN government 
(Burnham, 2008: 66). This allows me to substantiate the line of argument 
throughout the thesis. Robert Yin (2009: 8) proposed that three conditions point 
to the methodology of a case study: 1.) If the type of research question(s) is 
Why? or How?; 2.) if the researcher has little or no control over the event(s) or 
area which are/is being investigated; and 3.) if the focus is mainly on 
contemporary as opposed to historical events. All of these conditions are met. 
The methods for data collection used in this study (interviews, observation, 
document analysis; see below for details) have no influence on the course of 
security policy in El Salvador. The focus is on policy decisions and their 
implications in the recent past. In fact, not having any control over actual events 
even required (re)adapting the research design during data collection because 
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unforeseen decisions were made (Section 4.3). The focus is on a contemporary 
issue within its real-life context, even though historical developments are being 
taken into account.  
The disadvantages of an in-depth study are its limits regarding the 
generalisation of its findings (Burnham, 2008: 64). There are similarities with 
other cases of security decision making in violence-prone societies, and it is the 
goal of this thesis to add new thoughts and perspectives to the broader debate 
on understanding state responses to violence beyond the case of El Salvador. 
The arguments of this work are specifically generated in the context of the 
security policy process in El Salvador between 2009 and 2014, therefore their 
transferability to other cases needs to be tested for each case. However, the 
conceptual framework was also shaped to enable the exploration of some 
underlying suggestions that allow me to contribute to the broader debate about 
state responses to violence. Broadening our knowledge about why security 
provision fails by adding the perspective of security practices is the original 
contribution of the research. The case study is suited to show that more 
attention needs to be paid to the decision makers within the societies affected 
by social violence. These decision makers which are identified below are the 
ones who are responsible for drafting and implementing security policies 
against the resistance of powerful elites. 
 
4.2.2 Why choose a case study about security policy making in El 
Salvador? 
As mentioned before, the case study deals with security policy-making in El 
Salvador under the FMLN government 2009-2014. The specific choices to 
explore security policy making in the country of El Salvador and particularly in 
the timeframe of the first FMLN government were guided by a thoughtful 
selection process. 
The most straight forward reason for choosing El Salvador lies in its high levels 
of social violence. Despite extensive security reforms after the Peace 
Agreement in 1992, homicide rates increased dramatically and remain at high 
levels. As outlined in the introduction, El Salvador has one of the highest 
homicide rates in the world. El Salvador is a showcase of institutional security 
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reforms which did not result in a reduction of violence. This applies to the post-
war reforms as well as to reforms under the Funes government. As such, the 
case suits the thesis’ purpose of explaining this contradiction with the impact of 
powerful state and non-state elites on policy making. 
In the light of the magnitude of social violence (which is depicted in greater 
detail in Section 7.5) and its devastating consequences, security provision is not 
just a problem of a single policy area, but it is one of the most burning political 
questions in contemporary El Salvador. In the conceptual part of this work 
(Section 3.3), I referred to the five stages of policy making: Agenda setting, 
policy formulation, decision making, policy implementation, and policy 
evaluation. Security provision as a political subject is already on the political 
agenda in El Salvador. From the conceptual perspective, it is therefore possible 
to concentrate on the core stages of the policy cycle, the decision-making 
process, with reference to the previous policy formulation and the subsequent 
implementation stage. 
The FMLN government’s security policy is particularly interesting because it 
represents a change to previous government security approaches. Under the 
twenty years of the rule of the right-wing ARENA party (1989-2009), the state’s 
security and justice sector failed to contain and prevent violence (Section 7.3). 
In 2009, for the first time in Salvadoran history, a leftist government came to 
power. The FMLN which was once an insurgent group had transformed into a 
key political party seeking to build a state which is responsive to the needs of 
those large parts of the population which are affected by poverty and violence. 
The FMLN was one of the few left governments in the region which proactively 
addressed security issues. Prior to the presidential elections in 2009 the party 
elaborated a security approach that would differ significantly from the repressive 
policy of mano dura as it developed a vision of citizen security that reflected the 
‘post-neoliberal’ (Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2012) ideas of rapprochement between 
the state and non-elite parts of the society. However, the policy was not 
followed through in practice. A few months after taking power the original plans 
were neglected. The thesis asks why this was the case. The insufficient 
implementation of security policies is a problem that is not unique to El 
Salvador. Hence, understanding the reasons of failure is not only relevant for 
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security provision in El Salvador but can provide a useful starting point for the 
analysis of security policies of other violent-prone countries.  
Another reason for choosing the case of El Salvador lies in the country’s history. 
The formation of the Salvadoran state in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
century is closely linked with the emergence of a strong local coffee elite. 
Economic resources were, by far, a more important source of power than any 
political authority. El Salvador had no strong state centre; hence, a state 
monopoly over violence was not developed. The contemporary power struggle 
between state and social actors has its roots in this historical lack of a monopoly 
over violence, and state responses to violence can only be understood against 
this historical background. Chapter Five addresses these structural features in 
greater detail.  
Finally, personal impressions mattered. I started this research project with the 
intention to better understand why it was so difficult to contain violence in El 
Salvador. During a preparatory visit to El Salvador in 2011 I talked to a number 
of security experts from NGOs, the government, academia, and the police to get 
a clearer picture of the most burning questions regarding state security 
strategies. The question that most people were asking me was why the Funes 
government which had started out with so much ambition and hope for change 
was not able to realise its vision of citizen security. It was almost as if I was 
given this as homework to figure out what went wrong. This way the research 
question emerged by itself from within the research environment.  
 
4.2.3 Why choose police and prison reforms? 
In the following part of this chapter the design of the case study is explained in 
greater detail. The empirical research begins with exploring how the FMLN 
government responded to violence (Chapter Eight). A comparison of the 
FMLN’s security plans at the beginning of the term and their (lack of) realisation 
until the end of the term shows the discontinuity of the policy. This serves to 
justify the main research question (why did the FMLN government fail) which is 
addressed in Chapters Nine and Ten. 
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Using the previously defined characteristics of ad hoc decision making, the case 
study analyses the security decision-making process under the Funes 
government. As mentioned earlier, at the core of the analysis is the argument 
that economic, military, and political elites are powerful enough to contest and 
significantly alter policies of the official decision makers. The characteristics of 
ad hoc decision making provide a way to make this impact tangible. This 
includes determining which key actors were involved, and what their sources of 
power were. 
Empirical research concentrates on two specific arenas where security policy 
decisions are essentially contested: decisions regarding the professionalisation 
of the police, and decisions that affect institution building at prisons. Both fields 
are central elements of security provision but received different levels of 
attention. Internationally, the UN were one of the first organisations sending 
field missions to reform police forces in post-war environments in the 1990s – 
including in El Salvador but also in Haiti, Eastern Slavonia, Kosovo, and East 
Timor. Bilateral police training programmes have an even longer history (see 
Section 7.4.1 on the US sponsored International Criminal Investigative Training 
Assistance Program (ICITAP) in 1986). SSR was the effort to provide a more 
holistic reform approach not only for police forces but for all security actors that 
were believed to be relevant for a stable and ‘secure environment that is 
conducive to development, poverty reduction and democracy’ (OECD, 2005: 
16). Yet, other approaches to conceptualise such reforms (e.g. as democratic 
policing or post-conflict police reforms) do also exist, and there is abundant 
academic literature on the topic (Hansen, 2002, Bailey and Dammert, 2006a, 
Hills, 2009, Uildriks, 2009, Baker, 2010, Ryan, 2011, Francis, 2012).  
Similarly, efforts by international and bilateral development aid to support 
reforms of the penal system were integrated in the SSR approach to better 
connect it with other reforms. However, in practice prison reforms never 
received the widespread attention police reforms did – neither from the 
international community nor from scholars (Rico, 1997, Dammert and Zuñiga, 
2008, Bastick, 2010, Müller, 2012b, Macaulay, 2013, Rosen and Brienen, 
2015). A similar picture arises at the national level. Whereas the Salvadoran 
police was at the centre of security reforms after the war, prisons did not play 
any role in the reform process. This lack of attention continued under ARENA 
 65 
 
governments (Section 7.3). Thus, since not all security policy decisions and 
state and non-state actors involved in them can be analysed, two distinct areas 
of security reforms with very different starting positions for the FMLN 
government were chosen for this study. This serves the purpose of an in-depth 
analysis of the case.   
The two arenas are not treated as two different case studies because they are 
both in the realm of security policy which means decision makers are often the 
same. In the same way, policy decisions are connected in the sense that often 
both fields are affected by the same decisions and take place in a similar 
political context.25 They are not suited for comparison because they are not 
different enough since in both instances cohesion of the involved actors is low 
or almost non-existent (see Section 3.3 on the issue of cohesion). However, the 
case study’s explicit objective is to gain deep insight into security policy-making 
under the Funes administration. Therefore, exploring two arenas will shed more 
light on this topic than exploring only one arena. This is specifically true with 
regard to the argument that the power struggles undermined the institutional 
development because the effects of policy decisions will differ due to the 
different content of the decisions. This allows for a deeper understanding of the 
implications of contested policy making. 
The first arena is the Salvadoran police as a state force that is particularly 
important for both state-society relations and security provision. It will give 
insight into the relationship between the Salvadoran state and society in the 
field of domestic security due to frequent and diverse points of contacts 
between the police and society. As mentioned above, the Salvadoran police 
underwent comprehensive institutional reforms since the signing of the Peace 
Accords in 1992, not least with support of the international community. The 
focus of the study is on the attempts of the FMLN government to further 
professionalise the National Civilian Police (PNC) as part of their security 
strategy.  
The second arena deals with the prison policy. In contrast to the PNC, 
Salvadoran prisons are very little institutionalised and received less political 
                                            
25 Although the two arenas are not treated as two separate case studies in a methodological sense, 
occasionally I refer to them as cases. This is purely for the better flow of the text. 
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attention over the last three decades since the Peace Accords. The FMLN 
needed to address the growing power of youth gangs, the so called maras, 
which permeates the Salvadoran society through physical violence, extortion, 
threats of violence, and territorial claims. Their strategy aimed at establishing 
preventive and reintegrating measures. It also aimed at building an improved 
prison infrastructure since many (but not all) prisoners were gang members and 
prisons were known to exacerbate problems of gang violence. The study shows 
that the course of prison reforms can only be explained through the 
government’s actual responses to gang violence. This research first explores 
prison reform plans at the beginning of the term. The study then analyses the 
relationship between the government and the gangs which culminated in the 
gang truce 2012/2013 and its effects on the progress of prison reforms. 
The analysis considers both cases to be arenas, that is, both the police and the 
prison system are not comprehended as unified state organisations but as 
arenas of power struggles between multiple state and social actors. The 
advantage of using Migdal’s notion of arenas is the conceptual openness to the 
role of non-state actors. The difficulty, however, consists in determining the 
frame of an arena. What constitutes an arena and how can it be 
operationalised? As outlined in Section 3.2.1, Migdal (2001: 117-123) 
maintained that within society’s multiple arenas, there are four different levels in 
which state and society interact and on which state officials encounter pressure, 
ranging from the daily struggle of civil servants to the top leaders of the state. 
These levels provided a first point of orientation in the process of identifying 
relevant state actors. These actors comprised, for example, the President, the 
Ministry of Justice and Security, members of the Legislative Assembly, the 
Police and Prison Directorate, police officers, and prison guards. However, the 
concrete arena which also includes the relevant non-state actors can only be 
operationalised with the insights from the policy cycle model. To identify all 
relevant actors, the focus of the analysis has to be on the policy process and, 
more precisely, on the decision-making process. The policy decisions are at the 
heart of the analysis. This means, the study has an explorative design. Not only 
does the choice to focus on specific policy decisions emerge from the data. The 
same applies for the actors involved and affected by the decision making 
process. With Migdal’s levels and the policy decisions to be analysed in mind, 
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preliminary conversations and readings as well as the actual fieldwork 
interviews revealed who these actors were. The emphasis of the research is on 
decision making at the national level since this is the realm where public 
security policies are decided. This implies a focus on the central offices like the 
Security Ministry, the parliament, national agencies, and the Presidency. In 
addition, a look at the ‘local’ level is necessary to understand the effects of 
national security policies. Thus, the effects of security decisions which relate to 
the specific arenas – policing and the prison system – are explored by gathering 
data within the relevant environments (the police and prisons) and from people 
affected by the policy decisions. Relevant non-state actors were, for example, 
the US Embassy, business elites, the mediators of the gang truce and 
international organisations like the OAS. The following section shows how these 
actors were approached as interview partners.  
 
4.3 Field access and data collection methods 
Since the purpose of this case study is to gain deep insight into security 
decision making under the Funes administration, semi-structured interviews 
were chosen as the main method for data collection, supported by document 
analysis and field observation. Data was collected during three fieldwork trips. 
During the four weeks preparatory visit in 2011 the feasibility of the research 
was examined, first contacts were established, and the scope of the case study 
was limited to the police and prison arena.26 The bulk of data was collected from 
February to April 2012 and in February and March 2013.  
Based on preliminary conversations and reading, different groups were 
identified as relevant interviewees.27 First, an important group of experts to be 
consulted with regard to the original FMLN security policy were those involved 
in its development.28 Second, interviews with key decision makers and/or with 
people in their immediate environment (especially where key decision makers 
were not available) were needed. Here, interviews were arranged with officials 
                                            
26 Interviews from this trip are listed as background interviews in the appendix. 
27 See appendix for complete list of interviews. 
28 FMLN security experts often also held a position in state organisations; they are therefore not counted 
separately as security experts in the interview list. 
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at the Ministry of Justice and Public Security (including Minister David Munguía 
Payés (2011-2013), Vice Minister Douglas Moreno (2012-2013), and Ex 
Minister Manuel Melgar (2009-2011)), members of the Security Cabinet29, 
members of the Legislative Assembly, bureaucrats working on state 
modernisation30, and political advisers. A third group comprised PNC officials 
involved in the professionalisation process at the police. Interviews were 
conducted with current and former executive staff members and other (ex-) 
officials in leading positions.31 Interviews were also sought with ‘ordinary’ police 
officers who did not hold a leading position but both officers that were 
approached withdrew their consent before the meeting. Fourth, state officials 
from the penitentiary system were able to give insight into prison politics while 
visiting prisons and talking to inmates, employees, and human rights lawyers 
would inform data about the impact of prison-related security decisions.  
In both arenas, the PNC and the prisons, gaining access required some effort 
and time but eventually was successful (see below for more details). Due to the 
close connection between prison reforms and the government’s gang policy, 
interviews with gang members were also considered to be a valid source of 
data. However, gang members represented only one group among the broad 
range of interviewees, and establishing access to gang members was both 
dangerous and time consuming. Hence, only two gang members were 
interviewed.  
Establishing access to other non-state actors like representatives from business 
elites, criminal networks, the military, and international actors (especially the 
US) proved to be more challenging. In order to gain a business perspective on 
security issues, interviews were conducted with FUSADES employees 
(Salvadoran Foundation for Economic and Social Development, a think tank 
that was founded by the conservative coffee elite, see Chapter Five), with the 
director of the DTJ foundation (Democracy, Transparency, Justice foundation, a 
                                            
29 The Security Cabinet was a newly created institution of the Funes administration and initially 
comprised the leaders of all important security institutions: the Minister and Vice minister of the Ministry 
of Justice and Public Security (MJSP), Minister of Defence, PNC Director and Subdirector, Head of 
Prison Directorate, Head of Police Academy, Head of the Parliamentarian Security Commission, Attorney 
General, Director for Migration, and the Secretary for Strategic Issues.  
30 The FMLN Government had created a Secretary of Governance and State Modernisation 
(Subsecretario de Gobernabilidad y Modernicación del Estado) which belonged to the Secretary for 
Strategic Issues; interviews were conducted with the Secretary and the Head of Department of Political 
Reforms and Citizen Participation. 
31 To protect sources, details on the exact positions are withheld. 
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think tank funded and overseen by business elites), and with Rodrigo Ávila (a 
business consultant on private security, ARENA presidential candidate in 2009, 
and ex-police director (1994-1999, 2006-2008)). One ARENA Parliamentarian 
was also known to have his own business. A military perspective was only 
possible to obtain through talks with one Parliamentarian who was a retired 
colonel and with Security Minister Munguía Payes, who previously had been the 
Minister of Defence (2009-2011). International organisations were mainly 
relevant as donors of security reforms but were, at the time of field research, 
less involved in prison reforms. Police reforms were supported by consultancy 
from a sub-contractor of USAID who had already left the country at the time of 
field research. One interview with a member of the US Embassy added some 
knowledge about the US perspective. Some information was collected about the 
impact of criminal networks on the security policy but no interviews were 
conducted due to safety risks and difficult access. 
Additional information was sought through conversations with people with a 
certain degree of expertise on the subject, such as NGO employees, lawyers, 
community workers, journalists, Salvadoran academics, and church leaders. 
These interviews proved to be significant sources of data especially in cases 
where actors were difficult to access.   
Altogether, 61 interviews were conducted and whenever possible recorded.32 
Due to the nature of the topic and the FMLN being the ruling party, interview 
partners that were affiliated with the FMLN outnumbered those with another 
party affiliation, but interviews were also conducted with ARENA 
parliamentarians, persons with links to ARENA, and those with no particular or 
another political affiliation. Only in a small number of interviews the political 
affiliation was not revealed or not addressed explicitly. As the following chapters 
will show, the political affiliation is of considerable importance since some 
                                            
32 In a number of cases, interview partners had more than one function, e.g. the Vice Minister of Security 
was the previous head of the Prison Directorate, and one ARENA parliamentarian was a retired coronel. 
People also changed their position over the course of the fieldwork. The interview list refers to the main 
position interview partners held at the moment of the interview. Occasionally, more than one interview 
was conducted with the same person; and sometimes two or more people were interviewed at the same 
time (see interview list in the appendix). I had no permission to record the nine interviews that took place 
inside prisons; therefore only written notes could be taken. In seven other cases, interview partners 
preferred not to be recorded, and in two cases the talk was not recorded due to technical issues. Except for 
one case in which notes were taken from memory after the conversation, I had permission to take notes 
during all talks. 
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conflicts about security policies can only be understood against the background 
of the historical polarisation between the Left and the Right.  
Talks were roughly organised into four groups: 1) interviews about the FMLN 
security policy; 2) interviews about the reform process at the police; 3) 
interviews about prison reforms and the gang policy; 4) interviews about several 
of these topics and other security issues. Based on these types, they followed 
three previously developed interview guides, the latter type being a mix of the 
first types and other unrelated questions. The questions of the interview guides 
were developed according to the research question and research topics and 
sub-topics. After the first informative field visit, sub-topics were developed that 
would inform data collection and, at a later stage, data analysis. These sub-
topics were allotted with indicators which would help develop concrete 
questions. Some examples of previously developed sub-topics and indicators 
are given below: 
Sub-topic Indicators 
FMLN security policy FMLN security understanding, development 
of the policy, shortcomings of the policy  
Police reforms Police training and formation, promotion and 
hierarchies, Community policing, monitoring 
mechanisms  
Effect of deployment of military 
in prisons 
Effects on safety, riots, gang activities, 
rehabilitation 
Political decision-making 
process 
Decision-making authorities, their legitimacy, 
their values and attitudes, legislative process, 
decision-making structures 
  
During data collection and analysis some sub-topics turned out to be more 
useful than others; some were not useful at all because data was insufficient or 
difficult to gather, others had to be changed, and new sub-topics had to be 
added. The flexibility of this semi-structured data collection and analysis 
framework was necessary in order to examine security decision making in 
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depth. One of the main challenges of data collection was the need to re-adapt 
the research design in the light of the rapidly changing security environment 
without changing the whole research topic. A stricter framework with fixed sub-
topics and standard questions would have failed to take into account the real-
life context of Salvadoran policy making. Some of the most far-reaching security 
decisions were taken during the fieldwork period, often in reaction to (at least for 
the researcher) unforeseen events. Two decisions and events significantly 
altered the environment of security policy-making: The resignation of Security 
Minister Manuel Melgar in November 2011 which led to a change of personnel 
at various security institutions, and the truce between El Salvador’s two major 
gangs, the Mara Salvatrucha and Barrio 18 which went public in March 2012. 
Questions about these events and decisions were impossible to anticipate a 
priori. Therefore, interview guides were semi-structured and adapted to the 
specific situations. The concrete questions were also tailored to the 
interviewee’s position and expertise. Sometimes questions were adjusted 
during the conversation if the interview partner revealed a certain area of 
knowledge that was not anticipated.33 All interviews, except for one, were 
conducted in Spanish and usually lasted between 30 and 90 minutes.34 They 
were transcribed by students of the Central American University (UCA) in San 
Salvador. All students were native speakers which increased the quality of the 
transcripts since I could have missed or misunderstood some content of the 
interviews due to language issues. In practical terms, having help in transcribing 
interviews saved a lot of time. To ensure the accuracy of the transcripts, I 
proofread the transcribed interviews while listening to the corresponding audio 
record.     
In addition to the interviews, data was also collected through field observation. 
This includes observations of daily life with relevance to the topic while 
conducting research in El Salvador, observations during particular security-
related events, and observations made within the context of interviews.35 
Observations of daily life provided an ethnographic perspective on the security 
                                            
33 On this specific advantage of semi-structured interviews see Bryman (2004: 320-333). 
34 All translations from Spanish to English in this work are by the author. 
35 Although I participated in some events with the particular objective to gain information by listening to 
the talk I refrain from calling this method participant observation since my role was more that of an 
observer than a participant. On the roles of researchers between participant and observer in ethnographic 
research see Gold (1958). 
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conditions in my immediate environment, e.g. occasional short talks to the 
security guards in the neighbourhood where I lived during field research, 
noticing the presence of soldiers patrolling on the streets, and the experience of 
taking the public bus which included a quasi-assault.36 Participating in security-
related events became another important source of information, as they not only 
gave insights into national and local debates on the issue and thus deepened 
my understanding of the complexity of security problems and their possible 
solutions. They also served as an excellent platform to establish contacts to 
potential interview partners. Among these events were: an event for the 
presentation of the PNC gender policy, two roundtables of the FMLN to prepare 
the security policy for the following presidential term, five public talks about 
particular security issues (e.g. the gang truce), and the municipal and 
parliamentary elections in March 2012 during which I participated as an official 
election observer for the Iniciativa Social para la Democracia (ISD, Social 
Initiative for Democracy), a national NGO which monitors the political culture in 
El Salvador.  
Observations which were made in the context of conducting interviews also 
represent a source of information since in some instances the venue was of 
interest to the research. This is particularly the case for the three times where 
interviews were conducted in the prisons La Esperanza (or Mariona as most 
Salvadorans call it) in the capital San Salvador and Apanteos in the town of 
Santa Ana in the Western part of the country. Observations were also made 
during a visit to a re-integrative project for common (i.e. not gang-affiliated) ex-
prisoners in Santa Ana, and during a meeting with two gang members at a re-
integrative project in the periphery of San Salvador. All observations were noted 
in a research diary and used as additional information during data analysis. 
Schatzman and Strauss (1973) suggested that fieldnotes can be organised in 
three categories: observational notes which are statements gathered through 
watching and listening without interpreting them yet, theoretical notes which are 
attempts to derive meaning from observational notes, and methodological notes 
                                            
36 On the one hand, it is common for street vendors, street musicians, and beggars to get on the public bus 
and sell little things, do a performance, and ask for change (which is voluntary to give). On the other 
hand, buses are frequent targets of assaults. At the time of the truce, gang members developed the tactic to 
hop on the bus and ask for ‘voluntary’ financial support pretending that their ‘regular’ income (through 
extortions and robberies) had ceased due to the truce. During the quasi-assault I experienced, the gang 
members’ presence created a strong atmosphere of threat on the bus; after almost all passengers had given 
some money, including me, they left.     
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which help the researcher reflect on the operational side of data collection. 
According to Schatzman and Strauss, this categorisation can happen either 
deliberately during fieldwork or in hindsight, as naturally notes fall within one of 
the categories. Either way, it is a useful method to trace and reflect upon the 
research process, and to develop propositions from the gathered evidence. For 
this research, those notes falling into the category of observational and 
theoretical notes were considered to be relevant for the analysis, while the 
methodological notes were mainly relevant during data gathering. Observational 
notes referred to the events and moments described above and were coded in 
the same way other materials were coded (see Section 4.4 below). Theoretical 
notes were mainly used during the process of data analysing and interpreting 
(Section 4.4).  
A third method, besides interviews and field observation, was collecting and 
analysing documents. This served the purpose to complement information and 
impressions from the interviews and observations and to gain information on 
topics that were difficult to cover through interviews and observation. The most 
important documents were the FMLN’s security policy, the Política de Justicia, 
Seguridad y Convivencia (PJSC, Policy of Justice, Security, and Living 
Together) in earlier and later versions. Added to these were policy papers from 
NGOs and state organisations (e.g. on the modernisation of the penitentiary 
infrastructure, state modernisation, police professionalisation, the human rights 
situation), newspaper articles,37 legal decrees, crime and development 
statistics, surveys, and academic articles and books from Salvadoran 
researchers (which can be difficult to obtain outside of El Salvador). Except for 
the prison and social project in Santa Ana, all interview partners, events and 
archives were based in or near the capital San Salvador.38   
 
                                            
37 Most newspaper articles derive from the following Salvadoran sources: La Prensa Gráfica, a moderate-
conservative, fairly independent newspaper; El Faro, an online newspaper with a critical, independent 
stance; El Diario de Hoy, a conservative newspaper; Diario Co-Latino, a small leftist newspaper; 
ContraPunto, a leftist online newspaper.    
38 Since nearly all interviews took place in San Salvador, references to interviews do only indicate the 
place when the interview had not been conducted in San Salvador. 
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4.4 Data analysis 
All data, including interview transcripts, documents, and notes from the 
research diary, was organised around sub-topics, using NVivo software. This 
software is particularly useful in qualitative research as it allows for structuring 
large amounts of text (and audio) based materials. As described above, some 
of the sub-topics (or nodes, in the software language) had been developed 
previously, some emerged during data collection, and new sub-topics were 
added while organising the data.  
Besides allocating the materials to specific nodes, nodes were categorised into 
four broad groups: material concerning the police, material concerning prisons 
and gangs, material comprising of other specific information (like the FMLN 
history) and materials that where relevant for the overall picture of security 
policy making (like interview responses that revealed a specific understanding 
of security). This made it easier to recognise patterns and relationships between 
nodes and provided the necessary overview over the different materials needed 
for each chapter or section.  
Interpreting the data was a balancing act of distinguishing between facts and 
perceptions. First, I determined whether it was of more significance for the study 
to learn about an actual fact or about the perception of an interviewee. When 
the purpose was to learn about the facts of a particular situation or event and 
interview responses seemed to represent a personal opinion, I searched for 
additional facts to validate statements. However, at other points it was of more 
importance for the project to understand perceptions portrayed by actors. In 
these cases, the narrating line of interview responses was more relevant as it 
revealed how actors made sense of particular events or situations. This was for 
instance the case with the political polarisation of the Left and the Right and its 
effects on policing. To understand how polarisation affected policing, I had to 
get a sense of how decision-makers and police officers viewed their 
‘opponents’.  
As mentioned in the case selection, the choice to focus on specific policy 
decisions emerged from the data: during data collection, specific situations and 
events appeared to be decisive for the development of the security policy, such 
as the replacement of the Security Minister and the gang truce. Likewise, the 
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focus on relevant actors was guided by the aim to comprehend connections 
between decisions of policy makers and the environment in which these 
decisions were made. Based on this explorative mode, the subsections in both 
arenas were developed. For instance, for the power struggle between the 
government and the gangs, three aspects were found to be relevant: the 
deployment of the military to the prison perimeters, the anti-gang law, and the 
gang truce. These aspects structure the analysis of the decision-making 
process in the case of prison reforms (Chapter Ten). 
 
4.5 Cultural sensitivity and ethical responsibility during data 
collection 
4.5.1 Communication and informed consent in high and low context 
cultures 
Most international research projects have to deal with cultural differences that 
impact on the relationship between researcher and participants. Ethical 
research principles such as informed consent, confidentiality and avoiding harm 
for participants and researchers are important aspects that need to be 
considered during research (Economic and Social Research Council, 2010, 
updated 2012, Social Research Association, 2003, British Sociological 
Association, 2002). Yet, little is written about cultural sensitivity in an 
international research environment although it is crucial for successful 
communication during data collection. Being aware of differences between the 
researcher’s cultural background (German, affiliated at a British university) and 
the cultural background of most research participants (Salvadoran) was vital to 
avoid misunderstandings and create a positive research environment.  
Edward Hall’s (1976) classic work about high and low context cultures helps us 
reflect on how forms of communication vary among cultures. His book, Beyond 
Culture, has become standard literature for academics and practitioners of 
intercultural communication. Hall described high context cultures as cultures in 
which communication depends a lot on the context in which it takes place: often 
things are left unsaid, the meaning of words can only be grasped with sufficient 
background information. It describes communication between people who often 
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know each other well and for a long time, so they understand each other with a 
less verbally explicit form of communication. In such a context, face-to-face 
communication is important and decisions can be made dependent from the 
situation. Communication in low context cultures, on the other side, is made 
explicit, thus the content of the message is in the words that are said or written. 
In such an environment information is made accessible for people who do not 
necessarily know each other, i.e. in short term relations or communication in the 
public. Usually communication has a more stringent structure to make it 
understandable with less context knowledge.  
Both forms of communication can be found in each society, in dependence of 
milieu, class, and education etc. However, in most societies there is a tendency 
to either high or low context communication. The first authors who categorised 
societies into high and low context cultures were Copeland and Griggs (1986). 
Although Latin American societies were not among Copeland and Griggs’ 
categorisations, most intercultural trainings and textbooks of intercultural 
business communication refer to Latin America as high context cultures.  By 
contrast, most western societies are considered to be low context cultures. 
Based on my own experience in Central America, I follow this assumption and 
consider communication in El Salvador to have a tendency towards a high 
context culture. The cultural background of the university at which the research 
project is based (British) and of my own origin (German) is that of low context 
cultures. In societies with a predominantly low context culture (like the UK or 
Germany) signs and written instructions play an important role. In high context 
cultures (like El Salvador) information is absorbed through the social context.  
The different forms of communication in high and low context culture point to 
the deeper level of behavioural norms, Hooker (2003, 2012) wrote. He 
distinguished between rule-based and relationship-based cultures.  
Behavior in relationship-based cultures is regulated through 
close supervision by authority figures. This requires that 
authority be respected, and it therefore resides in persons with 
whom one has significant relationships, such as parents, elders, 
bosses (Hooker, 2012: 394).  
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Because relationships with authority figures are close, behavioural norms are 
usually implicit in the situation, Hooker noted. High-context communication is 
therefore more common in relationship-based cultures. 
Low context cultures are rule-based, Hooker argued. In both types of cultures 
respect for rules plays a role. However, the motivation for respecting rules 
differs. According to Hooker, people in rule-based cultures respect rules for their 
own sake. The enforcement of rules does not depend on personal relationships 
to an authority figure. The result is low context communication, the author 
argued. In relationship-based cultures, respect for rules stems from respect for 
the authority who sets the rules. This goes along with closer supervision to 
guarantee the enforcement of rules.  
Categorising societies into high and low context cultures bears the risk of 
cementing cultural stereotypes and overemphasising cultural differences in an 
increasingly globalised world. Therefore, high and low culture contexts should 
be understood as two different poles of a continuum rather than two contrasting 
concepts.39 However, the concept serves the purpose of illustrating how cultural 
differences influence the research process. Three aspects are important to 
note: first, communication in high context cultures can be more successful if 
based on personal relationships. Second, oral communication is likely to be 
more successful than written communication in high context cultures. Third, in 
low context cultures rules work because they are spelled out explicitly. This, in 
turn, does not apply to high context cultures. In the case of obtaining informed 
consent, this means that writing the rules down and getting them signed is an 
acceptable strategy in the UK as it gives interviewees the opportunity for a 
deliberate decision to share information. In El Salvador a signed consent form 
alone is not enough. Obtaining consent needs to consider the context of the 
interview. A Salvadoran policeman will never base his decision to share 
information on a written agreement between him and the interviewer. The 
decision depends much more on situational factors such as the potential impact 
of the information, the relationship to his boss and not least the level of trust 
between him and the interviewer.  
                                            
39 Another problem is the simplistic western/non-western distinction. Deriving from a western 
perspective, the concept is not paying enough attention to differences between non-western cultures. 
Also, it is debatable whether rules determine communication forms or vice versa. 
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This means that it was not enough for me as the researcher to write the rules of 
the interview down in the consent form and get them signed but I had to ‘play by 
the rules’ the interviewee set or that were given through the interview situation. 
For example, we would meet at an agreed location but before the interview 
would happen we would drive around by car and I would explain my research in 
detail before heading to another location where the interview eventually took 
place. During another occasion the interviewee was accompanied by a 
photographer and two assistants who also recorded the talk to make sure I 
would use the information genuinely. 
In the predominantly high context culture of El Salvador, I found oral 
communication more efficient than written communication for collecting data. 
The preliminary visit to El Salvador in 2011 revealed that the most effective way 
to approach interview partners was by establishing some kind of personal 
contact. Hence, gatekeepers played an important role for field access. In some 
occasions meetings were arranged by emailing and calling interviewees without 
the help of a gatekeeper. But in the majority of cases people were more open to 
a conversation when I was being introduced by someone they knew or when I 
had a chance to present myself and my research topic in person, for instance at 
the security events mentioned above. Gatekeepers and potential interview 
partners were identified by approaching experienced academics with contacts in 
the Salvadoran security sector, by re-activating contacts from previous work in 
the country, and by searching for contacts online as well as at the research site. 
Some characteristics of the Salvadoran society were supportive of establishing 
a network. First, El Salvador is a very small country and political life is 
concentrated in San Salvador. This means that not only the premises of many 
state and non-state organisations were in the same city but policy makers, 
academics, and NGO workers often knew each other and were able to direct 
me to further interview partners. Second, many people were open towards my 
requests and incredibly helpful in pointing me to interesting people, cases, and 
venues.  
However, these characteristics and the delicacy of the research topic also 
brought obstacles and limits to the fieldwork. The disadvantage of the small 
political circle is the danger of disclosure of sources which could impact 
negatively on the physical safety and occupational integrity of the involved 
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persons. Therefore, apart from keeping all data confidential, interview partners 
could choose to remain anonymous if they wished. Likewise, some gatekeepers 
remain anonymous. All transcribers had to sign a confidentiality agreement and 
were also briefed in person not to talk to anyone about any content they had 
transcribed. Whenever possible, interviewees were given written information 
about the research project in advance so they could decide on their participation 
and on the amount and content of information they wanted to share. In some 
instances, unforeseen and unique occasions of conducting interviews opened 
and/or I was not able to contact interviewees in advance (see below). 
Especially interviews inside prisons were difficult to plan in advance. On one 
occasion I had arranged an interview with the director of the penitentiary school 
who was responsible for the training of instructors who, in turn, trained the 
prison guards. At the end of the interview she suggested to visit the nearby 
prison La Esperanza, the country’s largest prison, to see the on-site premises of 
their training and talk to the instructors. This was a unique opportunity, I would 
not have been granted access to prisons on my own, especially since my visit 
fell into the period when the military controlled the entrances (May 2010 – April 
2012) and every visitor had to go through a rigid process of triple control at 
three gates, including a body search. The director of the penitentiary school 
decided which instructors could be interviewed and she was present during the 
conversation. I could not bring any item into the prison and was therefore given 
a piece of paper and a pen to take notes. The instructors were not made aware 
of my visit in advance, and even though I explained my research project and 
asked for their consent, I could not guarantee that their participation was 
actually voluntary. It is more likely that their consent was given out of respect for 
their superior. These circumstances have to be considered when analysing the 
information given in the interview (see Section 4.4 on how this was 
approached). I found myself in a similar situation during my visit to Apanteos 
prison. The trip to Santa Ana was arranged via the Human Rights Ombudsman 
Office (PDDH). This office, among other things, observed the human rights 
situation in the prisons by visiting the premises regularly and talking to inmates 
and employees. With the military controlling access to the prisons this routine 
was difficult to maintain. Since the human rights office was criticising the 
military’s rudeness towards prisoners and visitors in their reports, the 
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relationship between the soldiers and the PDDH was rather hostile. Sometimes 
access was granted only after long negotiations. Under these circumstances, it 
was not possible to anticipate whether I could enter the prison by accompanying 
the PDDH and with whom I could talk inside the prison. Once I was allowed 
inside I sat in the conversations of the PDDH workers with prison employees 
and inmates and was given the chance to ask questions towards the end of 
their conversation. Similar to the interviews in La Esperanza inmates were 
chosen by the prison authorities. But even though they were keen to share their 
experiences, I could not ensure they were given the opportunity to consider 
their participation and any possible consequences thoroughly. The same 
applied for an interview with an ex-prisoner at the reintegration project in Santa 
Ana.   
 
4.5.2 Safety issues 
Safety issues for me as the researcher arose from the generally high levels of 
crime and violence in El Salvador and, particularly, in the metropolitan area of 
San Salvador where most data was collected. However, levels of violence and 
crime vary between neighbourhoods. It was therefore essential to live in a 
neighbourhood that was considered to be safe. Furthermore, the bulk of data 
was collected by interviews and document research on the premises of 
governmental, parliamentarian, non-governmental and international institutions 
that were protected by security personnel and special security mechanisms.  
During the pre-fieldwork visit, I increased my knowledge about the city and its 
safe and less safe spots, so I could move with confidence. Using common 
sense and drawing on local knowledge also reduced risks. For instance, public 
transport was only used during the day and without carrying any items of value. 
In the one occasion of a quasi-assault it was best to do what all other 
passengers did, namely give my money to the robbers.  
As described above, interviews inside the prisons were arranged through 
gatekeepers with profound knowledge who were well able to evaluate the risks 
of entering prisons. Inside the penitentiaries, talks took place in a safe spot, 
usually the director’s or employees’ offices. As for the gang members, I was 
fortunate to be able to talk to them during the period when the gang truce was 
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still fairly intact (March 2013). During this time leaders and members of gangs 
were relatively open towards talking to ‘outsiders’ since the truce was partially 
motivated by the wish of gang members to stop their exclusion from society. 
The gang members I talked to also participated in a social project which should 
help them create a legal income. I could therefore anticipate that their 
motivation to talk to me was benign. During the interview a gatekeeper who 
knew the gang members was present which further increased safety.   
Carrying out interviews with the police and former police officials did not raise 
any particular safety issues for me. Due to their leading position and due to the 
way I approached them (i.e. being forwarded to them by gatekeepers, other 
researchers, and previous interviewees) most of them were experienced in 
talking to foreign researchers. This means they were usually straight forward in 
setting the conditions under which the interview had to take place in order for 
them to avoid any risks. This implied ‘playing by the rules’ of the interviewee as 
described above. However, anonymity and confidentiality were also vital and in 
several occasions interviewees preferred not to be recorded. 
This chapter set out the design, methods, and concerns of the empirical 
research. Before delving into the case of FMLN security policy making, the 
historical and structural backgrounds of state responses to violence in El 
Salvador are explored in the following chapters.  
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5. Elites and accommodation in the process of state formation 
in El Salvador 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter Five offers a historical narrative of modes of struggle and 
accommodation between economic, military, and political elites as well as other 
social forces in the process of state formation in El Salvador. Drawing on 
Migdal’s state-in-society approach (Section 3.2.1) and on the notion of 
contested statehood (Section 3.2.2) this chapter argues that the Salvadoran 
state was shaped by processes of struggle and accommodation between 
various social and state actors. This contextual chapter looks at the historical 
roots of the lack of a legitimate state monopoly on violence in the process of 
state formation. It examines in particular the importance of economic and 
military elites, and the relative insignificance of political elites in controlling 
violence until the 1980s. To that end, the chapter explores the emergence of a 
rent economy through the formation of rural elites in light of the expansion of the 
coffee market in the late nineteenth century. It continues with delineating the 
tight relationship between military and economic elites during the military 
dictatorship from the 1930s to the 1980s, and the emergence of the ARENA 
party as the civilian representative of the interests of economic elites since the 
1980s. The three sections of the chapter reflect this chronological order. Against 
the backdrop of the discussions about contested statehood the chapter shows 
that in El Salvador a state emerged in which many functions are not 
accomplished by state authorities. This chapter demonstrates that during the 
process of state formation in El Salvador, violence became an organisational 
means for different elites to exercise control. Furthermore, it shows that the use 
of violence as an organisational means of power did not lead to a centralisation 
of violence. 
Historical studies about El Salvador are scarce due to the limited existence of 
history as a discipline at Salvadoran universities before the 21st century. 
Attempts to establish historical science as a subject at the National University of 
El Salvador in the 1960s failed due to the politically controversial climate 
(Prud'Homme, 2011). The lack of historical investigation was recognised by 
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scholars of the Jesuit Central American University who pointed to the larger 
problem of the absence of a historical tradition or school (N.N., 1979: 345-346, 
cited after Prud'Homme, 2011: 53). However, individual intellectuals studied and 
published about El Salvador’s history and society, sometimes from exile. 
Examples for this are Rafael Guidos Véjar (1980), Rafael Menjívar (Guidos 
Véjar and Menjívar, 1978, Menjívar, 1980), and Knut Walter (Walter and 
Williams, 1993, Williams and Walter, 1997, Walter, 2002). Their contributions 
are considered in this chapter; two of them (Guidos Véjar and Walter) also 
shared their views during interviews for this study. Before the end of the civil 
war in 1992 some studies were published by foreign scholars from various 
disciplines, mostly English and American researchers, like David Browning 
(1971), James Dunkerley (1982, 1988, 1990), Jenny Pearce (1986), and 
Thomas Anderson (1971, 1988). Significant efforts to deepen Salvadoran 
historiography were undertaken after the end of the civil war. Since then the 
intellectual understanding about the Salvadoran past is expanding. Among the 
more recent historical, anthropological and sociological contributions the works 
of Aldo Lauria-Santiago (1999, 2004, 2005), Erik Ching (Ching et al., 2007, 
Ching, 2013), Héctor Lindo-Fuentes (Lindo-Fuentes, 1990, Ching et al., 2007), 
Patricia Alvarenga (1996), William Stanley (1996), Jeffrey Paige (1997), 
Elisabeth J. Wood (2000, 2003), and Jeffrey Gould (Gould and Lauria-Santiago, 
2008, Gould, 2015) are particularly relevant to the study of elites, violence, and 
state formation in El Salvador.     
 
5.2 The cafetaleros: rent creation through coffee exports  
This first section explores the beginnings of the Salvadoran state in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century and its links to the emergence of a rent 
economy based on coffee export. It tracks the formation of rural elites through 
the expropriation of land from mostly indigenous peasants. Without access to 
land which was the country’s most important resource, peasants were forced to 
work as temporary labourers on coffee farms. The social order was 
characterised by patronage networks controlled by a system of private 
vigilantism and the rural police (Guardia Nacional). Based on North’s concept of 
limited access orders, the section finds that although violence during this period 
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can be characterised as dispersed, the existence of the rural police and private 
vigilantes functioned to discourage large-scale violence and thus guaranteed 
the creation of rents. Since 1900 the national army began to form which 
together with the Guardia Nacional was strong enough to violently suppress the 
peasant uprising in 1932. The peasant revolt had been a reaction to the 
economic grievances following the collapse of the world coffee market in 
1929/1930. Despite these events, the social and economic order did not 
change. Instead, military elites took over the central political authority.             
To understand the importance of the economic elite in the evolving state two 
aspects need to be stressed: first, land ownership and access to land were key 
issues in the tiny and densely populated country. Second, the expansion of 
coffee cultivation after 1870 is considered a crucial moment in creating a 
system of domination and subordination in the Salvadoran society. Most 
historians and anthropologists agree that the rise of the coffee plantations and 
the subsequent opening up to the international market through the export of 
coffee was the foundation of an economic elite that was exceptional in Latin 
America.40 Small wealthy elites were not uncommon in the continent’s history, 
however, the Salvadoran elite comprised an extraordinarily small number of 
families who managed to accumulate enormous sections of land and capital 
over the course of the 20th century.   
As a nation state El Salvador is about 170 years old. Independence of Central 
America from colonial rule was proclaimed in 1821, but it was only in 1839 that 
El Salvador was first declared a nation state (Browning, 1971: 139). The 
decades between 1839 and 1890 were described as a politically chaotic period 
with frequent wars with the neighbouring emerging states of Guatemala, 
Honduras, and Nicaragua, as well as battles among different Salvadoran armed 
factions. During that time the coup d’état was the most common and frequently 
used mode of government change.41 Politically, the period was marked by a 
conflict between liberal and conservative ideas. In this context, conservatism 
meant holding on to the colonial apparatus and supporting clericalism and 
                                            
40
 See, for example, Browning (1971), Guidos Véjar (1980), and Menjívar (1980). However, Lauria-
Santiago (1999: 228) pointed out that coffee was not the only source of wealth, and that other activities 
such as cattle raising, import trade, sugar and balsam production and export also contributed to the 
emergence of capitalist entrepreneurs. 
41
 According to Lindo-Fuentes (1990: 62), 13 coup d’états took place between 1841 and 1890. See also 
White (1973: 265-266). 
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protectionism, while liberalists were usually supporters of positivism and, 
importantly, regarded the system of communal land of the indigenous 
populations as outdated (Dunkerley, 1982: 8).  
The regime of liberalist Rafael Zaldívar (1876-1885) was the first stable 
government which showed elements of a state in the making as it managed to 
enforce rules regulating the access to land. Individual ownership of land was not 
known among the indigenous population before the Spanish conquerors arrived 
in the 16th century. Instead, land was used by the whole community. Families 
were probably periodically allocated a plot of land of the community, but the 
right to cultivate the same land over a long period of time did not exist 
(Browning, 1971: 16). The concept of exclusive ownership was introduced by 
the Spanish. Under colonial rule two basic forms of access to land co-existed 
(Browning, 1971: 87). Ejido and tierra comunal were forms of common land 
typically used by indigenous communities, whereas haciendas referred to 
private estates typically owned by the few Spanish settlers. This co-existence 
was not free of conflicts or of contradicting claims to land use. Browning (1971: 
134) described how the Spanish settled amidst the indigenous communities and 
re-arranged patterns of land use by introducing new forms of farming and the 
cultivation of agricultural crops such as balsam, cocoa, and indigo. However, 
this system that – with variations – had lasted over the 300 years of colonial 
rule, changed significantly with the shift to coffee cultivation fostered by the 
Zaldívar regime.  
When the trade with indigo as the major export product during the colonial 
period declined after 1860, the commercial value of coffee was soon recognised 
by farmers and politicians. Coffee required more investment in terms of financial 
resources and time than indigo, and environmental conditions for its growing 
were best above 1,500 feet. However, the mountains with their fertile volcanic 
soil were already densely populated by indigenous peasants. Therefore, the 
land reforms under the Zaldívar regime between 1879 and 1882 abolished 
communal land and strengthened private landholding in order to accelerate 
coffee production (Guidos Véjar, 1980: 45-66, Menjívar, 1980). Those who 
worked at the coffee farms, on the other side, were seasonal or permanent 
workers. Coffee export was only profitable through cheap labour supply which is 
why the state introduced laws about agricultural day labour. These stipulated 
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that landless peasants were temporarily employed during harvest time, while 
most of the year they subsisted on a small plot of land on the landowner’s 
estate (Acevedo, 1996: 20, Pearce, 1986: 20-21). This principle was an 
expansion of the so called colonato, the feudal labour system developed at the 
haciendas during colonial rule (Dunkerley, 1982: 61-62). In addition, the laws 
stabilised and strengthened the central state. Alvarenga (1996: 33-36) 
described the perfidious logic behind the laws. She outlined that the positivists 
attributed much of the country’s under-development to the indigenous peasants 
and denounced their system of land use as backward-oriented. The 
expropriation of land was equated with economic progress. Taking the 
communal land away from the communities changed the political relationship 
between the state and the peasants. Previously, any issues between the 
colonial state and the communities were negotiated with community leaders 
which kept the community’s power and identity intact. But this power was built 
on their common use of land. The loss of land implied a loss of communal 
power and a corrosion of the peasants’ identity. This, in turn, strengthened the 
new and instable central state because it became more difficult for the 
indigenous population to organise as a collective in dealing with any issues 
regarding the state (Alvarenga, 1996: 35).  
Guidos Véjar (1980: 53-54) suggested that two groups possessed enough 
capital to become coffee producers and merchants. The first group was the so 
called cafetaleros, the new coffee elite, which comprised former indigo 
merchants and probably of urban residents with capital like traders, doctors, 
priests, and politicians. In addition, European immigrants with their technical 
and commercial skills integrated themselves quickly into the emerging elite 
(Paige, 1997: 15). These immigrants from countries like England, Germany, and 
Italy were usually single families or single men searching for new economic 
opportunities and attracted by the coffee boom. They established business and 
private connections, and marriage was a common way of both traditional 
colonial elites and new immigrants to build and strengthen kin groups (Paige, 
1997:16). Most kin groups had their own enterprise and usually the families of 
each group had stakes in the enterprise. Since the coffee boom, elites and their 
enterprises diversified, but due to the strong family ties of enterprises it is 
possible to trace back the origins of many enterprises to just a few founders, as 
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the family trees in the studies of Eduardo Colindres (1977), Maria Albiac (1998), 
and Carlos Paniagua (2002) showed.  
The land expropriation laws under Zaldívar transformed patterns of land 
ownership and access to land substantially and created a social conflict that 
was at the root of most political struggles since then. Zinecker (2014: 205-207) 
identified the establishment of the agro export economy as the beginning of El 
Salvador’s rent economy. The rural elite emerged because the cafetaleros were 
able to create an agricultural rent, firstly, by controlling access to land which 
was the most important resource for coffee production, and secondly, by 
establishing a work system which relied on seasonal labourers. These labourers 
were previously independent peasants forced into a patronage system (see 
below for the role of patronage).42  
Drawing on the model developed by North et al. (2009), we can see that a third 
mechanism existed which guaranteed the creation of rent: large-scale violence 
would have been counterproductive to the coffee economy, thus, rural elites 
had an interest in controlling and containing violence, as the following thoughts 
underscore.   
Due to the lack of documentary record it is difficult to determine the general 
structures of violence in the Salvadoran society and the level of coercion in 
social relationships. The most prominent in-depth study is Patricia Alvarenga’s 
(1996) analysis about the culture and ethics of violence in El Salvador 1880 – 
1932 which focuses on the western highlands.43 In addition, a number of 
recently published small scale analyses of historical material on specific topics 
like youth crime and crime against women exist (Dirección Nacional de 
Investigaciones en Cultura y Arte, 2011). Gomez and Herrera (2007) and 
Moreno’s (2015) works must also be mentioned as they add to our knowledge 
on the phenomenon of violence in the history of El Salvador. Although these 
                                            
42 Economic theorists defined rents as excess incomes of inefficient markets: ‘[A] person gets a rent if he 
or she earns an income higher than the minimum that person would have accepted, the minimum being 
ususally defined as the income in his or her next-best opportunity’ (Khan and Jomo, 2000: 21). 
Zimecker’s definition of rent is based on Elsenhans’ (2004, 2009)  model of rent economies understood as 
non-market economies which function through rent and marginal, precarious work force (in contrast to 
market economies which function through capital and work as empowerment). 
43
 Due to the higher density of population historical records about the western highlands are richer than 
those about other regions. Also, since coffee cultivation concentrated in this region, potential for violent 
conflict was higher, as the massacre of 1932 illustrates (see final paragraphs of this section). This, in turn, 
may have attracted more research.  
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studies do not necessarily provide us with a systematic analysis of patterns of 
violence, they demonstrate how entrenched violence was in social relationships 
before the violent decades of the military dictatorship and the civil war. In the 
introduction to their comprehensive compilation of essays on historical and 
contemporary forms of violence in El Salvador, Meléndez and Bergmann (2015) 
observed that violence existed as social practice or as an ordinary form to 
resolve disputes while, at the same time, it became institutionalised with the 
emergence of state institutions. This is an important observation as it points to 
the variety in the use of violence: on the one hand, violence was dispersed and 
widely used throughout the society. On the other hand, violence became an 
organisational means of control. As we will see below, these two aspects can 
be regarded as two sides of the same coin. Alvarenga’s study provided some 
insight into this development, as discussed in the following paragraphs.  
Alvarenga (1996: 102-104; 119) demonstrated that not only elites made use of 
violence but inside communities peasants also engaged in conflicts using 
physical violence. She suggested that peasants and labourers even used covert 
violence as a way to terrorise others: ‘Covert terror is not a monopoly of the 
state, not even of the dominant classes because it permeates all of society’ 
(Alvarenga, 1996: 33). In addition, it was common for elite factions to fight 
against each other. Whilst in some occasions landowners themselves went to 
shoot their rival, they often armed their labourers and sent them as proxies to 
fight against members of rival networks in conflicts about land and other matters 
(Alvarenga, 1996: 141). Besides these forms of violence as means to deal with 
disputes, there were efforts to organise violence. Before the rural police and the 
military were created, control over the workers at the coffee farms was sought 
through a private system of vigilantism. Landowners co-opted peasants as 
comisionados (commissioners) and auxilios (assistants) who would not only 
report irregularities but also the workers’ performance and whereabouts. 
Whereas for the comisionados this was a full time job, auxilios were peasants 
who controlled their fellow workers for a very small salary for only a few hours 
per week (Alvarenga, 1996: 89, 91). In this way, landowners were able to co-opt 
a relatively high number of peasants to control each other. Even after the rural 
police (Guardia Nacional) was founded, the ‘private police’ of the cafetaleros 
kept operating. The repressive character of private vigilantism is revealed in the 
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covert punishment. Delinquencies such as the stealing of coffee would not be 
dealt with in public. Instead, (violent) punishment usually took place without 
witnesses, but still with everyone knowing about it. The practice of covert 
violence sought control by creating fear and uncertainty. Landowners were most 
likely more efficient in using violence for their means than peasants and 
labourers because they could draw on their support network and allied patrons. 
Before the system of patronage is explained in the following section, it should 
be noted that the creation of the National Guard was the beginning of a system 
of control which served the rural elites to establish and maintain an economic 
system based on agricultural rents. However, while the Guardia Nacional was a 
sign of the increased organisation of violence, their creation did not imply the 
centralisation of violence. The National Guard was founded in 1912 as the rural 
police force and existed until their dissolution in accordance with the 1992 
Peace Agreement (Walter and Williams, 1993: 14). Modelled on the Spanish 
Guardia Civil its members were contracted by the government. It clearly was a 
militaristic police force which received its weapons and ammunition from the 
Ministry of War. Moreover, its officers were drawn from the Escuela Politécnica, 
the first military academy established in 1900 (Guidos Véjar, 1980: 125). De 
facto, the Guardia Nacional worked for the landowners of coffee estates and 
were paid a supplementary salary by them which created a mercenary 
relationship, as Stanley (1996: 48) noted. Their tasks comprised the 
enforcement of laws, enforcement of the prohibition of trade unions of rural 
workers, and administrative work for landowners (ibid.). As is shown below, they 
played an important role in impeding the autonomous organisation of peasants 
and in containing violent uprisings such as the 1932 and, thus, guaranteed the 
continuance of the limited access order (North, 2009). 
North maintained that in social orders based on rent-seeking and limited access 
to resources and means of organisation, personal relationships were central in 
creating order. Horizontally elites cooperate with other elites to create stability. 
Vertical relationships are typically (but not exclusively) characterised as 
patronage networks (North et al., 2013a). In El Salvador allegiance started to be 
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shaped around patronage networks with the emergence of coffee farms and the 
formation of work relationships that created unilateral dependencies.44   
Erik Ching’s (2004, 2013) work shed some light on the question how 
allegiances were formed at the coffee plantations. He argued that political 
conflicts primarily took place between rival patronage networks. These 
patronage networks were often rooted in class relations but they were also built 
on religious, ethnic or family foundations. He based his findings on materials 
that describe the fight for control over local electoral office in the western 
highlands between 1880 and 1940. Elections were largely a competition 
between patron-client networks in which aspirants (patrons) needed sufficient 
supporters (clients) at their command. These included people from their 
personal network, but also other patrons who joined them to build a larger 
network. Support came in the form of votes, but also through human and 
material resources in case competition turned violent which often was the case. 
This process of bonding could stretch from the local to the regional and national 
levels like a pyramid of networks. It represented a common way of forming 
alliances not only prior to municipal elections but throughout the political life in 
the country. Patronage networks constituted the political system of El Salvador, 
Ching (2004: 55) wrote. With regard to the establishment of elites, this would 
imply that patronage networks not only contributed to the accumulation of 
economic power. They were likely to be a decisive feature for the creation of 
political elites. How this worked out in exact terms is not entirely clear. Holden 
(2004: 59) for example explained the frequent changes of governments in the 
nineteenth century with the origins of the presidents in a limited number of 
patronage networks. According to the author, a change of the presidency did 
not necessarily induce a change of the whole patronage network. However, the 
frequent changes of governments could also be an expression of conflicts 
                                            
44 Hilgers (2012: 7) defined patronage or clientelism as a long-term relationship of unequal power 
between persons with access to resources on one side and those without access to resources that support 
the former in exchange for certain benefits. Clientelism is based on exchange and personal relationships, 
Hilgers noted. According to Clapham (1982), clientelism is ‘a mutually beneficial, if unequal exchange 
between a patron and a client whereby the patron offers protection and access to services to his clients in 
exchange for their support’ (cited after Kraushaar and Lambach, 2009: 10). The terms of patronage and 
clientelism are often used interchangeably in most of the literature. Erdmann and Engel (2007) suggested 
that there is a difference regarding the number of people involved: whereas clientelism refers to 
individual relationships between patrons and clients, patronage refers to relationships between an 
individual and a bigger group. However, both terms describe the same system of dependency, and they 
are used synonymously here. 
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between numerous elite factions. In either case persons with political 
aspirations did not only need capital but also a support network. Only economic 
elites were able to organise and provide sufficient support by drawing on their 
labourers. Presidents without such a network usually did not manage to stay in 
power for more than a few months.  
Until 1931 all presidents assuming power had a background in the coffee 
economy (Paige, 1997: 14) which guaranteed rules and policies being shaped 
in the interests of the cafetaleros. Between 1913 and 1931 the Quiñonez-
Menéndez clan usurped power (Dunkerley, 1982: 13). The existing patronage 
system allowed members of this one family to be elected and appointed as 
presidents uninterruptedly for eighteen years. In contrast to the turbulent and 
violent political changes of the nineteenth century, the smooth power changes 
within the same Quiñonez-Menéndez network marked a period of relative 
stabilisation. This continuity allowed for the expansion of the coffee market and 
lasted until the world financial crisis in 1929. During that time the share of coffee 
as an export product rose from 56% in 1890 to 96% in 1931 which means that 
the country’s entire export economy centred on coffee (Wilson, 1978: 209).      
Besides the expropriation laws of the Zaldívar regime and the expansion of the 
coffee export under the Quiñonez-Menéndez clan, the formation of the military 
was a third important factor in the formation of a state that was subordinated to 
the interests of the oligarchy. After the creation of the National Guard military 
structures further became institutionalised with the establishment of national 
military academies (the Escuela Politécnica was substituted by the Escuela 
Militar in 1927). These developments implied a certain degree of centralisation 
of violence control and thus more state power, a fact that became evident in the 
concerted reaction to the planned uprising in 1932.   
The army’s and guard’s capacity for large-scale violence unfolded in La 
Matanza (the slaughter), the brutal oppression of a planned uprising of 
indigenous peasants in 1932. During the course of the world economic crisis in 
1929 the coffee market collapsed and Salvadoran coffee production declined 
sharply. At this time coffee prices dropped by 57% (Dunkerley, 1982: 22). As a 
consequence wages of plantation workers reduced by 50% (Wood, 2000: 228). 
The cautious political opening under Presidents Romero Bosque (1927-1931) 
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and Araujo (1931) allowed students, workers, and peasants to organise 
themselves in trade unions, the Communist party, or student movements to 
express their discontent. In the politically heated climate of workers protests, 
demonstrations, and their subsequent suppression, General Maximiliano 
Hernández Martínez took power through a coup d’état in December 1931. The 
coup further accelerated popular mobilisation particularly in the centre and the 
western parts of the country. The insurrection did not take place as planned 
since most ring leaders were arrested in advance, including Farabundo Martí as 
the most prominent revolutionary leader who inspired guerrilla groups in 1980 to 
name their organisation after him. However, in January 1932 in the western 
departments of El Salvador a number of towns were captured by revolting 
peasants mostly armed with machetes and a few guns (Dunkerley, 1982: 27). 
The revolt was answered by unprecedented violence that saw the army and 
National Guard kill thousands or perhaps tens of thousands of people through 
mass executions.45 Most of the victims were indigenous, and many were not 
involved in the events at all. In the aftermath of the massacre any expression of 
indigenous identity was prohibited which almost led to the entire extinction of 
the indigenous culture in El Salvador.  
Scholars who understood the social conflict in El Salvador as a class conflict 
interpreted the elites’ attitude as fear of communism (Paige, 1997: 105-126). In 
other literature, like Ching’s study referred to above, the importance of local 
conflicts and the fear of organisational autonomy of peasant communities was 
highlighted. Based on his analysis of electoral competition Ching (2013: 16) 
found that indigenous peasants, similar to elite networks, started organising 
themselves politically with their own electoral candidates. Interpreting the 
events against the backdrop of North’s theory, the world economic crisis in 1929 
was an external shock strongly impacting on the Salvadoran export economy 
and causing instability of the social order. The bifurcated social order of rent-
seekers and precarious labourers was vulnerable because elite factions 
disagreed about the political course. While Presidents Romero Bosque and 
Araujo sought reforms, the landed elite sought to continue with the existing 
order. The organisation among peasants was preceded by this elite power 
                                            
45
 Exact numbers are not available, estimates range from 10,000 to 30,000. For accounts of the 1932 
massacre see Anderson (1971), Paige (1997), and Ching et al. (2007).  
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struggle which intensified disorder. The rebellion and the previous call for 
reforms created the impression among elites that organised opposition and 
social reforms endangered the socioeconomic order of rent-seeking and 
therefore needed to be suppressed. General Martínez Hernández and the 
military were ready to deliver the kind of suppression the landed elites were 
looking for. This was the beginning of a pact between economic and military 
elites which William Stanley (1996) called the ‘protection racket state’ and which 
guaranteed the continuance of the existing order.  
 
5.3 The military dictatorship (1931-1984) and economic elites: 
struggle and accommodation in the light of popular resistance 
This section depicts the struggles between military and economic elite factions 
during the military dictatorship (1931-1984) and shows that despite some 
conflict they had a shared interest in maintaining the existing order. Based on 
Migdal’s (2001) claim of mutual accommodation between the state and social 
forces, it is argued that the militaristic state accommodated the interests of 
conservative economic elites (and vice versa) in order to prevent popular 
rebellion. This pact generated some stability but, drawing on North et al. (2009, 
2013a), it was vulnerable to external shocks due to the diversification of elite 
interests and the emergence of the urban middle class. Similar to the world 
economic crisis in 1929, the international economic crisis of the 1970s 
threatened the Salvadoran rent economy and fuelled the organisation of popular 
resistance. The literature shows that resistance was increasingly responded to 
with violent means, escalating into state terrorism with extraordinarily high 
numbers of killings between 1977 and 1982. In 1980 the conflict between the 
militaristic state and popular forces escalated into civil war.   
With Martínez Hernández claiming presidency in 1931, the military became the 
central political authority for the following five decades. But the literature shows 
that the military accommodated the economic interests of the oligarchy. To 
understand how this pact worked and why it broke down in 1979 it is important 
to note the diversifying elite interests in the light of economic modernisation, 
and the existence of two different currents within the military. As shown below, 
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hardliners and reformist officers formed alliances with different factions of the 
economic elite, generating significant disagreement about the economic order. 
Since the 1950s, economic modernisation was sought by a diversification of 
export crops and the expansion of the manufacturing sector in order to promote 
trade within the Central American region (Bulmer-Thomas, 1987: 150). In 
addition to coffee, cotton and sugar cane became major export crops (Acevedo, 
1996: 21). The more active role of the state in economic policy developed into a 
highly protectionist policy. Parallel to the agro export model, the economy was 
boosted by import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) in the 1950s. This was a 
common development model for Latin American countries prior to the neoliberal 
era of free trade zones. ISI aimed to increase domestic production of industrial 
goods in order to balance the import of foreign goods. It was designed to create 
more independence from foreign currency fluctuations. However, it was 
implemented by a state policy of tax exemption and discretionary changes of 
tariffs. Thus, huge investments in industrial infrastructure led to a capital-
intensive industry (Acevedo, 1996: 182, Bulmer-Thomas, 1987). Similar to the 
coffee sector, ownership of these state-subsidised firms concentrated in the 
hands of a part of the oligarchy (Colindres, 1977: 129) (see below). The same 
development was observed for the diversification of agricultural export products. 
Like coffee, cotton and sugar cane needed large estates to grow which led to a 
further concentration of land. According to the 1971 agricultural census, 49% of 
agricultural lands were cultivated by only 1.5% of farms, while 20% of the lands 
were operated by 87% of farms (Acevedo, 1996: 21). Export crops came from 
the small number of large estates controlled by the rural elite, while small farms 
were used for subsistence agriculture. Hence, the modernisation process did 
not alter the concentration of wealth, as the works of Montoya (1998) and 
Colindres (1977) demonstrated. Instead, the symbiotic relationship between 
subsistence and export agriculture guaranteed the continuation of the rent 
economy.   
Modernisation processes and economic alterations between the 1950s and the 
1970s induced some diversification of the oligarchy. Family enterprises 
increasingly concentrated on a specific area within the coffee business such as 
growing and production, marketing, or export. Wood (2000: 232) described the 
traditional landed elite involved in the growing of coffee as the group that was 
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more conservative and opposed to changes in land tenure and wages. The 
divergence of economic interests became evident with the foundation of 
ABECAFE (Salvadoran Association of Cultivators and Exporters of Coffee) in 
1961. ABECAFE was the business association of those families who built their 
business on coffee processing and export (Paige, 1997: 187). These exporters, 
organised in ABECAFE, formed the so called agro-industrial group, which is 
described as being more open to political and economic change and with 
having diverse business interests (Wood, 2000: 232). Both moderate and 
conservative business elites extended their activities beyond coffee on other 
emerging sectors like finances, commerce and service. A third group developed 
with the emergence of the urban middle sector at the beginning of the twentieth 
century. As economic change had begun to generate greater social 
differentiation the urban middle class grew (Acuña Ortega, 2004, Parkman, 
1988). Descendants of Middle Eastern immigrants focused on the commerce 
and service sectors which concentrated in the urban areas. These medium-size 
businesses neither belonged to the agrarian elite nor to the agro-industrial elite. 
However, the urban middle sectors were not able to challenge the economic 
hegemony of agrarian and agro-industrial elites. In 1971 two-thirds of the equity 
capital was owned by the 36 landowners with the largest estates, who 
controlled about one third of the country’s top 1,429 firms (Dunkerley, 1982: 53).  
It was the conservative elite who allied with hardliners in the military to secure 
their economic interests against reform plans of junior officers. The hardliners 
were mainly officers heading the security forces (National Guard, National 
Police, and Treasury Police), the intelligence apparatus (Salvadoran National 
Security Agency/ANSESAL and Nationalist Democratic Organisation/ORDEN), 
and rural army posts (Wood, 2000: 231, Williams and Walter, 1997: 97).46 They 
did not tolerate any political liberalisation of the regime and did not hesitate to 
crack down opposition violently.  
Reformist officers were more open to carry out various reforms that were not 
necessarily in the elites’ interests. Wood (2000) and Williams and Walter (1997) 
distinguished between two currents of reformists: one group of officers was 
more independent from the oligarchy but still supported the continuance of 
                                            
46 All forces were subordinated to and led by the military (Costa, 1998: 27). The intelligence 
organisations were paramilitary forces with strong links to the military (see below for more details). 
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military rule. These were mainly junior officers from the urban lower-middle and 
middle class. Another small group of officers was ready for structural reforms 
and political liberalisation.  
Patterns of cohesion and division among the military were also shaped by the 
so called tanda (cohort) system. Introduced in 1948 this informal system 
guaranteed that officers graduating from the academy were eventually 
promoted - usually simultaneously with all officers from one class (García, 
1992). By moving up the hierarchy together and by giving the assurance that 
such promotion would take place independent of the officer’s performance it 
was hoped that intergenerational strife would reduce. However, the system did 
not overcome all intergenerational conflict as the coup of junior officers in 1979 
showed (see below). As long as the military ruled the country, this meant that 
usually a whole new tanda would take over power when a previous tanda 
retired. One effect of the system was that there was a high degree of cohesion 
within each rank which proved to be decisive for decisions as to who would rule 
the country. García (1992: 97-98) described the pattern that developed whereby 
a tanda would stay in power as long as junior officers did not manage to oust 
them. The long periods of leadership by tandas caused an incoherent 
progression in which several classes of officers were skipped. One such case 
was the decision of President Romero (1977-1979, tanda of 1948) to give key 
government positions to officers from the 1955 tanda instead of choosing those 
tandas (1956-1958) which previously had served under President Molina (1972-
1977). These displeased officers were important supporters of the junior 
officer’s coup which ousted President Romero in 1979 (they also thwarted the 
coup, see below) (Walter and Williams, 1993: 96). Another influential tanda was 
the class of 1966 which due to its large size was called the tandona (large 
cohort). The tandona had taken over all troop command positions by 1989 with 
René Emilio Ponce as chief of staff (1988-1990) and later as Minister of 
Defence (1990-1993). As military hardliners, members of the tandona were 
widely involved in human rights violations committed by the military during this 
period which caused widespread international outrage (see Section 6.2 for more 
details). Garcia (1992) and Walter and Williams (1997) agreed in their research 
that with the tandona the armed forces experienced unprecedented levels of 
corruption and disunity which lowered the chances of winning the civil war. 
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From the military’s perspective, this disunity contributed to a negotiated solution 
of the civil war in 1992 (along with other factors which are explained in Section 
7.2).   
In the effort to maintain political power the military exaggerated the threat of 
rebellion. Stanley (1996) called this a ‘protection racket state’ since it was an 
effective way to pre-empt economic elites from challenging military rule. 
However, resistance against the unequal social order imposed by the economic 
elites and guaranteed by the militarist state grew throughout the twentieth 
century. In the 1940s the urban middle sector’s discontent led to the ousting of 
Martínez Hernández. Under the impression that Martínez’ politics were 
increasingly aimed at securing his own position, resistance against a fourth term 
began to grow among junior officers in 1943. They found allies among urban 
workers and students, and financial support from bankers and merchants. The 
opposition which conspired to overthrow Martínez was initially defeated. 
However, their defeat provoked a popular protest that forced the dictator out of 
office.47 In the following years and decades, the military tried to put itself forward 
as the institution that was pursuing national development – in other words, it 
tried to build a state. However, scholars underscored that political action was 
characterised by impulsive reaction rather than long-term strategic thinking 
(Stanley, 1996: 69-70). The military failed to react upon the demands of various 
sectors of the society, especially of the lower and middle class. Although the 
military government tolerated the existence of small political parties, it did not 
tolerate electoral competition by opposition parties. From the mid-1960s political 
parties were used by military governments to create a façade of representative 
democracy (Álvarez, 2009: 10). These parties were called oficialista parties 
which could be translated as ‘controlled by the government’. They were an 
instrument of the military as became clear in moments such as the overt 
electoral fraud in 1972. An alliance of opposition movements called the National 
Opposition Union (UNO) competed with the military government’s oficialista 
Party of National Conciliation (PCN).48 The Christian Democratic Party (PDC) 
which formed part of the UNO during the 1972 elections and contributed 
                                            
47
 Parkman (1988), cited in Stanley (1996: 58-64). 
48 UNO was an alliance of the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) with leader Guillermo Ungo, 
the communist National Democratic Union, and José Napoleón Duarte. Ungo later became member of the 
First Revolutionary Junta in 1979 and Duarte was elected as president in 1984 (Section 5.4).  
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substantially to its popularity, attracted significant support from the new urban 
elites during José Napoleon Duarte’s term as mayor of San Salvador (1964-
1970) (Wood, 2000: 230). Duarte had gained a reputation of being sensitive to 
popular demands and of being proactive in community development. On this 
basis he was supported by urban political grass-root organisations. The PDC 
promoted democratic competition and sought economic reforms in favour of a 
more liberal order (Stanley, 1996: 78-79). The next section (5.4) shows that, in 
the 1980s, with strong backing from the US, the PDC developed into an 
alternative between military hardliners and the oligarchy on one side, and the 
guerrillas with the support of the rural and urban poor masses on the other side. 
Back in 1972 UNO most likely won the majority, but votes on the ballot papers 
were changed by hand. PCN candidate Molina was announced as victor by the 
Central Elections Committee and the Legislative Assembly confirmed Molina in 
a brought forward session (Stanley, 1996: 89, Dunkerley, 1982: 85). Such 
electoral practices demonstrated the will to politically exclude any substantial 
opposition (Álvarez, 2009: 9).         
The stability of the pact between military and oligarchy was undermined with the 
economic crisis of the 1970s. Disagreement among the elite factions and 
discontent among the population turning into organised resistance eventually 
terminated the mutual accommodation of elite interests. In the mid-1970s the 
economy suffered by the fall of world coffee prices due to the international 
economic crisis. In addition to the decline in wages that followed this crisis, the 
living conditions in the countryside had deteriorated in previous years due to the 
further concentration of land for agro-export trade (see below). President 
Sánchez Hernández and his successor President Molina sought to 
counterbalance the social effects of this development by implementing modest 
agrarian reforms to allow for a very limited redistribution of land. Resistance by 
both the landed and agro-industrial elite was prompt and effective, as Dunkerley 
(1982: 65) noted. The National Association of Private Enterprises (ANEP) was 
founded in 1966 specifically in order to counter the government’s increasing 
involvement in the economic elite’s interests (N.N., 2011a). Together with the 
most prominent association of rural elites at that time, the Farmers’ Front of the 
Eastern Region (FARO), ANEP mobilised their allies within the military to 
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oppose Molina’s reform attempts.49 They publicly lobbied against the plans, set 
up an independent vigilante group, and even manipulated the exchange rate by 
taking large amounts of capital out of the country. The redistribution was never 
realised, and reformist tendencies among the military experienced a severe 
setback. This example was not a unique case, but it represented a pattern of 
the relationship between military leaders and economic elites: conservative 
elites drew on their alliances to military hardliners to counter reform efforts of 
the reformist army officers (Wood, 2000: 231).   
The concentration of land and the process of import substitution industrialisation 
had significant effects on the social structure. The number of rural families 
without land tripled between 1961 and 1971 which ultimately affected almost 
30% of all Salvadoran families (Gordon, 1989: 56). In addition, the war with 
Honduras in 1969 forced many Salvadoran agricultural workers that had lived in 
Honduras to return to El Salvador which made the land issue an even more 
existential problem. Hoping to benefit from the expansion of the commerce and 
industrial sector, many rural families migrated to the urban centres, especially to 
San Salvador. Although modernisation efforts led to an expansion of the urban 
middle sectors, the flow of these newly arriving migrants could not be absorbed. 
Unemployment, marginalisation, and low salaries which were further fuelled by 
the effects of the world economic crisis on the manufacturing and industrial 
sectors, were the consequences (Álvarez, 2009: 9, Dunkerley, 1982). While 
deteriorating living conditions in the countryside led peasants to organise in co-
operatives, discontent also grew among the urban population. In the urban 
centres students, workers, and labour organisations gained momentum. With 
the spread of liberation theology in Latin America factions of the powerful 
Salvadoran Catholic Church started taking sides with the poor by pointing to the 
injustice of the social and economic system and distancing themselves from the 
regime (see Chapter Six for details about the role of the church during the 
insurrection). Influenced by the revolutionary culture of other Latin American 
countries, first and foremost by the victory of the Cuban revolution, an 
increasing part of activists believed that armed rebellion was the only way to 
achieve a change of the economic and political system (Álvarez, 2009: 10). 
                                            
49
 ANEP developed into one of the most powerful Salvadoran business associations; its continuing 
influence on government policies is shown in the empirical discussion (especially in section 9.3.2).   
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Initially organised in five different organisations, these groups later joined forces 
and became the FMLN (see Chapter Six for more details about the organising 
resistance). The electoral fraud in 1972 was repeated in a similar manner in 
1977. Along with the refusal of the military government to make any concession 
to the demands of peasants and workers this underscored that neither political 
participation nor a change of the socioeconomic situation were an option within 
the existing regime. Under this impression popular movements radicalised, 
generating significant support for guerrilla organisations (Álvarez, 2009: 10).  
As the popular movement and guerrilla organisations gained momentum, 
suppression by state security forces increased, and the years between 1977 
and 1982 were marked by an extraordinary high number of killings. The majority 
of grave human rights violations reported to the Truth Commission (murder, 
torture, disappearances) had been committed by the armed forces (46%) and 
also to a considerable amount by the security forces (National Guard, National 
Police, and Treasury Police).50 The military hardliners (security forces, 
intelligence, rural army posts) were the main agents of state violence. They 
were supported by the oligarchy both implicitly (through the oligarchy’s pact with 
the military dictatorship) and directly (through financial means). The two major 
paramilitary forces ANSESAL and ORDEN were mostly active during the 1960s 
and 1970s. ANSESAL was founded as intelligence organisation for the security 
forces and the army in 1961. It was the ‘brain’ of the security system, 
centralising the information from the investigative sections of all security forces 
and operating out of the presidential palace (Pearce, 1986: 91). ORDEN was 
created in 1963 and served as rural intelligence agency, supplying ANSESAL 
with information (Costa, 1998: 38). Its military core comprised about 10,000 
members but it relied on a vast network of informants which was estimated to 
have between 50,000 and 100,000 members (Dunkerley, 1982: 76). Both 
organisations quickly expanded and became infamous for their assassination 
and terrorisation of the population. They were disbanded under the 
revolutionary junta in 1979 (see below), but in fact kept operating as death 
                                            
50 The Truth Commission was set up in the post war Peace Accords to uncover human rights violations 
committed during the civil war (Section 7.2). The National Police was the urban counterpart to the 
National Guard which mainly operated in the countryside. Since the FMLN was primarily based in the 
rural and mountainous parts of the country where they also had started to gain popular support, violence 
in the rural regions was particularly ferocious. Not surprisingly, most accusations about grave human 
rights violations were directed against the National Guard. The Treasury Police was founded in 1933 and 
functioned as customs control 
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squads (Costa, 1998: 40). One of the most prominent leaders and organisers of 
the death squads was the ex-military officer Roberto D’Aubuisson, the later 
founder of ARENA. Agrarian and industrial elites contributed actively to an 
escalation of violence by financing and logistically supporting death squads 
(Wood, 2000: 240). Testimonies in the Report of the Truth Commission stated 
that landowners and businessmen offered their estates, vehicles and 
bodyguards to support the death squads (Wood, 2000: 241). In addition, 
wealthy Salvadorans who had left the country (many of them living in Miami and 
Guatemala) funded the death squads, especially those associated with 
D’Aubuisson. Their continuance as semi-clandestine forces was one indicator of 
how the state had built a security system which it did no longer control entirely. 
This did not only concern the intelligence agencies. Lauria-Santiago and 
Stanley agreed that the military and security forces operated with substantial 
autonomy. Stanley (1996: 164-165) found that no functioning chain-of command 
existed in the army and the security forces. Thus departmental and zone 
commanders were unable to control the security forces. Instead, lower ranks of 
the security forces were often servile to local patrons. Lauria-Santiago 
described how reformist officers failed to regain control over the security forces 
after the 1979 coup which contributed significantly to the worsening of state 
violence in the following years. He wrote that:  
[b]etween October 1979 and 1982 the center of gravity of the 
state itself shifted from the traditional executive and was 
restructured more clandestinely. It fragmented into diverse 
centers of power, including, notably, regional military 
commands (Lauria-Santiago, 2005: 95).  
This local autonomy of the military and security forces means that efforts to 
centralise state violence had existed (although no effort was made to legitimise 
state violence) but with limited success. While state violence increased in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s, it remained dispersed. In the attempt to prevent 
disorder which threatened the creation of rents, economic elites relied on state-
sponsored violence mostly committed by military hardliners. However, the 
following section shows how reformist officers took the lead during the coup in 
1979 which marked the end of the pact between military and economic elites.  
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5.4 ARENA as the civilian representative of economic elite interests 
This section delineates the changing relationship between the military and 
economic elites. The coup of junior officers in 1979 and the subsequent rule of 
the revolutionary juntas gave the impulse for the oligarchy to gain direct political 
power, re-establish political stability, and secure the continuance of the rent 
economy. However, in the light of violent suppression of any political 
participation and ever increasing state terrorism, resistance against the regime 
radicalised and became organised under the FMLN. In 1980 a civil war broke 
out. The involvement of the US, which backed the civilian PDC ruling between 
1984 and 1989 but also strongly supported the military, ultimately prolonged the 
war. Towards the end of the war convictions had grown among the Salvadoran 
elites that peace and electoral competition were more conducive for creating the 
necessary stability for economic recovery and development. To that end, 
ARENA became the political representative of the oligarchy which paved the 
way for a different kind of accommodation between the state and economic 
elites.  
The relationship between the state and the economic elites began to change 
when the revolutionary junta came to power after a coup of junior officers in 
October 1979. The revolutionary junta which was formed in the aftermath of the 
coup comprised both military officers and civilians. Among the civilians were 
representatives from the communist organisation Foro Popular, from the 
moderate faction of the private industry, and the director of the Jesuit Central 
American University (UCA) (Stanley, 1996: 134). For the first time since 
General Martínez took power in 1931 civilians who had not been appointed by 
the military took up key positions in the Salvadoran government. The statement 
released by the reformist officers in the night of the coup announced social and 
political reforms that were unprecedented in their scope. It was a call for 
reforms of the agrarian, finance, and foreign trade system to ensure a more 
equitable distribution of wealth; it was also a call for free elections, respect for 
human rights, and the end of violence (Stanley, 1996: 267-269). However, 
hardliners among the armed forces and the more conservative wing of the 
economic elites strongly opposed these initiatives. The junta could not hold their 
ground against the opposing forces. The first revolutionary junta was followed 
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by a second (January – March 1980) and third junta (March – December 1980), 
both of which were alliances between the military and civilians. With the second 
junta, the PDC and Duarte became part of the government, strongly supported 
by the United States who made military aid contingent on the Salvadoran’s high 
command’s acceptance of the PDC (Stanley, 1996: 183).  
In March 1980 the third junta issued an agrarian reform decree to expropriate 
land larger than 500 hectares and transfer it to the employees of the estates. 
The employees were organised by the state in co-operatives, in a later phase of 
the reform process the beneficiaries should become individual owners of small 
plots (Kowalchuk, 2004: 188). Landowners with large estates lost significant 
amounts of land during the initial phase of the reforms, and as was to be 
expected, resistance against the continuation of the reform process was high. 
The planned transfer of land from estates smaller than 500 hectares was 
successfully blocked by the agrarian elite. However, the maximum amount of 
individually owned land was now by 245 hectares and landowners were given 
three years to adjust to the new regulations which were defined in the 1983 
constitution. Yet, this timeframe of three years provided enough time to find 
ways to circumvent the law, as Kowalchuk (2004: 189) found. One day after the 
first land reform decree a second decree was passed that nationalised all banks 
and loan institutions, which threatened the power base of agro-industrial elites. 
A third measure that heavily impacted the economic elites was the 
nationalisation of the export coffee trade that started with the founding of the 
National Institute of Coffee (INCAFÉ) in January 1980. Whilst the nationalisation 
of the banking sector was difficult to reverse, INCAFÉ was opposed bitterly by 
the agrarian elite (De Rosa Ferreira, 2011: 23, Paige, 1997: 194-195).51 The 
process revealed some estrangement between the state and economic elites. 
The call for profound reforms by the junior officers of the first revolutionary 
junta, the reforms in the agro-export and banking sector under the second and 
third revolutionary junta in 1980, and the economic elites’ opposition to the PDC 
marked the end of the pact between the military and economic elites.  
                                            
51 Shortly after Alfredo Cristiani, a coffee grower and businessman, was elected as president, the institute 
was declared unconstitutional and dissolved. The new organisation, the Salvadoran Coffee Council, was 
much more lax with regulations, and the coffee trade basically was in the hands of coffee elites again 
(Paige, 1997: 197). 
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What did not change, however, was the military’s presence in the state and the 
violent suppression it enacted upon the population. According to Walter and 
Williams (1997), junior officers not only committed tactical errors but had a 
limited vision of reforms since the military’s institutional predominance in the 
Salvadoran state and the foundations of the economic order were not to be 
changed. In addition, the juntas were not capable of controlling the security 
forces’ violent campaign against the Left (Stanley, 1996: 180, Lauria-Santiago, 
2005: 95). This explained the lack of support from the popular movements and 
guerrilla organisations whose vision comprised a complete change of the social 
and economic system towards a socialist order, and whose social base suffered 
most under the ferocious violence.52  
The juntas proved to be unable to contain the increasingly violent conflict 
between repressive state forces and the guerrilla movements. In 1980/1981 the 
civil war broke out and about 30,000 people were murdered by state security 
and paramilitary forces between 1980 and 1982 (Vickers, 1992: 30). Walter and 
Williams (1997: 114) noted the paradox of increased civilian influence in 
governance and the on-going strong presence of the military at the same time. 
They explained this through the military maintaining its institutional strength and 
expanding their networks of control in the countryside (far away from the central 
government) (Walter and Williams, 1993: 55, 1997: 118). 
In 1984 the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) won the elections, not least due 
to the support of the United States who had helped to set up the PDC as the 
moderate alternative to both the extreme Right and the FMLN (Vickers, 1992: 
28). Against the background of the Cold War, the US sought to prevent the 
victory of the left and opted for a policy that aimed to strengthen a government 
with more legitimacy than the military dictatorship. The US had significantly 
contributed to the strength of the military and security forces since the 1950s 
(McClintock, 1985), and it continued to support the military throughout the civil 
war of the 1980s. However, its policy began to change in the light of increased 
concerns from US Congress and the international community regarding the 
army’s and security forces’ records of human rights violations. It aimed at 
strengthening the regular army as a counterweight to the paramilitaries and 
                                            
52 Accounts of the historic Salvadoran Left’s world views can be found in various autobiographies, e.g. 
Díaz (1988), Regalado (2011). For a brief summary see Álvarez (2009).   
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security forces while at the same time supporting the PDC as civilian 
government (Stanley, 1996: 194). Karl (1992) showed that this strategy of 
maintaining a low-intensity warfare against the FMLN whilst promoting a PDC 
government which was not strong enough to address economic grievances 
against resistance of the elites ultimately failed. More than this, it prolonged the 
war since it produced a stalemate between the FMLN whose force was 
underestimated and the US-backed Salvadoran military. 
The PDC which had already participated in the revolutionary juntas was the first 
non-oficialista party in government, i.e. it was the first party that was not a string 
puppet in the hands of military leaders (Wood, 2000: 234). Being a reformist 
party with some popular support, the PDC government under President José 
Napoleón Duarte (1984-1989) was strongly opposed by the conservative elite 
(Stanley, 1996: 188-189). With the PDC in place, they felt that their interests 
were no longer represented by the government. They perceived themselves as 
trapped between the attacks of the FMLN and the Duarte government which 
they considered to be a threat to their economic dominance (Galeas, 2013: 89-
90, De Rosa Ferreira, 2011: 23). 
This situation forced economic elites to rethink their strategies to secure power. 
In addition to the political changes, the costs of the civil war threatened 
economic productivity. Rettberg (2007: 262) delineated the oligarchy’s 
recognition that a peaceful environment was more conducive for their 
enterprises. While the 1970s already marked a period of economic decline and 
crisis, the Salvadoran economy further deteriorated during the war. El 
Salvador’s high dependency on few export products made the economy volatile 
to foreign economic developments. Higher world inflation, a rise in petroleum 
prices, and a decline in regional and international demand of the country’s 
export products led to a serious shortage of foreign exchange (Segovia, 1996c: 
32-34). Exports to the Central American Common Market fell by 40% during the 
1980s (Rettberg, 2007: 470). Added to this must be the infrastructural costs of 
the war which have been estimated between US $ 1.5 billion by the Ministry for 
Economic and Social Development in 1992 (Segovia, 1996c: 31). Many 
businesses had to close, leading to higher rates of unemployment and 
underemployment and to a drop of real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by 24% 
between 1979 and 1982 (Segovia, 1996c: 34). Part of the FMLN’s war strategy 
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was to sabotage production facilities and infrastructure, and abduct business 
executives which hampered the industrial process and created uncertainty and 
anxiety among the economic elite. These developments combined with the 
economic restraints experienced through the nationalisation of the banking and 
coffee sectors as part of the junta’s reform package, caused significant capital 
flight in the early 1980s. From the business sector’s perspective, the state’s 
economic policy in the form of import substitution, an overvalued exchange rate, 
and the nationalisation of the banking sector in 1980 had completely failed 
(Murray Meza, 1992). On the other hand, Segovía (1996c: 43) pointed out that 
throughout the 1980s the private sector resisted any meaningful tax reform that 
would have helped to counterbalance the increase of external debt. Instead, the 
government cut public spending by 14% between 1980 and 1990.53 Thus, the 
deteriorating economic situation reinforced the tremendous effects of the war on 
the population, especially with regard to migration, internal displacement, and 
poverty.  
The country being largely dependent on foreign aid, it was USAID that 
implemented the new economic model that was promoted by the Washington 
Consensus. In short, it envisaged export diversification, trade liberalisation, 
increased economic competition, and a limitation of the state’s role in the 
economy. As the PDC government resisted to adopt this neoliberal agenda, the 
business elite’s think tank FUSADES was boosted with $100 million to promote 
the new strategy (Segovia, 1996c: 42). FUSADES was closely linked to the 
agro-industrial elite that already had diversified their economic activities into 
commerce, industry, and financial services. This group was the one most open 
to economic change, but the implementation of the new model was believed to 
require the end of the armed conflict and electoral competition (Rettberg, 2007: 
470). The coffee grower Alfredo Cristiani was co-founder of FUSADES and a 
representative of this ‘modern’ business elite (Paige, 1997: 189).  
The moderate faction of the economic elites were not convinced by ARENA’s 
initial extreme right positions under founder D’Aubuisson, and it was only when 
Alfredo Cristiani became presidential candidate in 1984 that the hard-line 
                                            
53 This affected, for example, education and the public health sector. The defence sector was excluded 
from the austerity programme; military expenditures almost tripled between 1980 and 1984, and in 1992 
military spending was still beyond the level of 1980 (Segovia, 1996c: 43, 306-307). 
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nationalist and anti-communist ideology was exchanged for a line of more 
economic pragmatism (Paige, 1997, Wood, 2000: 243-246). Despite Cristiani 
losing the elections against Duarte in 1984, ARENA kept growing and was 
capable of gaining support from the middle sectors and small business owners. 
Cristiani winning the Salvadoran presidential elections for ARENA in 1989 
provided the moderate economic elite with the necessary political power to 
pursuit economic stabilisation and modernisation. Under Cristiani the neoliberal 
model was adopted as the new national economic policy and peace 
negotiations were initiated (7.2). Economic elites had exchanged military rule for 
a civilian political party as their new ally.  
This chapter showed that during the process of state formation in El Salvador in 
the nineteenth and twentieth century, violence became an instrument for elites 
to exercise control. These elites predominantly comprised economic and 
military leaders. Political elites only gained importance with the beginning of the 
transition from military to civil rule (i.e. the transition to democracy, as the next 
chapter articulates). Exercising control by using violence guaranteed the 
maintenance of the rent economy in which only elites had access to resources 
and large parts of the population were excluded from economic participation. 
However, the use of violence as an organisational means of power did not lead 
to a centralisation of violence. Instead, violence remained dispersed and widely 
used by various state and social forces, including the army, the paramilitary, 
security forces, FMLN combatants, and radicalised sections of the popular 
movement (for the latter two see following chapter). Insignificant political power 
and decentralised violence summarise the circumstances under which the 
Salvadoran state was formed. This describes what contested statehood means 
in the case of El Salvador. Returning to Risse’s (2011: 4) definition of statehood 
as ‘institutionalised rule structure with the ability to rule authoritatively […] and 
to legitimately control the means of violence’ (Section 2.1.3), this thesis argues 
that for most of the twentieth century a vacuum of political power existed in El 
Salvador. This means that no authority emerged capable of enforcing rules 
which were not bound to the interests of economic elites, i.e. which were 
directed towards the interests of the majority of society. In the process of regime 
change which began in the 1980s and continued with the Peace Accords, the 
rule structure of state institutions ought to be strengthened. But throughout this 
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process the question of whose interests the state should serve remained highly 
disputed. Before turning to the consequences of a state with decentralised 
violence and a rent-seeking economy for the post-war order and showing the 
contestation of state practices in the case of security provision (Chapter Seven), 
the following chapter looks at the FMLN using violence as a guerrilla 
organisation.   
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6. Genesis of the FMLN: from an armed guerrilla to a political 
party 
6.1 Introduction 
Understanding the history of violence in El Salvador requires explaining the 
FMLN’s use of violence as an insurgent group. In this chapter the development 
of the FMLN is portrayed from building military and ideological power to building 
political power. It is argued that for the FMLN as guerrilla, as for the oligarchy 
and the military, violence was an organisational means. However, in contrast to 
the military and security forces, violence was used in a very different 
quantitative dimension. That is, much fewer violent acts are attributed to the 
FMLN compared to the magnitude of terror committed by the military and 
security forces before the Peace Accords. In contrast to the oligarchy, for the 
FMLN building power was not connected to securing the rent economy but to 
changing the economic and political order and to defending against violent state 
repression. The chapter also highlights the FMLN’s roots in large popular 
organisations comprising of peasants, students, unions, and churches. The 
history of the FMLN and its transformation from an insurgent group to a political 
party as a result of the Peace Accords has been studied in detail by numerous 
authors, both Salvadoran and foreign researchers. The FMLN’s development 
and political work in the aftermath of the Peace Accords is less examined in the 
current literature, but some studies give insight into the process of the FMLN 
forming an identity as a political party. Based on Mann’s categorisation of the 
different sources of power and on Migdal’s concept of power struggle, it is 
argued that as a non-state actor the FMLN as guerrilla built ideological and 
military power to challenge the state’s predominance in guiding people’s lives 
(Section 6.2). After the regime change, the FMLN turned into a state actor, and 
built political power in a long and difficult process. The party’s roots in the 
popular organisations and its claim to work toward political and economic 
change are the historic background against which the FMLN formed an identity 
as a left party. Inherent in this identity is the claim to build a state which is 
responsive to the needs of those large parts of the population which are 
affected by poverty and violence. As political party in opposition it had given up 
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military power, but ideological power is the constant variable that continued to 
play a role (Section 6.3).  
 
6.2 The formation of the FMLN as armed guerrilla 
According to Mann (1994: 47), ideological power builds on norms, concepts of 
meaning, and aesthetic and ritual practices. It is organised as sacred authority, 
i.e. it relates to a transcendent form of authority that is beyond secular 
structures. Among the examples of ideological power Mann cited, religion and 
Marxism are the ones that apply specifically to the ideological power the FMLN 
built on: while the main ‘ideological driver’ of the Salvadoran revolutionary 
movement was Marxism, the FMLN would not have become such an important 
force without the influence of liberation theology which was spread by parts of 
the Salvadoran Catholic Church, as is shown below. The FMLN was formed in 
October 1980 by four guerrilla organisations, and a fifth organisation joined the 
group in December 1980. As mentioned in Section 5.3, the guerrilla 
organisations had emerged in the 1970s as a reaction to the military regime 
ignoring demands for economic and social changes and suppressing political 
participation. Each guerrilla organisation was closely linked to a popular 
organisation. The so called movimiento popular (popular movement) comprised 
student, peasant and workers unions, political parties, and sectors of the 
Catholic Church. These organisations were central for the five guerrillas to 
recruit new members and to create broad support within the Salvadoran society 
for their purpose of armed rebellion (see below). 
As described in the previous chapter, El Salvador was under military rule 
between 1931 and 1984, and economic power rested with the small oligarchy 
whose wealth was built on coffee export and beginning in the 1970s on 
industrial goods. The close alliance between economic and military elites 
guaranteed the maintenance of a social and political order that excluded large 
parts of the population from access to land and goods, and denied the exercise 
of civil rights. As shown earlier, in the 1960s the military government acted upon 
demands for more political participation by establishing oficialista parties and 
tolerating other political parties in the attempt to pre-empt unrest. During this 
short period of slight political opening, influenced by the Cuban revolution and 
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social-Christian activism (see below), urban workers also began to organise 
themselves in unions and parties. This activism was accepted by the military 
and oligarchy to a certain degree in the urban centres where the power base of 
the rural elite was not challenged (Byrne, 1996: 24-25). However, as social and 
political organisations gained momentum and sought change of the political 
system through the elections in 1972 and again in 1977, the military-oligarchic 
alliance reacted with fraud and, from the social organisations’ perspective, 
blocked the legal path to political and social change.  
In the countryside, where the majority of the population lived, political 
organisation was not tolerated by the dominant landed oligarchy (Byrne, 1996: 
24, Pearce, 1986: 68-91). The National Guard effectively controlled and 
silenced the rural population since the brutal oppression of the 1932 peasant 
revolt. In the 1960s, the National Guard was supported by the paramilitary 
organisation ORDEN (Section 5.3). Questions of land reform and higher wages 
for seasonal workers remained unaddressed and continued to trigger discontent 
among the rural population.  
Given the presence of intimidating security forces in the countryside, the 
development of a strong peasant movement which contributed essentially to the 
strength of the revolutionary movement seems surprising. It was the ideological 
power of the Salvadoran Catholic Church that helped raising awareness for 
social injustices among the peasantry.    
The Latin American Bishops’ Conference in Medellín in 1968 marked the 
beginning of the theology of liberation, an opening of large parts of the Latin 
American Catholic Church towards the poor and towards the continent’s burning 
questions of social injustice (Segunda Conferencia del Episcopado 
Latinoameriano, 1971, Dussel, 1983). Parts of the Salvadoran Catholic Church, 
namely the Jesuit fraternity and the Archdiocese of San Salvador, took the new 
theological thinking seriously and set a focus on pastoral work through the 
education of lay priests and the formation of Christian base communities in 
many parts of the country. These Christian communities became very active in 
the education of peasants and workers. (Pearce, 1986: 109-122, Binford, 2004, 
Purrer Guardado, 2012: 52). Through its work this progressive sector not only 
fostered the democratisation of the church, it also contributed to the 
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politicisation of their members and to an increased awareness of social 
injustices and inequalities (Purrer Guardado, 2012: 52). This process of 
education and politicisation of peasants eventually led to them becoming 
organised in order to push for their interests and defend themselves against the 
oppression of the oligarchy and its security apparatus.54 These peasant 
organisations played a crucial role in creating the mass popular organisations 
which represented the social base for the guerrilla organisations, although 
relationships between guerrilla organisations and popular organisations differed 
with regard of the degree of autonomy of popular organisations (see below) 
(Byrne, 1996: 29). Referring to an interview with FMLN senior commander 
Facundo Guardado, Byrne (1996: 35) estimated that by the end of the war, 
about 95% of FMLN combatants were peasants. 
As the economic situation deteriorated in the late 1960s and early 1970s 
(Section 5.3), discontent grew not only among peasants but also among 
workers and students and led to a series of protests and strikes. The 
government did not tolerate this form of ‘uncontrollable’ activism and reacted 
with violent suppression of the strikes. This, in turn, fuelled the radicalisation of 
parts of the popular movement and political youth, especially of the younger 
members of the ruling PDC and of the Communist Party (PCS) who were 
disillusioned by the futile strategy of peaceful political struggle of their parties 
(Dunkerley, 1982: 87). For example, the teacher’s union called for a strike in 
February 1968 in which many teachers, university students, and secondary 
school students participated and which was supported by other worker unions. 
The protest was violently suppressed by security forces and resulted in two 
union members being murdered and 30 leaders of popular organisations being 
incarcerated (Álvarez, 2009: 12). This open violence of the military government 
represented a turning point for the popular movements, especially for those with 
students and teachers among their ranks. One direct consequence of the 
incident was the creation of the first guerrilla organisation, the Popular Forces of 
Liberation ‘Farabundo Martí’ (FPL). At that time, the Communist Party that had 
been founded in the 1920s, preferred participation in the political system over 
armed insurrection. Dissatisfied with the PCS’ rejection of the armed struggle, a 
fraction of the PCS, including its Secretary General Salvador Cayetano Carpio 
                                            
54 For detailed accounts of this process see Pearce (1986). 
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left the party in 1970 and created the FPL. The FPL followed the strategy of 
prolonged popular war, whereby it would slowly gain support of the masses in 
the countryside before taking power in the capital city and establishing a 
‘popular revolutionary dictatorship’ (N.N., 1981: 17-18, cited after Dunkerley, 
1982: 91). This meant it did not seek to control the peasant movement but 
encouraged peasants and workers to organise themselves (Pearce, 1986). The 
FPL was particularly active in the department of Chalatenango. It was one of 
the two largest guerrilla organisations during the war, the other one being the 
Revolutionary Army of the People (ERP) (Artíga-González, 2006). Dunkerley 
(1982: 91) wrote: ‘[It] was to remain the largest, most consistently radical and 
influential force on the left over the ensuing decade’.55 The PCS gave up on its 
position of social change through political work only in 1979, and created its 
own military wing, the Armed Forces of Liberation (FAL) (Artíga-González, 
2006: 52).  
The ERP was founded by Catholic university students, the Communist Youth – 
also former members of the PCS –, and former members of the PDC in 1972 
(Álvarez and Orero, 2014). Many supporters were from the middle class, among 
them many females and many with an academic background (Allison and 
Álvarez, 2012: 92). In contrast to the FPL, the ERP did not advocate an 
independent peasant movement but sought to create an insurrectionary army in 
a rather short period of time (Pearce, 1986). Its stronghold was in the 
department of Morazán which, like Chalatenango, was one of the poorest 
regions in the country. El Salvador’s famous poet Roque Dalton had also joined 
the ERP but was assassinated by his own comrades due to a conflict over the 
strategic orientation of the group (Dunkerley, 1982: 94). In response to Dalton’s 
murder Dalton’s supporters left the ERP and founded the Armed Forces of 
National Resistance (FARN) in 1975, later known as National Resistance (RN). 
This guerrilla group had broad support from the popular organisations, 
especially the union sectors and radical parts of the Catholic church (Álvarez, 
2009: 14). The RN’s focus was on urban warfare and on political work (Allison 
and Álvarez, 2012: 92). 
                                            
55 After an internal conflict between Carpio and Anaya Montes which culminated in the murder of Anaya 
Montes and the suicide of Carpio, Salvador Sanchez Cerén, became the FPL’s leader in 1983. Sanchéz 
Cerén is the President of El Salvador since 2014. 
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The Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers (PRTC) was a regional 
party with a small branch in San Salvador. Its military division was the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Popular Liberation (FAR-LP) whose members 
came mostly from the University of El Salvador but also comprised dissidents 
from the ERP and the PCS. Similar to the other guerrilla groups the PRTC 
maintained close links to Communist unions and some of their prominent 
members came from Catholic student movements that were strongly influenced 
by Liberation Theology (Zinecker, 2004: 42). 
All five guerrilla organisations were the product of a cycle of violent repression 
of the military dictatorship and increased radicalisation of the popular 
movement. Byrne (1996: 33) summarised the major strategies of these five 
groups in three key points: 
1) to embark on a political-military struggle to overthrow the 
regime, prioritizing armed struggle and rejecting elections […]; 
2) to link guerrilla warfare with broad-based political organizing 
and to create mass popular organizations to incorporate diverse 
sectors into the struggle for a new society; and 3) to place a 
major emphasis on organizing peasants and rural workers as a 
key to bringing about change in a largely agrarian society.  
By 1980, all guerrilla organisations had already gone through a process of 
forming, splitting up, and re-organising themselves. They had developed their 
own command structures under which they had operated for several years. In 
hindsight, the numerous groups of popular and guerrilla organisations (not all of 
which are mentioned here) appear slightly confusing. Considering the frequent 
splitting up and re-organising of the militant groups, it seems surprising that they 
managed to unify in one umbrella organisation, the FMLN. In fact, the command 
structures of the five organisations were maintained within the FMLN (Zamora, 
2003: 52). The structures shaped the internal struggles of the group not only 
during the war but also in their later years as a political party (see next section). 
The main motivation for the groups to join forces in 1980 was to gain military 
power. This was primarily motivated by the urge counteract the growing violent 
repression of the state security forces. The number of assaults rose 
dramatically during the 1970s: between 1972 and 1976 state security forces 
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were made responsible for 37 political killings and 69 disappearances. Yet, for 
the time between 1977 and 1979, 461 political killings (Instituto de Derechos 
Humanos: 1,476 political killings) and 131 disappearances were recorded 
(López Vallecillos, 1979, Instituto de Derechos Humanos, 1988, cited after 
Lauria-Santiago, 2005: 96).56 Secondly, by the late 1970s military struggle was 
considered by all groups as the only option to bring about political change.  
Surprisingly little is written about the FMLN’s justification for using violence. 
Zamóra’s (2003: 70) rather detailed and reflective account of the FMLN’s history 
addressed the issue tersely in just one sentence (in which he also referred to 
the rejection of violence after the FMLN’s conversion into a political party):  
Finally, the discussion about the method of struggle in the 
eighties was resolved practically to the extent that 
everybody agreed to do it. Today the question is also 
resolved practically to the extent that the entire FMLN has 
accepted democratic and peaceful means as the method 
of struggle and rejects violence as a way to gain power. 
As the quote shows, the question of violence was resolved in ‘practical’ terms: 
everybody used it.  
A more considered explanation – probably the most common one – is offered 
by Pearce (1986) and Lauria-Santiago (2005). It goes along with the reasons of 
unification of the guerrilla groups given above. The mobilisation of broad 
support for the FMLN was not only possible because armed rebellion was 
considered to be the only option left for social and political change but because 
there was the wish to counter state terror. While the military dictatorships of the 
1970s considered state terror as instrumental to suppress opposition it had a 
counter effect, as Lauria-Santiago (2005: 92) pointed out. Even reformist and 
formerly inactive opposition radicalised, and guerrilla organisations recruited 
even more members. The same pattern applies for peasant activists as Pearce 
(1986: 177-184) showed. Experiencing that all peaceful and legal attempts to 
demand an improvement of their working conditions were met with violence, 
                                            
56 Numbers of political killings and disappearances rose exponentially in the following years of civil war, 
especially in the first half of the 1980s. Between 1979 and 1984, 41,769 political killings and 3,805 
disappearances were recorded (Lauria-Santiago, 2005). 
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peasants started to defend themselves. After the failure of the FMLN’s military 
offensive in San Salvador in 1980, the FMLN retreated to the countryside and 
began building a logistical rear-guard (Pearce, 1986: 208). Its stronghold in the 
mountains relied on support from the rural population. It is debatable whether 
having the FMLN present in the villages served as a protection mechanism or 
whether it exposed the population to more violence. On the one side, supporting 
the FMLN was often the only way to counter state violence. On the other side, 
FMLN strongholds were frequent military targets of the government who did not 
distinguish between civilians and rebels.   
Some of the readiness for armed struggle might be owed to the ‘zeitgeist’. 
Revolutionary movements in other Latin American countries, most notably Cuba 
and Nicaragua, had an explicit impact on the formation of the Salvadoran 
movement. The victory of the Sandinista Front in Nicaragua in July 1979 was 
both a tremendous motivation and model to follow for the Salvadoran 
movement (Dunkerley, 1982: 119, Artíga-González, 2006: 53). It showed that it 
was actually possible to overthrow a regime through armed resistance and thus 
nurtured the revolutionary plan of armed insurrection. In El Salvador, the 
revolutionary culture was further legitimated by the memory of the 1932 uprising 
and massacre, as Lauria-Santiago (2005: 91) pointed out. After all, the 
movement was named after one of the leftist leaders of the 1932 insurrection, 
Farabundo Martí.57  
The radicalisation of the popular organisations did not progress without debate. 
Especially within the leftist, progressive sector of the Catholic Church, the 
question of whether armed or peaceful opposition ought to be preferred was not 
resolved. Among the most pertinent voices calling for a peaceful settlement 
were those of Archbishop Oscar Romero, his successor Archbishop Arturo 
Rivera y Damas, and Ignacio Ellacuría, rector of the Jesuit Central American 
University (Whitfield, 1994, Purrer Guardado, 2012, Tombs, 2012, Gould, 
2015). The military regime did not distinguish between the different perspectives 
on the conflict within the church, instead the engagement of the Jesuits, the 
Archdiocese, Christian social groups, and numerous lay priests represented a 
provocation for the military regime. The ideological power of the church that 
                                            
57 The same holds true for the Right which named a death squad unit after General Martínez in 1970, as 
Lauria-Santiago (2005: 91) pointed out. 
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previously served the military-economic alliance to maintain its political and 
economic power was now used to contest the regime. As with the unions and 
peasant organisations, suppression by the state was fierce, and many members 
of the Church were persecuted, tortured and killed or forced into exile. The 
killing of Archbishop Oscar Romero in March 1980 had an escalating effect on 
the conflict since it demonstrated the regime’s ruthlessness and further 
encouraged the guerrilleros’ choice of armed struggle. Ironically, it was the 
brutal killing of Ellacuría together with five other Jesuit priests, their 
housekeeper and the housekeeper’s daughter in 1989 which contributed to the 
de-escalation of the war, as it caused international outrage and led the US to 
reduce military aid for the Salvadoran government and strengthen diplomatic 
efforts. The clerics’ calling for a negotiated settlement helped re-opening the 
path towards dialogue between the conflict parties.58 But until then armed 
insurrection and, after 1981, prolonged war were the method of choice of the 
FMLN (González, 2011b: 148).   
The Truth Commission’s report (1993) showed the huge difference in the 
pattern of violence used by state forces on one side and the FMLN on the other 
side. Victims of FMLN violence were often mayors, right wing intellectuals, state 
officials and judges who were considered to be military targets, traitors, 
informers, and opponents. Acts of violence were rather targeted and comprised 
executions, enforced disappearances, and forced recruitment (Commission on 
the Truth for El Salvador, 1993: 37). Some killings also took place among the 
guerrilla ranks. The armed forces, National Guard, National Police, and 
paramilitary forces, on the other hand, used large scale violence systematically 
to intimidate the population and eliminate any opponents and collaborators – 
either real or suspected. Apart from executions and disappearances, torture 
was a frequently used practice of violence.59 Almost 85% of all complaints 
received concerned state agents and paramilitary forces, while only five per 
cent of complaints were directed against the FMLN (Commission on the Truth 
                                            
58 Much has been written about Romero’s unusual life and social commitment, e.g. Delgado (2008). For 
the sometimes underestimated role of Archbishop Rivera y Damas see Purrer Guardado (2012). For 
excellent portrays of the life and impact of Ellacuría and the Jesuits see Whitfield (1994) and Gould 
(2015). 
59 20% of complaints related to torture (Commission on the Truth for El Salvador, 1993: 36). Not all 
forms and acts of violence were investigated by the Commission, as for example acts of sexual violence 
were not included despite its occurrence (Tombs, 2006). 
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for El Salvador, 1993: 36).60  It is important to keep these statistics in mind 
when addressing the question of violence committed by the FMLN. However, 
the FMLN was a conflict party of the Salvadoran civil war and as such a part of 
the spiral of violence and counter-violence. As Byrne (1996: xi) put it: ‘[t]hat the 
weight of moral responsibility is not equally shared does not alter this dynamic 
[of violence and counter-violence].’ That is to say, the FMLN drew on military 
power to achieve its goal which was to change the regime. Reversing the 
means and turning from coercive to political power was a long and difficult 
process.  
 
6.3 From militants to political work 
Fuelled by the process of suppression, radicalisation, and polarisation, the cycle 
of violence and counter-violence led the country into civil war from 1980 
onwards. Byrne (1996: 69-100) characterised the years between 1980 and 
1983 as military escalation on both sides. However, while the emphasis of the 
FMLN’s two-fold strategy of military and political action was certainly on military 
action during this time, political work regained momentum after 1984. Two 
reasons vindicate this turn (Byrne, 1996: 105): first, it was interpreted as a 
defensive response to the strength of the Salvadoran armed forces, backed by 
seemingly infinite military support from the US. Second, it could be understood 
as the FMLN’s endeavour to re-gain broader popular support, especially in the 
urban centres which had turned into the government’s stronghold (Pearce, 
1986: 206-208). The FMLN thus intensified its ideological and political work with 
the local population. At the same time, the war continued and the FMLN 
repositioned itself, envisaging a prolonged battle instead of a rapid victory 
through insurrection (Byrne, 1996: 105).  
The FMLN’s readiness for dialogue with the opposite party developed slowly 
during the second half of the 1980s, as González (2011b: 151) and Zinecker 
(2004: 44-52) showed. During this time, military action was still the dominant 
strategy of the revolutionaries but the FMLN realised that dialogue also 
represented a useful strategy. It would strengthen its position as an official 
                                            
60 The Truth Commission only considered cases between January 1980 and July 1991. The large number 
of acts of violence committed in the late 1970s is not included in the Report.    
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conflict party, the FMLN would gain popular support from those who rejected 
the method of armed struggle but sympathised with the political ideas, and, at 
least for some factions within the FMLN, it represented an alternative way of 
realising their political aims in the future should a military victory become 
impossible. Manning (2008: 118) suggested that the 1989 presidential elections 
provided another incentive for the FMLN to strengthen their political profile. 
Although the FMLN did not participate in these elections, the participation of 
another centre-left coalition was tolerated and signalled a potential opening of 
the political arena. 
However, a negotiated settlement was only considered a serious option after 
the conflict parties had realised the military stalemate. The FMLN’s military 
offensive in November 1989 underscored that the FMLN had considerable 
military strength but, similar to the armed forces, was not capable to defeat the 
other party (González, 2011b: 151). A number of other reasons which are 
explained in the following chapter eventually contributed to the successful 
settlement of the war with the signing of the Peace Agreement on 16 January 
1992. Details of the demobilisation process and the FMLN’s conversion into a 
political party were stipulated in the Peace Accords. With the accords, a 
paradigm shift of the relationship between state and violence occurred. While 
the state previously used violence as an instrument of suppression, citizens 
now ought to be protected from violence. This is explained in detail in Chapter 
Seven. In terms of the FMLN we can recognise a notable change that it 
undertook by disbanding its military structure, renouncing violence and 
becoming a political party. Such a transformation is quite outstanding as various 
authors underscored, since research showed that it is not uncommon for 
wartime coalitions to break up during the peace process or after negotiated 
settlements (Atlas and Licklider, 1999, Lounsbery and Cook, 2011, Allison and 
Álvarez, 2012). What is also remarkable about the transformation is the FMLN’s 
changed relation to the state. The raison-d’être of the FMLN was the battle 
against the Salvadoran military in order to overthrow the political regime. Now, 
after the Peace Accords, it aimed for becoming a part of the very same political 
system it had previously combatted. This required the FMLN to build a new 
identity as a party and to learn how to use political channels to raise their 
concerns (Allison and Álvarez, 2012: 98-99).  
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Finding an identity as a political party did not occur without the loss of members 
and whole factions. The conversion required the FMLN leaders to convince, 
firstly, its military base, and secondly, those leaders who resisted to give up on 
the revolutionary project, to submit themselves to an electoral democracy – 
initially without the prospect of becoming the ruling party. Not everyone within 
the FMLN was willing to follow this path, instead many militants struggled in 
finding their way back into civil life and part of the leadership left the party over 
ideological differences. Reintegration of ex-combatants has been a lengthy and 
incomplete process. In the Peace Accords, the ARENA government promised to 
care for ex-combatants with housing and job programmes, yet Zinecker (2007) 
and Spence and Vickers (1994a) pointed to the poor design and insufficient 
implementation of the programmes.61 However, it was not just the government 
that did not prioritise ex-combatants. A former FMLN member expressed his 
dissatisfaction with the FMLN regarding the neglect of ex-combatants: 
[M]any people were abandoned. They gave them a 
pittance, a small plot of land. And the whole issue of the 
veterans, of the war wounded, [...] nobody cared about 
them. Ten years had passed and many people were still 
without pensions.62 
The relationship between the base and the leadership of the FMLN also 
concerned the numerous activists from the popular organisations that supported 
the FMLN during the conflict. In an intriguing study, Pirker (2007) showed how 
these activists struggled to find their new place in the democratic regime. While 
the political space for participation had opened up, many of the social problems 
were not resolved with the Peace Accords. Hence, there were numerous 
potential topics that could be addressed by civil society organisations. However, 
the conversion from clandestine, semi-legal, or illegal activities in the context of 
a revolutionary, left subculture towards expertise-based, transparent, and 
efficient NGO work required time. It implied replacing the ideological imperative 
                                            
61 This view was confirmed in an interview with a former FMLN leader: ‘Imagine me after 22 years of 
fighting. 22 years! [...] I was 40 [at the time of] the Peace Accords. So you tell me, imagine, if you lost 
your family, if you don't have ... you have to start looking for a home, looking for a job because not all of 
us were fortunate. I can tell you that I have been fortunate to have been in public office, at least in recent 
years; for A or B reasons I've been there. But for the comrades who had to return to the countryside to 
cultivate the land it was not easy, especially since agriculture in this country was not a priority for 
governments […]’. Interview with FMLN security expert R58, 14 March 2013. 
62 Interview with Ricardo Ribera, 09 March 2012. 
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with the technical imperative, as Pirker (2007: 26) put it. In addition, today’s 
organised civil society in no way matches the quantity of people engaged in the 
popular movement during the conflict. Chapter Eight underscores the positive 
input from the civil society in developing a security policy and the FMLN’s 
hesitation in addressing security issues. In this context, it was not only the 
FMLN as a Left party that was slow in developing a security approach due to 
security being considered as a topic that is typically owned by the Right. But the 
slow transformation of the civil society after the war was another factor that 
delayed the serious engagement with citizen security.        
Apart from the military base, differences about the party’s identity rose among 
the leadership, too. The five organisations continued to share the same rights 
and the same number of representatives among the party’s leadership after the 
FMLN was formed as a political party by statute in 1993 (Spence and Vickers, 
1994b, Allison and Álvarez, 2012). Among these factions, different views 
existed about which political path the party should take. The ERP’s and RN’s 
vision of social democracy that had overcome Marxism-Leninism was not 
shared by the FPL, PCS, and PRTC. Based on this underlying dispute the ERP 
and RN left the party in 1994 (Manning, 2008: 124). Among the leaders who left 
the party in the 1990s due to ideological differences, was Dagoberto Gutierrez 
(PCS-FAL) who signed the Peace Accords. He found clear words to express his 
disappointment:  
When we signed the political agreements, the FMLN no 
longer existed, it was already dead. [...] Once the war had 
ended the state produced a political party which was also 
called FMLN, but that had nothing to do with the FMLN 
anymore […].63 
The conflict over the party’s orientation towards strict Marxist socialism or 
moderate social democracy continued, even after the five organisations 
dissolved officially in 1995 to create more unity within the party (Allison and 
Álvarez, 2012: 103). Two opposing wings emerged within the FMLN that remain 
until the present. The orthodox wing still identified with the revolutionary 
movement and comprised members of the PCS, led by Schafik Hándal 
                                            
63 Interview with Dagoberto Gutierrez, 27 March 2012. 
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(presidential candidate in 2004) and of the FPL around its leader Sánchez 
Cerén (El Salvador’s president since 2014). The reformist wing took on a more 
pragmatic, moderate approach to democracy and comprised those members of 
the ERP and RN who had not left the party, including former ERP commander 
Raúl Mijango (who played an important role in mediating the gang truce in 
2012, see Chapter Ten), the PRTC, and some FPL members around Facundo 
Guardado.  
Zamora (2003), Manning (2008), and Wade (2008) show that the split between 
the orthodox and reformist wings became deeper with each election. All three 
authors maintained that the internal division was not just about ideological 
tendencies but also about individual power of the leaders, party structure, and 
the fractions’ ‘practical orientation towards electoral politics’ (Manning, 2008: 
125). The orthodox wing has strong ties to specific social sectors, relies on a 
loyal electoral base that finances the party with their dues, and favours a 
centralist party structure with rigid adherence to the party line by all members. 
The reformist wing tends towards a model of party professionals that 
concentrate on winning elections. It maintains close links with interest groups 
who finance the party, and has a pluralist, discursive understanding of the party 
(Manning, 2008, Wade, 2008). These differences show that ideology still 
matters, but at the same time the party is clearly established in the political 
system, as the internal struggles about electoral politics and party governance 
show. The wings do play a role with regard to the FMLN’s policy-making – not 
least because electoral candidates are chosen according to their proximity or 
distance to one wing or the other. Choosing Mauricio Funes as presidential 
candidate for the elections in 2009 was a compromise on which both wings 
could agree since Funes did not belong to either wing. As a popular journalist 
he was an outsider to the party and as such he was believed to be beyond 
internal party conflicts that prevented previous candidates from winning the 
elections.64 However, once Funes had become president, his position as 
outsider increasingly alienated him from the party. The gap between him and 
the FMLN deepened over the course of the term. This is especially true for 
                                            
64 In contrast to previous FMLN candidates who were usually opposed by the United States, Funes’ 
apparent impartiality guaranteed him the support from the United States – an important factor given the 
close relations between El Salvador and the US in many areas, especially trade, remittances, and regional 
security. 
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decisions the President made in the area of public security that were not 
supported by the party base, as will be shown in the empirical analysis of the 
thesis.  
This chapter traced the genesis of the FMLN as an insurgent group in the 1970s 
fighting against the rent based economy and changing into a political party with 
the Peace Agreement and with the transition to a democratic political system in 
1992. It showed the difficult process of the FMLN leaving violent means behind 
and building political power as a party. Before turning to the question how the 
FMLN as a party approached security issues (Chapter Eight), the next chapter 
takes a closer look at issues of violence and security in the post-war Salvadoran 
state.      
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7. From coercion to the right for protection: violence control 
after the Peace Accords 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on two aspects: firstly, the nature of post-war and 
contemporary violence in El Salvador and, secondly, the notable gap between 
post-war security institution building and the actual performance of security 
actors. The chapter looks at the period after the Peace Accords of 1992 and the 
efforts to centralise and legitimise the use of violence through reforms of the 
security sector which were stipulated in the Peace Accords. Importantly, it 
demonstrates that despite the reforms violence was not centralised. Instead, it 
argues that the continuous use of violence by old and new state actors as well 
as non-state actors is connected to the coercive security policies under ARENA 
governments, and to an economic order characterised by multinational and 
national companies fostering precarious work relationships and social 
exclusion. The chapter does not offer a comprehensive policy analysis of 
security approaches under ARENA governments as this would require a 
separate empirical research beyond the scope of this thesis. However, based 
on the literature about post-war violence and security responses of the post-war 
governments, it is shown that a gap existed between the efforts to build 
democratic security institutions and the actual practices of security actors. The 
focus is on the Salvadoran police which was at the centre of post-war reforms 
and whose transition yielded a large amount of literature. We will see that prison 
reforms, the second arena of empirical research of this thesis, attracted much 
less political and scholarly attention. The chapter points to the failure of ARENA 
governments to establish a functioning security sector. Instead, authoritarian, 
coercion-based responses to social violence were the methods of choice. 
Discussing the role of the military in the post-war period, we will see that despite 
steps being taken towards limiting its influence on politics, it retained influence 
on citizen security with the support from political elites. The chapter argues that 
besides ARENA’s coercive security approach, supported by the military, 
violence was criminalised in the public discourse and made an issue of the 
poor. This means that it was delinked from political developments. This 
discourse driven by Salvadoran political elites as well as international policy 
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makers was conducive for the construction of a state that, in contrast to the 
intentions of the Peace Accords, withdrew from the responsibility to provide 
protection to all citizens. In other words, in post-war El Salvador, a state 
emerged in which the government did not seek to build a legitimate state 
monopoly on violence. As a consequence, violence remained dispersed.      
The chapter is structured in four parts. The next section (7.2) deals with the 
security reforms reflecting on how they were designed to change the 
organisation of violence in the Salvadoran post-war society. The control of 
violence was to be structured around the right for protection of citizens which is 
a key characteristic of democratic societies. Thereafter (Section 7.3), security 
approaches of ARENA governments are depicted, showing how they 
undermined the institution building of the security sector through coercive 
responses to social violence and fostered a shift from public to private security 
provision. Section 7.4 highlights the discrepancy between the mere existence of 
civil control and accountability mechanisms, and the lack of application of such 
mechanisms. It draws on reports about the development and performance of 
the police and prison system after the reforms. The final section (7.5) reflects on 
scholarly debates about the nature of post-war and contemporary violence in El 
Salvador by elaborating on its links to the post-war economic system and the 
government’s discourse on violence.  
      
7.2 Protecting citizens: security reforms as key component of the 
Peace Accords 
The literature about the Salvadoran peace process speaks of the profound 
changes of the security system that were envisaged during the peace 
negotiations (1990-1992) and stated in the final Peace Agreement. 
Expectations on the reforms outlined in the agreement were high as it was 
hoped they would not only prevent the country from relapsing into war, but that 
they would transform a violent and repressive state into a stable democracy. 
International attention for the peace process was enormous, not least due to the 
United Nations who was a main interlocutor of the talks and supported the 
implementation of the accords with the United Nations Observer Mission in El 
 126 
 
Salvador (ONUSAL) from 1990 to 1995. The available literature about the 
peace process is vast and many studies concentrated on the UN role in the 
country. The majority of texts were written by international scholars and opened 
up a post-war perspective on security. They dealt with the direct consequences 
of the war and the efforts and obstacles of changing the security system. Gino 
Costa (1998, 2001) (political advisor to the chief of ONUSAL and head of the 
ONUSAL police reform unit) and Alvaro de Soto (1992, 2000) (personal 
representative of the UN Secretary-General for the Central American peace 
process) both noted their personal experiences of the reform process in great 
detail. Costa, De Soto and other authors like Hampson (1996), Doyle et al 
(1997), Stanley and Loosle (1998), Holiday and Stanley (2000), Laurance and 
Godnick (2000), and Dobbins et al. (2005) drew a detailed picture of the 
performance of the UN mission, which expanded their task from monitoring the 
human rights situation to observing the process of verification of the agreement. 
Some other authors examined issues of justice and the construction of the rule 
of law with regard to the security system (Johnstone, 1995, Popkin, 2000, Call, 
2003), while some texts focused on the changing US policy in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s as contributing factor to the opportunity of a negotiated 
settlement of the Salvadoran conflict (LeoGrande, 1990, Karl, 1992). Only few 
contributions came from Salvadoran authors, but especially Alexander 
Segovia’s articles (1996a, 1996b, 1996c) provided insight into the economic 
conditions during and after the war (Section 5.4). Much of this literature 
enhanced the understanding of UN peacebuilding which was a new concept at 
the time. Moreover, it also shed light on institutional challenges of post-war 
peacebuilding and statebuilding. Theses texts serve as resources for the first 
section of this chapter, which outlines the factors leading to a negotiated 
settlement of the armed conflict and the role of civilian state organisations in 
creating and maintaining public order.   
The literature speaks of several factors which fostered a negotiated settlement 
between the FMLN and the Salvadoran government. First, a military stalemate 
prevented either conflict party from military victory (Karl, 1992). The armed 
forces had been massively supported by the US throughout the 1980s to avert a 
military victory by the FMLN. In November 1989 the FMLN launched a military 
offensive marching towards the capital San Salvador occupying six 
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neighbourhoods in the northern parts and assaulting seven more provinces 
throughout the country (LeoGrande, 1990). Despite them being struck by the air 
force in San Salvador, the offensive revealed the FMLN’s military strength and 
triggered a revision of US policy towards El Salvador. Between 1984 and 1989, 
the FMLN had not launched any major offensive, which led the US to the 
assumption that it was possible for the Salvadoran armed forces to gradually 
win the war if supported with sufficient military aid (LeoGrande, 1990: 331). With 
the November offensive it became clear that the FMLN was too strong to be 
defeated (Karl, 1992: 149). It was under President Bush Senior that the US 
turned towards a more pragmatic policy towards Central America and embraced 
a political solution for the region’s conflicts (Pearce, 1996: 589). Another aspect 
which has been regarded as contributing to the end of the civil war was the 
changing international situation with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the 
subsequent end of the Cold War. The United States’ motive of containing the 
communist threat in Central America could no longer serve as a justification for 
their massive military involvement in Central America. In this sense, the end of 
the civil war in Nicaragua in 1989, as well as the Sandinistas’ loss of the 
national elections in 1990 further paved the way for a negotiated settlement in 
El Salvador. However, while US influence on the war had been remarkably 
high, the relationship between the Soviet Union and the FMLN was not 
especially close, as Hampson (1996: 136) pointed out. Therefore, the 
interpretation of the civil war as a proxy affair which came to an end with the 
end of the Cold War ignores the internal issues described in the previous 
chapter.  
Section 5.4 highlighted the role of economic elites in paving the way for peace 
talks once they were convinced that economic benefits would be much higher in 
a peaceful environment. A few factors indicate the influence of the agro-
industrial elite on the peace negotiations: first, assigning members of the 
business elite to political posts was no exception with ARENA coming to power. 
Schneider (2012: 119) found that Cristiani filled 17 ministerial and bureaucratic 
posts with FUSADES allies. Second, Rettberg (2007) attributed the lack of a 
substantial socio-economic reform agenda in the Peace Agreement which was 
criticised by several observers and scholars to the strong connection between 
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economic elites and the ARENA government.65 The primary aim of the 
government was to end the war in order to pursuit economic modernisation and 
to maintain access to the evolving international market. This argument was 
explored in depth in Christine Wade’s (2016) recently published book on 
Salvadoran elites in the peacebuilding process. Socio-economic reforms that 
would level domestic social injustice were not part of that plan. Indeed, the 
emphasis of the negotiations was on security reforms as is shown below.  The 
third factor which allowed for peace talks was the FMLN’s readiness for 
negotiations. As shown above (Section 6.3), the FMLN’s slowly developed this 
willingness during the 1980s with the prospect of increased recognition as an 
official conflict party with considerable leverage on the terms of a potential 
Peace Agreement. 
Finally, what set the stage for a settlement of the armed conflict was the 
changing public opinion inside and outside El Salvador. After eleven years of 
battle and economic hardship with no victory of either conflict party in sight, 
support for an armed revolution among Salvadorans tried up. Concerns about 
human rights violations by the security forces were raised by international 
observers throughout the war. The turning point which changed public 
perception was the murder of six Jesuit priests, their housekeeper and the 
housekeeper’s daughter by the armed forces in 1989 (Section 6.2). As a 
consequence, US Congress voted for cutting military aid to the Salvadoran 
government by 50% – an act which marked the end of massive US support for 
the Salvadoran armed forces (Karl, 1992: 153, Arnson, 1992: 86).   
Prior to negotiations with the UN, Central American presidents agreed on 
strengthening efforts to create peace in the region. In this sense, the so called 
Esquipulas II agreement was signed in 1987; it marked the beginning of a 
serious search for political solutions for the region’s conflicts (Pearce, 1996: 
588). In 1990 both the FMLN and the Salvadoran government independently 
asked the UN for help with setting up peace talks. The first of seven rounds of 
negotiations took place in Geneva in April 1990 under leadership of Alvaro de 
Soto, the personal representative of the Secretary-General for the Central 
American peace process. According to De Soto, it soon became clear that the 
                                            
65 For criticism on the absence of socio-economic reforms see Soto and Castillo (1994), Pearce (1996), 
and Boyce (1996). 
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UN would not only act as an interlocutor of the talks but would take over active 
role in observing the verification of the agreed terms. The final document was 
signed on 16 January 1992 in Chapultepec, Mexico. It comprised nine chapters, 
among which the most comprehensive measures concerned the armed forces 
(chapter one) and the police (chapter two) (United Nations, 1992). Further 
chapters deal with the political participation of the FMLN, reforms of the justice 
sector and the electoral system, the ceasefire and the process of 
demobilisation, demilitarisation, and reintegration (DDR), and the resolution of 
land issues.  
The core elements of the Peace Accords were: 
- The military regime was to be substituted by a civil government. The 
constitutional role of the military was substantially modified. It no longer 
functioned as the central power above all other institutions, but was 
subordinated to the executive, i.e. to civil control. Its core function was 
stipulated to territorial defence against external threats. 
- Military strength was to be reduced significantly. National Guard, 
Treasury Police, and paramilitary bodies were to be abolished. The 
National Intelligence Department was to be substituted by the new State 
Intelligence Agency (OIE). An Ad hoc Commission was established to 
purge the military from members who committed severe human rights 
violations.    
- The National Police (PN) was to be disbanded. Instead, the new National 
Civilian Police was founded, comprising of 20% former PN members, 
20% FMLN combatants, and 60% newly recruited civilians. Training of 
police officers became the responsibility of the newly founded National 
Academy for Public Security (ANSP). 
- The conflict parties agreed on the possibility for the FMLN to transform 
into a political party to guarantee its participation in the political process. 
In turn, the FMLN had to dissolve its military arm. Support for the 
reintegration of combatants into civilian life was to be provided.  
- The Commission of the Truth was to be established to investigate major 
human rights violations during the war. In contrast to the Ad-hoc 
Commission, it consisted of Non-Salvadorans and was authorised to give 
specific recommendations for institutional reforms.  
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- Reform measures were to be taken to increase the independence and 
professional qualification of judiciaries.  
- The Accords also stated the need for land transfer programmes, 
structural adjustment programmes, and a national reconstruction plan but 
offered no concrete implementation mechanisms.     
These agreements which had constitutional character marked a complete 
paradigm shift of the state’s relationship to violence – at least in theory. Instead 
of violence being used by state security forces as an instrument of suppression, 
the state was now given the responsibility to monopolise violence in order to 
protect its citizens. This is what constituted the change to a democratic security 
system. Whereas in the past the military and economic elites used the state to 
protect their own interests, in the future civilian state organisations should 
guarantee security as a citizen right. It was hoped that decoupling military and 
police forces would reduce the long lasting dominance of the military in the 
society and foster the civilian character of security provision. The responsibility 
for public security should be taken by a new National Civilian Police that had to 
be built from scratch. The police should be operating under the new paradigm of 
serving its citizens and respecting their rights.  
As Spence and Vickers (1994a: 2) stated, the language of those issues dealing 
with land disputes, reinsertion and other social issues is considerably more 
general than the language of those aspects referring to security reforms and 
human rights. The two latter points were at the core of the negotiations right 
from the beginning, as De Soto (1992, 2000) recalled. As an agreement on how 
to proceed with the armed forces was difficult to reach, talks shifted towards the 
question of how to monitor and deal with human rights violations. Even before 
the Peace Agreement was signed and before a ceasefire was in place, both 
parties agreed that a UN Human Rights Verification Mission should monitor the 
human rights situation in El Salvador (United Nations, 1995, San José 
Agreement). This was considered to be a crucial, legally binding step towards 
curbing systematic human rights violations by the regular and irregular forces. 
The strong need for this was demonstrated by the severe suffering of the 
population through state terror, and by the fact that any human rights advocacy 
was seen as particularly compromised and unprotected in El Salvador, 
compared to other dictatorships (Wilkins, 1997, Collins, 2006). In terms of 
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uncovering and improving human rights conditions, international observers and 
consultants made considerable effort to realise the paradigm shift from 
repression to citizen protection.  
Firstly, the Truth Commission investigated human rights violations, committed 
between 1980 and 1992, and published its findings in the final report From 
Madness to Hope in 1993. As the commission was given only six months for its 
investigations, it decided to focus on a selection of cases rather than trying to 
uncover all incidents. As mentioned before, the final report stated that state 
security forces were the main perpetrators of killings, disappearances, torture, 
and as Tombs (2006) pointed out, of sexual violence. The commission also 
found that violence was used systematically to intimidate the population, create 
distrust, and break up opposition to the regime (Commission on the Truth for El 
Salvador, 1993: 27). The instrumentalisation of violence was not new, as shown 
in the historical discussion. Yet, the scope of terror during the 1970s and 1980s 
was unprecedented in Salvadoran history, and the Truth Commission made an 
important contribution in revealing this. The commission’s recommendations 
were far-reaching: it proposed the replacement of the entire Supreme Court to 
allow for a substantial judicial reform, the permanent removal of all persons 
found responsible for abuses from offices in public security and national 
defence, and the further investigation of illegal armed groups. The 
recommendations were not legally binding and the Salvadoran government 
ignored them by and large (Popkin, 2001: 12). The government’s close ties with 
the security forces explain their non-action, yet the differences between the 
government’s position and the position of the Truth Commission (headed by 
non-Salvadorans) indicates the contrasting perspectives of national and 
international bodies. ‘Unfortunately, [the commission’s] work became a 
substitute for any other official effort to address the atrocities committed during 
the conflict’ Popkin (ibid.) wrote, highlighting how little the contribution of the 
Salvadoran state was in uncovering the past. These differences were noticeable 
throughout the peace negotiations and the reform process.     
Secondly, the work of the Ad hoc Commission concentrated on human rights 
violations committed by the military. Headed by Salvadorans and closely 
observed by the UN, the Ad hoc Commission’s recommendations of discharging 
most officers of the military high command was more widely accepted within the 
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government than the Truth Commission’s recommendations. The purge 
comprised about 10% of the officer corps (232 officers), and 102 persons were 
discharged (McCormick, 1997:293). Most authors consider this outcome as a 
remarkable contribution to the peace process, given that for the first time in 
Latin American history the military submitted its officer corps to external 
reviewers (Spence and Vickers, 1994a, McCormick, 1997, Call, 2003). In 
addition, personnel numbers were reduced significantly, and the percentage of 
the official military expenditure within the public budget decreased from 24% in 
1990 to 3% in 2006.66 For the FMLN, reducing military strength and placing the 
military under civilian control was a key concern during negotiations. From the 
FMLN’s military-strategic point of view, the Salvadoran armed forces were the 
principal enemy during the war (González, 2011b: 149-151). Hence, their 
reduction was essential if the settlement was to last. The same held true for the 
police. Both military and police reforms were crucial for the FMLN to guarantee 
its survival after the demilitarisation (Allison and Álvarez, 2012: 97). As 
described in the previous section, economic elites sought political leverage 
through the rise of ARENA and relied less on the military. Thus, placing the 
military under civilian control was an acceptable move for the oligarchy. For the 
UN as the interlocutor between the conflict parties, the primary goal was to 
prevent a relapse into civil war. In this regard, the reduction of military strength 
contributed significantly to reaching this goal. 
However, purging the military was problematic as is shown by the fact that 90% 
of the officer corps got away without any review and not a single officer was 
prosecuted, as an amnesty law was passed in 1993 (Popkin, 2000). There was 
no particular focus on the victims and no reparations in any form, and as early 
as 1994 ONUSAL reported the involvement of active duty members in 
organised crime in the early post-war period.67  
Thirdly, the Human Rights Ombudsman Office (PDDH) was established in 1992 
as the central institution for all human rights concerns of citizens. The PDDH 
developed into an important national monitoring institution and has constantly 
recorded and investigated human rights claims. Its importance as a lasting tool 
of monitoring the human rights situation in the country should not be 
                                            
66 Data compiled from Kurtenbach (1996), FLACSO Chile (2006), and RESDAL (2007). 
67 See UN Doc. A/49/281-S/1994/886 in United Nations (1995). 
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underestimated, albeit its practical impact has been limited. The PDDH’s 
recommendations were frequently ignored by the judicial bodies, and its 
findings remained without consequences for those responsible for abuses. In 
this regard, the PDDH constitutes an institution – initiated by international 
mediators and implemented by Salvadorans – designed to embed a new set of 
norms in the Salvadoran society such as respect for human rights, 
accountability, and transparency. Yet, the political practice constantly 
undermines the acceptance of these norms.  
Similar to human rights issues, security reforms received significant 
international attention throughout the peace process. Once the ceasefire had 
been negotiated, demobilising the forces was the first step on the peace-
building agenda. The physical separation of military, paramilitary and police 
forces was a precondition for the creation of security forces with limited and 
clearly framed responsibilities. ONUSAL verified the demobilisation and 
disarmament process of all 8,000 FMLN combatants, whereas the government, 
under the observation of ONUSAL’s military division, was responsible for the 
reduction and reorganisation of about 63,000 members of the armed forces 
(McCormick, 1997). The initial intention of the FMLN negotiators was to agree 
on FMLN combatants being allowed into the officer corps (De Soto, 1992). As 
the armed forces strongly resisted such a step, the compromise was made to 
integrate FMLN combatants into the new National Civilian Police. The creation 
of the PNC as a civilian, democratic security organisation was without a doubt 
at the heart of the security reforms, and Section 7.4.1 deals with its 
development in greater detail. 
Judicial reforms sought to strengthen the independence of the Supreme Court, 
the attorney general, and the state counsel from single political parties by 
introducing the need for a 2/3 majority vote by the Legislative Assembly to elect 
its members (Spence and Vickers, 1994a). The Peace Accords also called for 
reforming the process of judicial nominations to reduce the enormous power of 
the Supreme Court, but the few changes that were made to this process did not 
reduce the Supreme Court’s supremacy. In addition, the government rejected 
the Truth Commission’s recommendation to replace Supreme Court justices 
who were largely responsible for the impunity of state sponsored violence  
(ibid.). Importantly, criminal justice reforms were notably absent from the Peace 
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Accords were. The Truth Commission pointed to the need to reform the criminal 
justice system in order to strengthen the protection of individual rights but it was 
only in 1998 that a new criminal procedure code was adopted (Section 7.4.2) 
(Popkin, 2000, Popkin, 2001).   
For a peace operation, the achievements of ONUSAL were considerable: the 
ceasefire was never broken and the fighting between the armed forces and the 
FMLN stopped. Moreover, the FMLN was successfully transformed into a 
political party and the first post-war elections in 1994 were conducted without 
any serious disruptions. The political integration of the insurgent group 
culminated with the FMLN winning the presidential elections in 2009. Engaging 
with armed non-state actors was a relatively new experience at the time. Given 
that most current conflicts are considered to be intra-state conflicts that involve 
non-state violent actors, the FMLN’s positive turn from a warring party to a 
political party has encouraged mediators and academics to analyse their 
possible impact on peace processes.68   
 
7.3 Security at the expense of democracy: security approaches 
under ARENA governments (1992-2009) 
This section elaborates on the differences between the paradigm of citizen 
protection, established with the Peace Accords, and security practices in the 
two post-war decades. It shows that while the reforms established security as a 
political task, political elites did little to contribute to a functioning security sector 
and did not promote citizen rights for safety. Instead, security and 
democratisation were considered a set of opposing, incompatible and 
unrealisable goals. The dramatic increase of crime rates after the civil war was 
used to defer the further democratisation of the security sector. This perceived 
dichotomy between security and democratisation re-opened the path for 
authoritarian decision making on security issues.  
For the period of the 1990s, reliable statistics are difficult to trace, but the 
available figures illustrate the severity of the problem of crime and violence at 
                                            
68 For instance, the Berghof research programme on resistance/liberation movements and their transition 
to politics included a study on the transition of the FMLN from revolutionary force to political party 
(Álvarez, 2009). 
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the time, even if variations are considered. According to Call (2003: 841) the 
number of homicides per year rose from 3,229 in 1992 to 7,673 in 1994. In 1995 
numbers were beyond the annual number of deaths during the civil war. With 
139 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, El Salvador was the most violent 
country of the world – a sad top position which the country regained in 2006.69 
Homicide numbers were constantly on the rise until 1996, significantly dropped 
until 2003 and increased again after 2004.70 This latter increase is believed to 
be related to the government’s hard-line mano dura (iron fist) policy which was 
introduced in 2003 (see below).  
Literature which critically analysed political reactions to the sharp increase of 
post-war violence is scarce. This may be due to the fact that political response 
to the problem was very slow and came late.71 Scholarly attention rose with the 
introduction of hard-line policies in the region after 2003 as these approaches 
were highly contested. For this thesis some insights about security approaches 
under presidents Cristiani (1989-1994), Calderón Sol (1994-1999), and Flores 
(1999-2004) was gained from Salvadoran analysts and NGOs (FESPAD, 2003, 
Aguilar, 2004, Amaya, 2006, Cruz, 2006). Additional information was found in 
UN documents and texts by UN-associated analysts (Costa, 1998) and in 
articles about regional security (Sereseres, 1998, Arévalo de León, 1999). The 
increasing literature about gang violence in the region and state responses to it 
give some insights to President Saca’s (2004-2009) hard-line security approach 
(Jütersonke et al., 2009, Bruneau et al., 2011, Wolf, 2011a, Zilberg, 2011, Cruz, 
2011). 
There was no articulated security policy under presidents Cristiani and Calderón 
Sol. During Cristiani’s term, international advisers were still present to help with 
the implementation of the security reforms. But the impact of this external 
influence on the government developing a strategy for public security was very 
limited. The support of international actors during the ceasefire and the first 
post-war years was crucial for making a democratic security structure possible. 
                                            
69 Call referred to sources from the Salvadoran General Attorney’s Office. The accuracy of numbers may 
be doubted, but even if actual numbers were lower or higher, they would still be staggering: the World 
Health Organisation considers an annual rate higher than 10 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants as 
epidemic. For statistics from 2006 see World Bank (2011).   
70 Zinecker (2007: 4) compiled and compared data from various sources to increase validity. The above 
observations seem in accordance with most data available. 
71 For literature discussing the nature of post-war violence see Section 7.5. 
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This means, with international actors being involved in the process of 
demobilisation and demilitarisation and in the development of a new police, 
there was heightened awareness for the new norms that should guide security 
provision such as non-violence, respect for human rights, and accountability 
and transparency of security organisations. However, with the reduction of 
international advisers and observers which mainly fell into Calderón Sol’s term, 
these new democratic norms gained less attention. In the light of skyrocketing 
numbers of homicides in the second half of the 1990s, concerns of further 
developing the democratic spirit of the security forces became secondary to the 
instant need to deal with the wave of post-war social violence. The problem of 
violence was not sought to be solved by furthering the democratisation of the 
security forces but by poorly planned, coercive responses. Instead of 
developing a comprehensive security policy, all ARENA governments used the 
problem of crime to defer a further democratisation of the security sector. Costa 
(1998: 144) pointed out that even before the signing of the Peace Agreement 
the Cristiani government stirred up fears about a potential post-war crime wave 
in an attempt to justify the maintenance of the National Guard and Treasury 
Police. Instead of dissolving them, they kept operating under the same 
structures, renamed as Military Police and Border Control (UN Doc. S/25812, 
McCormick, 1997: 295, Costa, 1998: 137-145). This line of argument continued 
further. After dismantling the old security apparatus, a security gap became 
apparent (Stanley and Loosle, 1998). Including the guerrilla, the number of all 
combatants and security forces dropped from about 75,000 to only 6,000. The 
only force responsible for public security was the newly founded PNC, but 
recruitment, training and deployment of the new police required time. It was 
convenient for the government to blame this security vacuum and the 
inexperience of the new PNC for increasing crime and violence, as Amaya 
(2006: 134) pointed out. Likewise, the government justified the deployment of 
military forces in joint police and army patrols with insufficient PNC members 
(UN Doc A/49/888-S/1995/281). The use of military forces in the realm of public 
security was no exception. In 2003 the number of joint groups had even 
increased and until the present day, tasks of the Armed Forces of El Salvador 
(FAES) in public security have been constantly expanded (Amaya, 2006: 135-
136).72 These incidents indicate that the Salvadoran governments’ 
                                            
72 See Chapters Nine and Ten for details about the involvement of the FAES in public security issues in 
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understanding of a democratic security sector was not identical with the vision 
of international advisers. In contrast, these incidents lead to the assumption that 
values such as institutional accountability and transparency which were 
prioritised by international advisers, were not top priorities of the governments.  
Although theoretically the regional agenda of the Framework Treaty on 
Democratic Security in Central America (Section 2.1.1) may have served as an 
incentive to further develop security policies on the country level, in El Salvador 
a policy which based security-political decisions on an analysis of needs or 
feasibility or potential was basically non-existent. However, with the constant 
increase of crime and violence it became more difficult to keep eliding the 
problem. President Flores (1999-2003) was the first to develop a public security 
strategy, the Alliance for Security. Although it largely existed on paper, the 
original strategy outlined a certain variety of goals such as crime reduction, 
institutional improvements, and a focus on citizen participation (Amaya, 2006: 
138-139).73 Yet, according to Amaya, the government reduced the plan to crime 
reduction only and strongly focused on the police. Into that period of time fell the 
introduction of Eficacia, a technology-based programme modelled on 
CompStat, a statistics programme to analyse criminal activities and designed to 
improve police response to crime. This programme reinforced tendencies of 
authoritarian policing. CompStat was first used in New York as part of zero-
tolerance policing which is a policing model that aims at confronting even minor 
offences with major force, believing that by doing so offenders would refrain 
from severe crime. CompStat is ‘the engine that drives ‘zero-tolerance’ policing’, 
Greene (1999: 172) wrote. Not only was the Salvadoran state response to 
insecurity insufficient and one-sided, but importing elements of zero-tolerance 
policing into a society with a history of enormous human rights abuses by 
security forces further undermined the democratisation of the security sector.  
With the elaboration and realisation of the mano dura security policy under 
President Antonio Saca (2003-2009), zero-tolerance policing became the lead 
model of the Salvadoran state response to violence and crime. ARENA’s 
authoritarian mano dura approach targeted youth gangs as the source of 
insecurity and comprised a one-sided combat of crime via numerous rapid 
                                                                                                                                
recent years. 
73 Detailed information about these goals was not available.  
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detentions, area sweeps and joint police-military patrols. It mixed the quite 
different phenomena of crime, violence, and social and physical insecurity and 
reduced them to a street gang problem. Scholars criticised the short-term 
orientation and inadequacy of the measures, given their launch eight months 
before the national elections in 2003 and the huge publicity for ARENA that 
accompanied the implementation (Peetz, 2008, Wolf, 2011b). The policy largely 
failed as 95% of all detentions have been dismissed during the first year of 
mano dura without any trial, homicide rates further escalated and the gangs 
quickly adapted to the new climate of repression by using heavier weaponry, 
toughing their entry requirements and adopting a more conventional look 
(Jütersonke et al., 2009, Wolf, 2010). This corresponds with the findings of 
failed iron fist policies in other Latin American societies like Brazil, Mexico, 
Guatemala, and Honduras (Willis, 2009, Castillo Berthier and Jones, 2009, 
Jütersonke et al., 2009, Bruneau, 2011). While the measures themselves 
clearly contravened the spirit of the Peace Agreement, their impact on the 
security system was destructive in so far as they blurred the line between 
military and police tasks and weakened the civil character of the Policía 
Nacional Civil (PNC, Civil National Police). Mano dura contributed to an 
increase in arbitrary use of authority, overpopulated prisons, and overstrained 
courts (WOLA, 2006, Cruz, 2011). Newly elected President Saca responded to 
the brutalisation of the gangs with the super mano dura (super iron fist) policy 
that resulted in an even more violent approach by the security forces. By 2009 
the situation was intractable, as Wolf (2010) described: gangs had sprawled 
hundreds of marginal urban communities and were deeper involved in 
organised crime – partly due to their criminalisation and social exclusion.  
The previous discussion showed that despite the rather positive circumstances 
for the transformation of the security system after the war (financial and 
practical support from the international community, a broad constitutional 
framework, changed international political setting), ARENA governments were 
not able to effectively reduce and control violence in the two post-war decades. 
Instead of deepening democratic values in the security sector, state responses 
to violence and crime were often exerted at the expense of democracy. In other 
words, security and democratisation were considered a set of opposing, 
incompatible, and unrealisable goals. This relates to the gap between the idea 
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of security sector reforms for building a liberal, democratic state and applied 
practices of security provision. The perceived dichotomy between security and 
democratisation ultimately leads to the question whether the democratisation of 
security institutions can be realised at the same time and to the same extent as 
security needs to be provided. This discourse has already taken place in 
debates about public security and human rights. Cruz (2004), Uildriks (2009) 
and others have pointed out the strong public support in democratised Latin 
American societies for repressive policing and the tolerance for human rights 
violations for the good of safety. In contrast to the public opinion, human rights 
groups and academics often criticised the ‘tough on crime’ approach. Chillier 
and Varela (2009) described the dilemma this poses for human rights 
advocates. Their work focused on state violence and criticised police brutality 
and arbitrary detentions occurring after the official transition to democracy. On 
the other hand, victims of police abuse are often believed to have committed a 
criminal act. With regard to the prevailing public opinion that the breach of laws 
is acceptable if it is believed to constrain crime, human rights activists can be 
seen as working against the menace of crime and as supporting ‘the criminals’. 
In this sense, adherence to human rights standards is not only regarded as 
being irrelevant but even counterproductive in reducing crime. This line of 
reasoning is repeated in the discourse on security versus democratisation, for 
instance, when the lack of security personnel is made responsible for escalating 
crime. This logic underlies the anecdote at the beginning of the thesis: more 
police force means more security. The same argumentative line is used to 
justify an undermining of the civil character of the police, as happened with the 
mano dura policy. In short, under ARENA governments punitive attitudes 
prevailed which corresponds with research about punitive and conservative 
attitudes. Gerber and Jackson (2015) demonstrated the connection between 
support for harsh punitive measures and preferences for conservative values.74 
Holland (2013) showed the connection between ARENA’s decision for mano 
dura policies and the need to gain support from traditional elites and their rural 
bases. With regard to the FMLN taking power in 2009, the question arises 
whether a left government would approach a security policy which differed from 
                                            
74 Characteristics of conservative values were, for example, respect for authorities, discipline, and 
preference for living in highly cohesive societies. 
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the punitive focus and whether it would be able to realise such a policy against 
punitive attitudes in society and state institutions. 
More than a side effect of ARENA’s security approaches was the rise of the 
private security industry which is explored in the remaining part of this section. 
Academically and politically, the role of private security in El Salvador has not 
received much attention. Two studies depicted the development of private 
security after the war and provided some figures (see below), an article from 
Melara Minero (2001) and a report from the OAS (Carballido Gómez, 2008). 
However, critical scholarly analysis exploring the political and economic context 
of this phenomenon is missing. Drawing on Wacquant’s (2008, 2009a, 2009b) 
work on connecting the rise of punitive policies to neoliberalism, Montoya 
(2013) suggested that the punitive turn in public security policies in El Salvador 
contributed to the emergence of the private security industry. Wacquant claimed 
that while social and welfare functions of the Latin American state were 
minimised in the 1990s, the penal sector was at the same time enhanced by the 
state. This also applies in the case of El Salvador, Montoya maintained. She 
argued that this was only possible because of close relationships between the 
public and private sector of security. Although relying mainly on anthropological 
research in the department of La Paz, some evidence underscores the 
relevance of the claims at the national level. As mentioned earlier, ARENA and 
economic elites are closely linked. Koivumaeki (2010) explored the 
consolidation of the party due to its support from the business community with 
financial resources and technocratic expertise in the 1990s. On the one hand 
most post-war presidents were successful businessmen, on the other hand it is 
their responsibility to appoint the two most important positions in public security, 
the minister of public security and the director of the PNC. It is also common for 
Salvadoran business elites to exercise public offices directly, including in the 
realm of security. One prominent example is Rodrigo Ávila who ran as 
presidential candidate for ARENA in 2009 after he had served as director of the 
PNC twice (1994-1999, 2006-2008). At the time of the fieldwork interview, he 
worked as a consultant for both private companies and public offices in security 
issues. He switched between the different spheres of security: political decision 
making with ARENA, state security practices as police director, and private 
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security entrepreneurship as consultant. This shows how interlinked political 
and business interests are with regard to security.  
There is more evidence which points to ARENA fostering the privatisation of 
security. It is fair to say that apart from passing the Law of Private Security 
Services from 2001 (which substituted the previous law from 1994) private 
security was not at the centre of political attention. The law regulated the 
approbation and control of firms, it defined the general legal framework in which 
firms can operate, and established procedures for its violation (Melara Minero, 
2001, Carballido Gómez, 2008). However, many aspects remained unregulated 
such as the abuse of firearms, working conditions of employees, and codes of 
conduct. With regard to the omnipresence of private guards, this lack of 
regulation is surprising. Guards and guns are highly present in the public. 
According to Godnick, 85% of the currently 25,000 vigilantes in El Salvador are 
armed.75 They protect small shops and large malls, all kinds of public buildings 
like schools and hospitals, businesses, residential areas, individuals, industrial 
compounds, and state agencies. Legally employed private guards must receive 
a 30 days training at the National Public Security Agency (ANSP). However, 
there are frequent reports about the abuse or accidental use of firearms (for 
example González, 2011a), and the legal consequences of these incidents are 
not always clear.  
However, from an economic perspective the deregulation fostered the 
evolvement of private security becoming a profitable industry.76 As is argued 
below (Section 7.5), Salvadoran businesses are usually hierarchically organised 
with few highly educated executives with profound expertise at the top level and 
a large number of less educated, poorly paid, and precariously employed 
workers with few vocational skills. The private security sector is no exception. 
Private security is supplied in manifold forms: by big companies, vigilante 
associations, privately employed vigilantes, and individuals (Carballido Gómez, 
2008: 20). The degree of legal regulation of these employer-employee 
relationships varies. However, precarious work situations exist in all these forms 
of employment, including in large companies. Payment is usually very low, 
                                            
75 Godnick’s (2010) calculations are based on the number of registered arms, the supposedly high number 
of unregistered arms is not considered here. 
76 For different forms of private security provision see Ungar (2007). 
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agents have to work long shifts (24 hours are common), often employees have 
no social security, the turnover of agents is high, and guards are poorly 
trained.77 Yet, large security companies prospered. Serconse became the 
biggest private security company in the 2000s. It was owned by Adolfo Tórrez, 
one of the former ARENA leaders. Serconse benefitted from the protection of 
state agencies with $38 million during Antonio Saca’s presidency (2004-2009) 
(Ávalos, 2015). Section 9.3.2 demonstrates that this development was not 
reversed under President Funes from the FMLN. To the contrary, the state 
increasingly relied on the private provision of security to guarantee the security 
of its agencies. This revealed how successful the shift to private security was 
and how important private suppliers became for the security sector. Remarkable 
is also the supposedly high number of ex-combatants, especially ex-soldiers, 
among security agents (Melara Minero, 2001). On the one hand, this is due to 
the delays and incompletion of the post-war reintegration programme which 
should have provided ex-combatants with scholarships, housing, jobs and loans 
(Spence and Vickers, 1994a, Zinecker, 2007). On the other hand, the private 
security industry provided a niche for high rank military officers. For example, 
the former president of the National Union of Private Security Agencies 
(UNAPS), René Rodriguez Hurtado, is a lieutenant-colonel who fought in the 
armed conflict (N.N., 2010, Arbaiza, 2013).   
Ultimately, with their shift of security interests from the public to the private 
sphere, economic elites contributed to the emergence of groups and networks 
outside the state that have the power to use violence. At the same time, this 
shift implied a lack of attention for the public security sector.  
  
                                            
77 There is no systematic study about working conditions of private security agents. However, labour 
unions repeatedly pointed to problems of irregular payment, arbitrary terminations of contract, and 
excessive working hours. See for example a report by MUSYGES, an association of labour unions: 
(MUSYGES, 2012) This impression was confirmed when talking to guards randomly during my research 
trips. Many streets in the middle class neighbourhood where I used to live were protected by heavily 
armed guards. Usually, two guards were responsible for one street, each working for 24 hours. According 
to the guards, monthly payment by the company was below $200 and sometimes irregular. Due to 
frequent conflicts with residents and the company, guards usually stayed for only short periods – 
sometimes a couple of days, sometimes several months. Some information has been collected by Arias 
(2009).  
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7.4 Police and prison institution building: new rules, old practices 
Previous sections showed that a new, civilian police (PNC) was to be formed 
following the stipulations in the Peace Accords. It was stated that reforms of the 
criminal justice system were basically irrelevant to the Peace Agreement. It was 
also explained how coercive policies undermined efforts to establish state 
security institutions capable of providing protection to citizens in a democratic 
and accountable manner. This section zooms into the two arenas which are 
analysed in detail in Chapters Nine and Ten for the period between 2009 and 
2014, police and prison reforms. Looking at the development of these two fields 
prior to this period, the gap between post-war institution building and actual 
practices of security actors is revealed. The section is less concerned with the 
initial setting up process of the police, as this has been addressed extensively 
elsewhere.78 The focus is much more on the performance of the PNC. With 
regard to the prison system, a brief outline of the development of the prison 
system since 1992 provides the necessary background to understand the lack 
of political attention to this area. 
   
7.4.1 Policing in post-war El Salvador 
There is less literature about the performance of the PNC itself than about 
ONUSAL’s performance in introducing and implementing police reforms. This 
may be due to the short time span of international attention during the 
negotiations and the mission’s active involvement in the short period of the 
implementation that stands in contrast with the long-term nature of institutional 
change. The existent literature primarily contains studies from national and 
international NGOs and academic institutions that monitor and evaluate 
progress on police reforms in El Salvador and the region, namely from the 
Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), the Fundación de Estudios para 
la Aplicación del Derecho (FESPAD), and the Facultad Latinoamerica de 
Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO). As outlined above, it was the defined aim of the 
reforms to strengthen the civilian character of the police and to establish an 
accountable and democratic force. It is shown that the influence of international 
donors and advisers was decisive for the police institution building process and 
                                            
78 See Section 7.2 for the relevant literature. 
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that their focus was – and to a large extent still is – on training and equipping 
the police. Whilst those are important contributions to improving police 
performance, scholars of police reforms (Peake et al., 2008, Bailey and 
Dammert, 2006b) argued that in addition, a shift towards better oversight and 
accountability mechanisms is necessary. However, the implementation of such 
mechanisms did not produce policing that is characterised by accountable and 
non-violent action. Where formal change has taken place, institutional beliefs 
and behaviour did not necessarily change in the same way. As is shown below, 
studies found that despite professionalisation efforts, severe problems with 
policing remained. Among them were inefficiency, scarce resources, the 
frequent use of violence, disrespect of human rights, clientelist relationships, 
distrust from the population, and the lack of transparent work procedures.    
Foreign assistance to policing in El Salvador started before the Peace Accords 
and was provided by the US. Whilst the Reagan administration’s support for the 
Salvadoran military during the 1980s became contested within the US, the 
International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) was 
launched in 1986 to improve prosecution of human rights cases and strengthen 
the criminal investigative capacity of the security forces. Participants not only 
comprised members from the National Police (PN), but also the Special 
Investigative Unit (CIHD) which was known for committing and covering up 
political murders (Call, 1998). Its focus, as Call depicted in his trajectory of 
ICITAP, was on ‘training’ and ‘development’. ‘Training’ meant that courses on 
interview techniques and forensics were carried out, while ‘development’ 
encompassed the transfer of equipment and invitations to conferences and 
internships in the US. ICITAP was broadened with the Peace Accords and 
conducted in cooperation with the UN. It was ICITAP and the US that provided 
the bulk of financial aid and material.79 Sending instructors and advisors and 
providing training was the shared responsibility of the UN and ICITAP. The 
credit for detecting past and on-going human rights problems among security 
forces can be primarily attributed to the UN, Call argued. Despite initiating 
internal control units and developing policies within the PNC, ICITAP was 
criticised for not doing more to prevent corruption and abuses after the PNC’s 
                                            
79 Between 1992 and 1997 $25 million were invested which is more than all other donors combined gave 
(Call, 1998: 336). 
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full deployment (Call, 1998: 335). The technological modernisation that came 
along with the equipment and courses is being acknowledged as an essential 
contributor to a better understanding of the crime phenomenon. However, it is 
only part of the solution, as Dammert (2007) noted, because its adaptability to 
the Latin American police culture is limited. She exemplified this in the 
introduction of CompStat, a statistics programme to analyse criminal activities 
that is designed to decentralise responsibilities and procedures (Section 7.3) – 
which would have been a desirable outcome of the reforms. But it only works if 
there are comprehensive efforts to flatten hierarchies and strengthen the 
discretion of individual commissioners. Under the ARENA government, 
however, there was a strong tendency towards administrative centralisation as 
reports from FLACSO (2006) and FESPAD (Arévalo, 2004) showed: in 2000, 
there was a request for a constitutional change to make the police Directorate 
General report directly to the Presidency and bypass the Minister for Public 
Security. In addition, it was suggested that the Inspectorate General (the core 
police institution for internal oversight, see below) and the police academy were 
subordinated to the General Directorate. This was clearly against the spirit of 
the Peace Accords and against the idea of imposing checks and balances. The 
proposal was never approved, however, the reports found that de facto police 
work was organised along these vertical dependencies.      
The strong focus on training and equipping still forms part of the US strategy on 
security issues in Latin America. With the US being the main destination country 
for Latin American drugs and Mexico and Central America becoming the main 
corridor for drug trafficking, the Mérida Initiative provided Mexico and Central 
America with $1.8 billion as a counterdrug and anticrime initiative between 2007 
and 2010 (Ribando Seelke, 2010). Mexico received $1.5 billion and Central 
America was provided with $248 million. The majority of the funds were spent 
on military and police equipment and training, mainly aimed at combating drug-
related crime. The Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) 
emerged out of the Mérida Initiative, concentrating specifically on the seven 
Central American countries. Until 2012, another $248.5 million were provided 
via CARSI (Meyer and Ribando Seelke, 2013). Since 2010, funding also 
incorporated support for capacity building of state organisations which marks a 
slight shift of US donor policy whose effects were addressed in Chapter Five. 
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However, for over 20 years, the focus was clearly on training and equipping 
state security forces. Despite the fact that drug trafficking represents a severe 
problem in El Salvador, this sort of funding further fostered the practice of 
focusing on high profile crime. A WOLA report (Beltrán, 2009) found that 
specialised and elite units dealing with drug trafficking or kidnapping often 
achieved impressive results. At the same time, fewer resources were dedicated 
to common crime that affects most of the population. Hence, international 
assistance targeted only that part of the security challenge which corresponded 
to its own strategic interests, meaning that it supported a selective security 
policy. In addition, imported new technologies like Eficacia did not provide the 
same results as in the country of origin when applied in a different political and 
organisational culture (Section 7.3).  
In collaboration with local civil society organisations, WOLA has monitored the 
progress of police reforms in Central America and published two reports that 
give insight into the development of issues of accountability, community 
relations and transparency (Neild, 2002, Beltrán, 2009). Together with locally 
published reports they allow for a closer look at control mechanisms and the 
function and structure of the police. Organisational accountability is usually 
guaranteed by internal and external control mechanisms. Internal mechanisms 
are for example codes of conduct, disciplinary measures and administrative 
rules. In this regard, the most important institution of the Salvadoran police is 
the Inspectorate General (IG) which controls all activities and also comprises of 
a disciplinary system. Yet, with placing the IG under the responsibility of the 
police director, the independency of the institution became seriously limited 
(Arévalo, 2004).  
All regulations of the PNC are stipulated in the police law (Ley Orgánica) and 
resemble the UN’s code of conduct for law enforcement officials. Due to 
criticism that some regulations were equivocal and not differentiated enough to 
address all offences laws were amended several times (Neild, 2002). There 
was some ‘normative confusion’, as Neild put it, because of ambiguities in the 
law and an overlap of functions. At the same time, police rights were curtailed 
with a presidential decree that allowed for the dismissal of police officers on the 
basis of suspicious facts only, as Martínez Ventura (2003) wrote. Thereupon, 
2,400 police officers lost their jobs (Zinecker, 2007). Together with attempts of 
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further re-centralisation, this increased the dependence of lower rank officers on 
their superiors. Such dependencies were further fostered by the practice of 
arbitrary and frequent transfers between units. Beltrán (2009: 17) found that 
these transfers often happened towards a lower rank and as such constituted a 
form of punishment for disloyalty. Arévalo (2004) noted that control was largely 
centred on hierarchical relations within the PNC rather than on an improvement 
of its service capacities for the citizens. This resembles a tendency towards a 
military fixation on internal norms in a number of Latin American countries. As 
Macaulay (2012) noted: ‘an officer is more likely to be punished for a defect in 
their uniform than for beating or killing a member of the public.’ Beltrán (2009) 
found that investigations of the IG often focused on minor infractions and 
targeted basic agents. This resulted in a backlog of more significant disciplinary 
cases and seriously hampered the efficiency of oversight mechanisms. 
Whereas international reformers paid less attention to the details of the new 
regulations (which might have been beyond their capacity), the regulations were 
indeed designed to improve accountability. However, they were not necessarily 
applied in that sense, but rather in a form that fitted traditional conceptions of 
the force. 
Outside the police, the Office of the Ombudsman for Human Rights (PDDH) as 
well as the National Council for Public Security (CNSP) were meant to take over 
key control functions over the security sector. The PDDH was the central 
institution for human rights claims for citizens. Despite its reactive rather than 
proactive character, it was seen as an important institution regarding the efforts 
to disclose human rights violations committed by security forces (Neild, 2002). 
Since 2001 the PDDH has collected and reported cases of torture of prisoners 
by members of the police as a disciplinary method. It stated that about 40% of 
all cases of human rights violations reported to the PDDH between 1995 and 
2003 went to the account of the police (PDDH, 2007, cited after Beltrán, 2009). 
Apart from these observations there was little information about the motivation 
of police forces for the random or systematic use of torture. It was also not clear 
to what extent police officers were held accountable when malpractices were 
reported. It is thus difficult to evaluate the success of the oversight mechanisms 
and to make detailed statements about the level of impunity within the PNC. 
The CNSP ought to be a counter-weight to the Ministry of Justice and Public 
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Security and feed into politics and the public by developing public security 
proposals and initiating public debates. As such, it was designed to increase 
accountability of security institutions. According to the FLACSO Report (2006), 
the Council did develop a number of suggestions regarding the police such as 
the introduction of measures to improve the information system and the 
strengthening of police leadership. However, ARENA governments’ interest in 
the implementation of these ideas was limited. The CNSP was dissolved after 
the FMLN came to power, and new organisations were founded to take over the 
CNSP’s responsibilities (Aguilar, 2014: 71-72). Besides PDDH and CNSP, civil 
society organisations started taking over an external control function over the 
security sector. Although their influence was very limited during the 1990s, 
WOLA found that between 2002 and 2009 both numbers and expertise of 
NGOs dealing with security issues was growing fast (Beltrán, 2009).  
The issues that are (by no means exhaustively) depicted here draw upon 
studies that all have something in common: most reports, including those with a 
broader Latin American perspective, have noted a gap between the existence of 
control and accountability mechanisms and their practical use or abuse. The 
lack of changing practices within the police was repeatedly regarded as a factor 
which limited institution building efforts. Dammert (2007) stated that police 
practices were often only on the surface adapted to the new institutional design 
and without a profound paradigmatic change. In the WOLA reports, a huge gap 
between police training and practice had been spotted. It was assumed that this 
was due to a disconnection between the institution’s official philosophy and the 
personal views of its leaders. A police commissioner is cited in the report (p. 
11): ‘The recruits can understand a bit about what community policing80 means, 
but they don’t implement it in practice. And there’s the difficulty, trying to 
internalise the concept instead of just memorizing the concept and saying what 
it is.’ An NGO worker added (p. 11): ‘We have an academy where humanistic 
and human rights topics have acquired a merely formal character […]. We have 
a police force […] that is quite weak with respect to the doctrine and legal 
framework of human rights, the respect for constitutional guarantees and the 
prevention and investigation of crime.” Zinecker (2007) referred to an interview 
                                            
80 Community policing is a concept that aims for better relations between the police and local 
communities and emphasises the service character of the police. See Chapter Seven for more details. 
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with the human rights ombudswoman that deplored the fatal worsening of the 
spirit, morals and attitudes of police, and particularly police leaders. Similarly, 
Call (2003) characterised the transformation of the Salvadoran police as a 
formal removal of authoritarian structures with an informal continuity of many 
practices and attitudes.  
In summary, a gap is observed between institution building efforts and policing 
practices. This gap remains mostly unexplained. It is argued that a focus on the 
police alone will not suffice to understand the gap. Instead of comprehending 
the police as the most important state organisation in the provision of citizen 
security, the police needs to be seen as an arena in which various state and 
non-state actors struggle to gain control over how the organisation of violence in 
society. This approach is used in Chapter Nine to analyse policing and police 
reforms between 2009 and 2014. The fact that with the change of government 
in 2009 re-orientation towards a more professionalised and less personalised 
police was not sustainable, indicates that institution building is not just a matter 
of political will. Chapter Nine will look at the apparent failure of reform efforts by 
showing how state security responses are trapped between attempts of long-
term institutional change and political ad hoc reactions to security crises. 
 
7.4.2 The post-war prison system 
There are a number of studies about the situation in Salvadoran prisons which 
give insight into the inhumane conditions prisoners live in, the poorly trained, 
corrupt guards, and overstrained prison authorities (Martínez Ventura, 2005, 
Fundación Quetzalcóatl, 2009, Santacruz Giralt and Ranum, 2010, Andrade 
and Carrillo, 2015). However, academics and non-governmental organisations 
paid very little attention to the political interests which made prisons to 
overcrowded and violent places, as well as to political efforts (or lack thereof) to 
reform the prison system. Therefore, drawing a picture of the Salvadoran prison 
system before 2009 is limited to a basic outline.  
Like police training, international support for justice reforms in El Salvador 
started during the civil war in the mid-1980s and was provided by USAID 
(Pásara, 2012). According to Popkin (2000), USAID proposed criminal justice 
reforms at the time of the signing of the Peace Accords, and likewise the Truth 
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Commission recommended criminal justice reforms. However, it was only in 
1998 that a new criminal procedure code took effect which marked an important 
step in modernising the system: criminal procedure changed from inquisitorial to 
an adversarial system, the protection of individual rights was stipulated, the use 
of preventive detention was restricted, and alternative sentencing besides 
imprisonment was strengthened (Popkin, 2001). Reforms were not perceived 
well by parts of the ARENA government. Popkin (2001: 17) wrote that Security 
Minister Barrera had complained about the excessive protection of criminals.  
Barrera’s complaint resembled the arguments brought forward by ARENA 
governments in the debate of security versus democratisation according to 
which a punitive attitude prevented the strengthening of accountability and rule 
of law for security forces. As for criminal justice, this debate evolved around 
‘garantismo’ which described a justice system protecting individual rights. In El 
Salvador, ‘leyes garantistas’ (‘guarantee laws’) had negatively connotations.81 
Detainees were believed to be criminals who needed to be punished. A fair 
procedure respecting suspects’ rights, determining whether suspects had 
committed a criminal offence as well as an adequate punishment was 
secondary. Despite the reforms, imprisonment was a frequently used form of 
punishment. In fact, it remained the preferred method of punishment as the 
mano dura policies between 2003 and 2006 indicated.82 The use of 
imprisonment as a method of deterrence and for ‘disciplining’ parts of the 
population perceived as risks to society, was discussed and criticised in the 
literature about penal populism in Latin America (Méndez et al., 1999, 
Wacquant, 2009a, Müller, 2012b, Macaulay, 2013). As shown above, there is 
some evidence that the connection Wacquant established between 
neoliberalism and punitive policies applied to the development of the private 
security industry in El Salvador. Although the neoliberal ideology was a decisive 
element of post-war economic policy (Section 7.5), this connection is difficult to 
prove for the prison system, primarily due to limited in-depth information. For 
instance, there was no evidence found which would have indicated a form of 
involvement of private sectors in the infrastructural provision or administration of 
                                            
81 Interview with police official R27, 12 April 2012; interview with FMLN security expert Óscar 
Fernández, 13 February 2013. 
82 Interview with Douglas Moreno (Vice Minister of Public Security at the time of the interview and 
former Director General of Penitentiaries), 11 April 2012.  
 151 
 
prisons. The government discussed ideas of privatising prison infrastructure 
during the mano dura period in 2004 (see below), yet there was no proof this 
plan was realised (FESPAD/CEPES, 2004). However, given the politics of 
abandonment of Salvadoran prisons (Macaulay, 2013: 381-382), penal 
populism certainly played a role in El Salvador. 
According to the NGO Quetzalcoatl (2009), the ‘penitentiary crisis’ was a 
constant subject of media reports since the 1990s. Between 1997 and 2007, 
prison population increased by 99% (Dammert and Zuñiga, 2008: 45). While the 
increase of the prison total population was slow between 1995 and 2000, it 
more than doubled between 2000 and 2006, as Table 1 shows. However, the 
capacity of prisons was not extended. According to an NGO report from 2004, 
the government announced to respond to the penitentiary crisis by building new 
prisons, including a mega prison, and by privatising the infrastructure 
(FESPAD/CEPES, 2004). Yet, in 2008, one year before the FMLN took power, 
19,814 inmates shared only 7,990 places (Dammert and Zuñiga, 2008: 47, 
Institute for Criminal Policy Research, 2015). This shows that the problem of 
overpopulation was not addressed by ARENA governments. Other issues like 
violence inside prisons, including lethal attacks, the growth of imprisoned 
gangs, and corruptive guards were ignored by policy-makers (FESPAD/CEPES, 
2004). 
Table 1: Total prison population in El Salvador, 1995-2008 
Year Prison population 
1995 7,013 
2000 7,754 
2006 14,771 
2008 19,814 
Source: Institute for Criminal Policy Research (2015). 
More substantial research and more reliable data are needed to explain the 
making of the penitentiary crisis in El Salvador in more detail. However, the few 
existing studies cited above allow for drawing the general picture: a mixture of 
punitive attitudes and ignorance by policy-makers in the 1990s and 2000s 
impeded the building of a prison system supportive of the stabilisation of a 
democratic, accountable security sector in post-war El Salvador. Alternative 
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forms of punishment and opportunities for rehabilitation were not strengthened 
during this period. The security threats this development fostered are discussed 
below with regard to imprisoned gangs and in the following chapters with regard 
to FMLN endeavours to prison reforms.  
 
7.5 Contemporary forms of violence in El Salvador 
Section 2.5 showed the struggle of scholars to comprehend the nature of 
violence in Latin American states after their transition from dictatorship to 
democracy and after the end of civil wars. This section takes a closer look at the 
debates about the post-war violence in El Salvador and at studies about 
contemporary forms of violence in the country. It finds that in addition to the rise 
of the private security industry outlined above, youth gangs represent the 
second new non-state actor who essentially undermines the creation of a state 
monopoly of violence. Special attention is paid to the socio-economic conditions 
contributing to the growth of social violence. The section provides an overview 
of the security challenges the FMLN faced when rising to power, and it 
summarises how, under ARENA’s security discourse and practices, a state 
emerged which was incapable of centralising and legitimately controlling 
violence. 
The previous section referred to the skyrocketing homicide numbers during the 
1990s in El Salvador. As in other Latin American societies after civil wars and/or 
the transition to democracy, scholars reflecting upon violence in El Salvador 
after the Peace Accords, interpreted the phenomenon differently. The debate 
between Philip Bourgois (2001) and Leigh Binford (2002) about the nature of 
violence in El Salvador is characteristic for the struggle of understanding the 
continuation of violence under democratic rule. Bourgois saw the embedding of 
violence in social relations as a product of the suppression during the war. 
Binford disagreed with Bourgois’ assumptions of a culture of violence as a mere 
outcome of the war, pointing to the connection between poverty and violence. In 
the subsequent discussion on structural reasons for violence, another 
explanation for post-war violence referred to the neglect of socio-economic 
issues in the Peace Agreement and the persistence of social exclusion 
(Savenije and Andrade-Eekhoff, 2003, Hume, 2008). Savenije and Andrade-
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Eeckhoff (2003) and Savenije and Van der Borgh (2004) spoke of everyday 
forms of violence in the context of social exclusion, and named three 
mechanisms for its reproduction: frustration caused by social and economic 
hardship, the normalisation of violence, and the existence of perverse social 
organisations (i.e. gangs). However, even before the debate between Binford 
and Bourgois evolved, scholars pointed to the inauspicious connection between 
El Salvador’s macroeconomic policy and social exclusion that put a fragile 
peace at risk (Boyce, 1996, Pearce, 1996). The debate reflected the shifting 
interpretations of violence as a legacy of the war towards a more structuralist 
perspective which highlighted the socio-economic conditions under which 
violence was growing (Savenije and Andrade-Eekhoff, 2003). An interesting 
explanation of the continuance of violence is offered by Zinecker (2014). 
Sections 5.4 and 7.2 set out how economic elites, especially moderate elite 
factions, pursued the transition towards a post-war society which guaranteed 
the maintenance of their economic interests in an evolving, modernising, and 
increasingly international market. Zinecker maintained that with the process of 
economic modernisation, the rent economy did not disappear. Instead, 
agricultural rents were replaced with the creation of rent equivalents, namely 
remittances and maquilas.83 In El Salvador, remittances became an important 
factor of the Salvadoran economy, as their share of the GDP increased from 
11.2% in 1995 to 16.8% in 2014 (World Bank, 2015). Most of the remittances 
are transferred by Salvadorans living in the US (1.12 million first generation 
immigrants in 2015, compared to 6.3 million inhabitants in El Salvador) (MPI, 
2015). Exports from maquilas and free trade zones to the US accounted for 
42% of total exports to the US in 2012 (Crossa, 2015). Zinecker argued that 
social violence, and in El Salvador particularly gang violence, functions as a 
substitute for profit through work (among other functions). She argued that 
many gang members were precariously employed and socialised in an 
                                            
83 Remittances are money transfers from migrants in the diaspora to relatives living in the country of 
origin. The money results from internationally diverging income structures. With remittances, local work 
force declines, instead work force is shifted abroad. Remittances are considered to be rent equivalents by 
Zinecker, since recipients of remittances did not work for this income; it is thus an excess income. 
Maquilas are factories which concentrate on job-processing and employ workers with few vocational 
skills. In free trade areas, these factories are often subsidised by the state. Low skilled workers in 
combination with low incomes make maquilas attractive for international companies. This means that the 
surplus profit of maquilas resides with international companies and is kept from the national economy 
(Zinecker, 2014: 56-57). Zinecker labelled remittances and maquilas as rent equivalents to emphasise the 
difference from former rents since the remittances are not excess income of national elites but of the 
lower classes and since work force in maquilas is paid. 
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environment where remittances and maquilas played an important role. 
Violence occurred either out of its instrumental use to compensate profit or out 
of frustration over the lack of economic opportunities. At the same time, the 
economic importance of remittances led to social disintegration due to 
increased emigration; under these circumstances, gang membership provided a 
feeling of belonging (Zinecker, 2014: 277-286).  
With regard to benefits for national economic elites, Zinecker considered 
remittances and maquilas as a stabilising factor since they reduce 
unemployment and poverty without threatening the generation of rents for 
national economic elites. There are limits to the model since rent-seeking of 
contemporary national elites is not explained. The author argued that these 
were generated within the banking sector (2014: 319). Yet, Bull (2013) found 
that Salvadoran elites had sold all banks to multinational companies by 2006. In 
her analysis about the diversification of Salvadoran business groups in the 
1990s and 2000s, Bull (2013) referred to Schneider’s (2009a) model of 
hierarchical market economies to describe the Salvadoran economy after the 
end of the civil war. Hierarchical market economies are characterised by small 
numbers of large national business groups that, together with multinational 
companies, account for large shares of the economic activity in a country. 
Businesses are organised hierarchically, i.e. they are often directly owned by 
families or family networks with powerful, well-educated executives at the top 
and ordinary employees with low levels of education, vocational skills, and weak 
worker’s organisations at the bottom. With the spread of multinational 
companies, the economic landscape in El Salvador changed over the last two 
decades, but according to Bull, national business groups have adapted to that 
in various ways. They still play an important role for the national economy, firstly 
because they can draw on indispensable local knowledge due to their family 
and elite networks, and secondly because they focus on sectors that are of less 
interest for multinational companies. In this regard, Salvadoran business groups 
have almost completely moved out of the banking sector between 1997 and 
2006 and also reduced their presence in the industry. Instead they focused on 
commerce, real estate and selected services such as tourism. Bull’s analysis 
showed that, while the Salvadoran economy was not a rent economy anymore 
but a market economy, certain characteristics resemble that of the rent 
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economy. This is especially true for the hierarchical organisation of work and 
the concentration of economic activity in a small number of large business 
groups. This implies that the national economy, together with the prevalence of 
remittances and maquilas, contributed to the precariousness of work, which in 
turn fostered violence. 
Besides socio-economic explanations, publications related the further 
escalation of crime and violence in the 2000s to the zero tolerance policies of 
ARENA governments (Cruz, 2011, Zilberg, 2011). These contributions 
highlighted the involvement of state actors in the reproduction of violence by 
committing acts of violence but also by failing to contain violence. This relates 
back to the discussion about the separation between social and political 
violence and the question whether the strong focus on social violence ignores 
the state’s role in reproducing violence under democratic rule (Section 2.5). For 
El Salvador, Moodie (2010, 2012) maintained that violence was criminalised 
through discourses of governments and international observers in the post-war 
environment. She emphasised that while crime rates did increase it was also 
the perspective on violence which had changed towards perceiving violence as 
common and, thus, as apolitical. Similarly, Peetz (2008) showed how youth 
were constructed as a security threat in the public discourses in Central 
America, and established a link between the existence of these discourses and 
repressive policies. Cruz (2016) recently began to articulate the state’s 
involvement in the reproduction of violence through the utilisation of the state by 
elites and social groups to pursuit their economic interests. 
Against the backdrop of previous elaborations on violence in the history of El 
Salvador, this thesis argues that violence after the Peace Accords remained 
dispersed and decentralised, despite efforts to establish a legitimate state 
monopoly of violence. One of the most visible expressions of post-war violence 
was gang violence and, as described above, political attention to violence in El 
Salvador was largely directed towards youth gangs. There is a considerable 
body of academic literature about the emergence of gangs in the region (Smut 
and Miranda, 1998, Cruz and Portillo, 1998, Savenije and Van der Borgh, 2004, 
Pirker, 2004, Santacruz Giralt, 2005, Jütersonke et al., 2009, Rodgers, 2009, 
Rodgers and Jones, 2009, Wolf, 2011b, Zilberg, 2011). This literature showed 
that the existence of gangs in El Salvador dates back to the 1960s but that 
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numbers of gang members increased with the deportation of Salvadoran gang 
members from the US after the Peace Agreement (Savenije and Van der Borgh, 
2004, Wolf, 2011b). Figures about gang membership vary widely. Cruz and 
Portillo (1998) estimated 20,000 people belonged to gangs already in 1996, 
while Ramos (1998) indicated 10,000-12,000 gang members for the same 
period. Between 2007 and 2011 gangs were estimated to comprise between 
10,000 and 30,000 members (UNODC, 2007, World Bank, 2011, Farah and 
Philips Lum, 2013) (Section 8.3.2). Although the quantitative development of 
gangs is difficult to trace, studies revealed that between the early 1990s and 
early 2000s gang structures changed. Whilst originally numerous small, loosely 
organised gangs revolved around the consumption of drugs and alcohol, 
hanging out together, and a specific dress code, over time gangs increasingly 
organised in two major gangs, the Salvatrucha and the Barrio 18 (Savenije and 
Van der Borgh, 2004, Santacruz Giralt, 2005). They developed formal, 
hierarchical structures with leaders, clicas (cells), and specific roles for 
members (Wolf, 2011b). Today only a small percentage of gang members are 
deportees. Besides local communities and schools, prisons are known to be a 
central recruitment place. In the 1990s gangs established local power and 
penetrated Salvadoran communities through the use and the threat to use 
violence – primarily against rival gang members but also against communities. 
Gang violence further increased in the 2000s. It is believed that the escalation 
of violence and crime following mano dura policies between 2003 and 2006 is 
related to the further transformation of gangs. There is evidence that gangs use 
heavier weaponry, including military weapons and commercial firearms. 
Moreover, they are involved in more serious crimes, especially in homicide, 
extortion, and drug trade. Beyond that, with increased incarceration of gang 
members, some prisons in which prison guards and prison management 
exerted very limited control became places for gang members to run their 
criminal activities (Wolf, 2011b: 47).84 Although there is evidence for links 
between gangs and transnational criminal networks, the question whether 
Salvadoran gangs themselves represent organised criminal networks is 
contested with regard to their comparatively limited degree of ‘professionalism’ 
and profit orientation (Arnson and Olson, 2009, Wolf, 2011b, UNODC, 2012, 
InsightCrime, 2015). The Mara Salvatrucha and Barrio 18 exist in other Central 
                                            
84 For more information about the prison system see Section 7.4.2. 
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American countries but ties with these groups are believed to be rather loose. 
This and their limited role in transnational organised crime led Wolf (2011b: 68) 
to the conclusion that gangs represent a national rather than an international 
security problem. However, there is a regional dimension to the gang problem: 
reports found that the rise of undocumented migration of Salvadorans in the 
past five to ten years is not only connected to the lack of economic opportunities 
but also to gang violence. NGO reports like that of CIDEHUM/UNHCR (2012) 
indicated the spread of the problem in Central America. However, the topic of 
forced displacement due to violence and organised crime has received little 
academic attention so far (Cantor, 2014). Cantor’s article and the report did not 
distinguish between threats originating from gangs and threats originating from 
organised crime. This may be due to the threat of extortion which is mostly 
posed by gangs although the method is also frequently used by organised 
criminal networks. A survey by the Central American University’s Public Opinion 
Institute IUDOP (2012: 57) found that in 2012, 2.1% of Salvadorans changed 
their place of residence within the country one or more times due to threats. 
Added to this number must be Salvadorans migrating to other countries which 
points to another risk: undocumented travelling exposes migrants to violence, 
another problem which has only began to receive academic attention (Gaborit 
et al., 2012).85   
Criminal networks do play a role in El Salvador (see Section 8.3.2 for details). 
Their use of violence against the population is not well researched but it is 
believed that they pose less of a risk of violence to the population than gangs. 
This is explained with their nature as transportistas, that is, they are more 
involved in the trafficking rather than the production of goods. Therefore, they 
operate in border regions and coastal areas and less in urban centres where 
violence peaks (Dudley, 2010). There activities rely more on bribery and 
corruption and less on violence, although the extent of the use of violence is not 
clear (UNODC, 2012). The threat of violence related to organised crime 
certainly poses a problem in another area, human trafficking. Trafficking of 
women and girls was identified as a serious problem in Central America by the 
UNODC Report on Organised Crime (2012: 53-58). However, comprehensive 
studies about the phenomenon are still missing. 
                                            
85 For some data about migration security see Section 8.3.2. 
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How much of the overall violence can be attributed to the gangs is an open 
question. As shown above, scholars argued that government discourses on 
violence overemphasised the threat of gangs. These claims coincide with 
official figures: while the PNC estimated that about 30% of homicides were 
committed by gang members in 2011, the IML attributed only 11% to the gangs 
(Ávalos, 2012). However, as shown above, other forms of violence are 
connected to the penetration of the society by the gangs. With regard to Mann’s 
definition of power, gangs have mainly coercive power. They compete with state 
power in different ways. For example, extortion functions like a perverse form of 
‘security tax’ residents, business owners, and bus drivers have to pay. 
Furthermore, they undermine the state’s predominance in the penitentiary 
system by bribing and threatening guards. Lessing (2010, 2013) found that the 
power base of imprisoned gangs grew significantly when members of one gang 
were incarcerated together. Lessing as well as Phillips and Rosen (2015) 
explored how incarcerated gangs extended their control beyond prisons and 
found that coercive power is the central mechanism. The frequent use of 
incarceration as punishment were characteristic of punitive policies, it almost 
guaranteed that every street gang member feared to be imprisoned at some 
point. If they were unwilling to cooperate with the incarcerated leaders, they 
were violently targeted in prison. Outside prisons, violence functions similarly to 
maintain gang coherence. Furthermore, territorial claims play an important role 
in the logic of gang power since they operate in specific neighbourhoods – 
usually the places where they live – and defend these areas against members 
of other gangs. Van der Borgh and Savenije (2004: 167) noted that claiming 
territories violently was not an end in itself. Instead, it served the gang’s struggle 
‘to achieve a reputation as a dominant, courageous and dangerous gang.’ 
Direct violence against state actors like the police, military, and prison guards 
increased in recent years, although systematic knowledge about this form of 
contesting statehood is still lacking. However, territorial claims, ‘taxing’, and 
prison control mark the gangs’ pursuit of power through violent means and 
represent expressions of contesting statehood.   
Gangs contribute significantly to the persistence of violence, although the 
problem of violence is not limited to gangs. Besides the above mentioned forms, 
some authors pointed to the persistence of everyday violence, referring to 
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frequent violent experiences in communities and families which are often 
normalised (Bourgois, 2001, Savenije and Andrade-Eekhoff, 2003, Savenije 
and Van der Borgh, 2004). Hume (2009) and Silber (2004, 2011) wrote 
extensively about different forms of violence affecting everyday live in 
communities from a gender perspective. These must be added to the spectrum 
of contemporary violence in El Salvador. 
This section demonstrated the magnitude of problems related to violence and 
insecurity as it is portrayed in the literature. It should be noted that existing 
studies do not provide a systematic overview of forms and consequences of 
violence in El Salvador since in their majority they focus on specific 
appearances and causes without comparing or connecting them to other forms 
of violence. A phenomenology of violence which would help understand the role 
of violence in the social order of El Salvador is still lacking. However, the outline 
of the problem provided above demonstrates the challenges faced by the FMLN 
taking power in 2009. Furthermore, the chapter explored the attempts of 
changing the post-war security order through institutional reforms and the 
difficult legacy of coercive security practices ARENA governments left. The 
chapter showed how coercive policies undermined efforts to establish state 
security institutions capable of providing protection to citizens in a democratic 
and accountable manner. A closer look at post-war police and prison reforms 
revealed that new institutional rules did not change security practices. In 
addition, economic elites, in close cooperation with conservative political elites, 
pursued an economic order which is conducive for the continuance of social 
violence. To sum it up, three issues impeded violence control after the civil war: 
coercive state security practices, the discourse of political elites which 
disconnected social violence from state policies, and a neoliberal economic 
order fostering social exclusion. 
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8. The FMLN and citizen security 
8.1 Introduction 
In the light of the paradigm shift towards the protection of citizens and their 
rights by the state which was sought to be established with the Peace Accords, 
this chapter asks whether the new paradigm became a political goal of the 
FMLN. Or, put differently, it questions in how far the FMLN has managed to 
establish and use political power in order to provide security. It also explores 
what kind of security the FMLN aimed to provide. This chapter is the first of 
three empirical chapters seeking an answer for these questions. It traces the 
development of security thinking of the FMLN as a political party (Section 8.2) 
and the subsequent elaboration of a security policy (Section 8.3). It contrasts 
the FMLN’s security policy goals at the beginning of the term with the lack of 
progress of security reforms by the end of the first term of the FMLN 
government which leads to the main research question as to why security 
reforms under the FMLN government did not lead to a reduction of violence. 
 
8.2 The FMLN and citizen security between 1992 and 2009 
While some scholars explored the FMLN’s development as political party in the 
aftermath of the Peace Accords (Section 6.3), studies about the party’s security 
thinking are still largely missing. To date, only three academic studies are 
known to me, namely Cruz (2012), Aguilar (2014), and Van der Borgh and 
Savenije (2014). I refer to their findings in this chapter where relevant. This 
goes along with the general lack of comprehensive research about security 
thinking of Latin America’s Left. There are a number of academic publications 
about Latin America’s ‘New Left’ studying how left parties rose to power in 
several countries of the region since 1998 (e.g. Chavez et al., 2008, Levitsky 
and Roberts, 2011, Ellner, 2014).  Although parties were quite diverse in their 
ideologies and policies, analysts articulated some commonalities about the 
‘New Left’. They argued that it owed much of its strength to the provision of an 
alternative to the neoliberal policy of conservative governments and 
international financial institutions in the 1980s and 1990s by offering a new 
vision of a state being more responsive to societal needs (Arnson, 2007, Grugel 
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and Riggirozzi, 2012). This ‘post-neoliberal’ (Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2012) vision 
of the state aimed at addressing social issues which concerned large parts of 
the population such as poverty and violence. Some analysts and policy-makers 
distinguished between two currents, the ‘populist Left’ which, in simplistic terms, 
is seen as ‘anti-capitalist’ and radical, and the ‘social democratic Left’ which is 
seen as more moderate and adherent to the conditions of liberal markets 
(Ramírez Gallegos, 2006, Ellner, 2012). This dichotomy was criticised for 
overlooking the different characteristics of each left project (e.g. Ramírez 
Gallegos, 2006, Schamis, 2006, Roberts, 2007). However, it showed the wide 
ideological spectrum in which left policies sought to develop their post-
neoliberal agendas. In El Salvador this wide spectrum is reflected in the 
existence of the moderate and orthodox wing of the FMLN (Section 6.3). Funes 
had won the elections with broad support from the FMLN base as well as 
centrist voters, but he was not part of any ideological current. His administration 
was considered to be a mix of policies aiming to appeal to both wings, with a 
stronger tendency toward the moderate wing (Perla and Cruz-Feliciano, 2013: 
84). The conflicts this constellation brought along in terms of security policy are 
depicted in the following chapters. However, specifically outstanding was the 
development of a vision of citizen security that reflected the post-neoliberal 
ideas of rapprochement between the state and non-elite parts of the society. 
This was remarkable given that many left governments in the region were 
strong in developing social policies but did not engage in likewise pressing 
security issues. Yashar (2011: 200) explained this lack of engagement by 
stating that security is traditionally considered a topic of the Right. After all, the 
conflict between the Latin American military dictatorships of the 20th century and 
their perceived opponents was a split between the Right and the Left. It was the 
military governments of the Right that defined security as national security 
which included the adherence to the military regime by suppressing citizens and 
opponents from the Left. Furthermore, Yashar argued that the Left’s reluctance 
in addressing security issues also explains the research gap around this topic. 
Indeed, while there is a large amount of literature dealing with the convergence 
of the Left on various policy areas, only few contributions critically analysed the 
relation of the Left with security issues (Yashar, 2011, Rochlin, 2011, Sain, 
2013). However, the FMLN did elaborate on a security agenda prior to the 
presidential elections in 2009, and it is worthwhile to explore its successes and 
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failures in order to see what characterises a left security approach. The 
discussion in this and the following chapters traces this process, drawing on 
data from my own field research and other available sources. 
Until 2009, security decisions at the national level remained in the hands of 
ARENA-led governments. As mentioned before, among the few security 
initiatives undertaken by ARENA presidents, mano dura was the most 
prominent example of a half-hearted, poorly planned, and poorly realised policy. 
There is little research about the governments’ positions regarding issues of 
insecurity before mano dura was launched in 2003 (Section 7.3). There is even 
less knowledge about the FMLN’s perspective on security issues. Elana Zilberg 
(2011: 169) pointed out that the Left, similar to the Right, supported a ‘tough on 
crime’ approach during the early post-war years. Zilberg also mentioned that the 
Left came out against mano dura, which leads to the assumption that a change 
in the FMLN’s security thinking towards a more critical stance against 
authoritarian security approaches has happened between 1992 and 2003. 
However, there is little evidence as to when the FMLN actively started 
searching for its own political responses to social violence. In an interview, the 
Salvadoran Historian Guidos Véjar maintained that the FMLN actually agreed 
with several of the mano dura suggestions and thus did not distance itself from 
mano dura.86 Other authors agreed with Zilberg that FMLN leaders criticised the 
hard-line approach (Equipo de la revista 'Proceso' de la UCA de El Salvador, 
2003, Amaya, 2012). Either way, the development of the National Policy of 
Justice, Public Security, and Living Together (PJSC) prior to the elections in 
2009 clearly marked the dismissal of mano dura. Until then, the FMLN had no 
security strategy at the national level, despite the ever increasing problems of 
violence for more than 15 years. This lack of engagement with security issues 
was similar to other left political forces in Latin America, as Yashar (2011: 200) 
showed (see above). As a political party, the FMLN was slow in embracing new 
conceptualisations of security such as citizen security. It was only in 2006 that 
the FMLN started developing its own security framework.  
                                            
86 Interview with Rafael Guidos Véjar, 23 March 2012. 
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[A]s a party, we have not had our own [security] policy before, 
but in 2006 we began the process of building it.87  
This new security framework was built on citizen security principles as will be 
shown below. Citizen security is not a specifically left concept. In El Salvador, 
the impulse for citizen security came from civil society and international 
organisations. However, the FMLN’s historical proximity to social organisations 
clearly impacted on the FMLN’s interest in a citizen security perspective, as the 
broad involvement of the civil society in the development of the PJSC proved 
(see below for details).  
The FMLN’s interest in a new security approach was also due to the local 
success of citizen security under the leadership of a charismatic FMLN mayor. 
Despite the internal power struggles described in Section 6.3, the FMLN gained 
essential votes since the elections in 1994 and thus managed to constantly 
accumulate political power. While ARENA continued to win all presidential 
elections until 2009, the FMLN soon caught up with ARENA in the legislative 
elections and won 27 seats (ARENA: 28) in 1997 and 31 seats (ARENA: 29) in 
2000 (CIDAI, 1997, Base de Datos Políticos de las Américas, 1999a). Even 
more significant is the FMLN’s electoral strength in the urban centres as 
Manning (2008: 119-120) showed: by 2003, nine out of ten urban centres were 
governed by FMLN mayors. These mayors did play an important role within the 
party as local offices often served as springboard to national office, as Manning 
and other authors found.88 This was also true for Óscar Ortiz who was FMLN 
mayor of Santa Tecla between 2000 and 2013. Santa Tecla is a city at the 
margins of San Salvador and represented the role model of a successful citizen 
security strategy. Homicide rates in Santa Tecla were significantly reduced from 
66.4 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in 2005 to 30.6 in 2009 and 13.1 in 
August 2012, as Figure 1 shows (SACDEL, 2013: 42). As with most Salvadoran 
homicide statistics these numbers should be dealt with caution. Numbers for 
2011 were exceptionally high, while in August 2012, the gang truce was already 
in place which may have affected homicides rates for that year. However, at the 
                                            
87 Interview with Benito Lara, 11 February 2013. 
88 This is particularly true for the mayors of San Salvador where today, due to rapid urbanisation, about 
one third of Salvadorans live. Various mayors became candidates for presidential elections (Armando 
Calderon Sol, 1994), and Norman Quijano, 2014) or were at least considered as such (Héctor Silva, 
2004). 
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time of the development of the PJSC, between 2008 and 2010, numbers had 
already decreased and served as proof of success.  
Figure 1: Homicide rate in Santa Tecla, 2004-August 2012 (per 100,000 
inhabitants) 
Source: SACDEL (2013: 42). 
Much of this success was attributed to Ortiz’ capability of implementing a 
visionary long-term security strategy (WOLA, 2011: 13, Zoethout, 2014, 
Interpeace, 2014b). This comprised different measures such as a strong focus 
on prevention through the recuperation of public space, the launch of an 
‘Observatory for the Prevention of Crime’ to collect detailed data on crime and 
violence in the local area, the active participation and consultation of citizens, 
and constant coordination with local, state, and non-governmental actors. Ortiz 
was a key figure in the FMLN’s reformist wing. Together with other mayors of 
large municipalities he represented a new generation of FMLN leaders who 
challenged the power of the orthodox wing (Manning, 2008: 127-134). His name 
came up during the debate on Manuel Melgar’s successor as Minister of Public 
Security in 2011,89 and since 2014 he has held the position as El Salvador’s 
Vice President. His political weight and his experience in significantly reducing 
violence rates at the local level against the national trend had fostered the 
political will to develop such a strategy at the national level. This view was 
confirmed during an interview with Benito Lara90 who did not mention Ortiz 
                                            
89 Interview with anonymous informant R30, 02 March 2012. 
90 Interview with Benito Lara, 11 February 2013. As former head of the Legislative Assembly’s Security 
Commission, Lara was actively involved in the creation of the PJSC. 
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explicitly but, being asked about the origins of the PJSC, pointed to the 
experiences of the local governments with citizen security and to their pivotal 
role for security provision.  
[A]s a party, we have not had our own [security] policy 
before, but in 2006 we began the process of building it. We 
did not start from scratch because the Public Security 
Commission of the Legislative Assembly… our deputies 
there were already making some progress in developing 
policies. The local governments of the Frente also did 
something in the preventive realm. But as a party, we did 
not have a well-structured policy. [...] So we had a number 
of meetings. [...] The main focus was on the issue of 
prevention, which was the main theme, giving the local 
governments an important role. In any prevention policy, it 
is the local governments which must make the main 
effort.91 
These foci on local communities and on prevention were central aspects of the 
PJSC, as we will see in the following section. So far, it can be stated that 
despite the disappointment and dissociation of some former leaders and 
members post-Peace Accords (Section 6.3), the FMLN did manage to acquire 
political power after its transformation to a political party. It can also be said that, 
while the party was slow in addressing security issues, it increasing applied itself 
to this field. The following section examines how it addressed problems of 
violence and crime.    
 
8.3 The FMLN’s Policy of Justice, Security, and Living Together  
8.3.1 Policy formulation 
In this section, the objectives of the PJSC that were developed at the beginning 
of President Funes’ term and their (lack of) realisation at the end of the term are 
compared. A look at homicide numbers quickly reveals the mismatch between 
policy formulation and implementation. Likewise, in interviews that addressed 
                                            
91 Ibid. 
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the PJSC, most responses either implicitly perceived the policy as failed or 
explicitly mentioned such failure.92 More than this, a gap is spotted between the 
security policy and the situation in many security areas at the end of the term. 
However, a more detailed analysis of the development of the particular security 
strategies is missing. So far, only few scholars published an analysis: Van der 
Borgh and Savenjie (2014) published an article that examines the Funes 
government’s security policy with regard to the gangs, and a study by the 
Salvadoran IUDOP institute (Aguilar, 2014) analysed the security and justice 
policy between 2009 and 2014. Only the IUDOP study fully addresses the 
strategies of PJSC. Some of this information is used in the analysis below to 
enrich own data. In addition, some studies about single aspects of the policy are 
used to complement the overview of the realisation of the PJSC. We will see 
that the FMLN developed numerous comprehensive proposals only some of 
which were implemented while many ideas remained unrealised. The research 
sub-questions emerge out of this gap between the plan and the precarious 
security situation at the end of the term: 1.) How did the FMLN government 
2009-2014 respond to violence in El Salvador and 2.) Why was the FMLN 
government not able to implement its far-reaching and well-designed security 
plans? In the remaining part of this chapter, the first question is addressed by 
contrasting the security plans (Section 8.3.1) and their implementation (Section 
8.3.2). In the following chapters, security practices are discussed in greater 
detail which includes seeking an answer to the second research sub-question 
outlined above and eventually an answer to the general question as to why 
violence was not reduced. 
The FMLN government’s security policy is articulated in the Política Nacional de 
Justicia, Seguridad Pública y Convivencia (PJSC). This paper originated in a 
process of creating the FMLN’s vision of citizen security prior to the presidential 
elections of 2009. As mentioned above, in 2006 the FMLN started to develop a 
left security paper as a counterpart to mano dura.93 This proposal was called 
ciudades seguras (safe cities) and was made known to party members and 
supporters during a large festive event at a football stadium in San Salvador. It 
focused on preventive approaches by strengthening local councils. This first 
                                            
92 See interview responses in Section 8.3.2. 
93 Interviews with Óscar Fernández, 22 February 2012 and Benito Lara, 11 February 2013; Urquilla 
(2006). 
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draft of a left security policy was elaborated further between 2008 and 2010. In 
2008 during the presidential campaign of Mauricio Funes, roundtables for 
different policy fields were set up in order to formulate a government 
programme, so called mesas del diálogo social abierto (roundtables of open 
social dialogue).94 At these roundtables, state and non-state experts in the 
respective policy field such as parliamentarians, academics, and experts from 
national and international NGOs participated. The roundtable for public security 
comprised ‘security experts’ from the FMLN, NGOs, academia, community 
councils, the justice sector, and the PNC - many of whom started working or 
were already working as state officials after the FMLN won the elections.95 At 
the same time, roundtables at local communities throughout the country were 
set up, gathering problems and requests from citizens and developing 
proposals on how to improve their situation – in terms of security as well as 
other issues. The process was participatory in the sense that it attempted to 
reach out to ‘ordinary’ citizens in an unprecedented way to collect their ideas 
and needs. Therein it must be considered that citizen involvement remained 
rather light, if it took place. Interview statements contradicted as to whether 
local and expert views were exchanged, and no evidence was found that the 
Frente (FMLN) followed up on citizens who submitted suggestions to see to 
what extent their requests had been addressed.96  However, the mesas del 
diálogo social abierto stand for an innovative approach of developing a 
government programme in collaboration with the civil society, even if most of 
the input came from officials or experts. Oscar Fernández, security adviser of 
the FMLN, explicitly drew a parallel between the party’s origin in social 
organisations and the inclusion of the civil society in the development of the 
security policy.  
SHF: How did the idea emerge to create a participative 
space for developing a security policy?  
OF: Well, this has to do with… first, with our origins. We 
were born glued to the people, we fought with the people. 
                                            
94 Interview with police official R27, 12 April 2012. 
95 Interview with state official R2, 03 March 2012 and Email communication with state official R2, 04 
February 2013. 
96 Interview with Benito Lara, 11 February 2013 and Email communication with state official R2, 04 
February 2013. 
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Many of the issues that constituted our vision of the 
revolution were obviously popular. Yes, [...] we subsisted 
on the people, we are not a party of elites. […].97  
From the first drafts at the roundtables to the final document it took 
approximately two years to formulate the strategy. It was finalised in early 
2010.98 Earlier versions were circulated among the FMLN before the elections 
in March 2009 and before President Funes took power in June 2009. This 
lengthy process of the mere development of a policy which continued after the 
FMLN took office was a first indicator of the difficulties the FMLN government 
had with starting the implementation of the ambitious security agenda. The fact 
that the policy was never made known to a large public underscored these early 
difficulties. Neither the President nor the Security Minister actively promoted the 
security strategy in the media.99 Thus, security decision-making under Funes 
actually began with a negative decision. This is to say, it was a deliberate 
decision to not announce the PJSC, even though insecurity was a huge concern 
at that time and a policy to encounter it had been formulated. The reasons for 
this negative decision are not entirely clear. The FMLN security experts who 
were interviewed did not have knowledge about the reasons for not announcing 
the strategy or avoided to give reasons. Only one interviewee supposed that the 
government feared to make itself vulnerable to critics from the opposition and 
the media.100 This view suggests that there was significant pressure from state 
and social actors on the government right from the beginning of the term. 
Similarly, Van der Borgh and Savenije (2014: 14) pointed to the pressure on the 
government due to the tense security situation at the time of Funes’ 
inauguration and the ever increasing threat the gangs posed to public security. 
Whatever the reasons for not announcing the PJSC, it raises the question how 
the government can work towards providing security for citizens if the citizens 
are not made aware of the government’s security plans.  
Five pillars form the PJSC: a) controlling and repressing crime, b) social 
prevention of violence and crime, c) rehabilitation and reintegration, d) attention 
                                            
97 Interview with Oscar Fernández, 22 February 2012. 
98 Email communication with state official R2, 04 February 2013. 
99 Only reluctantly did Minister Melgar and Hato Hasbún, Head of the newly formed Security Cabinet, at 
a press conference reveal a few aspects about how to address security issues (Martínez, 2010b). 
100 Interview with police official R27, 12 April 2012. 
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to victims, and e) institutional and legal reforms (Ministerio de Justicia y 
Seguridad Pública, 2010). Table 2 shows the basic ‘strategies’ for each pillar.101 
For every strategy, an action plan with numerous programmes was developed. 
The newly created Security Cabinet in which representatives from the most 
important state security institutions participated, took over the task to coordinate 
the various state security institutions to guarantee an integrative approach.102 In 
2010 the Prevention Cabinet was created which, as the name suggests, was 
responsible for coordinating all state activities with regard to the prevention of 
violence.103 The existence of these two Cabinets underscored the FMLN’s basic 
approach to security: balancing its policy between a long-term focus of social 
prevention (prevención social del delito) and the ability for immediate action to 
control crime and violence (represión del delito). Accordingly, the first two pillars 
of the five-fold policy are the most important ones. Such a strong focus on 
prevention was unprecedented in the history of security provision in El 
Salvador. Under previous governments it was mainly the CNSP that recognised 
the value of prevention and proposed a stronger consideration of preventive 
measures, but the proposals were never put into practice.104  
Table 2: The FMLN’s Política Nacional de Justicia, Seguridad Pública y 
Convivencia, 2010 
Pillar Strategy 
Controlling and repressing 
crime 
Improve criminal investigation, especially with 
regard to organised crime 
Reduce impunity through better coordination 
between the PNC and the State Attorney’s 
Office (FGR), improve police intelligence 
                                            
101 This work refers to the document that represented the final version of the PJSC under Minister Melgar 
from May 2010. The document was slightly modified under Minister Munguía Payes in 2012. The 
strategies outlined in the version from May 2010 are not necessarily recognizable as strategies (in the 
sense of explaining how a goal is achieved) but mix with the policy’s goals. However, to avoid confusion, 
I will stick to the term “strategy” as used by the PJSC. 
102 See Section 3.2 for a list of members. 
103 The Prevention Cabinet initially comprised representatives from the MJSP, the Secretary for Social 
Inclusion, the Sub-Secretary for Territorial Development and Decentralisation, CNSP (which was 
dissolved in 2011), National Directorate of Youth, PNC, and the Social Investment Fund for Local 
Development (Aguilar, 2014: 67-68).   
104 See Section 4.3 on the creation of the CNSP and Van der Borgh and Savenije (2014: 11-14). 
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Professionalization and modernisation of the 
PNC  
Improve PNC formation at the Police Academy 
(ANSP) 
Improve migratory security and combat human 
trafficking 
Social prevention of violence 
and crime 
Strengthen prevention through local activities 
(e.g. create municipal councils for prevention 
(Consejos Municipales de Prevención), regain 
public space, develop youth programmes) 
Reduce risk factors of violence and crime, 
especially through gun control 
Keep youth from joining gangs and stimulate 
gang ‘retirement’ 
Prevent and reduce domestic violence and 
violence against women, minors, and elderly 
people 
Promote a ‘culture of peace’ 
Rehabilitation and social 
reintegration, realisation of 
penalties 
Increase security inside prisons through better 
technology and inter-institutional coordination 
Initiate formation of prison personnel 
Adequate attention to prisoners 
Improve prison infrastructure (incl. new prisons) 
Differentiate penalty system (probation as 
alternative to imprisonment) 
Reintegration of ex-prisoners into society with 
support of NGOs 
 171 
 
Social reparations of crime 
and attention to victims 
Improve institutional infrastructure to attend 
victims of crime 
Protect victims and witnesses 
Institutional and legal reforms Strengthen the Ministry of Justice and Public 
Security (MJSP), centralise information on 
violence and crime 
Improve access to justice through inter-
institutional coordination and formation of 
officials 
Adhere to laws, norms, and standards 
Source: author’s elaborations based on MJSC (2010). 
The focus on prevention, the participatory way in which the policy was 
developed, and the pivotal role local communities play, indicated the PJSC’s 
normative orientation towards citizen security.105 This is also reflected in the 
introduction of the policy paper.  
The policy developed in this paper is a state policy. It 
arises from a commitment by those responsible for security 
institutions to address the phenomenon of violence and 
crime in El Salvador from a collective and diverse vision of 
society of which broad participation is required from all of 
its components. In that sense, one of the most important 
principles is citizen participation which is essential for any 
public policy (Ministerio de Justicia y Seguridad Pública, 
2010: 5).  
The PJSC postulated the aspiration of the FMLN to be a government which 
works towards the rapprochement between state and society. It presumed that 
a state can only provide security to its citizens if social cohesion is regained:  
                                            
105 The key principles of citizen security were outlined in Section 2.1.2: citizen participation, prevention, 
focus on local communities, decentralisation, focus on development and equality, protection of the 
individual, and strengthening democratic security institutions. 
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To retrieve the social fabric means that the state must 
come back to these places ensuring its presence and 
broadening coordination with local governments. On the 
other hand, it needs to strengthen the link between citizens 
and the state, so that there is not only a sense of 
belonging but a real inclusion (ibid. p. 17). 
Oscar Fernández described the normative underpinning of the PJSC as follows:  
We proposed the following as a fundamental element: to 
effectively provide public security, it must be brought to the 
citizenry, it cannot be handled by a bureaucratic machinery 
that offers people only ‘the stick’.106  
Although Fernández rejected the term ‘citizen security’ as too broad, 
fashionable, and exchangeable, he underscored the importance of putting 
citizens at the heart of the policy. In his words, public security is:  
[…] the lines and actions of the state in order to guarantee 
the order, tranquility and exercise your rights as a citizen 
walking, [...] sitting here and not being harmed, that is 
public security. And public security means if someone 
commits a crime, we must prosecute them, capture them, 
investigate them and bring them to justice.107  
This normative orientation of security policy towards a focus on citizens reveals 
several important aspects. First, the FMLN did aim to use its political power to 
provide security which would centre on the protection of citizens. Second, the 
FMLN claimed to develop a policy which would not just create equilibrium 
between violence control and social prevention, but would create a balance 
between state and society. Becoming the ruling party meant the FMLN had to 
give up to a certain extent its perspective of looking at the state ‘from below’ 
while at the same time it did not want to lose its focus on the citizens. Reviewing 
the critical security studies literature (Section 2.3), I referred to Kirk and 
Luckham’s (2012) conceptualisation of citizen security as having two sides: the 
right of citizens to be protected, and the responsibility of states to provide 
                                            
106 Interview with Óscar Fernández,  21 February 2012. 
107 Ibid. 
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protection. Commonly, the right of citizens to be protected is promoted by the 
civil society, while the state is more concerned with the production of security. 
The FMLN, coming from the midst of society, and turning into a central state 
actor, aimed at reconciling these two poles with the PJSC. However, not losing 
sight of the citizen perspective proved to be an enormous challenge for the 
FMLN once it faced the pressure of governing. As we will see below, the 
government did not manage to keep an equilibrium between these two poles.   
 
8.3.2 Policy implementation 
It is comprehensible that the ambitious security strategy outlined above raised 
many expectations among the FMLN, the party’s supporters, the civil society, 
international donors, and parts of the business sector. Even some gang leaders 
hoped that with the FMLN in power, new opportunities would arise for some sort 
of social inclusion of the youth in the most marginalised neighbourhoods (Van 
der Borgh and Savenije, 2014: 15). Yet, half way through the term the 
implementation of the policy was largely perceived as failed by state officials, 
police officials, and the wider public, as the following three statements make 
clear. 
I think that the 'National Policy of Justice, Public Security 
and Living Together' is a very important document that 
occurred in the country as a comprehensive proposal for 
addressing the phenomenon of violence and crime. Now 
the problem is firstly that the policy was not socialised, 
meaning that [...] no thorough discussion with the society 
took place.108  
The ‘Policy of Justice and Public Security’ has been very 
well designed and there are people who [...] have much 
technical knowledge [but] they are not considering that the 
discrepancy [i.e. difference, SHF] of political colors can 
influence work with local government.109  
                                            
108 Interview with state official R2, 05 March 2012. 
109 Interview with police official R29, 18 April 2012. 
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I think there are very good efforts in social policies, very 
good efforts, but there is enough investment in prevention, 
sufficient cohesion, sufficient coordination in prevention, so 
that the two efforts [repression and prevention, SHF] go 
hand in hand.110 
This perception of a well-designed but insufficiently implemented policy is 
confirmed with a look at the statistics. The clearest indicator of failure is the 
homicide rate.  
Figure 2: Homicide rate in El Salvador, 1998-2014 (per 100,000 inhabitants) 
Source: Author’s figure with data from UNODC (2011) for 2003-2010, Aguilar (2014) for 
2011-2013, and Guerney (2015, data: IML) for 2014. 
 
The graph shows that at the beginning of Funes’ term, the rate was peaking at 
70.9 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, a value that had not been reached 
since 1998. It highlights the difficult circumstances under which the FMLN 
government started. Numbers remained at this height until 2012 when homicide 
rates dropped to 41.5. Such a low score was last measured before the plans for 
the mano dura initiative were implemented in 2003. This reduction can clearly 
be attributed to the gang truce as the total number of murders per month shows. 
In January and February 2012, 413 and 404 homicides were registered 
respectively (El Faro, 2015). In March, when the truce was announced, only 255 
homicides were counted, a number which further fell to 157 in April and 
remained under 200 for more than a year. These numbers tell us that while the 
                                            
110 Interview with police official R9, 21 March 2012. 
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homicide rate decreased significantly during the FMLN’s first term in 
government, this decline has nothing to do with the PJSC since the truce was 
not part of it. In Chapter Ten this thesis examines the truce in more detail, 
establishing clearly that the truce was an example of the government’s ad hoc 
decision-making. For now, we can state that the PJSC did not serve to reduce 
homicide rates, even if it is taken into consideration that some measures only 
can show positive results in the mid and long term. This is confirmed by a look 
at the more recent numbers: In 2014, the average number of homicides went 
back up to 68.6 per 100,000 inhabitants, according to the IML (Guerney, 2015). 
During the second half of 2013, when the truce was slowly falling apart, monthly 
homicide rates steadily rose again from 253 in July 2013 to 372 in June 2014, 
when the new FMLN government took over under Sánchez Cerén. In March 
2015, numbers peaked at 481 homicides. 
These homicide numbers indicate the overall direction that security provision 
took in El Salvador and are commonly referred to by academics, practitioners, 
and the media to point to the government’s failure in security provision. 
However, a more substantial examination of the government’s security 
performance is needed to prove the gap between the FMLN’s objectives it set 
out to achieve at the beginning of their term, and the security situation at the 
end of the term. A more detailed look at further data demonstrates that none of 
the five areas of the PJSC show significant improvements, despite the 
realisation of at least some goals. A lot could be written about each strategy 
outlined in the table above, and the next chapters focus on just two aspects in 
detail, police professionalisation and prison policy. However, the purpose here 
is to draw a picture of the FMLN’s overall performance in security provision, 
based on the party’s own measures, and to articulate some issues of violence 
which were not addressed in the policy. 
8.3.2.1 Controlling and repressing crime 
Under the first pillar (controlling and repressing crime), the policy aimed to 
contain organised crime through better investigation; reduce impunity through 
better coordination between the police and the state’s attorney’s office; the 
professionalisation and modernisation of the PNC; improve police formation; 
and improve migratory security.  
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There were two big criminal networks in El Salvador, the Texis Cartel and Los 
Perrones, who continued to exist beyond the Funes term. As so called 
transportistas, the Texis Cartel was a transnational trafficking group involved in 
large-scale smuggling of drugs (mostly cocaine) and money laundering 
(UNODC, 2012: 21-26). The Cartel mainly relied on corruption and bribery 
rather than violence to manage its activities. In 2011, the Salvadoran online 
newspaper El Faro published a report that revealed the Texis Cartel’s 
widespread infiltration of the police and its close links with high-level politicians, 
judges, and persecutors (Arauz et al., 2011). Prosecutions against the three 
leaders of the Cartel started in late 2012 but only one of them was prosecuted 
for drug trafficking, and by 2014 none of the alleged three founders had been 
convicted. According to El Faro, no state officials were charged so far 
(Martínez, 2014). Los Perrones were also a transportista network who used 
corruption and bribery, penetrating security agencies and political circles, but 
who also used violence to manage their business. They were said to have links 
with maras (UNODC, 2012: 26, InsightCrime, 2015). Despite prosecutions, 
authorities had difficulties in breaking up the network, and the group continued 
with its business. Not least, it was the insufficiency of the legal system and the 
failure of the government to reduce impunity that accounted for these 
difficulties, as the following numbers show.  
Between 2009 and 2013 only 15% of legal cases were closed with a sentence 
(Aguilar, 2014: xxviii). This shows that the situation had not improved compared 
to previous years (2006-2009) during which about 80% of proceedings were 
dismissed (ibid.). Given that not all acts of crime and violence were registered, 
these numbers reveal the inadequate legal responses to crime and violence. 
The inactivity of the State Attorney’s Office (FGR) with regard to the persecution 
of crime, including organised crime, led the government to initiate a commission 
against impunity, similar to the International Commission against Impunity in 
Guatemala (CICIG). However, this Commission never started to work (Aguilar, 
2014: 74). The difficulty of obtaining reliable data is proof of the notoriously poor 
coordination between the PNC and the FGR. To take just one example from the 
IUDOP study, there was a huge discrepancy between the numbers of rape 
registered by the PNC, the FGR, and the Institute for Forensic Medicine (IML) 
(Table 3). Theoretically, these numbers should correspond in every institution 
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for each year. The discrepancies do not allow for any objective account 
regarding the development of violence against women since they lead to 
differing conclusions. While the PNC and FGR noted an increase of registered 
accusations of rape between 2009 and 2013, the IML’s number of medico-legal 
assessments of rape decreased during the same time period. 
Table 3: Registered complaints and medico-legal assessments of rape, 
2009-2013 
Year Complaints 
Medico-legal 
assessment 
 PNC FGR IML 
2009 2,074 3,328 2,260 
2010 2,495 3,167 1,992 
2011 2,287 3,540 1,992 
2012 2,589 - 1,913 
2013 - 3,599 1,972 
Source: Aguilar 2014: 29 (data: PNC, FGR, and IML). 
Police formation and professionalisation were strategies under the first pillar of 
the PJSC which received much attention during Funes’ term. Plans to improve 
police performance actually dated back to before the PJSC. In 2008, a 
comprehensive analysis of the PNC performance was undertaken with the help 
of USAID. When Funes took power, the window of opportunity to implement the 
recommendations of the analysis seemed to be widely open. Reforms were 
initiated especially with regard to strengthening community policing, formalising 
police careers, and improving investigative capacities and internal 
accountability. The promising start of police reforms experienced a serious 
setback due to personnel changes and resistance from the Right and the 
military. However, in some areas like community policing, reforms actually took 
place. Detailed data about the police reform is presented in Chapter Nine.     
Migratory security represented another strategy of the first pillar, but remained a 
challenge for Salvadoran governments: While the overall number of 
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undocumented migrants apprehended at the US border (most of them 
Mexicans) dropped significantly during the last decade, the number of non-
Mexican undocumented migrants increased by 175 percent between 2011 and 
2013. These migrants came primarily from Honduras, Guatemala, and El 
Salvador, as a WOLA news report based on US border patrol statistics found 
(Isacson, 2014). In addition, the number of unaccompanied children travelling 
from the Northern Triangle towards the US, increased steadily since 2009, with 
an unprecedented peak in 2014 when 67,000 unaccompanied children were 
detained in the US (Isacson, 2015).111 Data about trafficking is not 
comprehensive enough to get a clear picture of the development of the issue 
during the Funes term. However, there are indications that especially women 
and unaccompanied children travelling north became targets of trafficking 
networks. While anti-human trafficking training took place at the PNC, the FGR, 
and the courts, the conviction rate remained low. Out of the 96 traffickers 
arrested between 2009 and 2014 35 were sentenced (López and Orellana, 
2015). Migratory security is closely linked to issues of violence and the lack of 
economic opportunities in El Salvador, as argued in Section 7.5. Taking the 
perspective of the Salvadoran society, it becomes apparent that as long as the 
threat of insecurity and deprivation outweighs the risks of undocumented 
migration, large-scale migration will continue to exist. 
In sum, the problems that the Salvadoran government aimed to address in this 
first area remain in their majority unresolved, despite some effort made to 
address them. 
8.3.2.2 Social prevention of violence and crime 
The second pillar of the PJSC focused on prevention. This included prevention 
through local activities, gun control, reducing gang memberships, reducing 
domestic violence and violence against women, minors, and elderly people, and 
promoting a culture of peace.  
Although the Prevention Cabinet was not perceived as being very active in 
public, prevention became a buzzword under the FMLN government. Numerous 
programmes and activities were initiated, often with the support of international 
                                            
111 This peak is not repeated in 2015, probably due to Mexico’s Southern Border Plan according to which 
migrants are stopped and sent back further south (Isacson, 2015). 
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donors. In eight interviews the FMLN’s approach to prevention came up. In 
seven of these, the strategies were considered a positive idea that failed in 
practice.112 Three major problems were identified to have impeded the success 
of the programmes. First, interviewees attributed the failure to the lack of 
expertise and coordination among the involved institutions.113 Neither the 
Cabinet nor the Ministry managed to coordinate the multitude of activities and 
institutions involved. Van der Borgh and Savenjie (2014: 13) came to the same 
conclusion in so far as they listed eight different state institutions working on 
prevention, non-governmental institutions not included. Second, the lack of 
coherent information and reliable data represented a huge obstacle for the 
implementation and evaluation of the policy. During his short term of office as 
Vice Minister of Justice and Public Security from 2012 to 2013, Douglas Moreno 
took over the responsibility for prevention in the MJSP. Moreno expressed his 
concerns regarding the difficulty of working towards a policy of prevention that 
had insufficient foundation. 
SHF: And the prevention plan also started in 2009?  
DM: No. 
SHF: It’s something new? 
DM: It was a disaster, it is a disaster. We had strong 
control over the combat of crime, [it was] complicated, 
perhaps badly done. [But] the strategy towards prevention 
is a disaster. [...] The prevention policy is not there, it does 
not exist, they do not have the know-how. Everything has 
been called prevention, this is nothing, that is what I 
encountered right now. My task is to build that information 
because decisions about prevention have been made 
without information, the most absurd thing. So I have not 
found anything systemised. […].114 
                                            
112 Only Minister Munguía Payés considered prevention a success but related this success to the gang 
truce. Interview with David Munguía Payés, 19 March 2013. 
113 Interview with police official R29, 18 April 2012; Douglas Moreno, 11 April 2012. 
114 Interview with Douglas Moreno, 11 April 2012. 
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Third, the failure was attributed to pressure from the Right, from business 
people, from the US, and from the media placed onto the government to 
achieve immediate results.115 The first two problems are to some extent 
comprehensible given that the Funes administration was the first Salvadoran 
government to embrace a preventive approach. However, lacking expertise and 
coordination are not just technical problems which can be resolved by adding 
more expertise and more coordination. Instead, they point to an underlying 
mismatch between the new government’s plans and the already existing state 
institutions that are part of certain bureaucratic procedures. In other words, 
state practices within the realm of state institutions impact on the policy 
outcome. The third problem points to the impact of yet other state actors as well 
as non-state actors on the policy process. These interlinkages are analysed in 
more detail in the next two chapters with regard to police professionalisation 
and prison reforms. Although these two cases are not mentioned under the 
prevention pillar, we will see that they were clearly designed with a preventive 
focus in mind. The following examples that refer to the strategies under the 
prevention pillar further demonstrate the problems that existed with the 
implementation of a prevention policy.  
At the local level, the establishment of Municipal Councils for Prevention was 
considered a success according to the evaluation of the USAID work on 
community-based prevention (Berg-Selikson, 2014: 14). These Councils were 
established in high-crime, at-risk neighbourhoods, bringing together the various 
local stakeholders on security and prevention. These included especially the 
police, school directors, clergy, community development association leaders, 
and health service providers. However, the resulting experiences varied 
between municipalities. According to a government official, in some cases, the 
Council did not become very active. Moreover, in many instances other 
prevention programmes were already in place which led to rivalry with the new 
programme (Galván, 2010). Hence, despite the increased awareness for local 
focuses of preventive work, the duplication of efforts deflated the idea of 
prevention. 
                                            
115 Interview with Manuel Melgar, 26 March 2012; Oscar Fernández, 13 February 2013; police official 
R9, 21 March 2012. 
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The total number of arms circulating in the country is unknown and the number 
of unregistered arms probably exceeds the number of registrations by far.116 
The number of registered arms went from 23,324 (2009) to 35,575 (2010) to 
25,151 (2011) (Aguilar, 2014: 17) but there is no explanation provided for this 
big variation. A detailed picture of the gun problem is therefore difficult to obtain. 
However, guns were definitely a problem in El Salvador since about 70% of 
homicides were committed with firearms.117 Therefore, the FMLN proposed a 
change of gun control legislation towards creating more incentives for the 
registration of arms. While the proposal was debated in the Legislative 
Assembly, it was not supported by the other factions (Mejía, 2010). Resistance 
against improved gun control is likely to be linked to the involvement of the 
military in arms trafficking (Chávez, 2012, Gagne, 2014). This situation 
resembles the results of other strategies: The FMLN did approach the topic with 
a plan to bring about change but in practice no improvement was achieved. 
A similar problem with obtaining reliable data appeared with regard to gang 
membership. Numbers vary widely among the different sources but an increase 
is most likely to have happened during the past years. According to the UNODC 
(2007: 60, 2012: 29), Salvadoran gangs had about 10,500 members in 2007 
while in 2012 20,000 people had joined the gangs. The World Bank (2011: 15) 
estimated the number of gang members at 10,500 in 2011 and Farah (2013: 5), 
referring to data from the PNC, suggested there were 36,000 gang members in 
El Salvador in December 2011. While these numbers differ significantly, there is 
no evidence that the number decreased between 2009 and 2014. Hence, it 
cannot be assumed that the FMLN’s plan to reduce the number of gang 
members succeeded.118  
As for violence against women, the data was contradictory as demonstrated in 
the example of registered rape in Table 3. The same problem arose with regard 
to domestic violence. While the governmental Institute for the Development of 
                                            
116 A UNDP study from 2003 estimated that about 60% of all arms circulating in the country are 
unregistered (PNUD, 2003: 2). 
117 This number slightly reduced after 2010 but Aguilar argued that this reduction is likely to be due to the 
gang truce (and not to the PJSC) (Aguilar, 2014: 17-18). 
118 Not only are numbers of gang members unknown but it is also unclear how much of the violence can 
be attributed to the gangs. As mentioned in Section 7.5, official figures range from 11 to 30% of 
homicides committed by gang members. This stands in stark contrast with a statement to Minister 
Munguía Payés who suggested that 90% of homicides were committed by the gangs (Ávalos, 2012). 
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Women (ISDEMU) reported a decline of domestic violence from 6,711 
complaints in 2009 to approximately 4,530 in 2013, the PNC reported an 
increase from 2,137 cases in 2009 to 3,052 in 2013. The FGR and the IML also 
reported a rise of incidents but yet again with other numbers.   
Finally, the prevention policy aimed to promote a ‘culture of peace’. The term 
related to the General Directorate for Social Prevention of Violence and for 
Culture of Peace, Pre-Paz, which was part of the MJSP and one of the many 
institutions involved in preventive programmes. According to the PJSC, the 
strategy for a ‘culture of peace basically consisted of campaigning for values of 
‘convivencia ciudadana’ (‘citizens living together’). (Ministerio de Justicia y 
Seguridad Pública, 2010: 20). One such activity was the ‘campaña de 
mediación del buen vecino y de la buen vecina’ (‘campaign for mediation of 
good neighbourhood’) to train community leaders and schools to conduct 
activities which would promote values such as tolerance, respect, and solidarity 
in communities, schools, and families (Ministerio de Justicia y Seguridad 
Pública, 2011). The impact of these campaigns was difficult to measure, and no 
evaluation of the programmes was found. A multitude of other activities and 
programmes under the heading of ‘culture of peace’ were initiated by central 
state institutions, local communities, academia, and international NGOs. For 
instance, with support from the German development organisation GIZ, the Don 
Bosco University set up a master programme for ‘politics of prevention of youth 
violence’ as part of a planned lectureship on the culture of peace. While these 
campaigns and programmes for peace education were not necessarily related 
to the PJSC, they shared certain features with the efforts and failures of the 
state’s prevention policy. Programmes were designed with good intentions but 
could only resort to a small pool of experts, and problems with cooperation 
among the involved organisations limited their success.119  
8.3.2.3 Rehabilitation, reintegration, and penalty system 
Section 7.4 showed that criminal procedures were modernised after the civil war 
but these reforms were not used by ARENA governments to change practices 
of penal populism. In this sense, prisons turned into overcrowded, poorly 
administrated, and violent places of abandonment. For the FMLN government 
to reverse this process under the claim of citizen security provision implied 
                                            
119 Research Diary, 02 March 2012 and 12 March 2013. 
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developing reform strategies which would not only mitigate the effects of state 
abandonment, but build an institution capable of providing humanised 
conditions for inmates and employees, rehabilitation opportunities, and a secure 
environment both inside and outside the prisons. The third pillar of the PJSC 
focused on improving the prison infrastructure and security, differentiating the 
penalty system, the formation of prison personnel, and the reintegration of ex-
prisoners into the society. Details about how prison reforms were designed and 
realised are explored in Chapter Ten.  
8.3.2.4 Reparations and attention to victims 
The fourth area of the PJSC concerned the myriad of victims of crime and 
violence. Before the PJSC the rights and needs of victims were not considered 
in any governmental security approach. Those state institutions which attended 
victims did not necessarily do so in an integrative and coordinated manner, as 
an analysis of services to victims of sexual violence revealed (Luciano 
Ferdinand, 2011). Support for victims was mainly ceded to NGOs, and the state 
tended to perceive victims merely as useful witnesses in court (Marroquín, 
2013a). The PJSC aimed at improving this situation by establishing a better 
state infrastructure to attend victims of crime and violence, and by strengthening 
state capacities to protect victims and witnesses. In practice, this part of the 
policy received very little attention, as Minister Munguía Payes admitted.120 In 
2011, the Directorate of Attention to Victims (DAV) was founded as a unit of the 
MJSP, but it was only during the last year of the Funes government that the 
DAV gained momentum and started a campaign to increase its visibility and 
offer legal and psychological support to victims (MJSP/ Dirección de Atención a 
Víctimas, 2012). In an interview with the online newspaper Contrapunto, the 
Director of the DAV attributed this momentum to yet another change of 
personnel when Ricardo Perdomo became Minister of Security in May 2013 
(Marroquín, 2013a). However, according to its Director, the DAV attended 150 
cases by September 2013 (ibid.). This is an infinitesimally small number, given 
that in 2013 alone, 2,490 homicides, 3,491 sexual assaults, and 2,785 cases of 
extortion were registered.121 These cases do neither consider any other kind of 
assaults or robbery, nor the number of family members of victims, nor the large 
                                            
120 Interview with David Munguía Payes, 19 March 2013. 
121 Numbers refer to statistics from the PNC (homicides and extortion) and IML (sexual assaults). For 
homicides, see Santos (2014); for sexual assaults and extortions see Aguilar (2014: 27; 36). 
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number of undetected and unregistered cases. These numbers imply that the 
large majority of victims of violence and crime remained without legal, 
psychological, or financial aid from the state at the end of Funes’ term.    
8.3.2.5 Institutional and legal reforms 
Finally, the FMLN government sought to improve the institutional architecture of 
state security provision. The aims of this fifth area were to strengthen security 
governance by strengthening the MJSP, establishing mechanisms for the 
systematic collection and analysis of data about violence and crime, improving 
access to justice and strengthening alternative methods of conflict 
management, and guaranteeing the adherence to legal and normative 
regulations of the provision of security and justice.  
Issues with systemising the collection and analysis of data were described 
above. Especially the interview with Douglas Moreno gave insight into the 
difficulties at the Security Ministry in centralising information. With regard to 
improved security governance, the PJSC envisaged capacity building and 
formation of the personnel at the MJSP. It also aimed at increasing 
accountability of state security organisations. Here, especially the Inspectorate 
General which represented the internal control institution of the PNC was to be 
strengthened (Chapter Nine). Furthermore, improved coordination between 
security organisations was envisaged, especially between the ANSP, PNC, and 
the Security Ministry.   
In practice, the institutional and legal reform processes turned out different from 
these plans. The contradiction of having to build capacity first before drawing on 
expertise while at the same time needing expertise immediately to realise the 
policy could not be addressed. Lacking expertise with regard to the 
implementation of the security policy was a frequent assertion during 
interviews.122 The General Inspectorate started off with much enthusiasm but 
was soon stopped by political opponents, as will be demonstrated in the 
following chapter in detail. The Security Cabinet was to become an institution 
that would facilitate coordination between institutions, even though its creation 
was not anticipated in the policy. However, following the replacement of Minister 
                                            
122 Interview with Benito Lara, 11 February 2013; Oscar Alfredo Pineda and René Abrego Labbé, 15 
February 2013; Claudia Umaña Araujo, 20 March 2012; state official R2, 05 March 2012; Notes from 
Research Diary, 21 February 2012. 
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Melgar and other key positions in the security sector between November 2011 
and January 2012, a significant shift in the Security Cabinet towards the 
domination of the military could be observed.123 Besides replacing leaders from 
security organisations who were affiliated with the FMLN, other leaders close to 
the FMLN were no longer invited to the Security Cabinet.124 This made 
coordination between the security organisations increasingly difficult. 
To sum it up, this chapter traced the process of the FMLN developing a security 
policy based on the vision of a state being responsive to citizen insecurities. It 
showed that, in theory, the FMLN’s policy addressed a broad range of issues 
linked to violence beyond gang violence, including domestic violence, migratory 
security, and human trafficking. However, the PJSC did not incorporate a 
comprehensive strategy to contain gang violence. Chapter Ten deals with this 
issue in detail and asks whether this marks a limitation in the conceptualisation 
of the policy or whether the FMLN managed to address gang violence through 
other policy goals. A look at the concrete efforts of the FMLN to implement its 
policy and at its development in each of the five key security areas which were 
identified by the party has shown the shortcomings of the policy. The 
examination went beyond a simple look at homicide figures and drew a more 
nuanced picture of the PJSC’s (lack of) implementation to demonstrate the gap 
between the FMLN’s ambitious security plans and the precarious security 
situation by the end of the FMLN’s first term as party in government. This gap 
leads to the question that guides the following two chapters: why was the FMLN 
government not able to implement its far-reaching and well-designed security 
plans? The following chapters analyse how the FMLN government 2009-2014 
responded to violence in El Salvador with an explicit focus on police and prison 
reforms. 
  
                                            
123 With General Munguía Payés and General Salinas taking over positions of the Ministry of Security 
and the PNC, two civilian positions were occupied by members of the armed forces. See Section 5.3.2 for 
details.  
124 Interview with police official R27, 12 April 2012; interview with Carlos Dada and José Luis Sanz, 19 
February 2013. 
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9. Contested police reforms 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter shows that in the field of police reforms the Salvadoran 
government’s security policy (2009-2014) was affected and significantly altered 
by the interests and power strategies of political, economic, and military elites. 
The chapter argues that ad hoc decision making (defined as short-term 
decisions which are insufficiently implemented and easily reversed or replaced 
by other decisions) is a significant characteristic of policy processes in El 
Salvador. It continues to argue that the impact of state and non-state elites is 
illustrated in the ad hoc character of decision-making processes. The study 
furthermore analyses the effects of the elites contesting the policy process on 
the institutional development of the police. It demonstrates that an analysis of 
institutional reforms alone does not suffice for explaining shortcomings of 
security provision. It needs to be complemented by an analysis of security 
practices.   
Based on Migdal, it was argued that in contested states a power struggle takes 
place in the form of a battle between the idea of the state and the agenda of 
other societal (and state) actors about the organisation of society. In Migdal’s 
(2001: 65) words, public policy was defined as the attempt of state leaders to 
use state institutions to make rules which change the behaviour of the public. 
Hence, the efforts to professionalise the Salvadoran police described in the first 
part of this chapter (Section 9.2) were the attempt of the FMLN government to 
implement a specific idea of the state, in this case of policing. Using the 
characteristics of ad hoc decision making125, the second part (9.3) analyses 
how the US, the private sector, and political elites impacted on security decision 
making of the government and how the replacement of the Security Minister126 
was linked to pressure from these actors. Central elements of the power 
                                            
125 Ad hoc decision making was characterised as follows (see Section 3.3): 1.) It appears where state and 
non-state actors use their power to impact on and contest decisions of decision-makers in formal offices; 
involved actors have adverse interests; and resistance against (or attempts to influence) the policy is high. 
2.) It means that strategic long-term decisions are either easily replaced or ignored or reversed by short-
term decisions. Short-term decisions are often unrelated to any strategy. 3.) Ad hoc-ism has a temporary 
character (which means decisions are either provisional measures or soon replaced). 4.) It assumes that 
political awareness of the problem is high, and decisions are made with the intention to solve a problem. 
126 The official title is ‘Minister of Justice and Public Security’. For practical reasons, I often use the 
abbreviation ‘Security Minister’. 
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struggle, the involved actors and their sources of power are explored. In the 
third part of this chapter (Section 9.4), the analysis explores how policy 
decisions that were connected to the replacement of the Security Minister 
affected the professionalisation efforts at the PNC. It reveals that the power 
struggle between security decision makers and other state and non-state actors 
undermined the development of security institutions. It is due to these power 
struggles, the chapter argues, that the state was ultimately not capable of 
legitimately centralising  and controlling violence and thus failed to provide 
security for the majority of citizens.  
 
9.2 Police reform efforts under the FMLN 
This first section explores the efforts aiming at reforming the PNC under the first 
FMLN government. As mentioned in Chapter Eight, plans for further police 
reforms were developed independently from the Policy of Justice, Security, and 
Living Together (PJSC) but basically followed the same normative orientation 
towards citizen security and were thus consistent with the PJSC. Subcontracted 
by USAID, Checchi and Company Consulting, together with the PNC 
leadership, conducted an unprecedentedly comprehensive organisational 
assessment of the PNC as part of USAID’s ‘Justice System Improvement 
Program’ 2008-2012 in El Salvador (Checchi and Company Consulting, 2009). 
The assessment took place from March to May 2009 and analysed the period 
from 2004 to 2009 by collecting data through surveys, opinion polls, interviews, 
focus groups, and gathering documents inside and outside the police. The 
assessment identified severe organisational weaknesses which, according to 
the final report, seriously limited police efficiency and effectiveness. The most 
pressing issues were seen in the lack of overall strategic direction, inadequate 
career structures, the fragmented organisational structure, and little credibility 
and trust among the population (Checchi and Company Consulting, 2009: 127-
133).  
The reports’ proposals for improvement served as the basis for the so called 
Plan Estratégico Institucional (Strategic Institutional Plan, PEI). The PEI 
comprised strategies that aimed at remodelling the PNC between 2009 and 
2014 towards a more effective and professional security force (Policía Nacional 
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Civil/ Dirección General, 2010). It set out the overall strategic reorientation of 
the PNC but also gave detailed account of the activities needed to 
professionalise the police. The central idea was to revive the policing model that 
was stipulated in the Peace Accords from 1992, as Julián Belloso, leader of the 
Consejo Técnico (Technical Council) of the PNC, said.127 According to Julián 
Belloso, this implied a professional, civil, and democratic force that was willing 
to serve its citizens.  
The model which is a product of the Peace Accords has 
important features, perhaps most importantly it is 
professional, civilian, […], a democratic police, and most 
importantly the service to the community, serving the 
community. A police completely separate from the armed 
forces is born.128 
The reorientation towards the spirit of the Peace Accords is reflected in the PEI. 
In addition, the PEI emphasised the importance of the active participation of the 
citizens as well as that of all members of the PNC in searching solutions for 
problems of insecurity. Twelve strategic lines of action were identified and 
similar to the PJSC prevention and control of crime were two key areas as the 
planned allocation of financial resources shows: 50% of the planned budget 
was to be spent on prevention, 25% on the control of crime.129 The central 
feature of prevention was introducing community policing as the guiding 
principle for all aspects of policing. A large part of controlling crime was 
dedicated to the improvement of investigative capacities. Further central lines of 
action aimed at developing a coherent police career structure, increasing 
internal accountability by strengthening the General Inspectorate, and 
reorganising the organisational structure of the PNC by centralising strategic 
planning and decentralising operative capacities. All strategic lines were 
                                            
127 Interview with Rolando Elias Julián Belloso, 14 February 2013. The Consejo Técnico consults the 
General Directorate of the Police in strategic and managerial issues. As head of the Consejo Técnico, 
Julián Belloso was one of the PNC leaders involved in the development of the PEI.  
128 Interview with Rolando Elias Julián Belloso, 14 February 2013. 
129 See Policía Nacional Civil/ Dirección General (2010), Anexo No. 2. There is no evidence how much 
of the planned budget was actually allocated. The plan envisaged 88% of the budget ($1.8 billion) coming 
from the Government and 12% from external funds. It is not clear whether this money was in addition to 
the annual budget for the police or included. The planned general budget for the police between 2010 and 
2013 was about $1 billion (Ministerio de Justicia y Seguridad Pública, 2010-2013). Most certainly there 
were difficulties collecting sufficient funds as the public debate about a possible security tax shows 
(Section 9.3.2). 
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specified into ‘operative actions’ which in turn were further itemised in specific 
activities, indicators to follow up the implementation, responsible units, and a 
time frame. The time frame was designed to fit the presidential term from 2009 
to 2014 but Julián Belloso was well aware that a genuine change of the 
institution would take much longer and the changes that the PEI envisaged 
would take a lot more time.       
[T]he plan says 2009 to 2014 but that is a fallacy, that was 
imposed on me because the truth the plan is written in 
lines that are for 15, 20 or 30 years.130 
The PEI was notably more detailed than the PJSC. Whilst it was the principal 
document outlining police reforms, a number of other documents also deal with 
specific aspects of the police reform, for example the Plan Batalla por la Páz 
(Plan Battle for Peace), the Doctrina Institucional sobre Policía Comunitaria 
(Institutional Doctrine on Community Policing), and the Política Institucional de 
Equidad e Igualdad de Género (Institutional Policy of Gender Equality and 
Equity), to mention but a few. The amount of these written documents seemed 
large and their specific use was not always clarified. However, together with the 
specification of measures the PEI entailed they proved that the intentions to 
change the organisation were serious and profound. In the light of the policy 
cycle, the policy was not only formulated in the sense that options were 
generated for the police to respond to the problems of violence and crime but a 
specific course of action was adopted. With regard to the criteria of ad hoc 
decision making established in the conceptual framework (Section 3.3), 
decisions to reform the police were not made ad hoc. It followed a rather 
rational approach. The policy outlined in the PEI and other documents did not 
have a temporary character, instead it was designed as a multi-year effort and 
aimed at long term change. Furthermore, decisions to reform the PNC were not 
made under the impact of actors with adverse interests, but they represented 
the FMLN’s vision of citizen security provision. At the point of the 
implementation during the term, this became a problem because the 
contestation of the policy by other actors (which is examined in the following 
sections) was not anticipated in the security plans. Hence, it proved very difficult 
                                            
130 Interview with Rolando Elias Julián Belloso, 14 February 2013. 
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for the government to react to these contestations without changing the course 
of the policy significantly.   
Part of the problem is the limited consideration of the political and social context 
of police reforms in the assessment report and the strategic plan. The 
assessment report which preceded the PEI focused on managerial problems of 
the police as an organisation. This was reflected in the language used in the 
report which derived from the field of corporate management and consultancy. 
For example, the analysis followed seven ‘strategic lines’, four of which explicitly 
related to management issues (process management, human resource 
management, resource management, quality management). One area was 
labelled ‘strategic direction’, a term that is originating in strategic management. 
The two other areas referred to the focus on ‘interest groups’ (mainly the 
citizens) and relations of the PNC with other security institutions (Checchi and 
Company Consulting, 2009: 18-19). The PEI was less technical in its language 
and related more to the concrete areas in which professionalisation is sought. 
Yet, the definition of these areas was based on the analysis provided by 
Checchi and the PNC leadership. The assessment report and the PEI showed 
that the police were considered an organisation whose problems can be 
articulated in managerial terms. In the context of technical assistance, such an 
approach is comprehensible since consultancy needs to work with quantifiable 
variables and make suggestions that can be operationalised. However, the way 
in which problems were described missed the bigger picture in which reforms 
take place. That is to say, the assessment mentions problems and proposes 
solutions without addressing the causes of problems. One example is the 
problem of the politicisation of the organisation which was acknowledged as an 
obstacle for the development of clear career structures. Yet, the issue was dealt 
with in just one paragraph and did not explain what politicisation in the context 
of the PNC meant, how it had emerged and how it could have impacted on the 
implementation of the reforms (Checchi and Company Consulting, 2009: 79). It 
may have been beyond the scope of the assessment to elaborate on these 
issues in detail. However, in the light of this thesis’ argument about the 
importance of security practices, it needs to be clarified whether shortcomings 
of security reforms derive from ignoring the context in which reforms are to be 
implemented. The report’s suggested solutions for the problem of politicisation 
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(basically, restructuring police careers and increasing internal accountability) 
were very important issues in the process of further police professionalisation 
but the success of reforms did not just depend on the management of the PNC. 
Looking at the police as an arena of power struggle (instead of a unified state 
organisation), in which various actors inside and outside the police with diverse 
and even adverse interests were involved, does consider the political and social 
context of the reforms. Politicisation, for instance, is then regarded as an 
element that shapes the power struggle. This line of thinking is further 
developed in the following sections.  
 
9.3 Ad hoc security decision making: the replacement of the 
Minister of Justice and Public Security 
On 8 November 2011, Manuel Melgar stepped down from his post as Minister 
of Justice and Public Security. On 22 November President Funes appointed 
David Munguía Payes (then Minister of Defence) as the new Security 
Minister.131 The appointment of Munguía Payes had far-reaching consequences 
for the trajectory of state security provision between 2009 and 2014 (Section 
9.4). The following section analyses the decision-making process related to 
changes of personnel in key positions of the security sector. This process 
began with President Funes’ decision to replace the Security Minister and 
continued with decisions to replace leaders of security organisations, including 
the police. The analysis reveals that the decision making process was of ad hoc 
nature and as such, marked by short-term decisions which were unrelated to 
the strategic long-term goals outlined in the previous section. More than this, 
many decisions were revised soon after they had been made; and personnel 
changes occurred throughout the term. This ad hoc-ism reflects how various 
actors put pressure on the government and as such, serves to explore elements 
and patterns of the power struggle between the involved actors, as well as to 
determine the sources of power used by these actors. Three aspects stand out 
in the analysis, namely the pressure exerted on the Salvadoran government by 
the US, the lack of support from the private sector for state security institutions, 
and the polarisation between the political Left and Right. Whereas the first two 
                                            
131 Research Diary, 06 February 2012. 
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aspects emphasise the role of economic pressure on the government, the latter 
sheds light on the role of political power in the decision making process.  
9.3.1 Pressure from the United States 
During the interview with Manuel Melgar, I asked him what he believed to be the 
reasons why he had to resign and whether there was any pressure from outside 
El Salvador.132 He pointed to the pressure from the public on ‘delivering 
immediate results’, that is, to provide the public with dropping homicide 
numbers.133 The Funes administration was under pressure from the public right 
from the beginning of the term, and this only increased during the first two years 
as the literature showed (Marroquín and Vásquez, 2014, Van der Borgh and 
Savenije, 2014). Dada and Sanz described the logic of demanding and 
delivering short term results as a general pattern in the relationship between the 
public and any security minister, a pattern that Melgar and the long term reform 
plans did not fit.134 Following this line of reasoning, Melgar was a pawn to be 
sacrificed by Funes. However, the demand of the public for evidence that the 
government was ‘doing something about the violence’ was fuelled by powerful 
actors, namely the private sector and the political Right. This will be explored 
further in the Sections 9.3.2 and 9.3.3 respectively. In addition, what Melgar 
avoided to mention was specifically in his case the pressure that was exerted 
from the United States.   
Professor of philosophy and ex-FMLN member Ricardo Ribera claimed the 
reserved position of the US against the FMLN.  
Very clear is that the United States is behind this... the 
replacement of the people of the Frente [FMLN, SHF] in 
security, remove all of the Frente… but also the type of strategy 
is exactly that of the United States. [...] What strategy does the 
government of Mauricio Funes have? They are implementing 
that of the United States. [...] Yes, it will be better… to have a 
general and not a former guerrilla commander. That is more 
consistent, right? Because why would you impose the line of the 
                                            
132 Melgar left voluntarily but news reported he was asked by Funes to resign. Neither of the two gave a 
reason for the resignation. See Vaquerano et al. (2011) and Henríquez and Romero (2011). 
133 Interview with Manuel Melgar, 26 March 2012. 
134 Interview with Carlos Dada and José Luis Sanz, 19 February 2013. 
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state department, of the DEA and the CIA on Manuel Melgar or 
on Eduardo Linares, all these... Well, yeah, better put the 
military to follow it because, really, that is more coherent.135 
There is some evidence that this view was not just the subjective opinion of a 
former guerrillero. While Mauricio Funes as an outsider to the FMLN was 
regarded as a moderate and pragmatic politician and thus was an acceptable 
candidate from the US perspective, Manuel Melgar as ex-guerillero was not 
tolerated as member of the Funes cabinet. This was made evident by leaked 
cables from the US Embassy in San Salvador (Blau, 2009c, Blau, 2009b). 
According to the cables and to news reports, being one of the former leaders of 
the guerrilla organisation PRTC, Melgar was allegedly involved in the murder of 
four US marines and eight civilians in the Zona Rosa area in San Salvador in 
1985. This made him an ‘anti-American element’ (Blau, 2009c).  
In terms of Salvadoran public security, the US had built trusted relationships 
with the Salvadoran armed forces and their political allies in the ARENA 
party.136 This was not surprising, given the USA’s long term military and 
financial support during the civil war (Chapter Five). Therefore US diplomats 
hesitated to engage with ex-guerilleros. A US-American employee of the US 
Embassy in San Salvador described the security policy of the Funes 
administration as too ‘left’, ‘soft hand’ and ‘incompatible with reality’.137  
Salvadoran newspapers linked Melgar’s removal to the signing of the 
Partnership for Growth between the US and El Salvador (Calderón, 2011, 
Vaquerano et al., 2011). This agreement was made to counter the 
consequences of the financial and economic crisis of 2008/2009. Due to El 
Salvador’s economic dependency on the US, trade and the flow of remittances 
decreased dramatically in 2008 and 2009 (Garrett, 2010) (Section 9.3.). The 
Partnership for Growth comprised several measures of US support for the 
Salvadoran government in fostering rapid economic growth in El Salvador 
(2011b). The moment of its signing in November 2011 correlated with Melgar’s 
                                            
135 Interview with Ricardo Ribera, 09 March 2012. Ribera refers to the changes of staff that followed the 
replacement of the minister. Eduardo Linares as head of the OIE was among the staff that had to leave, 
too (Section 9.4). 
136 Interview with police official R30, 02 March 2012. 
137 Interview with employee of the US Embassy, 28 March 2012. 
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resignation. A Salvadoran government official confirmed the removal of Melgar 
was made a condition for the validation of the Partnership for Growth. 
Externally we had the pressure of implementing the 
Partnership for Growth in which… this is unofficial, but say 
there are many versions that say that in exchange for the 
implementation of the strategy of the Partnership for 
Growth, in exchange the Salvadoran Government had to 
make certain concessions by way of unwanted officials say 
protected by the government. So this is perhaps, without 
being an official fact, the dominant explanation for the 
departure of Manuel Melgar from the Government.138 
This condition was never mentioned officially because it represented a strong 
interference in Salvadoran domestic affairs. However, due to El Salvador’s 
heavy economic dependence on the US, the US was able to use its economic 
power and interfere in domestic security issues. The designation of Melgar as 
Security Minister had been a concession of Funes towards the wish of the 
orthodox wing of the FMLN to participate in the government. This decision was 
contested by the US due to their adverse ideological interests. It showed that 
the power struggle impacting on security decision making is not limited to 
pressure from national actors but involved the international arena, in this 
particular case the interests of the US. 
 
9.3.2 The private sector and state security provision 
As shown in Chapter Seven, Salvadoran business elites have enormous 
economic power and freedom that they were able to maintain after the civil war 
due to economic liberalisation processes in the 1990s. Before 2009 the close 
ties between ARENA and the business elites guaranteed the government’s 
loyalty towards the business sector and less interference from the state. For 
many business elites this model of power sharing was at risk with the FMLN 
winning the Presidential elections, and the private sector developed different 
strategies in dealing with this change. These strategies impacted on the security 
                                            
138 Interview with government official R2, 05 March 2012. 
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policy. The following four aspects demonstrate that the private sector 
undermined efforts to strengthen state security provision.  
First, the global financial crisis hit El Salvador especially hard because of the 
introduction of the US Dollar as national currency in 2001 which was part of the 
policy of economic liberalisation, as well as the sale of all major Salvadoran 
banks to multinational companies by 2007. The sale of the banks, previously 
privatised under President Cristiani’s neoliberal reforms, benefitted the handful 
of business groups that had owned them. But on the grand scale it made the 
country more vulnerable to the global financial market (Bull, 2013). In addition, 
many business elites resisted local and national investment and evaded tax 
payments. El Salvador had one of the lowest local investment rates in Latin 
America (Garrett, 2010: 7). Alfredo Cristiani, who is not just ARENA’s ex-
President but one of the country’s wealthiest businessmen, publicly admitted he 
would never invest inside the country (La Prensa Gráfica, 2010a). In addition, 
there was a huge fiscal deficit with tax revenues amounting to just 13% of GDP 
which represented one of the lowest rates in Latin America (Garrett, 2010: 7). At 
the same time, GDP growth was negative in 2009 and very modest in the years 
thereafter (Ribando Seelke, 2013: 39, Bull et al., 2015: 39). Funes’ economic 
policy aimed at tackling problems of growth, investment, and the fiscal deficit by 
various measures such as a tax reform package and an anti-crisis-plan which 
included an increase in social spending but also austerity measures (Bull et al., 
2015). However, as described above, for the Salvadoran economy to recover 
and stimulate growth, international loans and development aid were vital. These 
were provided not only by institutions like the IMF but through bilateral aid that 
came first and foremost from the US, for example through the Partnership for 
Growth (Ribando Seelke, 2013). Through this bilateral aid the asymmetry of the 
relationship between El Salvador and the United States was extended even 
further after the US recession and the financial crisis. Hence, Salvadoran 
economic elites not only benefitted from neoliberal reforms, they contributed to 
the economic dependency on the US through tax evasion and low local 
investment. It was this dependency which lowered Funes’ room for manoeuvre 
in the case of Melgar’s replacement.  
Funes’ relationship with the economic elites was close with some groups but 
distanced with others. As described in Section 6.3, Funes did not belong to 
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either the orthodox or moderate faction of the FMLN. During his presidential 
campaign he placed emphasis on winning the financial support of important 
interest groups. Funes knew he needed support from the business sector not 
only during the campaign but during his entire presidency for the country to 
recover from the economic and financial crisis. Especially traditional business 
elites around Cristiani, the National Association of Private Enterprise ANEP, 
and the Chamber of Commerce showed a sceptical and even hostile attitude 
against the government, when the FMLN took office (Freedman, 2010).139 
However, a few elements in the private sector grew alienated from ARENA and 
ANEP over the years, some of which formed the movement ‘Amigos de 
Mauricio’ (‘Friends of Mauricio’) and became Funes’ supporters. Therein, they 
helped him establish and maintain contact with private enterprise.140 This 
network was vital for the government to create an investment-friendly climate 
that would stimulate economic growth and employment (Bull et al., 2015). The 
network was also important to generally increase Funes’ space for policy 
manoeuvre (Hume, 2014: 395). In addition, Funes linked up with a third group 
of private entrepreneurs around Antonio and Herbert Saca. Antonio Saca, ex-
ARENA president, separated from ARENA and, together with his cousin Herbert 
Saca, is said to be the driving force behind the newly created Grand Alliance for 
National Unity (GANA) party. He stands for ‘the new capital’ of the financial and 
service sector.141 Funes’ alliance with the Sacas and GANA provided him with 
yet another option for accessing the private sector and in addition provided the 
FMLN with political support in the Legislative Assembly. In Garrett’s (2010: 34) 
report about the performance of the Funes administration during its first year in 
office, a fourth group of entrepreneurs is mentioned who evolved around the 
FMLN and ALBA petroleum. Funes’ relationship with this group was ambivalent 
since it was linked with his party but Funes grew alienated from the FMLN 
during the course of the term. The resignation of Melgar and the subsequent 
replacement of other FMLN affiliated leaders of security organisations marked 
the beginning of an increasingly tense relationship between Funes and the 
                                            
139 For the role of ANEP in gathering the Salvadoran economic elite see Section 5.3. With ‘traditional 
economic elites’ I refer to those groups of the business sector whose families and businesses represented 
the Salvadoran economic elite for several generations (Chapter Five). This comprises of the conservative 
as well as the moderate factions depicted in the historical chapter. The term ‘traditional’ is used to 
distinguish these elites from new economic elites including from the Left as they are portrayed in the 
following paragraphs. 
140 Interview with anonymous informant R25, 14 March 2012 and Burridge (n.d.). 
141 Interview with anonymous informant R25, 14 March 2012, Garrett (2010), and Arauz (2011). 
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party, especially the orthodox wing who had suggested Melgar as Minister. The 
new Minister Munguía Payés was a military officer and, as such, less trusted by 
the orthodox faction of the FMLN. The following sections show how these 
economic and political alliances and gaps impacted on security policy making.    
The second and third aspect which demonstrated the impact of business elites 
on state security provision concerned their role in public media. Traditional 
economic elites around Cristiani, ANEP and the Chamber of Commerce 
repeatedly questioned the FMLN government for its lack of a security strategy 
and thus contributed to the pressure on the Funes administration to adhere to 
ad hoc decision making. The Funes administration’s refusal to publicly 
announce the PJSC (Chapter Eight) – probably in fear of harsh criticism – did 
not prevent such criticism. Instead, it was easy for the private sector and 
ARENA to criticise the government precisely for its apparent lack of a policy. 
The private sector’s reluctance to contribute to functioning state services by 
paying more taxes was addressed during an interview with ANEP director 
Arnoldo Jiménez. Being asked about potential collaboration between the private 
sector and the government in the subject of security, Jiménez said: 
There are so many forms of collaboration that do not exist 
because there is no trust. There is no trust. You do not 
want to share. There is a... The police think that their plans 
must be top secret. We have approached them to ask: 
‘What is the security plan?’ And they have taken out a few 
[pages] and say: ‘Here is the security plan, look! But I 
cannot give you details. I cannot give you details because 
it is confidential.’ So it's very difficult. I can understand that 
the operation that will take place tomorrow morning is 
confidential because if not, if it gets out, it does not 
succeed anymore. But a plan that is based on an 
assessment and has specific strategies!142 
Criticism was expressed publicly on various occasions (Martínez, 2010a, La 
Prensa Gráfica, 2010b). The Chamber of Commerce even came up with its own 
security proposal which represented more of a provocation to the Funes 
                                            
142 Interview with Arnoldo Jíménez, 12 September 2011. 
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administration rather than a serious contribution in the search for solutions of the 
problems of insecurity (Cámara de Comercio e Industria de El Salvador, 2010).  
This duplicity becomes clear with the third point demonstrating the impact of 
business elites on state security provision. To acquire sufficient funds to invest 
in state security provision, the government suggested introducing a security tax. 
The proposal comprised the idea that personal and legal entities with assets 
over $500,000 should pay an extra tax of 1.5% (Belloso, 2011). This plan was 
strongly opposed by the private sector, as Benito Lara maintained when he was 
asked about resistance against the FMLN security plans. 
BL: [N]obody wants to contribute to security. So, for 
example, there was a government proposal for a small 
security tax. […] And they did not want to accept the 
proposal of a tax, a tax which surely was tiny, it was not for 
everyone, but only a tax for all legal persons that 
practically had a very high income, [...] but they resisted, 
right? So, there is this kind of resistance.143 
ANEP director Arnoldo Jiménez justified the opposition of the private sector by 
arguing it was the state’s responsibility to provide security, an argument which 
demonstrated how easily representatives of the private sector withdrew from a 
security policy that was not in their interest.144 Ultimately, the government’s 
proposal was absorbed by the debate about a larger tax reform and, in the end, 
it was not implemented. 
Thus, on one side, the private sector criticised the government’s inactivity and 
pressured the government with its own ‘proposal’ of a security policy. On the 
other side, the private sector refused to take on its responsibility to financially 
contribute to a functioning state, or, to be more precise, to a functioning state 
security provision.  
As the fourth and final point, efforts to strengthen state security provision were 
undermined by the expansion of private security enterprises. As mentioned 
above, Amigos de Mauricio (Friends of Mauricio) was a group of businessmen, 
military officials and advocates who were willing to support Funes’ candidacy 
                                            
143 Interview with Benito Lara, 11 February 2013. 
144 Interview with Arnoldo Jiménez, 12 September 2011. 
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with their money, networks, and public relations. Some of these ‘friends’ were 
Funes’ closest consultants and allies, for instance Gerardo Cáceres, his chief 
fundraiser; the economist Alex Segovia; Nicolás Salume, owner of large 
business corporations; Luis Lagos, a former politician from the right-wing PCN; 
and General David Munguía Payés.145 Funes’ friend and businessman Miguel 
Menéndez was also part of this network. Menéndez’ fortune was built on coffee 
but he also owned the so called Salvadoran Company for Security (COSASE), a 
private security company. While he previously supported ARENA, he became a 
sponsor of Funes’ presidential campaign. Once Funes held the office, COSASE 
gained contracts worth $2.5 million for protecting state agencies, compared to 
$2.8 million gained between 2005 and 2008 (Valencia Carravantes, 2010). In 
2013, El Faro reported that COSASE, now by far the largest security company, 
had secured contracts over $14.6 million for protecting state agencies (Lemus, 
2013). Apart from the allegation of influence peddling, as suggested by 
newspaper reports in La Prensa Gráfica (Ávalos, 2015) and El Faro (Arauz, 
2011), the ascent of COSASE has general consequences for state security 
provision, as the following discussion highlights.  
As outlined above, the privatisation of the public infrastructure and public 
services is a heritage of the ARENA government’s neoliberal policy. Since 
ARENA leaders are also business entrepreneurs, they directly benefitted from 
this trend. The privatisation of security was no exception. One of the former 
ARENA leaders, Adolfo Tórrez, owned the private security company Serconse 
that benefitted from the protection of state agencies with $38 million during 
Antonio Saca’s presidency (2004-2009) (Ávalos, 2015). Part of the Funes 
administration aimed at reversing this trend and establishing mechanisms that 
would improve public service, as the head of the Department of Governance 
and State Modernisation stated.146 However, with Menéndez’ influence on 
Funes the trend towards privatisation of security provision continued. Hume 
(2014: 393) argued private security firms reduce the autonomy and legitimacy of 
                                            
145 The relationship between Funes and Munguía Payés was a pragmatic one: Disagreements between 
ARENA and Munguía had previously prevented Munguía from ascension within the military (interview 
with Guidos Véjar, 23 March 2012). His approximation to Funes provided him with the top position as 
defence minister. For Funes, Munguía was a way to gain support from the military.     
146 Interview with Antonio Morales, 28 February 2013. 
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public security organisations, given the huge number of private agents.147 But as 
the case of COSASE showed, the impact of private security companies on 
public security organisations went far beyond these aspects. COSASE imported 
weapons and produced munition, while also aiming at gaining contracts to 
provide the PNC with munition (Blau, 2009a). This implied a proximity between 
COSASE and the PNC which could have impacted on the legally stipulated 
responsibility of the police to oversee private security firms. While the line 
between private and public security provision was already blurred under ARENA 
governments (for example by police officers working as private guards off-duty, 
Section 7.3), the FMLN did little to strengthen public security by separating the 
two spheres. In fact, the FMLN created a new security company called 
Alprodesa which is linked to ALBA petroleum, a regional oil consortium 
promoted by former Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez (Ávalos, 2015). As 
argued in Chapter Seven, the lack of regulation helped the private security 
sector to expand. Today, private guards are not just omnipresent, poorly paid 
men taking care of the grocery shops. Private security provision became a 
profitable industry and the commodification of security which had started under 
ARENA (Montoya, 2013) has further expanded under the FMLN. At the time of 
the interview, Rodrigo Ávila, ARENA’s former presidential candidate and ex-
PNC director, worked as security consultant and knew the private security 
business well. He pointed to the technological upgrading of private security 
services.       
RA: [There are] many companies and they don’t have 
physical armed security, what they have are a lot of 
cameras, [...] alarm sensors, gate locks, and biometrics, 
they have... I don’t know, a lot of technology. But yes, 
that's an interesting topic. And here in El Salvador 
companies have proliferated, but now as the private 
security companies stagnated… Between 1995 and 2010, 
sorry 1995 until 2002 they grew […]. 
SHF: They don’t grow anymore. 
                                            
147 Accurate figures about private security guards were difficult to obtain. According to Hume (2014), 
90,000 private agents outnumbered 19,000 police officers in 2010. 
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RA: No. No, I mean there are many but the boom of 
security companies was between 1995 and 2001, 2002. 
SHF: Why? Because the market is saturated? 
RA: The market is somewhat saturated. [...] What many 
companies do... what they have is electronic security. And 
if previously they had three guards, they no longer have 
three but one, the one at the door, and the rest is 
electronic security.148 
While the private security market did not grow exponentially in numbers 
anymore, companies invested more in better technology. There was a tendency 
towards the professionalisation of security services which means the market 
was increasingly dominated by large companies with sufficient financial 
resources to invest in professionalisation. La Prensa Gráfica (Ávalos, 2015) and 
El Faro (Lemus, 2013) both reported that COSASE became the leading 
company under President Funes and that there was a trend towards 
monopolisation of the market, a trend which was confirmed by Douglas Moreno, 
Vice Minister of Public Security at the time of the interview.149 
In sum, the question arises how these roles and strategies of business groups 
link to Funes’ decision to replace Minister Melgar. The United States was able 
to exert significant pressure on the government due to the precarious economic 
situation in El Salvador to which economic elites had contributed. It was shown 
that the US had reservations against sections of the FMLN which they 
considered as hardliners and in which they counted Melgar.150 They were 
pleased with the replacement of Melgar by Munguía Payés who was not just a 
member of the military but also a member of Amigos de Mauricio. For their part, 
the FMLN was less pleased with the removal of Melgar since it lowered their 
room for manoeuvre in security decision making as Section 9.4 will show. The 
decision marked the beginning of estrangement between Funes and his party 
that turned into a serious gap over the course of further security political 
decisions. The US and Funes’ friends had more impact than the FMLN in this 
                                            
148 Interview with Rodrigo Ávila, 25 February 2013. 
149 Interview with Douglas Moreno, 11 April 2012. 
150 The US perception of FMLN ‘hardliners’ and ‘moderates’ does not necessarily correspond with the 
orthodox and reformist wings of the FMLN. 
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decision due to their economic power. This shifting power balance turned into a 
disadvantage for the FMLN’s security reform plans, as the effects of the power 
struggle will reveal. 
9.3.3 The polarisation between the political Left and Right 
Another striking element which shaped the power struggle in El Salvador is the 
polarisation between political forces from the Left and the Right. Based on 
Migdal, this thesis argues that power struggles do not only occur between the 
state and social forces, they can also be observed among different state actors, 
in this case between the government and the opposition (in fact, between any 
government and any opposition). It is argued that deep political polarisation is a 
source of political power and is thus nurtured by political elites. If interests of the 
opposition and the government are at odds, the opposition will use its leverage 
to influence government decisions. Such a struggle among political elites 
reduces overall state power, as this part of the analysis demonstrates. More 
specifically, polarisation diminishes police professionalism and limits the 
chances to monopolise violence since polarised contexts are conducive for ad 
hoc decision making. Ad hoc-ism, as was argued above, illustrates that 
contestation – in this case in the form of polarisation – is counter-effective for 
the implementation of long-term strategic decisions and undermines the 
development of democratic security institutions.   
9.3.3.1 1992-2009: The roots of polarisation at the PNC 
The political polarisation in El Salvador is rooted in the emergence of the FMLN 
and ARENA as opposing parties during the civil war and the persistence of their 
opposition after the war. Although El Salvador has a multiparty system with 
currently eight parties represented in the Legislative Assembly, FMLN and 
ARENA gained 76% of the votes in the legislative period of 2015-2018, with 
similar results during the last four legislative elections (Tribunal Supremo de 
Elecciones, 2015, Base de Datos Políticos de las Américas, 1999b). This 
distribution of votes alone does not account for the polarisation, but figures 
about the self-positioning of FMLN and ARENA parliamentarians showed that 
the politicians placed themselves at the extreme left or right. In a survey from 
2013, on a scale from one to ten (1= extreme left, 10= extreme right) FMLN 
parliamentarians positioned themselves at 2.0, and ARENA parliamentarians at 
8.1 (PELA/ Fusades, 2013: 89). Ten years before, in 2003, self-positioning was 
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even more extreme with 1.22 (FMLN) and 9.31 (ARENA) (Artiga González, 
2007: 7). Surprisingly, voters’ ideological self-positioning is much more 
dispersed with peaks at the left, the right, and the centre, as Artiga González 
(2007: 8) pointed out. This brings into question how this difference can be 
explained. Carlos Dada (2007), co-founder of the online newspaper El Faro, 
showed that the Salvadoran society was not as polarised per se. Instead, the 
polarisation was driven by a confronting discourse initiated by the political 
parties, in particular by the FMLN and ARENA. While some communication and 
collaboration between the two parties took place during the first two ARENA 
administrations, it was under President Flores (1999-2004) that the polarisation 
was provoked by ARENA (Dada, 2007: 26-27). The FMLN responded with 
further radicalisation towards the left which implied a strengthening of the 
FMLN’s orthodox wing. According to Dada, the confrontational attitudes 
hardened over the years until the struggle between the two parties became an 
end in itself. Dada’s article implicitly entails the accusation that in the 
Salvadoran political system it had become more important to secure the power 
base against the political opponent instead of using the mandate for responsible 
leadership, or in other words, for leadership representing the interests of the 
majority of society. While this accusation is not unique to the Salvadoran 
situation, the degree of polarisation, in Dada’s (2007: 31) view, is perceived as 
so intense that it seriously destabilised and paralysed state institutions. If his 
claim is valid, we can draw the conclusion that the power struggle between the 
political forces of the Left and the Right impacted on the implementation of 
police reforms. Interview responses for this research point to the same 
direction. 
During an interview with Carlos Dada and his colleague José Luis Sanz, Sanz 
confirmed the same development of polarisation. Between 1999 and 2009, the 
ideological polarisation was more and more deliberately used to gain votes and 
secure power. As a result of this process, policies became increasingly 
opportunistic.   
Say that polarisation has changed its roots. After the war 
there was a polarisation that probably had very strong 
ideological roots or roots in political activism. The FMLN 
was always more ideological than ARENA but [...] ARENA 
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is also very ideological [...]. The FMLN from the [Peace] 
Agreements onwards and especially from 1999 onwards 
deeply de-ideologised but the game of political electoral 
polarisation is maintained. In that sense the difference is 
becoming less due to ideas and more due to pushing for 
power. That continues to condition the design ... the 
implementation of policies and the pursuit and 
achievement of strategic agreements and political 
agreements. In addition, the debate to reach those 
agreements is increasingly poor and more cyclical.151 
César Reyes Deming, ARENA Parliamentarian and former colonel at the armed 
forces, accused the FMLN of opposing any security plan ARENA was initiating 
at the Legislative Assembly during this period.  
Laws were created by the Legislative Assembly to try to 
combat crime; there were those [...] policies to combat 
crime: the mano dura, the súper mano dura, the mano 
amiga, the mano extendida... a lot of themes and names. 
[...] Being in the opposition the FMLN maintained a policy 
of permanent ‘no’ which means it never agreed to support 
anything, any public security policy for ARENA, not one.152 
While it is possible that the FMLN opposed ARENA’s mano dura plans because 
it disagreed with the idea of authoritarian security (Chapter Eight), this 
opposition was interpreted by ARENA as categorical rejection of the plans 
because the plans were authored by the political opponent. Zaira Navas, 
Inspector General of the PNC 2009-2011, shared this view of polarised policy 
making although from the reverse side, criticising ARENA to use the issue of 
insecurity to gain votes in the presidential elections of 2003.  
So this issue of security has been handled too 
ideologically. It is important that you are also aware that 
the ideology is so [strong] that the 2003 elections, in which 
won [...] President Flores, were won precisely with the Plan 
                                            
151 Interview with Carlos Dada and José Luis Sanz, 19 February 2013. 
152 Interview with César Reyes Deming, 21 February 2013. 
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Mano Dura and the security issue. Then they go on to say: 
‘We will implement force, we will strengthen the police, we 
will ...’ and this is how they win the elections. […] So they 
use the security issue ideologically, […].153 
This allegation that ARENA instrumentalised insecurity to win the elections was 
also expressed by analysts of the mano dura approach (Aguilar, 2004, Wolf, 
2008, Cruz, 2011) (Section 7.3). The question arises as to whether the impact 
of political polarisation on security policy making also affected the police. The 
quote from the interview cited above continues as follows:   
So they use the security issue ideologically, and that 
already stops one as an official because any initiative or 
any positive thing you can do in terms of security, your 
counterpart is saying, ‘I hope it will not work for them 
because if it works for them, it affects me as a political 
party or [it affects] my ideology.’ So… there is no vision for 
the country and for the state, that's it.154 
In the interviewee’s experience, the political polarisation was indeed paralysing 
the work at the police. Likewise, ARENA Parliamentarian Reyes Deming 
accused the FMLN of politicising the police. 
And the FMLN always, always has kept its ideological 
hands on the National Civilian Police, always. I mean there 
is an ideological policy of the FMLN which is present at the 
National Civilian Police.155 
All interviewees related the polarisation and politicisation of the police to the 
quota which originally constituted the newly founded PNC: FMLN combatants 
and former members of the Policía Nacional (PN) were to be incorporated into 
the PNC, making up 20% each. The additional 60% of police members should 
be newly recruited and trained civilians (Section 7.2). Elsewhere, I argued that 
the idea behind this calculus was to include both conflict parties in the police to 
equal parts, and thus overcome hostility by stimulating cooperation and perhaps 
                                            
153 Interview with Zaira Navas, 21 March 2012. 
154 Interview with Zaira Navas, 21 March 2012. 
155 Interview with César Reyes Deming, 21 February 2013. 
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even reconciliation (Flämig, 2012). The post-war security gap (Section 7.4) 
seemed to require the inclusion of the more experienced PN members, and for 
the FMLN, the inclusion of their members into the state security sector 
represented an important achievement of the Peace Agreement. At the same 
time, the quota was introduced to allow the PNC to strengthen its civilian and 
democratic impetus by constituting the majority of personnel with new recruits. 
The actual composition of the new police of 20% officers from the PN, 20% 
percent former FMLN combatants and 60% civilians was difficult to verify. The 
insertion of ex-combatants was initially only envisaged for the transition period 
until late 1994. After that time, only civilians were accepted for training and 
formation at the ANSP (National Academy for Public Security)  (Costa, 1998: 
196). During most of the transition period, neither ONUSAL nor the ANSP had 
access to membership lists of the conflict parties, and both the FMLN and the 
ARENA government declared former combatants as civilians, trying to increase 
their share of power at the PNC (Costa, 1998: 202-203). Costa (pp. 204-208) 
described how the government under President Cristiani repeatedly tried to 
insert military officers into the PNC, bypassing the ANSP’s process of 
scrutinising all police personnel. This strategy culminated with the transfer of two 
complete units of the old Policía Nacional to the PNC. Likewise, there is 
evidence that the FMLN tried to insert their people as civilians. 
I am of the second class, before me there was just one 
class. [...] I went with really no vision of... with my 
colleagues, yes, I saw that they got into it but with a strong 
tendency to either one side or the other. And there were 
many more people left-leaning, and anyone would have to 
admit that. For example, I had 80 colleagues, perhaps 20 
could have entered for the direct quota but the remaining 
60 were supporters of the Frente, this cannot be denied. 
And many of my colleagues, before entering the police, 
were prepared at the National University by people from 
the Frente.156 
An FMLN security expert stated: 
                                            
156 Interview with police official R55, 07 March 2013. 
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And then, the other 60% were civilians. What we did was 
to prompt the recruitment of 60% of civilians and put as 
many as we could to the police. The case of [Person X], 
[Person X] was not from the quota.157 
This interviewee claimed that there was a difference between the two parties 
since the government aimed to maintain the military’s influence at the upper 
levels. 
Those quotas were people coming from the armed forces, 
people coming from the Frente, coming from the civil war. 
Unfortunately the police came into being when we had 
right-wing governments in the country [...]. Obviously they 
distrusted people coming from left. So the leaders who 
started to command the National Civilian Police are the 
officers coming from the army. They brought a vision 
completely different from a serving police or a police close 
to the population. They came from a doctrine of 
repression, and this was being implemented because they 
[were] the leaders we had here at the police. So all 
generations grew under this concept, even though it was a 
new police, it was a police that was led ... that was coming 
from ancient structures. So [...] people were already 
educated with a repressive touch and all of us who were 
here learned to work from a repressive point of view, not 
from a preventive point of view [...]. Those who started to 
direct the police from the beginning were people who 
brought along repressive structures, they did not change 
the police. The police was transformed again into a civil 
body but with a more or less repressive doctrine.158 
Call (2003: 838-839) shared this view, in so far that he found that leadership 
positions were in their majority held by military officers. He concluded that 
despite the military occupying many top commands of the PNC the quota was 
                                            
157 Interview with FMLN security expert R58, 14 March 2013. 
158 Interview with police official R55, 07 March 2013.  
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more helpful in preventing rather than creating partisanship. Yet, the interview 
response above emphasised the difficulties arising from the fact that ex-
combatants were included in the PNC. The interviewee argued that the police 
retained a repressive character due to the military background of its leadership; 
and new generations of police officers were incorporated into the repressive 
work.159 Costa (1998: 211-212) maintained that due to the military claiming the 
strategic leadership at the PNC, not only the FMLN but also civilian personnel 
were marginalised. He concluded that the designation of top PNC positions was 
mainly based on political considerations.  
If these statements apply and the government managed to place military officers 
at the top levels of the PNC, it poses the question of how this was achieved. The 
Peace Agreement stated that the government’s share of police members should 
be derived from the Policía Nacional alone. However, the PN was under the 
command of the armed forces, and all superior positions were led by military 
officers (Costa, 1998: 27). In addition, the transfer of military officers to the PNC 
was managed by a strategic move by President Cristiani. In 1994 he signed a 
decree which changed the status of 25 army officers to reservists and thus 
allowed them to stay at the PNC.160 According to Silva’s recently published work 
about corruption at the PNC, it was one tanda (cohort) of 25 militaries which was 
taking over top positions at the PNC and kept them for over 20 years (Silva 
Ávalos, 2014: 6-7).161 As discussed in Section 5.3, it was usually one military 
tanda who ruled the country between 1948 and 1984. Since the tanda system 
created a high degree of cohesion among the officers who belong to one tanda, 
this strong network allowed them to keep their leadership positions over a long 
period of time. If Silva was correct about an entire military tanda entering the 
police and occupying key positions, this did at least partially explain why even 
after 20 years, a significant part of the PNC leadership were still those army 
officers which had entered the PNC in 1994. Being asked about whether 
younger and professionally trained officers would slowly replace the ‘old’ 
leadership, this police official maintained: 
                                            
159 Ibid. 
160 Hence, in interviews, in the public debate, and in the literature it was and is commonplace to speak of 
‘the military’ when relating to the Government’s quota at the PNC. This use of language serves as an 
example which demonstrates the military influence on the PNC. See Cristiani and Corado Figueroa 
(1994).  
161 For the names of the officers see Footnote Six in Silva Ávalos (2014). 
 209 
 
No. Because they won't allow you. [...] You have heard of 
the military tandona [large cohort, SHF] during war time 
which were militaries that moved up to the field of military 
leadership and that lasted longer than other leadership 
positions and that maintained their power and therefore 
they called them the tandona. So now we're having a 
similar tandona at the police, and for a longer time 
because everyone who entered as deputy commissioners 
are now commissioners and do not want to leave the 
police.162 
The police official confirmed that the tanda system of the military was applied to 
the police. For consecutive ARENA governments, it was easy to maintain links 
to the military officers at the PNC and thus keep exerting influence on the 
course of the police. Below we will see that Cristiani’s decree was not the only 
case of militaries taking over positions at the PNC which according to the Peace 
Agreement ought to be held by civilians. We will see that most militaries even 
persisted during the change of government and the successive police reforms.  
The close links between ARENA and the military, especially between the party 
and those officers at the PNC with military background are important for 
understanding the power struggle which shaped the development of the police. 
9.3.3.2 2009-2014: Polarisation versus police professionalism 
The following paragraphs demonstrate that the political polarisation which 
became manifest at the PNC after the war continued under FMLN rule. The 
resignation of the Inspector General is used as an example for showing how 
police professionalisation efforts were influenced by political power struggles. 
 When the FMLN came to power, it did not hesitate to replace key positions with 
officers who were either ex-guerilleros or associated with the FMLN’s social 
base.  
R57: [W]hen the Frente wins the elections in 2009 and it 
takes over the police leadership [...], some had been in key 
positions but it was not the same as performing in the field 
                                            
162 Interview with police official R57, 13 March 2013. For the role of the military tandona see Section 
5.3. 
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of strategic management of the institution [...]. So it was 
obvious to me that they used (and keep using) ideological 
bias rather than measuring the professional skills of those 
of us who are already there. So they extended the gap of 
the quotas even more. […] 
SHF: That was the mistake? 
R57: That is the mistake and it keeps being the mistake 
[…] to the extent that they name Mr Ascencio […] as 
director of the police even though others were more 
capable. […] Mr Ascencio's advisers still belonged to the 
quota of the Frente; they fought in the war in the different 
sections of the Frente. For example, some names ... I'll 
keep them to myself but a colleague who belonged to the 
PRTC, a colleague who belonged to the National 
Resistance, like this... And several militaries were not 
allowed or not involved in the leadership structure. On the 
contrary, they started vicious disciplinary processes about 
the militaries being part of criminal structures and of drug 
trafficking without investigation or intelligence work which 
would verify that these people truly belong to such 
structures.163 
As Director of the police, Funes named Carlos Ascencio, who was associated 
with the FMLN (La Página, 2009). Opinions about Ascencio’s leadership 
qualities varied in so far as not all officers were as sceptical as the interviewee 
cited above. However, importantly the cited police officer was part of the FMLN 
quota and held a leadership position at the PNC, yet he accused the FMLN of 
replacing personnel disregarding their suitability. In his experience professional 
policing was hampered by the FMLN’s confronting attitude. For the FMLN 
government under Mauricio Funes it appeared necessary to replace top 
command positions at the PNC with their trusted people in order to implement 
the reforms envisaged in the PEI. This implied the same politicised decision 
making that ARENA used to adhere to. It was contradictory aiming to overcome 
                                            
163 Interview with police official R57, 13 March 2013. 
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obstacles of professionalism such as the politicisation of the PNC by the very 
same means. On the other hand, as argued previously, the FMLN did have a 
serious interest in improving citizen security and in professionalising the police. 
To that end, for some posts within the police and the broader security sector a 
number of experts were recruited who had studied in detail and criticised the 
security sector for a long time. For instance, Jaime Martínez Ventura became 
director of the ANSP; Luisa Arévalo became head of the study section at the 
ANSP; and Edgardo Amaya was designated security adviser at the MJSP. All 
three of them had worked at FESPAD in previous years and had published 
critical reports about the security and justice system.164 Zaira Navas, the 
designated Inspector General, was a human rights lawyer with long-standing 
professional experience at the PDDH and other human rights organisations. 
While there may be a difference between noticing the shortcomings of the sector 
from an external perspective and being confronted by the practical challenges to 
overcome these shortcomings, these and other experts had serious ambitions in 
advancing security provision. As is shown below, ARENA reacted to their 
designation by strongly opposing the marginalisation of police officers with 
proximity to ARENA. It accused the FMLN of politicised motives, disregarding 
their own contribution to a politicised police.   
The case of the prosecution of the police officers with military background 
mentioned in the citation above clearly demonstrated that the political 
polarisation continued to affect the police under the Funes administration. 
According to the PEI, as part of the effort to increase internal accountability at 
the PNC the position of the Inspector General (IG) ought to be strengthened. 
The IG started work in 1994 as the PNC’s direct oversight body (Section 7.4.1). 
The assessment report concluded that accountability via the IG and other 
disciplinary mechanisms was working to a certain degree but that some sections 
of the PNC evaded control (Checchi and Company Consulting, 2009: 94). As 
noted in Section 7.4.1, other analysts, including Arévalo (2004), were even more 
critical of the IG’s role. A WOLA report from 2009 pointed to the major problem 
of oversight, stating that the PNC continued to be one of the state agencies 
most frequently denounced for human rights violations (Beltrán, 2009: 21). Yet, 
                                            
164 FESPAD is a national NGO focussing on legal advocacy. For relevant publications before 2009 see, 
for instance, Martínez Ventura (2003), Amaya(2006), Arévalo (2004). 
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the bulk of IG-initiated investigations comprised minor infractions, paying little 
attention to human rights violations (Section 7.4.1). Another concern the report 
stated with regard to the IG was the focus of investigations on lower ranks 
(Beltrán, 2009: 21). The PEI envisaged structural and managerial changes as 
well as a resource upgrade to improve on the IG’s performance. However, the 
IG’s activities gained significant momentum when Zaira Navas became 
Inspector General in 2009. She placed emphasis on those precise failures of 
previous years. By opening investigations against high ranking officers she did 
not fear to touch on cases of human rights violations, corruption, and the 
involvement of officers in criminal networks. Thus, she created considerable 
turmoil.  
The amount of opened cases, the type of investigations (disciplinary or criminal), 
and the responsible investigative body (IG, disciplinary unit at the PNC, or State 
Attorney’s Office) are difficult to reconstruct since not all investigations were 
made public and proceedings were opened, dismissed, and re-opened due to 
the strong resistance some of these cases had caused. The most prominent 
case was that of Ricardo Menesses, ex-director of the PNC (2003-2005) and 
one of the 25 military officers transferred into the PNC by Cristiani’s decree.165 
On 20 July 2009, the IG opened investigations for alleged links between 
Menesses and José Natividad Luna Pereira (‘Chepe Luna’) (La Prensa Gráfica, 
2009b). At the time of Menesses serving as police director, Chepe Luna was 
one of the most wanted Salvadoran human and drug traffickers. Yet, he 
managed to escape detention four times. On 20 September 2009 investigations 
were also opened for Menesses’ ties with Carlos Alberto Rivas Barahona 
(‘Chino tres colas’), one of the leaders of the Barrio 18 gang (ibid.). In November 
and December 2009, the newspapers La Prensa Gráfica (2009a) and El Faro 
(Valencia and Arauz, 2009) named other high ranking police officers under 
investigation, all of them belonging to the tanda of the 25 militaries.166 According 
to the article in El Faro, the IG had initiated investigations against 14 high rank 
officers (commissioners and deputy commissioners) between June and October 
2009 and had planned on more investigations.  
                                            
165 Menesses did not take over a leadership position at the PNC immediately; he graduated from the 
ANSP and rose through the ranks of the PNC (Silva Ávalos, 2014: 6). 
166 Among them Pedro González and Douglas Omar García Funes (both ex deputy directors of the PNC), 
and Commissioner Godofredo Miranda. 
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As early as in September 2009, a group of Parliamentarians under the direction 
of Coronel René Deming (ARENA), Ernesto Angulo (ARENA), and Coronel José 
Antonio Armendáriz (PCN) formed a commission to investigate the ‘possible 
abuse of the Inspectorate General of the PNC against members of that 
institution’ (Asamblea Legislativa, 2011). All three leading parliamentarians were 
members of the armed forces and/or members of ARENA or the right-wing PCN. 
No FMLN member was among the Commission which raised doubts about the 
impartiality of the Commission. The Commission accused the IG of biased 
investigations. Angulo stated:    
I was the president of the commission. Colonel Armendáriz 
of the PCN was the secretary, and we met with each and 
every one of the people who were being investigated, with 
their lawyers, and we had concluded that there was a 
political bias against a certain field of the police, which was 
the armed forces, the ones coming from the armed 
forces.167 
SHF: But what had happened? Why did the commission 
exist?  
EA: Because of what I say. We started to receive 
complaints from people who were being investigated, and 
they told us: "Look, there is no reason to investigate me” 
[…].168 
The close ties between the military officers at the PNC and the conservative 
parliamentarians became visible with Angulo’s response. According to Deming, 
the only aim of the IG investigations against the military officers was to remove 
them from their positions and place people with affinity to the FMLN. 
[T]he report which was released by the commission that 
inquired Inspector Zaira Navas, [comprised] the cases of 
each police officers, all of which had been at the armed 
forces, all were from the quota of the armed forces. She 
investigated only these, she arrested... she stopped only 
                                            
167 Interview with Ernesto Angulo, 19 February 2013. 
168 Interview with Ernesto Angulo, 19 February 2013. 
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these from their professional development. [...] I mean that 
[the investigation of the Inspector] was a political process 
that the FMLN had opened with these people. Why? So 
that their people, their share could take positions at the 
executive levels.169 
Other voices of the political Right supported the Commission’s view of biased 
investigations, albeit in a less ferocious tone. 
[F]or me it is important to strengthen internal investigations 
[...] but what happened there was a political persecution. 
Basically there was a persecution against those police 
officers who came from the former ranks of the armed 
forces. If we look at the cases one by one, the whole focus 
was on purging the police from former cadres of the armed 
forces, without making a difference. And some were 
absurdly ridiculous, I mean, there was a charge against an 
ex-director […], Menesses. Menesses, in my opinion, 
committed a series of mistakes and Menesses was not a 
good manager of the police, but that does not mean he 
was a criminal. [...] But they invented that he did… and so 
it came to the Legislative Assembly, because there was 
some political bias,[…].170 
Members from the business think tank FUSADES stated: 
[I]n 2010 there was a questioning of the inspector of the 
police […] because it was assumed that she was 
prosecuting cases with bias, only against those who were 
soldiers and not against those who had belonged to the 
guerrillas. Such problems still have some impact […].171 
In May 2011, the Supreme Court declared the Commission as unconstitutional 
on the ground that the matter was not of national interest (Chávez et al., 2011). 
However, the Commission managed to hamper the investigations and thus to 
                                            
169 Interview with César Reyes Deming, 21 February 2013.  
170 Interview with Rodrigo Ávila, 25 February 2013. 
171 Interview with Oscar Alfredo Pineda and René Abrego Labbé (Fusades), 15 February 2013. 
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protect the officers in question by exerting pressure and intimidating staff at the 
IG, as Navas explained:  
They made all that show, they knew that legally they could 
do nothing against me, but they started to call the 
Legislative Assembly, to request records, to intimidate... 
One thing was that I was the head of the institution, I was 
clear that they could do nothing, but those who were 
leading the investigations, the people that worked were 
terrified. And many people said to me: "If they are doing 
that to you, what are they going to do to us when you leave 
here?" So that's where you see that there was 
protection.172 
Deming explained how the inquiry continued: 
SHF: What happened after [talking to Navas and 
publishing the report]? 
CRD: Well, she backed down, a few days later she 
resigned. And she left, a few days later Zaira Navas left, 
making a lot of excuses, but she retired from office. 
SHF: But didn’t the Supreme Court also declare the 
commission unconstitutional? 
CRD: It was declared unconstitutional, but we did the 
investigation, and the result was there. When we proposed 
our work and when it was done, only then it was declared 
unconstitutional, due to the pressure from the FMLN.173 
In contrast to Deming’s statement, Navas did not resign until eight months after 
the Commission was declared unconstitutional. She resigned in a different 
context when most of the PNC leadership was replaced (Section 9.4). However, 
Deming’s statements made clear he considered the Commission a success. In 
the long term, he was right that most investigated officers returned to leading 
posts at the PNC, and their suspected links to organised crime were no longer 
                                            
172 Interview with Zaira Navas, 21 March 2012. 
173 Interview with César Reyes Deming, 21 February 2013. 
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under investigation.174 Similar to Navas’ resignation, this was not a direct 
consequence of the Commission’s intervention, but the Commission is part of 
the pattern of contestation. As such, both parties contributed to the polarisation. 
The polarisation was politically nurtured and used opportunistically. In other 
words, it was a source of political power. In the case presented above, the 
military officers under investigation drew on their ties with right-wing 
Parliamentarians to stave off threats to their positions. All leading members of 
the Commission were part of the opposition resisting the work of Navas who 
was affiliated with the FMLN. That is, political power was used to defer the 
consequences of the FMLN-induced police reforms. Likewise, the FMLN filled 
top positions at the PNC with officers from their ranks, raising doubts about 
whether the decisive criteria was party affiliation or job suitability. In this regard, 
it did not act upon the goal to professionalise the PNC.  
 
9.3.4 Conclusion 
As stated initially, a long-term policy was developed which ought to advance 
with the professionalisation of the PNC. This policy programme, captured in the 
PEI and other documents, was not designed in an ad hoc manner. However, 
the implementation of the policy was hampered by several decisions of the 
Funes administration regarding the position of the Security Minister, 
encompassing the removal of Manuel Melgar, his replacement with former 
defence minister David Munguía Payés, and the subsequent replacement of the 
police director and other leaders of the security sector. This decision-making 
process was contested by actors like the political opposition, business elites, 
and the US and meets most characteristics of ad hoc decision-making as 
outlined in Section 3.3. This ad hoc-ism illustrates how the policy process was 
altered, as outlined in the subsequent paragraphs. 
Awareness of the policy problem of insufficient police professionalism was high 
among those who had designed the reform plans. However, during the term of 
the Funes government other policy problems, especially the economic crisis, 
emerged and demanded immediate policy decisions. That is, decisions to solve 
                                            
174 While Menesses had to leave the PNC, Douglas Omar García Funes and Pedro González became 
director and assistant director of the newly created Antigang Unit and Godofredo Miranda remained 
Commissioner. See Garrett (2012), FESPAD (2014), and Membreño (2011). 
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an apparently unrelated problem had an impact on the problem of lacking police 
professionalism. Drawing on the previous discussion about the Salvadoran 
economic order, it is argued that the economic order – a hierarchical market 
economy highly dependent on foreign exchange – was vulnerable to an external 
shock, the international financial and economic crisis in 2008/2009. The crisis 
did not lead to an outburst of violence (the worsening of the economic situation 
at the micro level may have been conducive for more violence, but this 
connection would require more substantial evidence). However, it shifted 
priorities of the FMLN government away from the PJSC and the PEI. This 
implies that police reforms were neglected to some extent which raises the 
question whether decisions in this regard could also be described as negative 
decisions.175 However, there is no proof that a deliberate decision was made to 
abandon the reform plans and to retain the status quo of a semi-professional 
police (which is a significant aspect of negative decision-making). The neglect 
was rather a consequence of other decisions which interfered with and altered 
the course of the reforms. Thus, the process is best described as ad hoc 
decision making. 
Resistance against the policy was high. Even though Melgar did not promote 
the PJSC as vigorously as FMLN security experts had hoped, he was the 
central figure of the implementation of the security policy. However, the US 
used its economic power when it came to the signing of the Partnership for 
Growth, putting pressure on the Salvadoran government to remove Melgar. 
Munguía Payés, coming from the influential circle of Funes’ friends, represented 
a replacement which satisfied both the US government and Amigos de 
Mauricio. Given Miguel Menéndez’ prominent role in private security, it is 
unlikely that Amigos de Mauricio had an interest in promoting the FMLN’s plans 
for police reform. In addition, the traditional business elite refused to support the 
FMLN’s security policy. These actors had enough power to outweigh the FMLN 
security reform plans in favour of their own interests. As for the political 
polarisation of the police, the FMLN was not able to advance with their reforms 
                                            
175 Negative decision making describes the deliberate choice to do nothing about a public problem and to 
retain the status quo, even though the problem is on the political agenda and a policy might have been 
formulated. Non-decisions mean that problems are not put on the political agenda and the status quo is 
retained. Rational decision making means solving public problems by choosing the best of all alternative 
strategies after attributing costs and benefits to each alternative. Incrementalism refers to decision making 
which is based on a step-by-step mode and is sometimes describes as ‘muddling through’. See Section 
3.3. 
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and diminish the polarisation. To the contrary, both opposing parties used the 
polarisation for political power struggles which thwarted professionalization 
efforts. Again, it could be questioned whether resistance against the policy 
really implies an ad hoc decision-making mode since resistance is most likely to 
be expected in any policy process and could, for instance, also point to an 
incremental decision-making style. However, the difference between an 
incremental and an ad hoc mode lies in the role ascribed to political and social 
change. Incrementalism is oriented toward achieving change through small, 
continuous steps. Ad hoc-ism often leads to inertia, despite the intention for 
change (see Section 3.3). This difference is best exemplified in the effects of 
decision-making which follows below.  
The designation of General Munguía Payés as Minister and of General Salinas 
as Police Director was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in May 
2013 on the ground that the constitution stipulated the separation of national 
defence and public security (Chavarría, 2013). The removal of the Generals 
only one year and a half after their designation underscored the temporary 
character of the decisions.  
The most central long-term decision outlined in the original policy was to re-
establish a professional, civil, and democratic force willing to serve its citizens. 
The above discussed decisions taken during the term were all short-term 
decisions ignoring this long-term goal. The effects of this kind of decision 
making on police reform efforts are analysed in detail in the next section.  
 
9.4 Effects of elite power struggles on policing 
Demonstrating the relevance of security practices for security institution-
building, this section discusses the effects of contested decision-making on the 
advancement of the PNC towards a professional force. It is argued that the 
power struggle between security decision-makers and other state and non-state 
actors, which was illustrated in the ad hoc decision-making process, 
undermined the development of stable democratic security institutions. Thus, 
elite power struggles impeded the formation of a state which is capable of 
controlling violence. The conceptual framework introduced two different 
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characteristics regarding the effects of ad hoc decision making which guide the 
analysis (Section 3.3): 1. Comprehensive and/or long-term strategic decisions 
are not or insufficiently implemented because decisions are either ignored or 
replaced or reversed by short-term decisions which are often unrelated to the 
long-term strategy. 2. Public problems remain unsolved because ad hoc 
decisions do not result in substantial change.  
The change of General Munguía Payés from the Ministry of Defence to the 
Ministry for Justice and Public Security on 22 November 2011 marked a turning 
point of the security policy of the Funes administration.176 By many critics this 
has been characterised as re-militarisation due to the military background of 
Munguía Payés and government decisions which ascribed the armed forces a 
bigger function in public security (FESPAD, 2014: 20, Aguilar, 2014: 96). The 
role of the military in public security will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 
Ten. Fact is that a significant part of the leadership of security organisations 
was replaced following Munguía Payés’ appointment. Besides the replacement 
of the head of the state intelligence service OIE and the Vice Minister for Justice 
and Public Security, most of the replacements concerned the police. General 
Francisco Salinas, the former Vice Minister of Defence and also a military, 
became the new director of the PNC. Likewise, the head of the centre for police 
intelligence (CIP) was replaced, and several heads of divisions within the police 
had to leave, resigned or changed to a different position. Among them were the 
heads of the divisions for public security and investigation, the Inspector 
General Zaira Navas as well as several regional police directors (Aguilar, 2014: 
101-109, Membreño et al., 2012). 
For historian Guidos Véjar these changes of staff equalled a failure of the 
FMLN’s preventive security approach:   
RGV: What has happened in recent months? [...] The 
Minister who came with the prevention policies is out; the 
Police Director that came with that idea is out. The man of 
the OIE, of the intelligence, who is also part of this line of 
                                            
176 This was not the first turning point of the policy. Previous central events and decisions were the 
deployment of the armed forces to the prisons and the anti-gang law. These are analysed in Chapter 10.  
 220 
 
prevention, is out. The woman who was at the National 
Civil Police, who was the... 
SHF: The Inspector… 
RGV: The Inspector General is out. And she was from the 
line of prevention, too. The National Council of Security 
disappeared, can you imagine. It disappeared.177 
Zaira Navas left due to the future militaristic orientation of the PNC which, in her 
opinion, was implied in the appointment of Munguía Payés and Salinas and 
which thwarted the FMLN’s original security policy. 
In my point of view, the appointment of [the generals] is 
already unconstitutional. But in addition, their working 
method is what we are already witnessing: A militaristic 
approach - in addition to not knowing the essence of the 
approach of democratic security, citizen security, turning 
away from the issue of prevention and turning towards the 
repression of crime again. We are seeing operations, […] 
mass arrests, and so on. That is contrary to the policy we 
build, what this government offered in the political 
campaign; and one cannot be a part of something one 
disagrees with.178 
Most of the police officials who had left the PNC during this phase were hugely 
disappointed because they have had high expectations in the FMLN 
government.179 They had worked at a polarised, politicised and often inefficient 
organisation for many years. In this context, the police reform plans of 2009 had 
raised expectations about the professionalisation of the PNC which seemed 
voided with the appointment of the generals. However, those interviewees close 
to the FMLN who remained at the PNC did not agree on whether the changes 
implied a reversion of the reform plans. 
                                            
177 Interview with Rafael Guidos Véjar, 23 March 2012. 
178 Interview with Zaira Navas, 21 March 2012. 
179 Research diary, 21 February 2012. 
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In the opportunities I've had due to my own function, in the 
working meeting I had with the new police director, I'd say 
that even being a military, he is really working to sustain 
the changes at the PNC.180 
Another police official stated: 
Frankly, the strongest support I have felt in this process [of 
reforms] is today with the current director, [...] I have seen 
very strong and very determined steps towards the 
implementation of community policing. If you ask me 
where I felt the greatest power for the implementation, it's 
with the current director, he is the most... Commissioner 
Ascencio, yes, I cannot say he did nothing, yes, but he 
lacked that power that is working today.181 
The following excerpt is from an interview with Howard Augusto Cotto, former 
assistant director of investigations who had changed to be assistant director of 
public security shortly before the interview.   
SHF: What are the emphases, what is the approach of 
your successor in terms of… is he going to continue the 
same work or is he going to do things differently? 
HC: Well that I don’t know very well. I guess to some 
extent yes. Although I think he also has the vision that 
previously existed, of operating the street.182 
It is reasonable to assume that those who had left the organisation would speak 
more frankly about the problematic sides of the changes compared to those who 
remained at the PNC and were still under observation of their superiors.183 
Likewise, those who had left may have had more frustrating experiences than 
those who managed to remain at the police. With Munguía Payés and Salinas in 
place, police employees became more reluctant talking to outsiders, not least 
because police officers were instructed not to give interviews to journalists 
                                            
180 Interview with police official R27, 12 April 2012. 
181 Interview with police official R55, 07 March 2013. 
182 Interview with Howard Augusto Cotto, 15 March 2012. 
183 See Section 3.4 on communication in high context cultures like El Salvador.  
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without permission of the director’s assistant.184 Although researchers were not 
explicitly included, this order did not only complicate access to interview 
partners, but interviewees were also cautious about criticising the new 
leadership. The direction of Salinas’ instruction was clear, instead of transparent 
communication with the citizens, as envisaged in the PEI, communication 
became restricted. Cotto’s statement cited above is interpreted as an example 
of cautious criticism. The successor mentioned in the conversation was Héctor 
Mendoza who had previously been accused for his connections with criminal 
networks, yet he was the interviewee’s replacement for a top position at the 
PNC. Cotto mentioned the police’ ‘previous vision of operating the street’, 
relating to zero-tolerance policing under previous governments. His response 
implied that the successor was part of the old, corruptive leadership that was 
now staffing key positions again. The return of the old leadership was the main 
concern expressed in a number of conversations with persons with inside 
knowledge on the police (besides the interviews already mentioned here). 
These conversations took place only a few weeks after the replacements, and 
the persons in question preferred to remain anonymous, fearing for becoming or 
having become a target of prosecution and being intimidated by personal and 
physical threats.185 The concern over the return of a corruptive leadership was 
also the tenor of Silva’s book on corruption at the PNC (Silva Ávalos, 2015). 
However, the first two statements cited above show a much more positive 
evaluation of the new leadership. Hence, from the statements and conversations 
alone it is difficult to evaluate the progression or reversion of reform plans. A 
more detailed analysis of the implementation of the reform plans is necessary.    
During interviews I asked police officers about the implementation of the PEI 
reform plans and the effects of the changes of staff on the progress of reforms. 
According to the reform plans outlined in Section 9.2, the main areas where 
professionalisation was sought were: internal accountability, career structures, 
investigative capacities, the organisational structure, and community policing.  
Progress and setbacks in increasing internal accountability were demonstrated 
in Section 9.3.3 with the rise and fall of the police Inspector General. Together 
with Zaira Navas, a number of employees left the IG after the replacement of 
                                            
184 Research diary, 18 April 2012; Silva Ávalos (2015: 259). 
185 Research diary 22 February 2012; 02 March 2012; 12 March 2012. 
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police director Carlos Ascencio by General Salinas. Before the new inspector 
was designated, I interviewed an employee of the IG. The interviewee 
characterised the relationship between the IG and the new director as polite but 
distanced. It was felt that the IG was marginalised again in terms of attention, as 
well as financial and human resources.186 The new Inspector General took 
office in July 2012 and closed all cases of those police officers under 
investigation for links to drug trafficking (Garrett, 2012). He resigned after just 
one year due to lack of support from the Ministry and police director (Marroquín, 
2013b). Efforts to strengthen the IG as envisaged in the PEI thus came to an 
end. 
Reforms regarding the structure of the police professional career aimed at 
formalising the promotion system and adapting training and formation 
programmes to the specific needs of police officials (Policía Nacional Civil/ 
Dirección General, 2010: 28). The assessment report had revealed 
inconsistencies between the position of many officials and their degree, 
formation, experience, or age (Checchi and Company Consulting, 2009: 90). 
Promotion was a long known problem due to the politicisation of the PNC 
described in Section 9.3.3. With the tanda-like system of PNC leadership merit-
based promotion was underdeveloped, but during Funes’ term, the Salvadoran 
Parliament approved of decrees which would allow the much delayed promotion 
of officers at various levels. Three interviewees explained the problems and 
according changes: 
There are three commissioners who are in that situation... 
it is time for them to retire and yet there they are, hired at 
the same positions with the same issues, not allowing the 
ones below them to move up.187 
 
[W]e need to strengthen [the police] because it is an ill-
equipped, poorly paid police, promotion does not work... 
For example, at first, only 812 members of the National 
                                            
186 Interview with IG employee, 18 April 2012. 
187 Interview with police official R57, 13 March 2013. 
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Civilian Police graduated from corporal or sergeant and 
many of them had to wait 18 years for this to happen.188 
 
The head of police said it was a priority to grant 
promotions at the basic level, because in 17 years there 
were never any promotions. So last year, for the first time, 
over 850 members were promoted from the basic level. 
Agents moved up to being corporals and corporals to 
being sergeants. Currently there is a process ... and there 
were many promotions from deputy inspectors to 
inspectors, I mean, that concerns the executive level [...]. 
What for? So that the police can have the generational 
handover that it needs.189 
The progress of these efforts to improve police promotion under the Generals 
Salinas and Munguía Payés is difficult to prove. One police official stated that 
Salinas promised to be supportive of the process of further professionalisation 
of police promotion. Yet, it is not clear to what extent he kept that promise. For 
his part Munguía Payés was quick in replacing the PNC leadership with persons 
loyal towards him, disregarding their merits. In an interview with researchers 
from IUDOP he openly admitted preferring a patronage system over a merit-
based system.  
Why the changes? Well, changes are normal. When a 
person assumes a new responsibility, in an office or in a 
public office, you want to work with people in whom one 
has a little more confidence, who is not only a capable 
person, but in whom one has a little more confidence. And 
the problem of the arrival of the soldiers [...] causes some 
tensions and anxieties within the police, because we are 
connected a lot with mano dura, with iron discipline, 
coercion, including with authoritarianism. So I think some 
police officers thought we were coming [to do things] this 
                                            
188 Interview with Manuel Melgar, 26 March 2012. 
189 Interview with Zaira Navas, 21 March 2012. 
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way. And as already expressed, some, their disagreement 
with the arrival of us... we were not going to work, 
certainly, in a harmonious and coordinated manner. So it 
was best to make some changes. So we decided to make 
some changes within the police itself. And that was the 
reason for the changes.190 
A number of posts were filled with people who belonged to the old leadership 
and/or had been under investigation for criminal and disciplinary offenses. Thus, 
while in the early period of the legislative term 2009-2014 some efforts were 
made to improve the structure of the police professional career, the 
replacements of staff that Munguía Payés was responsible for, reversed much 
of these efforts for professionalisation.   
Strengthening the investigative capacities of the PNC was essential for the 
government’s aim to gain control on crime (represión del delito, see Table 2). 
Most investigative tasks were bundled in the Division of Investigation 
(Subdirección de Investigaciones), apart from some specialised units. Chief 
investigator Howard Augusto Cotto (2009-2011) was responsible for 
implementing the reforms in this area as outlined in the PEI (increase staff and 
equipment, provide more expertise through better training, strengthen regional 
and local units by decentralising investigative capacities, improve cooperation 
between the PNC and FGR) (Policía Nacional Civil/ Dirección General, 2010). 
He shared his view about the PNC’s problems with investigations and the steps 
taken to professionalise procedures and personnel.  
In the division of investigations we began a process of 
creating all those procedures [to] establish an 
organizational model and forms of action for investigation 
which had never been done. I think one of the biggest 
weaknesses the police always had is the day to day work 
... every day work is the most important. And rarely a 
measure was presented or deployed with the strategic 
vision to build and strengthen police structures. So one of 
my biggest efforts was focused on that, on trying to build a 
                                            
190 David Munguía Payés, cited after Aguilar (2014: 104). 
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model of police investigation that had not existed [before]. 
From my point of view and the point of view of many other 
officers, this will result not only in creating a more coherent 
organizational structure but also to in dealing with the 
matter of professional development of the police, police 
training, the chances of developing a career in criminal 
investigations, establish operating parameters etc. 191 
Others related to Cotto as having been proactive in advancing with the reform 
plans. Melgar mentioned the increase of numbers of qualified investigators.192 
Security adviser Fernández explained:  
SHF: There were some changes at the police, right, in the 
field of investigation? 
ÓF: Yes, brief ones. Brief ones and unfortunately like 
everything in this country, they were not continued. This 
guy Cotto tried to do something, right, he did a reform, and 
they helped him, but then they removed him and this other 
guy comes who has a mentality of... he couldn't care less. 
So that's the story of this poor police, the one who comes, 
does what he wants.193 
Cotto’s objective was to implement the reform in a way that it would last beyond 
politically motivated changes such as the replacements in early 2012. That is, 
he aimed at building a resilient, permanent institution not just by adapting the 
organisational structure to the strategic objectives of the division (see quotation 
above), but by generating coherence between the investigators’ performance 
and legal stipulations. 
And look what was the most interesting thing of everything 
that I tell you, of everything we did: For the first time in the 
history of the police, besides building those ideas and 
realising those actions, we generated the conditions for 
legal actions, for it to work well, for not being something 
                                            
191 Interview with Howard Augusto Cotto, 15 March 2012. 
192 Interview with Manuel Melgar, 26 March 2012. 
193 Interview with Óscar Fernández, 13 February 2013. 
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done but for it being legal, for the real organisation of the 
investigation being in accordance with the law.194 
However, Cotto was replaced only two years after taking the position. General 
Salinas transferred him to a different unit and put Héctor Mendoza in his 
position in January 2012. As mentioned earlier, Mendoza was accused of being 
corrupted by members of the Texis Cartel during his time as head of 
investigations and police chief in the western region of El Salvador (Silva 
Ávalos, 2013). Handing him the main responsibility for police investigations in 
the country implied a change of direction for professionalisation efforts in this 
field. Mendoza’s promotion as chief investigator reversed the Inspector 
General’s efforts to purge the police and fuelled further penetration of the PNC 
with persons linked to organised crime. Besides the damages caused by 
Mendoza’s background, the bigger problem of a low degree of 
institutionalisation of police work (which Cotto and others had tried to overcome) 
was reinstalled. The staff changes caused a considerable disruption of police 
work, as stated by Óscar Fernández in the interview cited above.  
As determined in the assessment report by Checchi and several other analyses, 
a high degree of centralisation had marked the organisational structure of the 
PNC (Checchi and Company Consulting, 2009, Beltrán, 2009: 30-32). This was 
especially the case in the area of investigations. A number of highly specialised 
units like the Elite Anti Organised Crime Division (DECO) and the Antinarcotics 
Division (DAN) (usually based in or directed from the capital San Salvador) 
were well equipped and trained to fight crime related to their speciific field with 
some degree of success. However, as mentioned before, the performance of 
investigators of common crime was often poor, not least because local 
investigative units were underdeveloped or not existent and responsibilities 
were not clear, as Cotto and a security expert explained: 
[T]he organisational model of criminal investigation gave 
priority to the central investigative units and not to 
investigation in the territory. [...] So that was our effort to 
the extent that we decided to create 83 new investigative 
                                            
194 Interview with Howard Augusto Cotto, 15 March 2012. 
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sections in sub delegations, places where there had never 
been established any investigative units.195 
 
The problem some of the assessments found in the area of 
criminal investigation was that they had created too many 
specialised areas: homicide, kidnappings, this and that and 
I don't know what, and that they were centralised in San 
Salvador. The policing model that the now former police 
director tried to push was to concentrate the specialised 
units and put them in one common area [...]. That does not 
mean that people lose their specialisation but it means to 
reduce some of the steps or the boundaries between each 
and, secondly, to distribute them geographically so that if a 
complex case happened in a department outside San 
Salvador, that the department had the capacity there and 
did not have to be calling on San Salvador to send 
investigators. […]196  
According to these statements, decentralisation meant strengthening 
investigative capacities especially at local police units and delegating operative 
tasks to small units throughout the country. However, with the designation of 
General Munguía as Minister and General Salinas as PNC Director, this 
process was reversed. The statement of the security expert cited above 
continues: 
[…] That was basically the idea, and I understand that the 
police director is currently returning to the previous 
scheme which means returning to specialization and 
concentrating it in San Salvador.197 
There is some evidence supporting this statement. One of Munguía Payés’ first 
actions as Security Minister was to create an Antigang Unit – another 
specialised and centralised unit under the leadership of Douglas Omar García 
                                            
195 Ibid. 
196 Interview with government official R2, 05 March 2012. 
197 Ibid. 
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Funes, one of the commissioners from the ranks of the armed forces previously 
under investigation by the Inspector General (Valencia, 2012) (Section 9.3.3). 
This emphasises two aspects: first, the placement of García Funes confirms 
that with the designation of Munguía Payés, people with military background 
were given key positions in the PNC because they were trusted by the United 
States. García Funes had previously worked at the Transnational Antigang 
Centre which was financed by the US and supported by agents of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) (Martínez and Valencia, 2011).  
Second, the creation of this new special unit indicated a reinforcement of the 
problems of highly centralised and inconsistent work structures which were 
sought to be reformed. Being asked about the relationship between the 
Antigang Unit and other units, this police official admitted that responsibilities 
remained unclear: 
SHF: How will [the Antigang Unit] coordinate with the other 
divisions, for example?  
R27: This is an organic problem of the police. Indeed, they 
will have to see how they do it, at what time. That is a 
problem they have, a serious problem. Because where will 
be the difference between what crime the investigative 
division will investigate and what crime the Antigang Unit? 
If it is homicide, who is going to investigate? Anti-
homicide? Or if it is extortion, is there going to be an Anti-
extortion unit or not? Or will they pass it to the Antigang 
Unit? These are answers that I cannot give you […].198 
The discontinuity of the decentralisation process contrasted with the interview 
statements about progress on community policing. As mentioned earlier, 
community policing was to become the guiding principle of policing and a major 
venture for advancing in preventive work. Before 2009, some proactive police 
officials in the police’ secretary of community relations discussed the concept of 
community policing and were trying to incorporate it through a number of pilot 
projects. Despite some initial success, these pilot projects remained piecemeal 
and were never expanded to the entire police under police directors before 
                                            
198 Interview with police official R27, 12 April 2012. 
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2009.199 This changed with the FMLN security reforms, as Director Ascencio 
supported the plan to train all police staff in the principles of community policing, 
seeking to improve the relationship between the police and citizens in several 
ways.200 Most importantly, it would have been an important step towards 
realising the claim of citizen security according to which the police is a 
democratic force that serves its citizens (Section 9.2). It would have implied a 
police that is more present in communities, knowing about and acting upon local 
problems of security, building trusted relationships with the population, and 
countering the feeling of insecurity that many Salvadorans had. Ultimately, the 
implementation of community policing would have meant the rapprochement 
between society and state which was exactly what the PJSC was claiming to 
achieve.  
Interestingly, the quote of the police official R55 cited at the beginning of this 
section indicates that while Ascencio was the one to introduce community 
policing as a principle for all police work, it was under General Salinas that 
community policing was more promoted. Julián Belloso, head of the Technical 
Council, confirmed this with clear words:  
From all the people of this government, the only one who 
speaks of community policing is the Director of the 
Academy [of Public Security]. Not even the former Director 
[of the police, Ascencio] talked about it, he was afraid. He 
was a coward! It's true because he did not agree with us. 
The previous governments did not agree. But this one 
[Salinas], yes, because he quickly signed the 
documents.201 
Similarly, this police official underscored Salinas’ support for the concept of 
community policing: 
Ex-General Salinas said he really believed, he was sure, 
he was convinced that the police itself [...] would not solve 
all the problems of crime in the country; that it needed to 
                                            
199 Interviews with police official R55, 07 March 2013 and with police official R29, 18 April 2012. See 
also Savenije (2010). 
200 Interview with police official R55, 07 March 2013. 
201 Interview with Rolando Elías Julián Belloso, 14 February 2013. 
 231 
 
be close to the population, to the community; that it 
needed the support of the society, of the people; that 
therefore he agrees with the community approach of the 
police […].202 
To sum up, in all areas in which reforms were sought, efforts were made before 
the replacement of the minister. After the replacement of the minister and the 
subsequent personnel changes, setbacks were observed in all areas except 
community policing. This clearly showed the impact of the decisions on the 
course of reforms. The exception of community policing is difficult to explain, but 
it could be due to the strong involvement of USAID in this field. If the US 
favoured working with General Salinas over working with Ascencio who was a 
civilian, this might explain the advancement of community policing. Does the 
partial success of community policing imply an incremental decision-making 
mode? As argued earlier, incrementalism is oriented toward small step changes 
whereas ad hoc-ism is more prone to inertia. Thus, the changes achieved in 
community policing could point to a different decision-making style. However, in 
the case of the replacement of the police director there is no evidence that 
Salinas took over in order to deliberately continue with community policing and 
thus achieve small step changes. Rather, the continuation of community 
policing plans seems fairly contingent. 
It remains to be seen whether community policing becomes the guiding 
principle for all areas of policing and whether any other reform efforts survived 
the short term changes. With regard to the ad hoc character and the 
contestation of security decision making under the Funes government, the 
analysis of the effects of decision making revealed that the decisions to change 
the minister and other leaders in the security sector altered the policy process. 
As the examples of police internal accountability, investigative capacities, and 
career and organisational structure demonstrated, the government’s short-term 
decisions for replacement impeded the continuance of strategic long-term 
reforms. The effects of the short-term decisions reversed much of the reforms; 
thus, the problem of limited police professionalism which was identified in the 
assessment report remained unresolved. This confirms the second part of the 
                                            
202 Interview with police official R27, 12 April 2012. 
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thesis’ argument with regard to the police, namely that ad hoc decision making 
undermined the development of stable democratic security institutions.  
With regard to the militarisation of public security the Court’s decision to declare 
the Generals’ position unconstitutional showed that the role of the military is 
critically observed and debated in El Salvador. Although the military did 
severely interfere with the realm of public security, democratic mechanisms 
functioned inasmuch as the military’s interference could at least be pushed back 
by the Supreme Court’s decision. However, for the progress of police 
professionalization, the removal of the generals only one year and a half after 
their designation meant yet another change of personnel. The cycle of ad hoc-
ism lasted which meant that the discontinuity continued. 
 
9.5 Conclusion 
The analysis of police reforms between 2009 and 2014 firstly highlighted 
conflicts within the political system. It showed that political elites from the Left 
and the Right instrumentalised political polarisation to maintain their power. This 
political polarisation fostered ad hoc decisions and impeded the realisation of 
police reforms. Secondly, the impact of actors which do not form part of the 
Salvadoran state played a role in the failure to realise reforms. Salvadoran 
business elites which are traditionally close to the conservative right-wing 
ARENA party developed different strategies for dealing with the FMLN rising to 
power and for securing their traditionally strong influence on economic politics. 
Where economic and security interests overlapped, the majority of the business 
elite resisted government initiatives and only a small part of the elite 
accommodated with the government. However, in both instances, activities of 
business elites undermined state efforts of security provision. Furthermore, 
based on its position as the biggest bilateral donor and most important trade 
partner, US interests impacted on the security decision-making process of the 
FMLN government. The US influenced decision making concerning personnel 
changes in the Salvadoran Security Ministry which successively changed the 
course of police reforms. Finally, conflicts within the FMLN impacted on security 
decision making. Parts of the party, especially of the orthodox wing, disagreed 
with the post-liberal policies of the moderate wing. In addition, a second 
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cleavage between the party base and President Funes further complicated 
decision making. The impact of these state and non-state actors on security 
policy decisions of the FMLN government and the ad hoc mode which shaped 
the decisions in this context eventually impeded the realisation of plans for a 
professional and democratically controlled police.  
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10. Prison reforms and state responses to gang violence 
10.1 Introduction 
Whereas the last chapter focused on police reforms, this chapter demonstrates 
that policy decisions with relevance for prison reforms were also strongly 
contested and made on an ad hoc basis. Reforming the penal system was a 
key aspect in addressing social violence under the first FMLN government, as 
the first section shows (Section 10.2). Given past governments’ notorious lack 
of attention to the prison system (Section 7.4.2), prisons had become places of 
state negligence where the state exerted only limited control. The core idea of 
reforms was for the state to regain control over prisons and turn them into 
places of enforcement of sentences, but also into places of rehabilitation based 
on the rule of law. As mentioned earlier (Section 8.3), the National Policy of 
Justice, Public Security, and Living Together (PJSC) did not comprise an 
explicit gang strategy but addressed the problem of gang violence within other 
strategies. One such strategy concerned the reform of the penal system. Since 
prisons were known to exacerbate problems of gang violence, gaining control 
over prisons would have contributed to better control and contain gang violence. 
However, decision making during the FMLN’s first term differed significantly 
from the policy programme. Based on the conceptual framework developed in 
Chapter Three, the analysis shows that most government decisions in relation 
to the prison system followed a power struggle between the government and 
the gangs. As such, they were unrelated to a broader strategy of building a 
penal system which helped to control gang violence. Moreover, adopted 
decisions were often modified or revised subsequently. These aspects are 
discussed in Section 10.3 which specifically considers the power struggle 
between the government and the gangs over the control of violence during the 
gang truce in March 2012 (10.3.3).203 The dynamic of the power struggle 
between the government and the gangs unfolded prior to the gang truce, on the 
basis of a number of events and government decisions which are analysed in 
Sections 10.3.1 and 10.3.2. Since the government resorted to military force to 
gain control, the military is the third major actor in this power struggle. In 
                                            
203 The gang truce was set up between the two major Salvadoran gangs, Mara Salvatrucha and Barrio 18 
to which most gang members belong. There are other small gangs (pandillas) but these are less significant 
in size and influence (Section 7.5). Therefore, when I relate to gangs or the gang truce, I relate to the 
Mara Salvatrucha and Barrio 18.  
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Section 10.4, this thesis argues that the effects of the FMLN government’s 
decisions were not just increased violence and the militarisation of public 
security, but a deflection from security institution building, namely from 
penitentiary institution building. The chapter argues that although non-elites like 
the gangs were able to influence the policy process, they did not outweigh the 
power of state and non-state elites. The attempt to achieve an accommodation 
between state elites and non-state non-elites over violence control failed 
because there was no agreement reached over the gangs giving up coercive 
power or transforming it into another form of power. As a consequence, efforts 
to centralise violence and build a legitimate state monopoly on violence failed. 
 
10.2 Prison reform efforts under the FMLN: from the penal state to 
the ‘Road of Opportunities’ 
According to the FMLN’s security plans, improving the penal system aimed at 
various aspects, namely improved security, the training of personnel, adequate 
attention to prisoners, modernise the sentencing system, investment in the 
prison infrastructure, and a focus on rehabilitation and reintegration (Ministerio 
de Justicia y Seguridad Pública, 2010, Dirección General de Centros Penales). 
These measures were delineated in a very short policy paper which comprised 
26 lines of action (Dirección General de Centros Penales). The penitentiary 
policy was also called ‘Carretera de oportunidades con justicia y seguridad’ 
(‘Road of Opportunities with Justice and Security’). As discussed earlier 
(Section 7.4.2), the prison system had been politically neglected for most of the 
post-war years, and prison institution building in 2009 faced enormous 
challenges. Rodíl Hernández, at the time of the interview Assistant Director of 
the Directorate General of Penitentiaries (DGCP), described the reform efforts 
as follows:  
RH: We say it like this: we did not start from zero, but we 
had to start from minus 10, minus 20 actually. So, we had 
to begin with this policy not from zero or from five but from 
somewhere very low. 
SHF: Where are you now? 
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RH: Perhaps at one… at one or two […].204  
Stopping the trend towards the dehumanisation of prisoners did not just imply 
an improvement of the conditions in prisons by placing inmates at the centre of 
the penitentiary policy. The claim of rapprochement between state and citizens 
which underlay the PJSC’s orientation towards citizen security meant that more 
attention was paid to the rights and needs of inmates and their relatives. In the 
introduction of the Penitentiary Policy reference was made to the disrespect 
both prisoners and staff experienced in the past. 
We have had twenty years of governments who relied on 
repression and the application of harsh sentences without 
an emphasis on reintegration and rehabilitation of 
prisoners. Also those responsible for controlling and 
monitoring the prisoners were becoming repressed groups 
and despised by the system […]. (Dirección General de 
Centros Penales, n.d.: 3-4). 
The text then cited Article Two of the penitentiary law as point of reference for 
establishing a new ethos: 
The execution of the sentence shall provide the convicted 
with favorable conditions for their personal development, 
allowing them a harmonious integration into social life 
when regaining their freedom (Ley Penitenciaria, 1997).  
One example of appropriate attention to the personal needs of inmates were the 
mesas de la esperanza (roundtables of hope). These mesas de la esperanza 
were designed to improve the contact of inmates to their relatives, and also 
served the broader goal of the policy to establish a form of constant dialogue 
between state organisations, NGOs, and inmates and their relatives.205  
                                            
204 Interview with Rodíl Hernández, 27 March 2012. 
205 Mesas de la esperanza are not to be confused with the mesa penitenciaria which was set up in 2009 by 
the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman (PDDH) and invited NGOs, prison authorities, and officials 
from the Security Ministry to regular meetings to communicate strategic issues regarding penitentiary 
reforms. The PDDH’s efforts were met with little interest by government officials and thus were not able 
to contribute to any strategic advancement of the penitentiary policy. Reasons for this lack of interest are 
unknown but the Ministry’s and prison authorities’ reserve is remarkable, given the PDDH’s nature as 
observer of human rights. The PDDH took a central role in pointing to human rights violations in the 
prison system especially during the period of the deployment of the armed forces in prisons. 
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The head of an NGO working with prisoners described the improvements that 
followed from these efforts: 
Since this government took power the system has 
changed. It opened up and there was a lot of 
communication. The Road of Opportunities… the mesas 
de la esperanza were opened in every prison and there 
was a lot of listening at the national level. We were invited 
to take a tour of all prisons; we visited all prisons, and had 
access to every individual and every complaint […]. Even 
some family representatives participated in that tour, every 
weekend […] we went to the prisons.206 
One of the biggest problems with Salvadoran prisons was their overcrowding. In 
2009 21,032 prisoners shared 8,090 places which means prisons were 
overpopulated by 260% (Aguilar, 2014: 115).207 Overpopulation did not only 
affect the living conditions and physical and mental health of prisoners, it also 
impeded accommodating prisoners according to their penal status and 
providing any space for rehabilitation and reinsertion measures. To improve on 
these problems, the DGCP aimed for creating more places. A second measure 
to improve on prison infrastructure and security was the installation of a video 
surveillance system in the communal areas of the prisons which should also 
help to contain another big problem of Salvadoran prisons – contraband based 
on systematic corruption. Another step to contain corruption was the 
replacement and training of prison personnel. One of the most serious efforts to 
counter corruption in the prison system was the creation of a penitentiary school 
to train prison guards. The DGCP also aimed at strengthening the capacities for 
rehabilitation and sentences which could provide an alternative to imprisonment 
and help inmates to prepare for their release, like probation and day release.  
The outlined measure indicated the intention of stopping further 
dehumanisation. However, this thesis argues that the policy was thwarted by 
the government’s decisions in response to gang violence, especially by the 
                                            
206 Interview with Brian Rude, 16 April 2012. 
207 Numbers in the cited study are based on information from the DGCP. 
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decision to deploy the armed forces to the prison perimeters. Therefore, the 
penitentiary system was not turned into a rehab-oriented institution.  
Altogether, the conceptualisation of the penitentiary policy was weak. The 
FMLN’s penitentiary policy was not as detailed as the police reform plans. The 
concept presented in the Road of Opportunities was only 16 pages long, in 
some cases reform areas did not correspond with the lines of action, and funds 
and budget allocation remained unclear. The policy represented more a 
collection of ideas on how to realise the envisaged new ethos rather than 
strategic long-term planning with detailed steps of implementation. Not least, 
this may be due to the lack of support and interest of international organisations 
and bilateral development aid in criminal justice reforms (Sections 4.2.3 and 
7.4.2). Zinecker (2014: 374) stated that while FMLN security experts were good 
at developing preventive security approaches, they lacked concrete ideas of 
how to control and repress crime. If this was true, it could be argued that 
approaches to control and repress crime largely resembled ARENA’s mano dura 
approach. Since the mano dura approach did not comprise penitentiary reforms, 
concepts of criminal justice based on the rule of law remained underdeveloped. 
The following sections explore the validity of this argument in detail.    
As a starting point, the question arises how gang violence and prison policy are 
related. As shown in previous chapters, ARENA governments responded to 
gang violence by mano dura policies which included punishing gang affiliation 
with prison penalty, and the extension of maximum penalties which prolonged 
the time inmates spent in prison (Cruz, 2011). Although detained gang 
members were often released due to lack of evidence (Wolf, 2008: 73), prison 
population rose from 7,754 to 19,814 inmates between 2000 and 2008 (Table 
1). The first FMLN government’s security policy did not elaborate explicitly on a 
gang policy but the general direction was clear from PJSC’s citizen security 
focus. Controlling and repressing crime was considered to be important, but 
rapprochement and dialogue, prevention and rehabilitation were the buzzwords 
that marked the FMLN government’s approach to potential and actual 
offenders, including gang members. An adequate implementation of prison 
reforms would have supported this approach. It must be considered that not all 
prisoners were gang members. In 2009, at the beginning of Funes’ term, about 
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30% of inmates were affiliated to a gang.208 However, policy makers, journalists, 
and academics have suggested strong leverage of incarcerated gang members 
– especially incarcerated gang leaders – inside and outside of jails. Based on 
the case of Brazilian prison gangs, Lessing (2010) argued that the power of 
imprisoned gangs manifests itself in their degree of control over prison units, 
their ability to spread to different prisons within the penitentiary system and the 
projection of their power beyond prison walls (Section 7.5). In September 2004 
a number of Salvadoran prisons were exclusively assigned to either the Mara 
Salvatrucha or the Barrio 18, the two major gangs (Valencia, 2014). It is 
believed that this helped the gangs to expand their control both inside and 
outside jails and that extortion and homicides are frequently ordered by 
imprisoned gang leaders. A systematic empirical analysis of the leverage of 
incarcerated gang members on criminal activities outside prisons is still missing. 
Despite the lack of reliable data, government decisions strongly built on the 
assumed power of imprisoned gangs, as we will see in the example of the 
armed forces being deployed to the prison perimeters. This together with further 
examples outlined below demonstrates that government responses to gang 
violence strongly impacted on the course of prison reforms.      
 
10.3 Ad hoc security decision making: the power struggle between 
the FMLN government and the gangs 
10.3.1 Deployment (and withdrawal) of the armed forces to (from) the 
prison perimeters 
Salvadoran soldiers had been taking over public security tasks since the end of 
the civil war despite the strict separation of defence and public security tasks 
established in the Peace Agreement (Section 7.3). As discussed in Section 7.3, 
ARENA governments adopted an authoritarian, punitive approach to solve 
problems of crime and violence, and therewith undermined the strengthening of 
the security sector in the spirit of the Peace Accords. In the public security 
sphere, ARENA governments kept relying on the military. As Chapter Nine 
demonstrated, ARENA maintained political leverage on the police through its 
links with officers with a military background. It showed how difficult it was 
                                            
208 Figures from the DGCP, cited in Aguilar (2014: 124). 
 240 
 
during Funes’ term to reduce the influence of military officers at the police. This 
section explains how the military’s influence was not limited to the police but 
extended to the prison system. It bases the explanation on the proximity 
between President Funes and Munguía Payés, a military officer who belonged 
to the circle of Amigos de Mauricio (Section 9.3.2.).  
Given the FMLN’s historical distance from the military and the party’s envisaged 
public security policy, the intensified use of military force in public security 
issues under the Funes administration was remarkable. The PJSC did not 
indicate an involvement of the military in any field. In fact, the armed forces 
were brought up only once in the entire document under the fifth pillar (legal and 
institutional reforms) with regard to the coordination of state security 
organisations, mentioning the exceptional use of the Armed Forces of El 
Salvador (FAES) in the realm of public security within the constitutional 
framework (Ministerio de Justicia y Seguridad Pública, 2010). Being asked 
about the possible role of the armed forces in public security envisaged on the 
PJSC, an FMLN security expert said:  
[O]ur security policy proposal was a concept of the 
progressive left […]. We never set out to expand the 
participation of the armed forces in security tasks, we 
never proposed that. To the contrary. What I do remember 
is that we neither said the armed forces were being 
excluded from security tasks but we did not say it was 
going to expand powers […], impossible. We were not 
going to propose that.209 
Yet, in May 2010 Legislative Decree 371 was passed which allowed for the 
deployment of the armed forces in penitentiaries (Asamblea Legislativa, 2010). 
This was not the first decision which extended the tasks of the FAES in public 
security. In October 2009 Presidential Decree 70 paved the way for soldiers 
patrolling the street both with and without the police in a number of – 
presumably the country’s most violent – communities (Funes, 2009). Both 
decisions were taken in response to public pressure on the government to react 
upon criminal violence and because Munguía Payés, at the time still Minister of 
                                            
209 Interview with security expert (and police official) R27, 12 April 2012. 
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Defence, publicly proposed the FAES’s assistance in public security tasks 
(Aguilar, 2014: 90). With the legislative decree from May 2010 the Legislative 
Assembly decided on the deployment of soldiers in nine out of 19 prisons as a 
temporary measure for one year in order to control the entrance and exit of 
prisoners, visitors, and goods, as well as the periphery of the prisons. The 
military’s presence was limited to the perimeters and entrances, though control 
inside prisons ought to remain in the hands of prison authorities.210 The 
measure was prolonged in the following year. Likewise, the deployment of the 
armed forces in other public security areas was constantly extended: soldiers 
patrolled street, they were sent to schools to prevent recruitment of students by 
gangs, and they were placed as support for border control to contain 
contraband. Aguilar (2014: 90) noted an increase of 6,500 soldiers assigned to 
public security tasks in 2009 to 8,200 soldiers in 2010 and 2011 (in comparison, 
1,975 soldiers were counted in 2008). About 1,500 of them worked at the prison 
perimeters. However, the military’s presence in jails came to a sudden end in 
April 2012 when the government ordered their immediate withdrawal (see 
below).     
This decision to include the military in public security provision and to extend its 
deployment, brings to question how far the decisions represent ad hoc 
measures. The step to deploy the military in penitentiaries was justified with the 
need to counterbalance the scarcity of prison personnel and to allow for the re-
organisation of guards which included the purge of corrupt staff and the training 
of new personnel. Furthermore, it was regarded as a measure to contain the 
coordination of criminal activities outside jails by inmates through more rigorous 
control at the gates. The decision was made while Manuel Melgar was still 
Minister of Security. He explained: 
[…]The logic of [deploying soldiers to the security 
perimeters, SHF] was that we encountered very 
unmotivated staff in prisons, very corrupt staff, and we had 
to impede escapes. [...] So, the explanation of the 
                                            
210 Salvadoran prisons have three security rings; soldiers were deployed at the gate locks of all rings and 
withdrawn from the two inner rings in April 2012. In the debate about the degree of military control over 
prisons, different views existed as to whether the deployment of soldiers to the inner rings implied that 
the military was taking over control inside prisons or not. The penitentiary law prohibited the military 
taking over any tasks involving contact with prisoners; with the legislative decree from May 2010 this 
regulation was suspended. Thus, legally, the military took control inside prisons.      
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presence of the armed forces has to do with - in the case 
of prisons - the need to strengthen security without having 
well trained staff, because you have two possibilities to 
control a prison: together with prisoners or by trying to 
exert control. We chose to try to exert control and 
effectively there is more control.211 
Rodíl Hernández, Assistant Director of the General Directorate (at the time of 
the interview), pointed to the problem of corruption in prisons: 
SHF: When the thought of asking the armed forces for 
their support came up, where did the idea come from? 
RH: […] It was an open secret in the country that prisons 
were places where crimes were (and still are) committed. 
There was a very high level of corruption in the system, so 
much corruption that it ranged from the lowest spheres of 
the system to the highest.212 
Nelson Flores from the NGO FESPAD stated: 
The argument raised at some point by the government was 
that it was necessary to use the army [...] because the 
Directorate General of Prisons intended to purge all 
guards.213 
Similarly, Douglas Moreno who was the Director General of the Penitentiaries at 
the time when the decision was made (2009-2011) justified the step with the 
need to purge prison staff:  
SHF: How was the decision to deploy the armed forces 
made? 
DM: Extortions exploded [...]. Cell phones [were smuggled 
into prisons] without any difficulties [...]. We had to purge. 
And at the same time, we had to train. [...] So I told the 
President, I spoke with the minister of defence, and I said: 
                                            
211 Interview with Manuel Melgar, 26 March 2012. 
212 Interview with Rodíl Hernández, 27 March 2012. 
213 Interview with Nelson Flores, 26 March 2012. 
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take a hard, drastic decision of the armed forces 
participating in [prison] security to a certain degree... 
without interacting with prisoners.214  
Interestingly, the idea of military support in prisons had been brought up already 
in the Penitentiary Policy, albeit in a very vague formulation and without going 
into detail about any strategic, practical or legal implications (Dirección General 
de Centros Penales: 13). Thus, it could be argued that this particular decision 
was not entirely ad hoc in the sense that it came out of nowhere. However, the 
whole decision-making process regarding the deployment and withdrawal of 
militaries in prisons clearly shows characteristics of ad hoc-ism as 
conceptualised earlier in this work, as the following discussion highlights.215   
The crisis of the penitentiary system was a permanent crisis (Section 7.4.2). 
Corruption among prison staff, overpopulation and the large-scale coordination 
of extortion by inmates were bringing the prison system near to a collapse, 
while the increasing number of revolts of imprisoned gang members with lethal 
consequences fuelled the public impression that the state was not in control of 
the penitentiaries. However, neither the problem nor public awareness of the 
problem was new. The media had frequently reported about the ‘penitentiary 
crisis’ since the 1990s (Fundación Quetzalcóatl, 2009). During the interview, 
Douglas Moreno explained the constant deterioration of the penitentiary system 
since 1993.216 In their publications, organisations like FESPAD (Martínez 
Ventura, 2005) and IUDOP (Santacruz Giralt and Ranum, 2010) had pointed 
out problems of overcrowding, human rights violations, and lethal violence in 
prisons. For years, the PDDH visited prisons and observed the precarious 
situation in which inmates found themselves.217 Yet, the Funes government’s 
militaristic response to the problem was designed for a limited period of time – 
                                            
214 Interview with Douglas Moreno, 11 April 2012. 
215 Ad hoc decision-making was characterised as follows (see Section 3.3): 1. It appears where state and 
non-state actors use their power to impact on and contest decisions of decision-makers in formal offices; 
involved actors have adverse interests; resistance against (or attempts to influence) the policy is high. 2. It 
means that strategic long-term decisions are either easily replaced or ignored or reversed by short-term 
decisions. Short-term decisions are often unrelated to any strategy. 3. Ad hoc-ism has a temporary 
character (which means decisions are either provisional measures or soon replaced). 4. It assumes that 
political awareness of the problem is high, and decisions are made with the intention to solve a problem. 
216 Interview with Douglas Moreno, 11 April 2012. 
217 On some occasions, I accompanied the PDDH during these visits which granted me access to a number 
of prisons (see Section 3.2 for details of data collection). 
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initially for one year, later it was extended for another year. Thus, a permanent, 
complex problem was addressed by a temporary solution.  
Moreover, the decision was reversed with the sudden withdrawal of the armed 
forces from prison gates in April 2012, one month after the gang truce between 
the Mara Salvatrucha and the Barrio 18 became public.218 The reason for the 
removal was not entirely clear. Government authorities released different 
statements regarding this step: that the newly trained guards were ready to be 
deployed; that soldiers were pulled out in response to complaints about human 
rights violations; that the move was not related to the gang truce (Castillo, 2012, 
Flores, 2012a). Clearly, the decision to withdraw did not take into consideration 
whether there were sufficient newly trained guards. Instead, coordination with 
prison management was poor as is shown by the fact that the director of one of 
the country’s largest prison stated that he was informed about the change only 
two days in advance.219 Furthermore, being asked about the relationship 
between soldiers and security guards, the Director of the Penitentiary School, 
Nora Serrano, mentioned that guards will take over from the military in the far 
future.220 Given that the interview took place twelve days before the army’s 
withdrawal, it leads to the conclusion that Serrano was not made aware of these 
changes long in advance, and that from her practical point of view the formation 
of new personnel would require multiple years of work. This lack of coordination 
with prison management contradicted the original justification of the deployment 
of the armed forces with the purge of corrupt staff. Moreover, it raises the 
question of how prison management could have planned the replacement of 
soldiers with newly trained, non-corrupt staff.221 It highlights that the 
government’s decision was unrelated to the reform plans.  
Also, the decision to withdraw was taken due to resistance from the gangs 
against the military’s presence in the penitentiaries, which pointed to the 
intensifying power struggle between government and gangs. In contrast to initial 
                                            
218 Research diary, 01 August 2012. On details about the gang truce see Section 8.2.3. 
219 Interview with prison director R39, 16 April 2012. 
220 ‘[I]n the far future, these perimeter zones will be left by the military and we must be prepared with 
trained personnel to take those positions. This has been like a containment strategy because remember 
that the armed forces are not the personnel who has a vision to provide rehabilitation treatment.’ 
(Interview with Nora Serrano, 29 March 2012). 
221 According to data from the penitentiary school, 516 guards graduated in 2011 (Serrano, 2012). Given 
that 1,500 soldiers were withdrawn, it is unlikely that there were enough newly graduated guards to 
compensate this gap, even if some soldiers remained at the outer perimeter. 
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statements of the government, there was evidence of the connection between 
the gang truce and the soldiers’ removal. Approximately one year after the 
events, Minister Munguía Payés admitted that the withdrawal was linked to the 
gang truce:  
DMP: The withdrawal of the armed forces coincided with 
the beginning of the process of the truce, this should be 
clarified, it coincided with that. But we knew that at some 
point the armed forces had to withdraw. First, because it 
was not their role, second, because we were waiting for 
the newly trained guards to arrive, and third, because we 
were notified by human rights organisations of too many 
abuses at the [prison] entrances. 
SHF: So it was more by chance that [the withdrawal of the 
armed forces] was more or less at the same time [when 
the truce became public]? 
DMP: No. No, we had to remove them more or less in 
those days. But within the context of the truce, we knew 
that one of the things that most bothered the prisoners was 
the registration by the armed forces. On the one hand 
because it prevented smuggling. On the other hand, they 
were offended because their families were affected. So we 
thought the time the truce began was the time to withdraw 
[the armed forces]: "let's deploy the trained people and 
hand it over to them". This was the most convenient thing 
to do, which is why we withdrew [the armed forces].222 
This response revealed that the government submitted to pressure from the 
gangs. Even though Munguía did not say explicitly that the withdrawal was 
demanded by the gang leaders, he made clear that it was a concession to the 
gangs in the light of maintaining the truce. Imprisoned gang members felt 
impaired by the military’s presence in the prisons and used the immediate 
consequences of the truce – a sharp drop in homicide numbers – as leverage. 
                                            
222 Interview with David Munguía Payés, 19 March 2013. 
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Thus, the withdrawal was a product of the impact of gangs as non-state actors 
on key government decision makers.  
Considering the discussion of the deployment and withdrawal procedures brings 
to question what role the military had during these events. As discussed in the 
extant literature, more soldiers taking over public security tasks and the change 
of the penitentiary law to allow for the deployment of the FAES in prisons were 
signs of increased militarisation. But the primary power struggle over who 
controls violence evolved between the government and the gangs. It was the 
government’s decision to deploy (and withdraw) the FAES; the military was the 
government’s source of coercive power to combat gangs whose power, 
likewise, rested on coercive means.223 This constellation can be observed in 
other events, as will be shown next.  
Altogether the government’s way of dealing with the penitentiary system was 
contradictory. The normative underpinning of reform plans – the rapprochement 
between state and citizens by acknowledging prisoners as part of the society – 
was undermined by the ad hoc decisions to deploy and withdraw the armed 
forces. The decisions were made in response to pressure from various sides, 
encompassing the gangs, the general public which demanded a reaction to ever 
increasing criminal violence, and the military in the person of Munguía Payés 
who publicly advocated for coercive responses to prison insecurity. The effects 
of such contested policy making on penitentiary institution building are 
examined in Section 10.4.  
   
10.3.2 The anti-gang law 
Besides the decisions concerning the role of the military in public security, 
another decision signalled a further shift away from the citizen security 
framework under which the Funes administration had started out. This decision 
concerned the Ley de Proscripción de Maras, Pandillas, Agrupaciones, 
Asociaciones y Organizaciones de Naturaleza Criminal (Law Banning Criminal 
Maras, Gangs, Groups, Associations and Organisations), in short, the anti-gang 
law. It prohibited the existence of gangs and criminal organisations as well as 
any support to gangs from third parties, and it sanctioned breaches with up to 
                                            
223 See Section 7.5 on gangs and coercive power. 
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ten years in prison. The initial draft was released by the Security Ministry in 
June 2010, and the law passed in September 2010. Adopting the anti-gang law 
formed part of the broader decision-making process regarding gang violence, 
and a look at the literature analysing these events revealed that the decision 
was taken ad hoc (Van der Borgh and Savenije, 2014, Aguilar, 2014, Moodie 
and Martínez D'Aubuisson, 2015, Fuentes, 2015).  
The anti-gang law was proposed in response to an unprecedented act of gang 
violence. On 20 June 2010 members of the Barrio 18 captured a public 
microbus with the driver and passengers on board in Mejicanos, a 
neighbourhood of San Salvador.224 They murdered the driver, set the bus on 
fire, and shot everyone trying to escape. The passengers burned to death. More 
people died in an attempt of members of the same gang to hijack a second bus, 
among them an 18-month old girl. During these attacks, supposedly an act of 
retaliation against the Mara Salvatrucha, 17 people were killed. Salvadorans 
were shocked by the incident, and as with the decision to expand the armed 
forces’ involvement in public security, the government had to respond if it did 
not want to appear as having lost control (Moodie and Martínez D'Aubuisson, 
2015: 162). The new anti-gang law was proposed three days after the attack. 
Although general public support for the initiative was high (Van der Borgh and 
Savenije, 2014: 18), the use of the law was contested from various sides. It 
resembled anti-gang legislation of the mano dura years. This caused resistance 
among human rights organisations which denounced the potential 
stigmatisation of parts of the population (Aguilar, 2014: 72). Also, as Fuentes 
(2015) and others pointed out, there already existed a law with almost identical 
content, namely Article 345 of the penal law. Thus, despite broad support for 
the act in the Legislative Assembly, the practical use was not clear to judges, 
attorneys, and police officers. Consequently the law was barely used (Aguilar, 
2014: 73). Finally, the gangs themselves contested the law. Van der Borgh and 
Savenije (2014) described how both Mara Salvatrucha and Barrio 18 paralysed 
public transport by threating bus companies a few days before Funes was to 
sign the law. They asked the president to veto the law and suggested a 
‘dialogue’ about ending violence. Funes signed the law and refused the maras’ 
                                            
224 For a detailed narrative of the incident and its background see Moodie and Martínez D’Aubuisson 
(2015). 
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offer on the grounds that it was unacceptable for the government to ‘negotiate’ 
with gangs.225 
Van der Borgh and Savenije (2014: 18) considered the anti-gang law to be 
primarily an ‘authoritative response to strong public revulsion and the 
cacophony of statements’ that did not address the roots of the gang problem. 
Fuentes (2015: 143) criticised the mere symbolic use of penal law and the 
temporary character of anti-gang laws which undermines the use of penal law 
for adequately addressing criminal acts. All four texts either implicitly or 
explicitly demonstrated how the Funes administration turned towards a 
repressive security approach by adopting the anti-gang law. Based on the 
information of these texts, the decision for the law can be characterised as ad 
hoc decision making. The law was neither part of the PJSC nor of any other 
explicit strategy to contain gang violence. Similar to the deployment and 
withdrawal of the FAES, the measure contradicted the normative underpinning 
of the PJSC (citizen security).  
The anti-gang law caused resistance from both state (judicial branch) and non-
state actors (gangs, human rights organisations) which underscores that the 
decision was made on an ad hoc basis (Aguilar, 2014: 72-73, Whitfield, 2013: 
11). Reasons for resistance differed according to the respective organisation(s) 
that demonstrated discontent. While judges and human rights organisations 
questioned the constitutionality and practical implications of the law, the gangs 
had to worry about the limitation of their room for manoeuvre or, in other words, 
a limitation of their power. This led them to demonstrate their existing power by 
paralysing public transport and putting pressure on the government to not sign 
the law. Due to the limited practical use, the law was mostly ignored and thus 
did not contribute to the solution of the problem of gang violence. In contrast to 
previous anti-gang laws the act was not adopted as a provisional measure. 
However, the decision for the law had temporary character since it was 
basically abolished when the gang truce became public less than two years 
later (Aguilar, 2014: 73). 
                                            
225 The mix-up of dialogue and negotiation is remarkable and created additional confusion over the 
relationship between the government and the gangs during the gang truce, as the following sections 
shows. 
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Similar to decision making with regard to the deployment of the armed forces at 
the prisons, decisions concerning the anti-gang law were made in response to 
pressure from the public and from the gangs. The decisions revealed a 
preference for a coercive approach while at the same time representing an ad 
hoc response which was not connected to a broader strategy of reducing gang 
violence. The gang truce which is discussed in the next section also clearly 
featured characteristics of ad hoc decision making. However, in contrast to the 
previous two aspects, the truce was a non-coercive response to gang violence, 
and the implications of this difference are discussed below.  
 
10.3.3 The gang truce 
On 14 March 2012 El Faro published an article about the Salvadoran 
Government negotiating the reduction of homicides with gangs (Martínez et al., 
2012). The story revealed that in the days before the legislative elections on 
Sunday 11 March 2012 thirty top gang leaders were transferred from a 
maximum security prison to ordinary prisons. According to the newspaper, the 
transfer allowed the gang leaders from the Mara Salvatrucha and the Barrio 18 
to communicate to all their members a truce between the two gangs. Since that 
weekend homicide rates were constantly dropping from an average of 18 
homicides per day in the first months of 2012 to about 5 homicides per day.226 A 
month later newspapers celebrated the first day without any homicide in three 
years (El Mundo, 2012, Flores, 2012b). In the days, weeks, and months that 
followed, the truce and its impact were subject of intense and controversial 
debates. The circumstances of the disclosure of the truce and the nebulous, 
incoherent reactions from the Funes administration made clear that the 
negotiations had not been intended to go public.227 Information about the 
conditions of the truce, possible claims from the gangs and concessions made 
from the government was scarce and contradictory. In the following months, 
more details emerged but the process remained opaque. It became known that 
former ERP commander (and adviser of Munguía Payés) Raúl Mijango and 
military chaplain Fabio Colindres had mediated the conversation between the 
gang leaders. While Minister Munguía Payés initially denied any involvement of 
                                            
226 Numbers are based on figures of the PNC, cited in Smutt (2012: 3). 
227 Research diary, 12 March/ 16 April/ 01 August 2012. 
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the Salvadoran government, he later admitted that the government had 
‘facilitated’ the talks without being a negotiating part itself by sending Mijango 
and Colindres as mediators. 
[T]he role we have been playing as government has been 
the role of facilitating the work of the mediators and 
sometimes even promote it, help them to promote it. And 
to the extent that this is happening, there is greater 
involvement of us.228 
This version was rejected by Funes who continued to deny any involvement of 
the government in the process.229 This rift between the Security Minister and the 
president further contributed to the confusion and scepticism among the 
population about the truce. It also was not clear what the truce comprised. 
Besides refraining from killing rival gang members, the conditions and the 
purpose of the truce seemed unclear. In the months that followed the disclosure 
of the truce, proposals for agreements were exchanged between the gangs and 
the facilitators with differing content. The gangs suggested ceasing attacks on 
members of the police and military, extortion of bus drivers, forced recruitment, 
and recruitment at schools. They demanded improvement of prison conditions, 
including the withdrawal of the FAES, and opportunities of reinsertion of gangs 
and their relatives outside prison, among other claims. Reacting on public 
discussions regarding the continuance of extortion while the truce was in place, 
they proposed to:  
reduce all acts of violence and criminality in exchange for: 
an end to police operations in the communities; repeal of 
the law prohibiting gangs; reforms to the Penal Code and 
prison conditions; an end to torture and abuses by police 
during interrogations; removal of soldiers from public 
security deployment; pardons for aged and infirm 
prisoners; an end to extermination groups; and reinsertion 
                                            
228 Interview with David Munguía Payés, 19 March 2013. Similar statements were made at other 
occasions. 
229 For accounts of the truce process see Garrett (2013), Whitfield (2013), and Mijango (2013). For 
further analysis see Peeters et al. (2013), Kan (2014), and Sampó and Bartolomé (2014). For micro 
analyses of truce effects see, for example, Zoethout (2014) and Carballo (2015). Despite these overviews 
and analyses there is little in-depth academic research about the truce.  
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programs including education, training and jobs for those 
on the outside and relatives of incarcerated members 
(Garrett, 2013: 20). 
The Funes government did not react upon these requests directly, but the 
facilitators Mijango and Colindres brought up a number of issues which were 
discussed with the gangs (Whitfield, 2013) and some government decisions 
seemed closely related to the gang leaders’ proposals, as we will see below. 
Against this background of little transparency, it is not an easy task to delineate 
the government decision-making process. However, it is still possible to take the 
most obvious decisions that related to the gang truce and analyse them using 
the notion of contestation and ad hoc decision making established earlier. This 
reveals two important aspects which are explained in detail below. Firstly, 
government decision making was connected to the power struggle between the 
gangs and the government. Secondly, despite its ad hoc character, the truce 
process could have become part of a broader strategy of containing gang 
violence if the government would have taken ownership of the truce.  
Two decisions which directly related to the situation in the prisons and were 
already touched upon were the sudden withdrawal of the armed forces from the 
prison perimeters and the transfer of 30 gang leaders to prisons with lower 
security standards. Another decision concerned the formation of so called 
‘peace zones’ or ‘sanctuaries’ at a later stage of the truce. In January 2013 
gangs promised to cease violent confrontations in a handful of communities, 
while the state, in turn, agreed to relax police control and fund social 
reintegration projects (Garrett, 2013). This was to be gradually extended to 
more communities. Another important government decision regarding the gang 
truce was tolerating a conversation about the reduction of violence in which the 
gangs took an active part. Whether this conversation was a dialogue or a 
negotiation, and whether it was promoted, facilitated or just not obstructed by 
the government, remained unclear. Either way, for the first time the gangs were 
acknowledged as actors who could play an active role in the solution of 
problems of violence and crime. Finally, Funes’ refusal to take the lead in this 
process also represented a form of decision – most likely a negative or non-
decision, according to Howlett’s taxonomy of decision making (Section 3.3). 
Decisions that are actually not made are difficult to analyse, which depicts clear 
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limits to the use of the policy model. Yet, Funes’ position was not unimportant. If 
it is regarded as a part of the policy process and not just a single (non-)decision, 
it links to the bigger issue of a missing long-term strategy for the truce process. 
A first indicator of ad hoc-ism is that decisions were not part of a broader 
strategy of controlling gang violence. As demonstrated in Section 10.3.1, the 
withdrawal of the FAES was not linked to the policy of prison institution-building 
but was related to the ‘negotiating’ process with the gangs. Likewise, the 
transfer of the gang leaders was a concession to the gangs. In fact, Nelson 
Flores from the NGO FESPAD pointed to the arbitrariness of the transfer of 
gang leaders. Article 91 of the penitentiary law established clear mechanisms 
according to which prisoners can be transferred to different penitentiaries (Ley 
Penitenciaria, 1997). According to Flores, these mechanisms were not 
considered in the case of the 30 gang leaders.230 Disregarding the inappropriate 
legal conditions, the prison transfer as well as the withdrawal of the FAES and 
the creation of peace zones could have become part of a strategy if the 
government would have taken ownership of the truce and integrated it into a 
sustainable, comprehensive strategy of containing gang violence. However, in 
the following paragraphs it is shown that there was no strategy which guided 
and structured state action regarding the gang truce:  
It never became clear what should follow the truce. It remained questionable 
how the temporary lowering of homicide rates could be guaranteed in the long-
term. Moreover, it remained unclear how the government could use the gang 
leaders’ readiness for dialogue to construct larger agreements. Beyond that, the 
question remained about how the truce could be used to develop functioning 
reintegration programmes. These questions concerned with the sustainability of 
the truce were raised during interviews and informal conversations shortly after 
the truce went public.231 In 2012 one interviewee from the police leadership 
compared the situation to the post-war period, arguing that a DDR 
(demobilisation, disarmament, and reintegration) programme was needed to 
make the truce sustainable.232 The same questions were raised in policy 
briefs233 and interviews that followed later. In 2013 concerns regarding the 
                                            
230 Interview with Nelson Flores, 08 February 2013. 
231 Research diary, 17 April 2012. 
232 Interview with police official R27, 12 April 2012. 
233 See, for example, Peeters et al. (2013). 
 253 
 
sustainability still persisted. Nelson Flores from the non-governmental 
organisation FESPAD which worked together with imprisoned gang members 
and their relatives explained:  
[I]f there is no adequate way to institutionalise [the truce], 
then any government can come and break this, and then 
things will be worse than before, violence will increase. So 
this is one of the concerns we have. But if it is 
institutionalised, if things are really done in a planned way, 
evaluating the public policies of the government, then 
that's the right way..234 
During a television interview about the peace zones, Munguía Payés explained 
that it was conceivable to turn the truce into a state policy.235 During our 
personal interview I asked him to elaborate on this thought and he mentioned a 
couple of ideas: 
How to make this [truce] sustainable? Looking for the 
involvement of other actors, such as churches, the society 
in general with all its civil institutions... but also 
‘territorialising’ the whole strategic concept that we had at 
the national level, bring it to the municipalities. As [the 
concepts] are being ‘territorialised’, they are becoming 
state policy automatically. […].236 
Yet, it proved very difficult for the government to ‘make the truce sustainable’. 
Since the PJSC, the security strategy developed earlier, did not comprise of an 
explicit gang strategy, it did not offer any orientation for the government to 
respond to the gang truce. In addition, the emerging rift between President 
Funes who refused to lead the process and Security Minister Munguía Payés as 
the central political figure of the truce demonstrated the disagreement regarding 
the questions outlined above. For the government, the truce was an experiment 
with unpredictable outcomes, as Munguía Payés admitted.237 This underscored 
the temporary character of government action. In hindsight, the temporariness 
                                            
234 Interview with Nelson Flores, 08 February 2013. 
235 Research diary, 27 January 2013. 
236 Interview with David Munguíá Payés, 19 March 2013. 
237 Interview with David Munguía Payés, 19 March 2013. 
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of the truce was reconfirmed with its gradual abolishment since mid-2013. 
Security Minister Ricardo Perdomo, Munguía Payés’ successor since May 
2013, declared that the government would leave it to the mediators and gangs 
to continue dialogue, which signalled a more distant position of the government 
(Santos, 2013). After President Sánchez Cerén (FMLN) was elected in March 
2014, he announced the new government would discontinue the truce 
(Mélendez and Aguilar, 2014). Since mid-2013 homicide rates rose again and 
had reached pre-truce levels by mid-2014 (Gurney, 2014, see also homicide 
graph in Figure 1).  
Developing legal income alternatives to extortion or drug sale for gang 
members was one of the biggest challenges in making the truce sustainable. 
Establishing the peace zones were local attempts to face these challenges. 
Despite the government’s promise to provide the municipalities that were 
declared peace zones with funds,238 it was the local authorities, the gangs and 
the facilitators who played the key part in it. A glimpse at one of these peace 
zones demonstrated the difficulties faced.  
The municipality of Ilopango, in the east of San Salvador, was an area afflicted 
by violence. With the support of local authorities, gang members started two 
small businesses, a bakery which was run by the Barrio 18, and a chicken farm 
which was run by the Salvatrucha. One of the problems was the imbalance 
between the large number of gang members and the limited profit of such small 
projects. The chicken farm was intended to provide for about 25 gang members, 
their families and several imprisoned members of the Salvatrucha which 
seemed already like a high number given the modest size of the project.239 In 
newspaper reports, the number of Salvatrucha gang members and their families 
in Ilopango was estimated to be between 500 and 700 persons (Martínez, 2013, 
elsalvador.com, 2014). Hence, many more alternative income opportunities 
would have been needed to sustainably change the role of gangs in the 
municipality. The municipality encountered several other problems.240 At the 
time of the interviews with gang members and an employee from the 
municipality, the municipality was the only sponsor of the chicken project. Whilst 
                                            
238 Ibid. 
239 Interview with Marvin, local spokesperson of the Salvatrucha gang, 08 March 2013; interview with an 
employee of the Ilopango municipality R56, 08 March 2013.  
240 Interview with R56, 08 March 2013. 
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the government had promised some funding, these funds were delayed. Other 
funds from international donors were bound to other projects or certain 
communities and thus could not be used for the gang projects, and local 
companies did not react upon requests for support. Furthermore, since the truce 
came as a surprise, there was no time to develop a coherent plan or to react 
upon the doubts of the sceptical population.241  
This situation at the micro level reflected the problems at the national scale, as 
Whitfield’s (2013) overview over the truce process showed. In September 2012 
the Organization of American States (OAS), in particular their Secretary Adam 
Blackwell, offered support to the process by monitoring potential agreements 
between the gangs and trying to persuade the Salvadoran government to take a 
more active role. It announced the creation of a Humanitarian Commission 
which would gather (moral and financial) supporters of the truce and increase 
its credibility. The Commission was later renamed as Humanitarian Foundation 
and comprised representatives of think tanks and the private sector. FUSADES, 
known for its affiliation with business elites (Section 5.4), took the lead of the 
Foundation under chair Antonio Cabrales, former president of FUSADES. 
Through the Foundation, the European Union provided US$ 1.7 million to 
support the process of ‘pacification’, as it was called by the OAS (Blackwell, 
n.d.). This was the strongest sign of support from the Salvadoran business 
sector. Apart from the Humanitarian Foundation, business elites did hardly 
engage in providing opportunities for economic reintegration of gang members. 
Some companies previously engaged in violence prevention and gang 
reinsertion efforts, as the Americas Society (2012) showed in an effort to 
encourage more public-private cooperation of this kind. Besides the companies 
mentioned in the Americas Society’s brief, there were other initiatives like the 
project Metamorfosis in Santa Ana which employed ex-prisoners, including 
former gang members, at a shoe factory.242 However, most of these projects 
were developed prior to the truce. They involved either faith-based 
                                            
241 According to a report by the NGO Interpeace and news reports, both projects, the bakery and the 
chicken farm, were still viable in 2014. Funded by the European Union, the Salvatrucha’s project was 
extended to growing and selling vegetables. In September 2014 – after the truce had fallen apart – it still 
employed 40 gang members. However, according to elsalvador.com, gangs still showed a very strong 
presence in Ilopango, and extortion was believed to have continued (Interpeace, 2014a, elsalvador.com, 
2014). There were no reliable homicide statistics for the municipality in 2014 and 2015 available. It was 
thus not possible to determine whether the reduction of homicides was permanent. 
242 Interview with project manager Nestor Granados, 18 February 2013. 
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organisations or multinational companies but no national business corporations. 
ARENA Parliamentarian Deming gave a list of reasons for businesses not to 
engage in the truce: choosing gang members as employees would discriminate 
other young people seeking employment, it was the government’s responsibility 
to provide for gang members, businesses simply did not want to get involved 
with criminals that were not yet prosecuted, gang members were not ready to 
subordinate to corporate structures but more interested in becoming 
entrepreneurs themselves using illegal money.243  
In addition, not all international actors were supporters of the truce. Its biggest 
critic was the United States that strongly opposed negotiations with criminal 
actors (Whitfield, 2013: 13). Given that the US were the most significant 
economic partner and most important donor in development aid, its opinion was 
not irrelevant. In October 2012  the US Treasury Department labelled the Mara 
Salvatrucha a criminal organisation arguing that this would allow for better 
persecution of leaders of the gang (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2012). 
However, it also represented a signal towards the Salvadoran government that 
from the US’ perspective negotiations were not the preferred method in dealing 
with the gangs. A second signal was sent in January 2013 when the US 
government released a travel warning for El Salvador (U.S. Department of 
State, 2013).     
In sum, supporters of the truce like the OAS, the European Union, and 
FUSADES were working towards a sustainable truce but broader economic 
support as well as backing from the US as largest donor and trade partner was 
missing.  
The government’s ambivalent attitude towards the gang truce and President 
Funes’ non-decision regarding a more active engagement was strongly 
influenced by the power struggle with the gangs. Many sceptics of the truce 
feared that dialogue with the gangs would ultimately increase gang power. The 
government’s decision to transfer gang leaders into prisons with lower security 
standards certainly helped the gangs to organise themselves. There was no 
way to guarantee that improved organisation was only used to command a stop 
                                            
243 Interview with César  Reyes Deming, 21 February 2013. More in-depth research about the role of the 
business sector would be needed to validate the listed reasons for lack of support. 
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of homicides. However, the truce also revealed the already existing power of 
the gangs. Their ability to organise the reduction of homicides pointed to the 
functioning hierarchy and a certain unity which must have had developed before 
the truce. The truce only made this high degree of organisation visible.  
Besides these more pragmatic considerations, the debate about increased gang 
power and the purpose of the truce can be grouped into three different threads: 
one group of critics argued that the truce was a ‘mafia peace’ which helped 
gangs to expand narco-trafficking business. According to this group, homicides 
were a pressure mechanism, thus, if the gangs’ claims were not met they would 
return to kill people. Concerns that the gangs could blackmail the government 
were expressed across different political factions. FMLN security adviser 
Fernández stated: 
What will the gang members say if one day the 
government does not give them anything? Then they will 
return to throw two thousand dead on the street. I mean, 
who dominates, who rules public security? The state or 
them?244 
Likewise, ARENA Parliamentarian Deming criticised that any concessions 
towards the gangs were extortions if they were granted against the background 
that the murder rate was in the hands of the gangs. He considered the truce to 
be a mafia peace:  
SHF: In your opinion, would it have been better not to 
negotiate with the gangs?  
RD: And do you think it is right to negotiate with criminals? 
Of course not. No modern country, or underdeveloped 
country, if you like, negotiates with criminals. […] They 
called it a mafia peace. […]. All this ends in a disaster.245 
Doubts about a ‘criminalised peace’ (Whitfield, 2013: 16) were also expressed 
by former ARENA presidential candidate Ávila:  
                                            
244 Interview with Óscar Fernández, 13 February 2013. 
245 Interview with César Reyes Deming, 21 February 2013. 
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[I]n the long term, [the truce] can be a very serious 
problem, simply because negotiations take place with the 
gangs, about gang members stopping to killing people. But 
the gangs are being strengthened as criminal 
organisations.246 
These concerns about government interaction with criminal actors were shared 
with the United States’ official stance, and they were also expressed by 
international analysts (Farah and Philips Lum, 2013, Sampó and Bartolomé, 
2014). Doubts were raised that instead of ceasing the killing, dead bodies were 
simply hidden. Reports about an increased number of disappearances while the 
truce was active, and the findings of various clandestine cemeteries were 
indicative of this possibility, although there was little reliable data available 
(Rauda Zablah, 2013, Dudley, 2014). This nurtured the concern of a mafia 
peace which only would have served the gangs to expand their economic 
(narco-trafficking) and coercive (homicide as pressure mechanism) power. 
A second group argued that the truce offered a unique chance for pacification if 
gang members could be socially and economically included. This line was 
argued by the OAS but also by the facilitators of the gang truce, the gang 
leaders and all those who attempted to make the truce sustainable (see above). 
Choosing the way of permanent pacification would have required the gangs to 
give up their coercive power and their potential economic power in return for 
economic participation and improved prison conditions. However, broad 
economic participation was not in sight which made the realisation of this path 
difficult. In addition, the gangs’ approach of using their coercive power to 
demonstrate their wish to be included in society was contradictory, as to 
become part of the society they ultimately would have had to give up coercive 
power and subordinate to the state. Similar to the peace negotiations with the 
FMLN as guerrilla group, coercive power was the only leverage the gangs 
possessed. This raises the question whether it was conceivable that gangs 
would acquire political power, like the FMLN started to do 20 years earlier. 
This was the line of argument adopted by a third group. Farah (2012) and 
Lohmuller (2015) suggested that the gang truce helped the gangs turn from 
                                            
246 Interview with Rodrigo Ávila, 25 February 2013. 
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criminal to political actors, although it remained unclear what the notion of a 
political actor meant. Hernández (2015) attempted to address this question 
academically by arguing that Salvadoran gangs had some potential to act as 
political pressure group. However, research about the political potential of 
Salvadoran gangs is still at its very beginning and the concept is not fully 
developed yet. One of the questions that arise is to what end gangs would seek 
to become political actors. These issues notwithstanding, Hernández showed 
that indicators of influence of gangs on the political sphere exist, such as 
homicides as pressure mechanism, influence on electoral campaigns, and the 
development of a common political position of rival gangs. 
All three perspectives pointed to the unresolved issue concerning the 
transformation of gang power.247 Against the background of Migdal’s state-in-
society approach and Mann’s concept of power networks, the impact of gangs 
on the political sphere can be understood as part of the interaction between 
state and society. This interaction can be characterised as a power struggle 
between the gangs and the state.248 In this regard, gangs are social actors that 
use violence as a means to exert power over the policy process. That means, 
policy making is contested not because of resistance against the policy but 
because of the leverage social actors have. This leverage notwithstanding, the 
question as to what kind of power gangs could acquire in a pacified social 
environment remained unresolved, and the truce failed. The government’s 
decision to tolerate the participation of gangs themselves in the debate about 
reducing gang violence also reflected this dilemma. On the one side, gangs 
were acknowledged as relevant actors in the process which had the power to 
reduce violence, but on the other side, there was the fear of turning gangs into 
even more powerful actors given that they used coercive power as leverage.   
 
                                            
247 Apparently, dismantling gang structures altogether was never subject of negotiations as this was 
considered to cross a red line of the gangs (Martínez and Sanz, 2012, Whitfield, 2013: 11). 
248 Although the power struggle was displayed here primarily as a struggle between the gang leaders and 
the government, it also concerns other state actors. The police and the military were state actors used to 
contain gang violence. As such, they were also targeted by gang violence, and their role was discussed 
during the truce. Thus, in a broader sense, the power struggle took place between the gangs and the state. 
 260 
 
10.3.4 Conclusion 
State responses to gang violence under the FMLN government 2009-2014 were 
contradictory. This section argued that decisions regarding the deployment and 
withdrawal of the army to the prisons, the anti-gang law and the gang truce 
showed characteristics of ad hoc-ism. This is confirmed if the entire decision-
making process in the realm of prison policy is considered. Although singular 
aspects of other decision-making modes (Section 3.3) can be found at some 
stages of the process, they are not crucial.249 First, Funes’ reluctance to take 
the lead in the truce process could be seen as a non-decision. However, the 
entire prison policy-making process cannot be characterised as non-decision 
making because the penitentiary crisis was deliberately put on the political 
agenda by the FMLN government. As outlined at the beginning of this chapter, 
prison reforms aimed at placing offenders, including imprisoned gang members, 
at the centre of the penitentiary policy, and a number of measures were 
developed to improve the penal system. Second, the process was neither 
rational nor incremental because decisions did not build on each other but often 
contradicted each other. The deployment of the armed forces in the 
penitentiaries and other areas of public security as well as the anti-gang law 
marked a repressive turn away from the penitentiary policy. Yet, decisions 
which were related to the truce contradicted the previous repressive turn: gang 
leaders were transferred to prisons with lower security standards, the armed 
forces were withdrawn from the prisons, dialogue with the gangs was tolerated, 
and peace zones with relaxed police control and opportunities for social and 
economic reintegration of gang members were created. Third, the deployment 
and especially the withdrawal of the army in the light of the gang truce mark 
some kind of neglect of the prison reform plans by the government. However, 
this does not fall into the category of negative decision-making because the 
intention was not to retain the status quo (which is, as mentioned earlier, a 
decisive aspect of negative decision-making). The status quo was the tense 
situation at most prisons described at the beginning of the chapter and was 
                                            
249 As outlined in Section 3.3 and footnote 175, negative decision making describes the deliberate choice 
to do nothing about a public problem and to retain the status quo, even though the problem is on the 
political agenda and a policy might have been formulated. Non-decisions mean that problems are not put 
on the political agenda and the status quo is retained. Rational decision making means solving public 
problems by choosing the best of all alternative strategies after attributing costs and benefits to each 
alternative. Incrementalism refers to decision making which is based on a step-by-step mode and is 
sometimes describes as ‘muddling through’. 
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sought to be improved by regaining control of the prisons. This intention did not 
change. What changed, were the tools to achieve this goal (from institutional 
reforms to repressive measures).  
The zigzag course described above showed that the government did not follow 
a coherent strategy. The previous section also demonstrated that gangs used 
their power to resist and influence policy decisions, and that at the same time 
decisions often had a temporary character. In sum, government decision 
making was ad hoc in all three aspects discussed above. That is, security 
practices, in contrast to the institutional reform plans, were marked by ad hoc 
decision making. However, not all ad hoc decisions comprised coercive 
responses. The truce was a creative approach to reduce violence with non-
coercive means. It failed because ad hoc policy making regarding the truce was 
not transformed into a sustainable long-term strategy. 
 
10.4 Effects of the power struggle between the FMLN government 
and the gangs on prison reforms 
This section turns to the effects of the power struggle between the government 
and the gangs and the consequences of ad hoc policy making. Similar to the 
effects of power struggles on policing, the purpose of this discussion is to 
demonstrate the relevance of security practices for security institution building. 
Two characteristics of ad hoc decision making were articulated in this regard 
(Section 3.3): 1. Comprehensive and long-term strategic decisions are not or 
insufficiently implemented. Instead, they are ignored, reversed, or replaced by 
short-term decisions. 2. Public problems remain unsolved because ad hoc 
decisions do not result in substantial change. 
The government’s failure to make the truce sustainable impeded containing 
gang violence and violence further escalated at the end of Funes’ term (Section 
8.3.2). Other problems relating to gang violence were not solved either. The 
effects of gang violence such as forced internal displacement and migration, 
and the importance of creating spaces of economic and social participation for 
gang members were outlined in Section 7.5. Moreover, the situation at the end 
of Funes’ term was depicted in Section 8.3.2. Ultimately, the problem of gang 
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violence remained unresolved since ad hoc decision making with regard to the 
truce did not result in substantial change. Another effect of the government’s 
security policy was the increased militarisation of public security as has already 
been noted in the literature (Aguilar, 2014, FESPAD, 2014). In addition to this, 
the government’s ad hoc decision-making style led to a deflection from security 
institution building, namely from penitentiary institution building. This means that 
the long-term goal of turning prisons into rehab-oriented institutions was 
undermined by short-term decisions, as the following explanations highlight.    
With the decision to deploy the FAES at the penitentiaries, it became clear that 
it was not the offenders, their needs, and the poor conditions they lived under 
that were at the centre of the policy. Instead, the focus was on containing their 
criminal activities and prohibiting the organisation of such activities from inside 
the prisons. Although by 2013, 400 new places were provided at La Esperanza 
prison, the prison population further increased to 26,848 inmates, meaning an 
overpopulation rate of 316% (Aguilar, 2014: 115). The Funes administration did 
not create this problem as the extreme increase of inmates dated back to the 
years of mano dura policy, yet the government did not manage to solve the 
problem.250 As outlined in Section 10.2, modest efforts were undertaken to 
differentiate the penalty system and strengthen alternative sentencing and 
rehabilitation measures. Prisoners interviewed at Apanteos stated that the 
overall situation in the prison had improved since 2009 when a new Director 
took over. They explicitly mentioned the option to participate in reintegration 
programmes like working at farms.251 However, a penitentiary expert registered 
a temporary deterioration of the situation during the two years when the military 
controlled the perimeters (2010-2012).252 He gave examples like the decline of 
family visits, abusive body checks, and missed recreational activities due to 
delays of food delivery. Beyond that, he also pointed to the negative 
consequences for the mental and physical health of the inmates. There are no 
numbers for comparison at the beginning and end of term but one interviewee 
calculated that 188 out of 5,300 prisoners in La Esperanza were at the ‘fase de 
                                            
250 Between 2004 and 2008, while mano dura and super mano dura policies were in place, prison 
population increased by 62%. In contrast, between 2009 and 2013 the increase slowed down to 25% 
(Aguilar, 2014). 
251 Interview with prisoners R37 and R38, Santa Ana, 13 April 2012. It should be noted that the 
interviewees may have avoided criticism regarding the prison system since the prison personnel selected 
the interviewees and was present during the interview.   
252 Interview with penitentiary expert R35, Santa Ana, 13 April 2012. 
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confianza’ (stage of trust) and, thus, were able to leave the prison every day for 
about four hours for job training, and another 100 prisoners were on day release 
(‘semi-libertad’).253 Hence, only about five per cent of the prison population at 
La Esperanza were actively prepared for life after prison.254  
The replacement and training of personnel was probably the most consequent 
and rigorous implementation of the PJSC plans. While Aguilar (2014: 132-133) 
noted some irregularities in the process of replacing allegedly corrupt 
employees, their replacement was perceived as a positive change by 
prisoners.255 According to the DGCP, 433 guards and 154 administrative 
employees were replaced between 2009 and 2013 (Aguilar, 2014: 132). In 
addition, 800 persons were trained at the newly established penitentiary school 
(Aguilar, 2014: 135). This signalled some progress that was made in institution-
building towards slowing down the punitive trend which characterised the policy 
of previous governments. A detailed evaluation which examined the effects of 
the deployment of the military with regard to the containment of corruption, 
contraband, and the coordination of criminal activities was not available. But 
effects were still observed in other areas, especially human rights violations of 
prisoners and visitors. 
Being asked about how she perceived the deployment of the FAES at the 
penitentiaries, an employee of the PDDH criticised that the FAES had total 
control over every person entering the prisons, not only prisoners and visitors 
but also prison staff. 
Consequently, the armed forces began, according to the 
decree, by controlling the perimeter area around the 
prisons, by taking control of security and of the entrance of 
inmates, relatives, and officials, of all personnel entering a 
penitentiary, including prison employees.256 
                                            
253 Interview with penitentiary expert R39, 16 April 2012. 
254 A much larger number of inmates (2,250) participated in workshops and school but it is not clear to 
what extent these activities serve as reintegration.  
255 Interview with prisoners R37 and R38, Santa Ana, 13 April 2012. 
256 Interview with PDDH employee Rosa Elena Ramos, 26 March 2012. 
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In its anual report, the PDDH (2012: 91) wrote: ‘Hasta antes del mes de febrero 
del presente año la Fuerza Armada había logrado tener el control total de la 
seguridad en los centros penitenciarios […].’ 
Another interviewee from the PDDH emphasised that lawyers and human rights 
observers were also affected by this situation and that human rights observation 
at prisons was hampered by the FAES. 
[T]he armed forces hinder our work so that sometimes it is 
very difficult or sometimes it is almost impossible to do. In 
the prisons where the armed forces are, staff from the 
PDDH has many difficulties entering. The armed forces do 
not distinguish... a soldier who is doing the registration 
does not distinguish between the mother of a prisoner, the 
wife of a prisoner, a lawyer who will come to defend him, 
or a human rights advocate. For [the armed forces], all are 
the same.257 
While NGO worker Brian Rude had observed improvements of the conditions of 
his NGO working in prisons at the beginning of the Presidential term (Section 
10.2), he also described how the situation deteriorated with the presence of the 
armed forces:   
[T]he soldiers themselves decided who entered and who 
did not. [...] For us, too, it was a difficult process entering, 
passing the administration, getting inside, then returning to 
the administration... it was always a difficult registration 
[process]. Sometimes it took half an hour, one hour simply 
passing the registration. We wasted many hours waiting 
and passing the registration. I don't know, it was like a 
[form of] aggression, perhaps to discourage people.258 
Human rights violations committed by soldiers were repeatedly reported. 
Especially female visitors who represented the majority of visitors suffered 
abuse during intimate physical examinations at the entrances.259 The PDDH 
                                            
257 Interview with PDDH counsellor Gerardo Alegría, 21 March 2012. 
258 Interview with Brian Rude, 16 April 2012. 
259 Interview with Gerardo Alegría, 21 March 2012; interview with Nelson Flores, 26 March 2012. 
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(2011) reported that by November 2010 (six months after the armed forces had 
started working at prisons) 20 cases were under investigation which were in 
majority about abusive examinations of visitors and prison and court employees 
by military personnel.260 Prison staff also noted fewer visitors during the time 
prison entrances were under military control.261 Collaboration between prison 
staff and soldiers was described as ambivalent by prison authorities and staff. 
While the numerical increase of workforce was welcomed, the relationship was 
described as ‘difficult’ by a prison director as well as by Rodíl Hernández, 
Assistant Director at the General Directorate.262 Moreno drew a similar picture, 
emphasising that the military was not qualified to work in prisons. 
SHF: How did you perceive the cooperation between […] 
the military and prison staff? 
RH: Difficult! Difficult, difficult. 
SHF: In what way? 
RH: In the sense that the army is the army, isn't it. The 
army is the army and has its training and its doctrinal 
direction and its training direction. And we have our own 
[ideological] direction which differs in many ways.263 
Some interviewees perceived the behaviour of the military as excessively hostile 
and as intruding upon administrative work.264 
As stated at the beginning of this section, the deployment of the armed forces 
was justified because of the lack of state control over prisons. However, the 
human rights violations which resulted from their deployment undermined the 
normative claim of the reform to reach rapprochement between state and 
citizens. It was very likely that those who directly suffered from abuse by 
soldiers experienced estrangement from the State rather than rapprochement. 
                                            
260 There are no statistics available that list the total number of complaints received at the PDDH for the 
period between May 2010 and April 2012 (the time when the FAES was present at 19 prisons). However, 
complaints of all human rights violations committed by the FAES increased by 537% between 2009 and 
2011, as Aguilar (2014: 95) found.  
261 Interview with assistant prison director R35, 13 April 2012; interview with prison director R39, 16 
April 2012.  
262 Interview with prison director R39, 16 April 2012; interview with Rodíl Hernández, 27 March 2012. 
263 Interview with Rodíl Hernández, 27 March 2012. 
264 Interview with assistant prison director R35, 13 April 2012; interview with prison director R39, 16 
April 2012. 
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Sending the military was a decision made by the government. Thus, it was the 
state that used the military as a source of coercive power. Even if the military 
might have been perceived as acting independently from state authorities, the 
state in the shape of prison authorities was not able to protect citizens from 
abuse. This statement underscored the physical danger to which inmates were 
exposed by the measure:  
I am extremely pleased that [the military] left that day. Very 
pleased. In 2010, 2011, for almost 18 months, really, we've 
played with life and death. I mean there could have been a 
massacre by the armed forces against prisoners. And it did 
not happen. It [was] very risky.265 
As outlined earlier, the withdrawal of the military was a concession made by the 
government to imprisoned gang members. However, the withdrawal did not 
imply an end to the dehumanised conditions under which inmates used to live; it 
was rather a return to the previous status quo. First, disregarding the transfer of 
the 30 gang leaders, gang leaders continued to claim an improvement of the 
situation in prisons during the truce process (Section 5.4.2.3). Second, prison 
staff was not prepared for the new situation, and the withdrawal was not linked 
to reform plans. For guards and prison authorities the withdrawal put them to the 
new (and old) challenge to cope with overcrowded prisons and scarce 
personnel, therein they feared the loss of control.266 Hence, the problem of 
dehumanised conditions under which inmates lived remained to a large extent 
unresolved. 
Some other observable effects of government ad hoc decision making 
highlighted the intensification rather than a solution of problems of gang violence 
and poor prison conditions. Amongst others, the failure to embed the gang truce 
in a broader strategy was mentioned. The lack of coordination among state 
institutions did not only keep the truce from becoming sustainable, it also 
complicated institutional reform efforts. Through the so called mesa de la 
esperanza an institutionalised form of dialogue was set up within the prison 
environment and with support from the civil society. However, this 
                                            
265 Interview with Douglas Moreno, 11 April 2012. 
266 Interview with assistant prison director R35, 13 April 2012. 
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institutionalised form of dialogue was not used for the provisional truce dialogue. 
Likewise, the actors involved in the institutionalised dialogue (like NGOs) did not 
participate in the truce dialogue. 
The decision to transfer gang leaders to a low security prison contradicted the 
previous focus on keeping gangs from organising themselves inside prisons. 
With the failure of the truce, the transfer ultimately contributed more to 
empowering incarcerated gangs than to a reduction of gang violence.  
The consequences of the failed truce for the relationship between state and 
society is comparable to the estrangement from state institutions experienced by 
victims of human rights violations committed by the armed forces at the prison 
gates. In this regard, it is likely that public trust in the capability of the state to 
solve the problem of gang violence diminished with the failure of the truce. 
Likewise, a commitment of gangs to search for nonviolent ways of social and 
economic participation has become unlikely. This means that there is less space 
for rapprochement between the state and the gangs which makes the long-term 
development of the security sector, including the penal system, more difficult. 
Finally, since the anti-gang law was not enacted, there was no evidence of any 
visible effects of the law (for instance an increased incarceration rate). 
However, given its symbolic use, the law as part of the ad hoc decision-making 
process contributed to an intensification of the power struggle between the 
gangs and government. 
 
10.5 Conclusion  
Youth gangs shaped the situation in Salvadoran prisons decisively, and reforms 
of the prison system were closely connected to policy decisions of the 
government concerning the gangs. The analysis showed that government 
decisions concerning the prison system mainly followed a power struggle 
between the government and the gangs which developed around the truce 
between the two major Salvadoran gangs in 2012-2013. The truce was an 
attempt to establish a pact between the state and non-elites. In the context of 
contested statehood where powerful elites exert pressure on the official 
decision makers and where ad hoc decisions are characteristic for policy-
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making processes, the truce was a creative approach to reduce violence with 
non-coercive means. However, it failed because ad hoc decision making 
regarding the truce was not transformed into a sustainable long-term strategy 
which would have connected with other security issues like the prison system. 
Remaining in an ad hoc decision-making mode implied that decisions regarding 
the gangs were easily reversed and ultimately replaced by coercive responses. 
Whilst the government used the military as an instrument of power, the gangs 
used their influence on the homicide rate as leverage. With the end of the truce 
in 2013 the attempt of the gangs to use murders as leverage became futile and 
the homicide rate escalated. Likewise, the increased militarisation of public 
security was a futile effort of the government to contain gang violence. Reforms 
of the prison system had aimed at the humanisation of inmates and the 
professionalisation of prison management. However, they were impeded by the 
failure to bring about rapprochement between gangs and the government and 
by the increased militarisation of the prison system. The study revealed that 
policy decision making was impacted by the gangs and other non-elites (like the 
withdrawal of the armed forces from the prisons as a concession to the gangs 
or the adoption of the anti-gang law in response to pressure from the public). 
However, the attempt to achieve an accommodation between state elites and 
non-state non-elites over violence control failed because there was no 
agreement reached over the gangs giving up coercive power or transforming it 
into another form of power. As a consequence, efforts to centralise violence and 
build a legitimate state monopoly on violence failed.  
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11. Conclusion 
11.1 Security provision as a result of power struggles 
This thesis argued that while institutional conditions are an important aspect of 
security provision in the global South, more attention needs to be paid to 
security practices. Institution building as set out in the SSR and statebuilding 
literature assumes that it is possible to provide security to all citizens of a state 
by building democratic state security institutions. However, this is only possible 
if the state represents the dominant power in controlling violence. The literature 
showed that this is rarely the case in countries of the global South (Migdal, 
2001, Boege et al., 2008, Risse, 2011). Instead, it was suggested that 
statehood in the global South in terms of institutional structure and policy 
processes is contested. This thesis argued that the analysis of security 
practices allows for an analysis of security provision as it is (not as it ought to be 
according to SSR and statebuilding advocates). The analysis of security 
practices contributed to a better understanding of the shortcomings of security 
provision in the global South as it showed the impact of societal and state 
actors on security policy making. The case of El Salvador showed that in a 
contested state the interests of powerful elites are important forces of society 
which can shape the state-society relationship. In this context, policy making 
does not necessarily result from a pact between the state and society or from a 
social consensus as envisaged by parts of the FMLN and other forces of the 
New Left in Latin America. Instead, policy making results to a significant extent 
from elite pacts and elite struggles. Thus, the interests of the broader population 
are less decisive for security provision as a policy field than elite interests.   
This research reflected on studies which showed that despite processes of 
economic modernisation in El Salvador, characteristics of the rent economy 
which had favoured the emergence of a small, strong elite, remained 
entrenched in the post-war economic order. This thesis argued that under 
ARENA governments (1989-2009) an economic order emerged in which 
economic activity was concentrated among a small number of business groups 
and multinational companies, resulting in precarious work and social exclusion 
for a large part of the population. This did not only foster social violence, as 
some studies showed. Scholars of the Paris School (and the Copenhagen 
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School) drew our attention to the importance of discourses of both securitisation 
and insecuritisation. In this regard, Moodie (2010, 2012), Peetz (2008), and 
Cruz (2016) shed light on the discourses of the Salvadoran political elites and of 
the international policy makers involved in constructing the post-war Salvadoran 
order. They showed how violence was criminalised and made an apolitical issue 
by describing violence as something common whose appearance was beyond 
political influence. In the given economic order, this implied that violence was 
made a problem of the poor and marginalised. This was contrary to the 
intentions of the post-war security reforms mediated by the UN and agreed 
between ARENA and FMLN in the Peace Accords in 1992. What is more 
important, it allowed for the construction of a state that withdrew from the 
responsibility to provide protection to all citizens. In other words, in post-war El 
Salvador, a state emerged which was not in the position to legitimately control 
violence. In a state in which the government did not seek to build a legitimate 
state monopoly on violence, violence remained dispersed. In the light of 
massive social violence, this translated into security practices marked by 
coercive, punitive, and short-sighted policies (mano dura).   
El Salvador became a country governed by a party of the New Left, a term 
which is associated with the politics of left parties rising to power in several 
Latin American countries since 1998. Although parties were quite diverse in 
their ideologies and policies, analysts articulated some commonalities among 
the New Left. It strived to replace the neoliberal policy of conservative 
governments and international financial institutions in the 1980s and 1990s with 
a new vision of the state being responsive to societal needs and addressing 
social issues which concerned large parts of the population, such as poverty 
and violence. In contrast to other left governments in the region which only 
reluctantly addressed security issues, the FMLN developed a vision of citizen 
security that reflected the post-neoliberal ideas of rapprochement between the 
state and non-elite parts of the society. This vision was stipulated in the PJSC, 
the FMLN’s security policy programme. However, the analysis of actual security 
practices in the arenas of police and prison reforms revealed the problems of 
implementing the citizen security policy. The Salvadoran case study showed 
that non-coercive responses to social violence did exist but lacked in their 
implementation, due to the impact of interests and power strategies of state and 
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non-state elites. Due to the power struggles between state and social forces 
which included the Left, the idea of the Left to develop a state which is 
responsive to societal needs was not realised.     
Research about different decision making modes formed the basis of the 
concept of ad hoc decision making. It was argued that ad hoc-ism is a 
significant characteristic of policy processes in El Salvador and reflects the 
impact of power struggles on policy making. The study revealed that in the two 
analysed arenas – policing and prison system – ad hoc-ism is the predominant 
decision-making style. In some cases, decisions could not be categorised as 
purely ad hoc. For instance, the government’s neglect of prison reforms could 
also be considered as a mix form of negative and ad hoc decision making. 
Likewise, the partial advancement of police reforms in the field of community 
policing may point to a mix of incremental and ad hoc decision making. 
However, in the majority of cases, decisions in the two arenas clearly were 
made ad hoc. This raises the question if policy making in El Salvador in general 
can be characterised as ad hoc. It is likely that the decisions and behaviour of 
actors described in the policing chapter impacted on other arenas of security 
policy making. The decision to replace the minister, the role of the private 
sector, and the links between parliamentarians and military officers may also 
have affected other arenas within the justice system. Security policy making is 
one of the most contested policy areas. As the thesis showed, contestation and 
ad hoc-ism are closely linked. Therefore, this area was ideal to demonstrate the 
conditions and effects of ad hoc decision making. However, ad hoc-ism may 
also penetrate other policy areas. The polarisation of the Legislative Assembly, 
which was highlighted in the policing case, probably affects other fields of policy 
making. It is also possible that the shown interlinkages between politics and 
economy affect other policy fields, especially the economic policy, and may be 
conducive to an ad hoc decision-making style in this field. Eventually, this is 
subject to more detailed, empirical research. 
Compared to prison reforms, the analysis of police reforms turned out more 
comprehensive and detailed. On one side, this is due to fieldwork constraints. 
The lack of political and academic attention to the prison system made it 
challenging to collect sufficient data in this field. On the other side, and more 
importantly, the prison system is a more clearly identifiable arena with a limited 
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number of actors, less political attention and, thus, less contestation. In 
contrast, in police reforms more stakeholders are involved, ranging from 
international actors to the local residents of communities. Therefore, the 
contestation of policy making in this arena was more visible and could be 
explored in greater detail. The implementation of prison reforms was not more 
successful than the implementation of police reforms. However, future research 
should explore the question whether policies in less contested arenas (i.e. the 
prison system) are easier to implement than policies in more contested arenas 
(i.e. police reforms).  
The ad hoc character of decision making illustrated the resistance security 
policy making was confronted with. Where security decision making of the 
FMLN government touched on the economic interests of the business elites, it 
was mostly met with resistance. Only in a few instances, elites aligned with the 
government. Yet, in either way activities of the business elites undermined 
efforts to strengthen state security institutions. The change of government in 
2009 led economic elites to develop new modes of contestation and 
accommodation with the new political leaders without giving up any privileges 
gained in past economic orders. In addition, economic dependency on the US 
led the Salvadoran government to give in to pressure from the US regarding 
security decision making which highlighted the difficulty of policy making in an 
era of globalised markets. Further resistance came from opposing political elites 
who instrumentalised political polarisation to maintain their own power and their 
impact on security decisions. Eventually, parts of the FMLN, especially from the 
orthodox wing, disagreed with the pragmatic post-liberal policies of the 
moderate wing, while a second cleavage between the party base and President 
Funes further complicated policy making. By contesting the FMLN’s security 
decision making, these multiple state and societal actors impeded the building 
of a state which would be capable of legitimately centralising and controlling 
violence. The gang truce, for its part, was an attempt to establish a pact 
between the state and non-elites and a creative approach to reduce violence 
with non-coercive means in the context of contested statehood. However, it 
failed because ad hoc decision making regarding the truce was not transformed 
into a sustainable long-term strategy. As a consequence of these power 
struggles, the attempt to implement a citizen security policy at the national level 
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failed. Instead, the FMLN relapsed into the repressive patterns of security policy 
making of previous governments. 
Ad hoc-ism is not limited to elite manoeuvring, as the struggle between the 
government and the gangs showed. In contexts of contested statehood, it is 
theoretically possible for non-elites to build up and use power as leverage to 
enforce their interests. However, as characteristics of the rent economy 
remained entrenched in El Salvador’s post-war economic order, elite pacts still 
play a decisive role in the organisation of society and politics. It is thus difficult 
for non-elites to alter the political decision-making process in the long term if 
their interests do not coincide with those of the economic elites. This research 
also showed that not all elites can draw on power sources to the same extent. 
The political power of the FMLN party did not have enough weight to compete 
with the economic power of the private sector and the US. Thus, it can be 
difficult for political elites, even if they represent the governing party, to be the 
decisive force in the policy-making process. While this may also be due to the 
structure of the political system or due to a particular political culture, the case 
of El Salvador showed that elite manoeuvring is a decisive factor that impacts 
on policy processes. 
Research showed that in general terms the PJSC was well-designed and far-
reaching, with the notable exceptions of prison reforms and a gang strategy. 
Police reform plans were built on post-Peace Accords professionalisation efforts 
and were as such comprehensive and detailed. As the prison system had been 
notoriously neglected in the Peace Accords as well as under previous 
governments, the need for reforms was immense. The Security Ministry and 
prison authorities did embark on this endeavour, albeit with a less detailed plan 
compared to police reforms. Importantly, prison reforms were not linked to the 
challenge of containing gang violence. Developing a gang strategy as an 
integral part of the policy programme and linking it to prison reforms would have 
minimised the undermining of prison reforms by the ad hoc-ism of the Funes 
government’s responses to the gangs. In addition, a gang strategy could have 
provided some policy orientation during the gang truce which might have helped 
make the truce sustainable. In sum, the PJSC was innovative but failed to 
address some crucial problems of violence such as incarcerated gangs. The 
analysis of prison reforms showed that an innovative but not fully developed 
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security policy is impossible to implement considering the lack of support from 
powerful actors like business elites and the US on one side, and considering the 
impact of powerful gangs on the other side. Yet, even with a comprehensive 
reform plan for a well institutionalised body like the police, reforms were 
undermined by political and economic elites. This demonstrated the political 
relevance of actors who are not official decision makers for security practices. 
 
11.2  Areas for further research 
If we aim to understand why security reforms in contexts of massive social 
violence fail, a look at the nature of security institutions gives an incomplete 
answer. Scholars and policy makers need to broaden their perspective and pay 
attention to those decision makers who are responsible for drafting and 
implementing security policies in the affected societies. The fact that in societies 
which lack a legitimate monopoly on violence, security policy decisions are 
contested and made on an ad hoc basis should imply a revision of the 
possibilities of approaching security reforms in such a specific context.  
This leads to the question what such a revision entails. First of all, it needs to be 
acknowledged that the state is not necessarily the predominant force controlling 
violence. In the security domain, it competes for power with social actors that 
undermine state efforts to centralise violence control. Also, the state is not a 
unified entity but consists of various actors with potentially contradicting 
interests. Thus, the realisation of security reforms needs to incorporate more 
critical thinking about the process of reform implementation. This process of 
reform implementation happens under the influence of multiple actors which are 
not the official decision makers but claim power through the use of violence. 
The thesis highlighted the gap which exists in understanding shortcomings of 
security provision in the global south from the perspective of security practices. 
This research began to fill this gap using the case of El Salvador. Analysing 
security practices in other countries which similarly suffer from massive social 
violence would not only help explain the dynamics of perpetuated insecurity, it 
would also help to better understand why reforms of the security sector fail to 
contain violence and crime. In other words, the search for solutions to violence 
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and crime must pay more attention to the political dimension in which social 
violence continues to exist.  
This is especially true for dealing with organised non-state violent actors like 
gangs. The body of literature about these groups is growing. However, thus far, 
academic and policy ideas about the integration of gangs into society 
concentrate on individual members and not on the organisations as a whole. 
More research is needed to investigate the possibility or impossibility of the 
transformation of gang power from violent, destructive forms to non-violent 
forms of social or even political participation.     
While this research primarily focused on police and prison reforms, further 
research concentrating on security practices could include other arenas of 
security policy-making like the justice sector or reforms of the military. At the 
same time, there is a need to better understand contemporary forms of 
violence. This research only touched on multiple policy issues arising from the 
permeation of the Salvadoran and other Latin American societies with different 
forms of violence. For instance, migration (in)security, trafficking, and internal 
forced displacement are being increasingly studied by academics from various 
angles, but these issues must be linked if policies are to tackle them. This 
means that addressing problems of violence issue by issue is important, but it is 
even more essential to comprehend the role of violence in violent-prone 
societies. It is not enough to explore the different phenomena of violence, 
beyond that there is a need to articulate the kind of social and political order that 
emerges from a society in which violence is dispersed and used by various 
state and non-state actors.   
The FMLN was one of the few left governments in the region which had 
developed a national non-coercive security policy. Its failure points to the need 
for advancing with the development of national security approaches that 
comprise of robust preventive and de-escalating strategies. With the concept of 
citizen security, there exists an approach which was developed by scholars and 
policy makers of the region and which is relevant to local and regional security 
challenges. However, its theoretical tenets are underdeveloped and need to be 
strengthened if it is to provide an alternative to coercive security responses.  
This includes addressing the question how the concept of citizen security 
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relates to the different forms of violence and crime that exist in the region. For 
example, what would it mean to approach a problem like drug trafficking from a 
citizen security perspective? Advancing with the development of non-coercive 
state security responses means developing and implementing policies which do 
not equate more security with a quantitative increase of force as the boy in the 
introductory anecdote of the thesis did. Instead, firstly, it means drawing on 
policies tailored to the needs of those in society who are most affected by 
violence. Secondly and most importantly, it means developing new ways of 
realising these policies in an environment where security practices are 
challenged by multiple elites and non-elites.  
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Appendix: List of interviews 
 
List of interviews 
Name or Code267 Organisation / Function (at the time 
of the interview) 
Date 
Óscar Fernández FMLN  
Adviser for Public Policy 
22 February 2012 
13 February 2013 
R30 PNC  
Former officer at the executive level  
02 March 2012 
R2 Ministry of Justice and Public Security 
Adviser 
05 March 2012 
Ricardo Ribera Central American University 
Professor of Philosophy and former 
FMLN member 
09 March 2012 
Padre Antonio 
Rodríguez López 
Servicio Social Pasionista  
NGO working with at-risk youth, 
Director 
12 March 2012 
Deysi Cheyne Instituto de la Mujer 
NGO for women’s rights, Director 
14 March 2012 
R25 Director of a political foundation 14 March 2012 
Mauricio Figueroa Fundación Quetzalcoatl  
NGO working with at-risk youth, 
Director 
15 March 2012 
Augusto Cotto PNC  
Assistant Director of Public Security 
15 March 2012 
Luis Ortega and 
Daniel Fernández 
Former members of the FMLN, 
participants of a movement of 
wounded war veterans   
19 March 2012    
                                            
267 Codes are used where interviewees preferred to stay anonymous. 
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Claudia Umaña 
Araujo 
Fundación Democracia Transparencia 
Justicia 
NGO working on political participation, 
Director 
20 March 2012 
Zaira Navas PNC 
Former Inspector General 
21 March 2012 
Salvador 
Menéndez 
PDDH  
Attorney at the Human Rights 
Ombudsman Office 
21 March 2012  
28 March 2012 
Gerardo Alegría PDDH  
Assistant Attorney at the Human 
Rights Ombudsman Office  
21 March 2012 
Oscar Santamaría ARENA  
Former member of the Legislative 
Assembly, signatory of the Peace 
Accords 
22 March 2012 
Rafael Guidos 
Véjar 
Ministry of Education 
Professor of History 
23 March 2012 
Nelson Flores FESPAD 
NGO working on legal advocacy, 
Programme Director of citizen security 
and penal justice 
26 March 2012 
08 February 2013 
Manuel Melgar Ministry of Justice and Public Security 
/ Central American Parliament 
Former Minister/ Member of the 
Central American Parliament 
26 March 2012 
Rosa Elena 
Ramos 
PDDH  
Employee at the Penitentiary Unit of 
the Human Rights Ombudsman Office  
26 March 2012 
Rodíl Hernandez DGCP 
Assistant Director at the Directorate 
General of Penitentiaries 
27 March 2012 
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Dagoberto 
Gutierrez 
Tendencia Revolucionaria  
Leader of a political movement of the 
Left, signatory of the Peace Accords 
for FMLN 
27 March 2012 
R20 US Embassy  
Political Officer 
28 March 2012 
Obispo Medardo 
Gómez 
Bishop of the Lutheran Church 28 March 2012 
Pedro Monterrosa Secretary for Strategic Issues  
Coordinator of Political Reform and 
Citizen Participation 
29 March 2012 
Nora Serrano DGCP 
Director of the Penitentiary School 
29 March 2012 
R31 Instructor at the Penitentiary School 29 March 2012 
R32 Instructor at the Penitentiary School 29 March 2012 
R33 Instructor at the Penitentiary School 29 March 2012 
R34 Instructor at the Penitentiary School 29 March 2012 
Douglas Moreno Viceminister of Justice and Public 
Security, former Director General of 
Penitentiaries 
11 April 2012 
R27 ANSP 
Employee at the executive level of the 
National Academy of Public Security 
12 April 2012 
Brian Rude AEIPES  
NGO working with (ex-)prisoners 
16 April 2012 
R29 ANSP  
Employee at the management level of 
the National Academy of Public 
Security 
18 April 2012 
R35 Assistant Director of a prison 13 April 2012 
R36 Psychologist at a prison 13 April 2012 
Francisco Prisoner 13 April 2012 
José Prisoner 13 April 2012 
R39 Director of a prison 16 April 2012 
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R40 PNC  
Employee at the Inspectoría General 
18 April 2012 
Benito Lara FMLN  
Parliamentarian, member of the 
Security Commission 
11 February 2013 
Rolando Elias 
Julian Belloso 
PNC  
Head of Technical Council 
14 February 2013 
Oscar Alfredo 
Pineda and René 
Abrego Labbé 
FUSADES 
Think Tank, Analysts at the 
Department of Legal Studies 
15 February 2013 
Nestor Granados Project Metamorfosis 
Social project for ex-prisoners, 
Manager 
18 February 2013 
R47 Project Metamorfosis  
Ex-prisoner 
18 February 2013 
René Rosales Project Metamorfosis  
Director 
18 February 2013 
Ernesto Angulo ARENA  
Parliamentarian, member of the 
Security Commission  
19 February 2013 
Carlos Dada and 
José Luis Sanz 
El Faro  
Online newspaper, Director (Dada) 
and Journalist (Sanz) 
19 February 2013 
César René Reyes 
Deming 
ARENA  
Parliamentarian, member of the 
security commission, Coronel 
21 February 2013 
Rodrigo Avila ARENA  
Presidential candidate in 2009, Ex-
Director of the PNC, private security 
adviser 
25 February 2013 
Antonio Morales Secretary for Strategic Issues 
Head of Division of Governance and 
State Modernisation 
28 February 2013 
Knut Walter Professor of History 06 March 2013 
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R55 PNC  
Chief Inspector 
07 March 2013 
R56 Municipality of Ilopango 
Employee 
08 March 2013 
Marvin (and 
Carlos) 
Mara Salvatrucha 
Spokesperson (Marvin), gang member 
(Carlos) 
08 March 2013 
R57 PNC 
Police Intelligence Centre, employee 
at the executive level 
13 March 2013 
R58 FMLN security expert 14 March 2013 
Edwin Ramírez Political activist 15 March 2013 
David Munguía 
Payes 
Ministry of Justice and Public Security 
Minister, former Minister of Defence  
19 March 2013 
 
 
List of background interviews 
Rodolfo Parker PDC 
Secretary General 
24 August 2011 
Aída Santos de 
Escobar 
CNSP 
Former President of the National 
Council for Public Security 
24 August 2011 
Hugo Ramírez PNC 
Assistant Director of Public Security 
25 August 2011 
Deysi Cheyne Instituto de la Mujer 
NGO for women’s rights, Director 
31 August 2011 
R2 Ministry of Justice and Public Security 
Adviser 
01 September 
2011 
Ingrid Schlaffke de 
Escobar 
Fundación Seidel 
Political foundation, Director  
02 September 
2011 
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Ramón Villalta ISD 
NGO monitoring political culture, 
Director 
06 September 
2011 
Benito Lara FMLN  
Parliamentarian, member of the 
Security Commission 
07 September 
2011 
María Silvia 
Guillén 
FESPAD 
NGO working on legal advocacy, 
Director 
08 September 
2011 
Arnoldo Jiménez ANEP 
Director of the National Association of 
Private Enterprise 
12 September 
2011 
Jaime Martínez ANSP 
Directo of the National Academy of 
Public Security 
12 September 
2011 
Jeannette Aguilar IUDOP 
Director of the University’s Institute of 
Public Opinion 
13 September 
2011 
 
 
